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A learned, and partially domesticated, Jesuit colleague 
remarked to me that he thought that pre-existence was 
like the 'pre-wash' setting on a washing machine -- it 
was still a wash, whatever is meant by the prefix 
$pre-'. This may be a small illustration of the 
bemusement which many people feel about pre-existence 
language: it does not lend itself easily to the 
creation of clear thinking. It is rather blurred at 
the edges -- inevitably so, given the connotations it 
implies and presents. In addition, the topic has been 
known to bring blank expressions to faces, and to 
freeze dinner conversations at which the wine is 
flowing freely. 
I have been puzzled by two things, and this study is a 
partial attempt to find a way of relating them. The 
first is the capacity of pre-existence language to 
effect such a radical redescription of the identity of 
Jesus that, under the impetus of this Christological 
development, a new -- Trinitarian -- language about God 
is devised. out of all the New Testament descriptions 
of Jesus, it is pre-existence language which sets up 
the categories which expand Jewish monotheism in the 
direction of Christian Trinitarian monotheism. . The 
word itself, and its cognates, are-absent from the New 
Testament writings; instead, there are ways of 
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describing Jesus which are conveniently grouped under 
the general category of 'pre-existence language'. 
These texts, principally the Johannine Prologue, the 
opening verses of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the 
Philippians hymn, have been the foundational documents 
for a sequence of Christological and theological 
conversations which continues to this day, both in a 
dominant orthodox form and in an accompanying, but no 
less important, heterodox form. Would the history of 
Christian thought have been different without this 
descriptive category of pre-existence language? 
Undoubtedly so. our relations with our Jewish and 
Islamic co-worshippers still stumble over the 
implications which derive from this way, of speaking 
about Jesus. 
And yet -- and this is the second thing which has 
puzzled me there is a lack of an adequate 
interpretative category for Christological 
pre-existence language. The customary approach -- to 
regard it as 'mythical'--- falls into the swamps of 
this over-defined, and therefore imprecise, category. 
'Myth' is used in so many different disciplines with 
different senses attached to it, that each individual 
author has, of necessity, to define it for his or her 
own purposes; this, in turn, only adds to the 
proliferation of definitions of 'myth'. A case can be 
made for declaring a moratorium on the use of 'myth' in 
theological language for the foreseeable future: its 
value as a category is in inverse proportion to' its 
occurence. Not much good was done by applying it to 
the nature of Incarnational Christology in the 
collection entitled 'The Myth of God Incarnate': the 
response it provoked in a volume entitled 'The Truth of 
God Incarnate' indicates the confusion which the word 
currently breeds. 
In addition, one must say that'often 'myth' is used to 
cover aspects of literary work which require more 
precise delineation: 'there a're'aspects of metaphor, 
symbol, allegory and imaginative expression which 
perish when they are subsumed under the heading of 
'myth'. Interpretative categories are instruments of 
understanding and clarification which should' be 
abandoned when their edges are'blunted. Such seems- to 
be the case with the approach which would portray 
pre-existence language as 'mythical'. The power ýof 
pre-existence languag6' to bring about such a radical 
and far-reaching redescription and evaluation of the 
identity of Jesus points in the direction of 
considering it as a form of''predication which is that- 
of a metaphorical statement. Paul Ricoeur's recent 
work on metaphor proposes an account of the nature and 
workings of metaphor which may be valuable in our 
consideration of pre-existence language. This study is 
an attempt to illuminate the Christological use of 
4x 
pre-existence language through his reflections on how 
metaphors work as heuristic devices which apply 
innovative predications to an already known subject, 
with the purpose of disclosing new ways of viewing that 
referent. Metaphor includes, as part of its working, 
an imaginative, or visual, element, in which the 
subject is seen as whatever is presented in the 
predication. At the same time, it requires, for the 
interpretation of how the subject is to be thought to 
be described as the predicate, that the reader construe 
the predication in a way which avoids nonsense, and 
which issues in the creation of a new way of looking at 
the subject. Ricoeur presents the power of metaphor as 
its capacity to generate insights and conceptual 
clarifications which form the basis of subsequent 
non-metaphorical statements -- precisely the phenomenon 
observed in the history of Christology. This leads us 
to think that it may be possible to consider 
pre-existence language as a form of metaphorical 
predication. 
Guided by this approach, 
other treatments of 
Hamerton-Kelly's work, P 
Son of Man, is primarily 
study of the various New 
this motif, both 
ecclesiologically. His 
descriptive: 
our study will differ from 
pre-existence. R. G. 
re-existence, Wisdom and the 
an exegetical and taxonomic 
Testament texts which apply 
Christologically and 
initial definition is 
'"Pre-existence" is a mythological term 
which signifies that an entity had a 
real existence before its manifestation 
on earth, either in the mind of God or 
in heaven. ' I 
This definition is then differentiated according to 
four different forms: 
Il/ one in which an entity exists before 
its own manifestation but not before the 
creation; 2/ another in which an entity 
exists before its own manifestation and 
before the creation; 3/ a third in 
which an entity 'exists before the 
creation but is not necessarily 
manifested at all; and a fourth in 
which things simply exist in heaven, 
without reference to creation or 
manifestation., 2 
one has to ask about the value of this approach: in 
spite of its value as a comprehensive analysis of the 
relevant texts, Hamerton-Kelly's work lacks the means 
to go beyond the phenomenology and classification of 
the texts according to this guiding schema. In 
addition, he presents aquestionable conclusion, in his 
desire to locate pre-existence as a theme within the 
Synoptic Gospels, and indeed, as an element in the 
self-consciousness of Jesus: he is of the opinion that 
'when Jesus used the self-designation "Son of Man", he 
and his hearers understood it to imply his 
pre-existence. 13 There is no justification for this 
view; continuity between Jesus and the Christology of 
the post-Resurrection Church is an important concern, 
I 
but it is not to be achieved by proposals like this. 
t 
. IX 
our own study will not treat of the varying 'degrees' 
of pre-existence -- whether 'ideal' or 'real' -- since 
this distinction, and this way of dealing with the 
theme, does not aid understanding, but rather presents 
a distinction that no one really knows what to do with. 
Instead, after expounding Ricoeur's analysis of 
metaphor, we shall take the discussion into four 
related but distinct areas in order to make a 
contribution to each of them. We have chosen this 
path, because one of our concerns will be the context 
of discussion which derives from pre-existence language 
-- both in Christology and in Trinity -- and the 
relationship between pre-existence language and other 
Christological concerns. our first chapter will be an 
exposition of Ricoeur, but after that, we shall draw 
upon his theory as it seems appropriate. It is not our 
intention to make a point-by-point application of his 
whole theory to every detail of pre-existence language. 
Such an approach would be highly artificial, tedious , 
repetitive and, I suspect, too constricting to *be 
valuable. We shall be guided by his approach; it is 
for Ricoeur himself to do it differently. 
Our second chapter will examine the Christological use 
of pre-existence language, with the intention of 
bringing some clarity into how it should be viewed 
within the Christological sphere. our third and fourth 
chapters will examine the use Barth makes of the theme 
of the pre-existence of -the man Jesus, and the 
relationship between this theme and other concerns of 
the Church Dogmatics, and-the place of pre-existence 
language in the Epistle to the Hebrews. our choice of 
this New Testament text, rather than the obvious choice 
of the Fourth Gospel, is partially inspired by the 
neglect of this theme in the majority of works on the 
Epistle. Yet there is an integration of this 
Christological theme with the soteriological concerns 
of the Epistle which is worth pursuing. In addition, 
the absence of a separate 'pre-existence narrative', 
such as the Johannine Prologue, concentrates attention 
on the application of pre-existence language to the 
person of Jesus -- a point which links this chapter 
with our previous two studies of Christology and Barth. 
our final chapter will consider the necessity for a 
formal distinction. between Christological and 
Trinitarian languages: within the first, we shall 
propose that pre-existence language has, as its 
referent, the person of Jesus, but within the second, 
it is necessary to speak of another referent, the 
'Eternal Son or Word', distinct from Jesus. We shall 
approach this through a consideration. oUthe issues at 
stake in the contemporary discussion, of the 
relationship of the immanent and economic Trinity. In 
conclusion, the chapter will turn to a way of proposing 
a more pneumatologically conceived view of the 
relationship of the immanent and economic Trinity, and 
of the relationship between the 'pre-existent' Son and 
the Incarnate Son. 
Each section is, to some extent, autonomous, but they 
are linked together by inter-related themes and 
questions. I have been aware of the ways in which the 
different areas of study chosen for examination have an 
organic unity which derives from the particular line of 
investigation I have chosen. 
The laborious task of preparing the final version was 
undertaken with great dedication and cheerfulness by 
Anne-Marie O'Loughlin. My thanks are due to Professor 
James Mackey and Professor Hugh Anderson of New 
College, for their advice, support and correction. 
During Professor Anderson's sabbatical, John Ashton was 
an inspiring guide. My thanks must go, too, to my 
fellow Jesuits who have endured my slow path through 
this study, and who have supported me with friendship 
and patience. In particular, my thanks go to James 
Crampsey and Robert Murray of Heythrop College for 
their help in Biblical and Early Syriac writings, and 
to James Hanvey who introduced me, seriously and 
enjoyably, to Barth. Outside the Society, my cousin 
Eileen climbed many a Munro with me when relaxation was 
required, and Leslie-Ann Hales in Canada, and Mary 
McClure in Glasgow were sources of love and support. 
my final thanks go to my mother and my cousins, James 
and Frank Shields, who, during the dark events of the 
first year of study, and of course for a long time 
before that, gave me love and care. This is dedicated 
to them and in memory of my father and Nina who died 
while I was working on this thesis. 
Paul Ricoeur's Theory of_Metaphor 
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Frequently, the examples chosen by writers on metaphor 
are banal. In particular, they can fail to bring out 
the organising power of metaphors as they are used in 
literature. We shall begin with some examples chosen 
in order to illustrate the themes we shall expound in 
Ricoeur's treatment of the character of metaphor. 
First of all, a poem by Emily Dickinson: 
Crumbling is not an instant's Act 
A fundamental pause 
Dilapidation's processes 
Are organised Decays. 
ITis first a Cobweb on the Soul 
A Cuticle of Dust 
A Borer in the Axis 
An Elemental Rust 
Ruin is formal -- Devil's work 
Consecutive and Slow -- 
Fail in an instant, no man did 
Slipping -- is Crash's law. 1 
Faced with a poem like this, one can make several 
choices, some of which will be misguided, and some of 
which will be correct. The first misguided approach 
might be to recapture the intention of Dickinson as she 
composed the poem. An appreciation in these terms 
would see its task as re-presenting or re-creating the 
'mind' of the poet in the act of composition through 
some form of psychological and aesthetic empathy. 
Schleiermacher's proposal that we should try 'to 
, 
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understand an author as well as and even better than he 
2 
understands himselfr has as its foundation the belief 
that the more we enter into the poet's mind, the better 
our understanding of the poem. Northrop Frye 
formulates this approach in these terms: it is 'the 
notion that the poet has a primary intention of 
conveying meaning to a reader, and that the first duty 
of a critic is to recapture that intention. "3 The main 
difficulty about this approach is that it identifies 
'poetic meaning' with the psychological intentions of 
the poet. The meaning of a poem is sought in something 
external to itself, namely, in the personality of the 
poet, and, even if we leave aside the question of how 
we could possibly have access to the 'intention' of the 
writer, in such a way as to supersede it, this approach 
in effect searches for a meaning elsewhere: not in the 
poem itself but in the intention of the writer. 
Northrop Frye again: 
'If intention is still thought to be 
apparent in the poem itself, the poem is 
being regarded as incomplete, like a 
freshman's essay where the reader has 
continually to speculate about what the 
author may have had in his head. If the 
author has been dead for centuries, such 
speculation cannot get us very far, 
however irresistibly it may suggest 
itself. 4 
Another version of the attempt to find the 'meaning' of 
a poem in something external to the poem, is found in 
Ii 
the attempt to say 'what the poem means': the 
formulation of a paraphrase which grasps the 'point, of 
the poem and re-expresses, in a more accessible -- 
shorterl -- way, the inner conceptual core of the poem. 
This implies that there is a 'meaning' which is 
separable from the poem, and which can be adequately, 
and often more clearly expressed, though a 'non-poetic' 
re-statement of the 'ideal of the poem. So, Dickinson's 
poem might be re-expressed thus: 'A person's life is 
subject to minute adjustments which, eventually, can 
erode the quality of one's soul. ' The poem is thus an 
ornamental embellishment of a simpler prose statement, 
and the metaphors used are a 'mask' for the real 
meaning. Northrop Frye again: 
I ... if a poem cannot be literally 
anything but a poem, then the literal 
basis of meaning in poetry can only be 
its letters, its inner structure of 
interlocking motifs. We are always 
wrong, in the context of criticism, when 
we say "this poem means literally" -- 
and then give a prose paraphrase of it. 
All paraphrases abstract a secondary of 
outward meaning.... a poem's meaning is 
literally its pattern or integrity as a 
verbal structure. o 5 
The poem is a complex, inter-related verbal structure, 
whose 'meaning' is a function of its 'centripetal' or 
'inward-directed' character as a self-contained verbal 
pattern.. 
ý The question about the 'meaning' of a poem is 
thus inseparable from the question of how the poem 
works: it cannot be ascertained without considering the 
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internal relationships among the various parts of the 
poem, the interaction between the individual elements 
and the total coherence of the work, and the structural 
features which combine to the expression of this verbal 
structure. 
It is both a matter of experience and an axiom of-poetic 
criticism that poems cannot be adequately paraphrased; 
Dickinson's poem is a case in point. ý The density of the 
composition and the tightly packed juxtaposition of the 
phrasing resists elaboration; equally, one would be 
hard put to preserve the, tautness of structure, which is 
essential to her phrasing, in a less constrained form of 
expression. A complete analysis of this poem would take 
us away from the principal direction of our journey, 
namely the character of metaphor, but if we turn to the 
principal characteristic of the poem, the organising 
principle of the extended metaphor which generates the 
dominant theme and deploys its development throughout 
the three stanzas, we shall be right on target. 
The poem refers to an elusive area, which it designates 
the 'soul', the field of the personal appropriation -of 
the interaction of a person's spiritual, emotional and 
intellectual life: the particular aspect treated is the 
experience of inner Icrumbling', 'decay', 'ruin', 
'dilapidation', seen not as an instantaneous event, but 
as the result of a slow, cumulative action usually 
! 'I+- 
imperceptible in its effects. What is being described 
is the area of the 'inner atmosphere' of personal life; 
yet this intangible area is described by words which 
have a strong physical reference: 'crumbling', Idecay`, 
'dilapidation'. While retaining their original physical 
connotations, they are transferred to a distinctly 
non-physical context. The second stanza gives a series 
of physical images in which the only non-physical noun 
denotes- the new context to which the other nouns are 
transferred metaphorically: 
''Tis first a Cobweb on the Soul 
A Cuticle of Dust 
A Borer in the Axis 
An Elemental Rust. ' 
The physical connotations of the images are applied to 
inner experiences which are viewed as though they were 
dependent on the functioning of machinery capable of 
decay and malfunction. To say this, in these terms, is 
to say something rather bizarre; but to create a poem, 
in which the imagery shapes and organises our whole 
perception of the character of inner experience, as 
Emily Dickinson does, is to use metaphors to provide a 
-field of description which is remarkably effective. 
The original context of the imagery is brought into 
contact with a new field of reference in such a way 
that the new referent -- the inner experiences -- are 
seen in the light of the ; MvYk7Mtiqm which the imagery 
brings. In this stanza, the personal experiences of 
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'decay' are 'seen as' the corrosion of a neglected 
machine. Although the two networks brought together 
here are radically different, the imagery of machinery 
is transferred to the soul in a way which shapes the 
reader's insights into an area which is inaccessible 
other than in metaphorical terms. (Consider, for 
example, the spatial and kinetic imagery used in 
Freudian and Jungian * psychology. ) The interaction 
between the two networks -- machinery and inner 
experience -- overcomes the incompatibility which 
initially exists between them, and a new perception of 
the soul's experiences, in terms of the transferred 
imagery, is offered to the reader. We might think of 
the imagery as a 'heuristic device' which discloses 
aspects which cannot be rendered accessible in other 
terms, except, perhaps, through the use of a different 
metaphoric network. We know that the soul cannot rust, 
but we gain from the poem a description of the 'soul 
rusting' which is experienced by us as a meaningful and 
effective description. We construe the imagery in a 
way which 'fictively' considers the soul as capable of 
the decay and rust known from a totally different, 
mechanical context, and we experience this as 
illuminating and truthful. 
A second example, this time from the art criticism of 
Adrian Stokes: in this passage, he discusses the 
significance of the putto in Renaissance art, with 
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particular reference to Donatello's putti on the 
singing gallery of the Duomo in Florence: 
'The putto makes the air move. Indeed 
he is associated with all the elements. 
He bursts stone like earth, at Rimini he 
rides the dolphin, his tempestuous 
energy enkindles a flame that withers 
tasteful ornamental foliage poor in sap, 
and heats the luscious growth to a 
vibrant tropical bulbosity. The putto 
is elemental force under the symbol of 
the infant's animal nature., 7 
Here the contrast is between the innocence of the image 
of the putto -- a dancing, playful child -- and the 
energy which he is seen to embody: the power of the 
natural forces of the world. We might say that here 
the tension is between his apparent weakness and 
innocence -- he is, after all, only a 'child' -- and 
the elemental energy which he symbolises; this tension 
reaches its high point in the description of the putto 
enkindling a flame strong enough to be that of the sun 
whose heat withers foliage and, at the same time, 
generates a tropical richness of growth. The putto is 
the sun, destructive and exhuberantly creative at the 
same time. There is no need to specify what foliage it 
might be that 'withers', or what 'growth' it might'-be 
that flourishes 'to a vibrant, tropical bulbosity', 
since these terms do not refer to anything 'in' the 
putto: they are the images tranferred from nature, 
(7 
from the world under the sun's energy, to the putto. 
As with the poem by Emily Dickinson, where there. was 
nothing 'in' the soul which can be corroded or rusted, 
yet, under the transfer of the connotation of the 
metaphor, the soul can be seen as capable of physical 
decay, so here the transposed imagery creates a 
fictive, heuristic account which enables the reader to 
consider the putto as though his energy were that of 
the sun. One may think here of Wallace Stevens' line, 
'Description is revelation'-8to summarise Stokes' 
technique in this passage: he views the putto as the 
symbol of the forces of the world, and his image of the 
putto as the sun is, within the conventions of natural 
symbolism, the highest metaphorical attribution he 
could make. The interaction between the referent and 
the hyperbolic imagery used to describe it effect a 
redescription of the putto through the 'filtering' 
effect of the new descriptive categories in which it is 
viewed. 
Stokes may provide us with another example: the 
following aphorism occurs in the same volume: 
'Pleasure is a lighthouse flash seen 
across empty wastes encompassed by a 
sense of loss. ' 9 
Like all such aphorisms about human experience, the 
brevity of expression requires from the reader that he 
appropriate the insight thus formulated, and evaluate 
it against his own experience by comparison and 
judgment. it moves easily into the realm of 
ratiocinative discussion. One should note, first of 
all, that the opening phrase of the aphorism, 'Pleasure 
is d lighthouse flash seen across empty wastes' could 
well be expressed as a simile. The element of 
comparison would be the same; the only difference 
would be that, if 'like' were inserted, the 
illocutionary force of the metaphor, with its dramatic 
'is', would be lacking, to the detriment of the 
aphorism. As we shall see later, although simile and 
metaphor are related, there is a distinct difference 
between them in the way they conjoin referent and 
predicate: to say that Margaret Thatcher is like the 
Iron Lady, and to say that she is the Iron Lady is to 
effect an assimilation between the two elements which 
is quite different in each case. 
The tone of Stokes' aphorism is moral: it concerns the 
place of pleasure within a life, otherwise empty, in 
which the feeling of loss is the most enduring and 
significant experience, unrelieved by the occasional 
flash of pleasure. It achieves its force from the use 
of the metaphor of the flashing light across waste 
ground -- a highly visual image, in which pleasure is 
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'seen as' the brief, intermittent beam of light. The 
abstraction of the two referents, 'pleasure' and 
'loss', is given visual form through the image: within 
the metaphor, there is a visual association between 
them which corresponds to the moral point about their 
relationship in terms of their duration and 
significance. The strong word 'encompassed' conveys 
the permanence and dominance of the sense of loss, 
which is only temporarily relieved by the moments of 
pleasure. The interpenetration of the moral, 
experiential dimension, evoked by the aphorism, and the 
visual dimension of the image, exemplifies the power of 
metaphor to bring together the pictorial element and 
the discursive element which arises out, of the 
description: while functioning at a pictorial level, 
it shapes the discussion at a moral level, thus 
oscillating between the figurative and the conceptual 
dimensions of language. 
In our analysis of these metaphors, we have anticipated 
many of the themes found in Ricoeur's treatment. We 
have indicated that the question about the meaning of a 
metaphor involves an examination of how the metaphor 
actually works. on the negative side, we have 
indicated that it, is not sufficient to consider 
metaphors as simply 'one word' phenomena. The 
metaphors we have examined resist explanation in terms 
of a simple substitution theory whereby a metaphor is 
simply the insertion, from another context, of a word 
transferred to a new setting. Nor is it Sufficient to 
regard metaphors as ornaments: ý in our examples, the 
metaphors were central to the meaning of the statements 
being made. Moreover, they functioned, not asý single 
words, but as parts of statements, integral to the 
semantic content of the poem or description. We 
indicated that the most satisfactory account of how 
they worked was one which considered an interaction 
between two networks, directed towards introducing the 
capacity for a new, and fruitful, description of a 
particular referent. We spoke of this as a process, by 
which the referent was 'seen as' something else:, the 
reader's perception of the referent was organised by 
the implications and connotations of the metaphorical 
predication. Finally, we indicated that, while 
functioning at the pictorial or figurative level, 
metaphors also had the power to initiate and provoke 
discussion at a conceptual or ratiocinative level. 
Part of their power and value lies in this ability to 
oscillate -between the figurative and the conceptual, 
and it is this feature which is significant in the 
Christological use of the predication of pre-existence. 
We shall turn now to an exposition of the main features 
of Ricoeur's analysis of metaphor. His principal work, 
The Rule of Metaphor is subtitled, Multi-disciplinaLy 
Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language and this 
explains the presence in the work of wide-ranging 
discussions of semiotics, semantics, psychology, 
literary criticism, linguistic philosophy and 
hermeneutics -- all of which have some part to play in 
Ricoeur's typically complex treatment of metaphor. 
Like Tacob, Ricoeur wrestles with angels, though he 
seems to prefer them to come at him in groups, rather 
than individually. It will not be possible to broach 
all these topics in our exposition. In addition, it 
should be said that we intend simply to provide a basis 
for the approach to pre-existence language which we 
shall adopt later. It is not our intention to work 
with his theory later in detail, taking point by point 
and applying it to pre-existence language. To do so 
would prevent us from considering the theological and 
Christological issues which are more our concern. 
However, it is important to provide an exposition here 
of the semantic importance of metaphorical predication, 
which can act as the supporting pillars of the later 
examination of how the dynamic of pre-existence 
language is to be characterised. 
The Rule of Metaphor is a series of inter-related 
studies. Its structure is such that an exposition of 
Ricoeur's theory necessarily involves a presentation of 
the 'conversation partners he has chosen, since the 
qualifications, comments and criticisms he offers 
require contexts in which the nuances of his position 
can be appreciated. Therefore, something of the 
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'organic quality' of his work must be reflected in this 
exposition; this will not be a fruitless exercise, 
although it will be extremely wide-ranging, since in 
his discussion, the main points in the contemporary 
treatment of metaphor are raised. our presentation, 
too, will consider a range of contemporary writers 
insofar as they contribute to the debate. 
Ricoeur regards the history of the theory of metaphor 
as the history of interpretations of Aristotle's 
writings on the topic. The counter-positions which he 
rejects all have a common origin in the orientation 
given to the subject in Aristotle's Poetics. As we 
shall see later, the wheel comes full circle, when 
Ricoeur himself returns to Aristotle for his own 
evaluation of the semantic and referential importance 
of metaphor. Initially, he is concerned to highlight 
the features of Aristotle's approach which give rise to 
inadequate analyses of metapahor. 
ARISTOTLE AND THE RHETORICAL TRADITION 
Aristotle gives the following definition of metaphor: 
'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a 
name that belongs to something else; 
the transference being either from genus 
to species, or from species to genus, or 
from species to species, or on grounds 
of analogy. ' (Poetics 1457 b 6-9) 
?- 
Ricoeur draws attention to the following features of 
this definition: 
Firstly, the definition sees metaphor as 'something 
that happens to the noun'. -1OBy connecting metaphor with 
the noun or word, and not with the wider context of 
'discourse', Aristotle directs the interpretation of 
metaphor in the direction of a 'word-centred approach': 
'Aristotle's definition contains in nuce the theory of 
tropes, or figures of speech that focus on the word. ' 11 
Secondly, 'Metaphor is defined in terms of movement', 12 
as a displacement of a word or name from one class to 
another, from one context to another. 
Thirdly, Ricoeur notes that the transposed name belongs 
to something else. Aristotle also speaks of 'the alien 
name' (1457 b 31), which is opposed to the ordinary or 
customary usage. 'Metaphor accordingly is defined in 
terms of deviation. 113 
Fourthly, the latter part of the definition outlines a 
typology of metaphor: '-from genus to species, etc. ' 
The transference operates through some sort of 
transgression of the classification of words: 
'Metaphor occurs in an order already constituted in 
terms of genus and species and in a game whose 
;; ý7ý 
relation-rules subordination, co-ordination, 
proportionality or equality of relationships -- are 
already given... Metaphor consists in a violation of 
this order and game. 1 14 
Several of the features of this definition gave rise to 
the view in the Rhetorical Tradition that metaphor is 
merely another trope, an ornamental device which 
carries no new information. Ricoeur blames this on the 
emphasis on 'the word', or more specifically, on the 
noun or name, and on the act of naming, in the theory 
of meaning. Instead, as he argues later, -more 
attention should have been paid to the sentence as the 
primary unit of meaning. What he calls the 'tyranny of 
the word in the theory of meaning' reduces metaphor to 
the status of ornament, because it gives rise to a 
'substitution theory' in which the metaphorical process 
is viewed as the substitution of a more common word by 
one drawn from another realm. The metaphor can be 
viewed, according to this theory, as an ornamental 
deviation from proper meaning in the interest of giving 
aesthetic pleasure. 
The effect, of this approach is to limit the 
appreciation of the semantic importance of metaphor: 
1) It seems to imply that words are to be 
taken in isolation from one another, each one having 
within itself what Aristotle calls its 'current 
meaning'. It focuses on the word as the bearer of 
meaning, with little consideration of the fact that 
meaning is a function of a larger unit, namely, the 
sentence. 
2) It fails to take seriously that it takes 
two ideas to make a metaphor; these two ideas must be 
present, in some form, if the sentence is to be 
recognised as requiring a metaphorical interpretation. 
This requires a consideration of metaphor as more than 
simply the substitution of one word for another. -,, 
3) It fails to see a positive value in 
metaphor's ability to create new meaning. Its 
preoccupation with deviation, substitution and 
paraphrase are negative concerns which inhibit a 
positive appreciation of the power of metaphor to- say 
something new which cannot be adequately paraphrased in 
other terms. The relationship between deviation -from 
customary-meaning and the production of new meaning, -- 
what Aristotle calls lepiphoral (Poetics 1457 b 3) 
can only be dealt with by a theory of metaphor which 
considers its character as primarily predicative, since 
the new meaning which is created occurs at the level of 
the interaction of the elements of the metaphor. This 
interaction is a particular, and indeed peculiar, 
instance of attribution or predication, which demands 
that the metaphorical statement, and not just the 
'metaphorical word' be considered as the setting for 
the creation of new meanings. 
The principal criticism to be levelled at the 
Rhetorical Tradition's approach concerns the inadequacy 
of the theory of meaning which it implies: it limits 
itself- to a 'word-centred' theory of meaning, in which 
words, not sentences, are presumed to have an in-built 
meaning independently of their use in sentences. 
According to Rikhof, the word-centred approach views a 
sentence as an 'extra-long wordl: 
1-5 the implication 
being that meaning is contained in discrete units, 
words, and that the formation of sentences does not 
alter their functioning in any significant way. it 
would seem impossible to have an adequate theory of 
metaphor which ignores the relationship and interaction 
between word and sentence. If our general theory of 
meaning is forced to attend to this relationship and to 
account for it in some way, then our theory of 
metaphorical meaning must be consonant with this wider 
theory. If meaning occurs at the level of a sentence, 
then metaphorical meaning cannot continue to be 
regarded as something that 'happens to a word'; there 
must be some consideration of metaphor as a statement, 
attribution or predication. 
7-7 
BETWEEN SENTENCE AND WORD: THE INTERPLAY OF MEANING 
Ricoeur comments that in the traditional rhetorical 
view, 'metaphor belongs to the language game which 
16 
governs naming. `-The Wittgensteinian characterisation 
of the rhetorical view can be amplified: what is wrong 
with 'the language game that governs naming'? Nothing, 
but you should not think that the naming game is the 
model for how language as a living reality works. 
'"We name things and then we can talk 
about them: can refer to them in talk. " 
-- As if what we did next were given 
with the mere act of naming. As if 
there were only one thing called 
"talking about a thing". Whereas in 
fact we do the most various things with 
our sentences. t17 
A large part of the Philosophical Investigations is 
concerned with refuting the notion that words are 
essentially names, and that naming is the paradigmatic 
activity of language. Our use of language is a much 
more diverse activity in which there is a disjunction 
between the acts of naming something and making 
statements about it, involving predication and 
-----illocutionary aspects. - This is the point Wittgenstein 
makes here: we presume without justification that the 
activities of 'naming' and 'talking about a thing' 
follow on from each other, as it were, in a straight 




involves operations which cannot be -adequately 
accounted for by the simple fact that we know the name 
of a thing. 'Naming' may be one aspect of linguistic 
usage, but language is much more than ostensive 
labelling. The central aspects of language 
predication, reference, illocutionary aspects, 
propositional content, communication -- require that we 
think of sentences as ways of using words in particular 
ýlinstances of discourse' or contexts, in order to 
express what we mean. The words themselves do not 
contain the meaning of a sentence, as though the 
sentence were a combination of the discrete units of 
meaning which each word brings, ready-made and 
complete, like units in a Leggo set. ýWe might quote 
R? : 
I ... we ought always to keep before our 
eyes a complete proposition. only in a 
proposition do the words really have 
meaning. 1 18 
Ryle makes a similar clarification: 
'Sentences are things we say. Words and 
phrases are what we say things, 
with.... It follows that there are some 
radical differences between what is 
meant by "the meaning of a -word or 
phrase" and what is meant by "the 
meaning of a sentence". Understanding a 
word or phrase is knowing how to use it, 
i. e., make it perform its role in a wide 
range of sentences. But understanding a, 
sentence is not knowing how to make it 
perform its role. The play has not got 
a role. 1 19 
exposition of Frege's distinction between sense and 
reference: 
The priority of sentence-meaning over word-meaning is 
something of an axiom in post-Pregean philosophy. The 
thesis that 'only in the context of a proposition do 
words have meaning' implies that we cannot begin with a 
theory of word-meaning and then construct a theory of 
sentence-meaning; the reverse direction must be 
chosen. Dummett makes the point clearly in his 
'Frege's initial insight was that 
sentences play a primary role in the 
theory of meaning. A sentence is the 
smallest linguistic complex which one 
can use to say anything: hence the 
meaning of a word is to be given in 
terms of the contribution it makes to 
determining what may be said by means of 
a sentence containing it. t20 
f 
We might note in passing that the word-concept theory, 
criticised, indeed battered, by James Barr, is an 
instance of the notion that words have a whole range of 
concepts, implications, references, allusions within 
themselves, independently of the contexts in which they 
are used 21 Hence, within this view, it is possible to 
import into any instance of a word's use all the 
connotations which it might have as a result of its use 
in other contexts: the word, like a Contac cold 
capsule, explodes with pre-determined meaning, 
irrespective of the restraints of the particular 
sentence involved. Equally, one only has to think of 
the procedure adopted in Kittel's Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament to find a theological 
exemplification of this position, and an illustration 
of how it can be used. 
The relevance of this discussion of word meaning and 
sentence meaning goes beyond a concern to refute the 
views of the rhetorical tradition on metaphor: it 
raises the question of the relationship between langue 
and parole, between the code of language, available at 
any one time and modified through the diachronic 
changes of polysemy, shifts in meaning, figurative 
expressions, etc., and the instances of actual use of 
this code in living speech. We might make a comparison 
with chess: out of the possible moves controlled by 
the rules of the game, there is a selection made by 
each of the players on any one occasion. Similarly 
with language: the code might be recorded, however 
inadequately, by a dictionary, but the living use of 
language is both a selection of available words and 
phrases and an enrichment of that store through the use 
of language in_a particular 'instance of discourse'. 
There are no metaphors in a dictionary other than those 
which have been used and codified according to their 
established use in certain contexts. The important 
factor is that in any instance of discourse, there is a 
determination of the sense-of the words through their 
context in particular sentences. 
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It is this 'determinative' or 'sifting' action of a 
sentence on the polysemy of words, which constitutes 
the 'meaning' of a sentence. Ricoeur speaks of words 
having a potential meaning which is actualised in their 
use in sentences: 
'Taken in isolation, the word still has 
only a potential meaning, made up of the 
sum of its partial meanings, themselves 
defined by the types of contexts in 
which they can participate. They have 
an actual meaning only in a given 
context, that is to say, in an instance 
of discourse... o22 
As a result, discourse can be pictured as a 'reciprocal 
23 
interplay between word and the sentence. - The polysemy 
of words is the sum of the values which words- derive 
from their contextual uses, and it is 'reduced' by the 
specification which a sentence brings to the 
functioning of a word. 
If we return to the question of word meaning in the 
light of this approach, we find that it is impossible 
to separate the meaning of a word from the context in 
which it is used, and from which it derives 
specifications of its usage. The polysemy of words 
their ability to be used with different senses in 
different contexts -- testifies to the fact that 
word-meaning is irreducibly contextual. Clearly, some 
words will retain a wide range of senses in their 
contexts: in Wheelwright's terms, they have a 
Itensive'24character which, to some extent, defies 
univocal determination of their sense. This should not 
be interpreted as an objection to the view that the 
action of a sentence is to bring out the 'semantic 
capital' of the words with - specification and 
determination. Indeed, literature in particular, and 
one might add, theology, exploits particularly this 
quality, ' in enabling statements to carry a wide and 
profound depth of meaning. What characterises poetic 
language at its best, in whatever aesthetic mode the 
poet is working, is the ability of poetry to focus on 
the 'charged' quality of words more intensely than 
other uses-of language permit. In this sense,, it is in 
the reading of poetry that our reading is most literal, 
in that we are more attentive to the 'potential' 
meanings which each word carries. one can go further 
in this direction, and draw a parallel between the 
action of a sentence inýdetermining the'senses of the 
words used in it, and the action of a verbal structure, 
such as a poem, in shaping our interpretation of the 
senses to be drawn from thewords it uses. Poetic form 
is simply an extension of the same principle as exists 
in every use of words, but more concentrated and 
potentially complex in its variety. 
The advantage of this approach is that it avoids some 
of the knotty problems which surround the question of 




metaphorical meaning. Much of the discussion of this 
distinction seems to ignore the metaphorical and 
5 symbolic character of all language. L Ricoeur's view of 
literal meaning avoids this purported opposition with 
metaphorical meaning, since it derives precisely from 
the 'word-centred' theory of meaning which he rejects. 
Instead, he views the 'literal' meaning of a word, not 
as the 'original' or 'proper' meaning of a word, but as 
the totality of potential meanings, the set of possible 
contextual meanings which constitutes the polysemy of a 
word. Every sentence is a specification of which of 
the, meanings to be adduced for the words: it is an 
actuaýsation of the potential which words have, as a 
result of their use in other contexts. The process 
which takes place in sentences is the model for what 
takes place in a metaphorical statement: 
'The contextual action which enables 
univocal discourse to be produced with 
polysemic words is the model for that 
other action whereby we draw genuinely 
novel metaphorical effects from words 
whose meaning is already codified in the 
vocabulary. We are thus prepared to 
allow that even if the meaningful effect 
which we call metaphor is inscribed in 
the word, nevertheless the origin of 
this effect lies in a contextual action 
_which places. -the semantic-fields _of several words -in interaction. P26 
The Saussurean characterisation of 'Pý! role', the living 
use of the code of Ilanguel, is constituted by the 
contextual use of words already codified in the 
language considered as a system; hence it becomes 
difficult to oppose 'literal' and 'metaphorical' as 
simply as has often been supposed, since both 'literal' 
and 'metaphorical' meaning occurs through the 
contextual specification of the potential meanings of 
the words. Metaphor's character as a contextual'change 
of meaning is thus to be viewed as a particular 
instance of the general process by which the 
determination and specification of the polysemic 
quality of words takes place within a sentence. In 
this sense, we can speak of metaphor as a semantic 
innovation arising out of the networks brought together 
in the predication, rather than an alteration of a 
single word in a sentence: 
'Metaphorical attribution is essentially 
the construction of the network of 
interactions that causes a certain 
context to be one that is real and 
unique. Accordingly metaphor is a 
semantic event that takes place at the 
point where several semantic fields 
intersect. It is because of this 
construction that all the words, taken 
together, make sense. 127 
METAPHOR AND DISCOURSE 
We have distinguished several contrasting pairs in our 
exposition thus far: word-meaning and sentence 
meaning; metaphor as one-word trope and metaphor as 
predication; langue and parole; naming and talking 
about a thing; polysemy and contextual determination. 
-31-- 
These distinctions correspond to the distinction 
between semiotics and semantics, between the science of 
signs and the science of sentences -- a distinction 
which Ricoeur regards as the key to the whole problem 
of language. As part of a general alignment of the 
theory of metaphor with a theory of meaning, Ricoeur 
assimilates the features of metaphor as closely as 
possible to the features of discourse: it is in 
discourse (or 'parole') that sense and reference become 
operative features of language, since it is only at 
this stage that language engages in a meaningful 
engagement with the world. By placing metaphor in this 
context, as a particular instance of the production of 
meaning, although by an unusual process, Ricoeur wants 
to affirm the role of metaphor in the production of new 
sense through the unusual attribution of the 
metaphorical predication. In turn, the creation of a 
new sense can be said to refer to the world in a way 
which is analogous to the 'indirect' reference of works 
of literature. It is therefore important for him to 
establish the common ground between discourse and 
metaphor, which will permit him to attribute to 
metaphor the capacity to engage in a redescriptive, and 
meaningful, relationship to the world: without this 
capacity, metaphor loses its status as the device by 
which reality is redescribed. 
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According to Ricoeur, 'parole' or discourse -- a term 
he prefers -- has several traits which are relevant to 
the discussion of metaphor. 
Firstly, 'discourse always occurs as an event, but it 
28 
is to be understood as meaning. -r By 'event', Ricoeur 
means the discrete and unique acts by which language is 
actualised by a speaker, the acts by which 'languel 
passes into 'parole'. Although these events have a 
transitory character, in that they occur in speaking or 
writing, they can also be identified and re-identified, 
so that it is possible to repeat what was said, or to 
re-express it in a different way. We might compare 
this dialectic of event and meaning with Frege's 
discussion of the relationship of sense, reference and 
ýh, 2RýLht in a sentence: 
'we now inquire concerning t 
reference of an entire 
sentence. Such a sentence 
thought. (Footnote: ) By a 
understand not the 
performance of thinking 
objective content, which is 
being the common property 
thinkers. 1 29 








Frege goes on to identify the 'thought' of the sentence 
with the sense, not the reference: it represents the 
content of the sentence, irrespective of its truth 
value, and can be shared by other people. We might 
-36 
also think in terms of the propositional aspect of a 
sentence which can be identified in any illocutionary 
act. John Searle distinguishes, within the category of 
speech acts, propositional acts and illocutionary acts: 
I ... in performing an illocutionary act 
one characteristically performs 
propositional acts and utterance acts. 
Nor should it be thought from this that 
utterance acts and propositional acts 
stand to illocutionary acts in the way 
buying a ticket and getting on a train 
stand to a railroad trip. They are not 
means to ends; rather utterance acts 
stand to propositional and illocutionary 
acts in the way in which, e. g., making 
an "X" on a ballot paper stands to 
voting. ... the same propositional acts 
can be common to different illocutionary 
acts ... in performing different 
utterance acts, a speaker may perform 
the same propositional and illocutionary 
acts., 30 
Propositional acts, which are characteristically 
reference and predication, always occur within an 
illocutionary act such as assertion, question, command, 
etc. The propositional aspect of sentences is always 
there, whenever one says something, and for this aspect 
to be present -- for there to be 'meaning' in Ricoeur's 
terms -- there must be an event which expresses it. 
Searle's presentation is similar: 
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'Propositional acts cannot occur alone; 
that is, one cannot just refer and 
predicate without making an assertion or 
asking a question or performing some 
other illocutionary act. The linguistic 
correlate of this point is that 
sentences, not words, are used to say 
things. This is also what Frege meant 
when he said that only in the context of 
a sentence do words have reference. l3l 
Ricoeur applies this dialectic of event and meaning in 
the following way: he speaks of metaphor as an event, 
an instance of discourse, in which there is a 
determination of the meaning of the sentence through 
the contextual interaction of the disparate networks 
which are brought together in the predication. 
Metaphor is a 'momentary creation of language, a 
semantic innovation which does not have a status in the 
language as something already established, whether as a 
32 
designation or as a connotation. r For example, in, the 
Emily Dickinson poem we considered, the line 'A Cobweb 
on the Soul' is unknown in the code of language, but is 
a 'linguistic event', in that it is a new assimilation 
of words in a context which forces a particular 
interaction between what, originally, were disparate 
and previously unconnected words. The act of 
construing the metaphor, of determining the sense which 
is to be adduced from this linguistic event, is the 
creation of a new meaning which we call 'metaphorical 
meaning'. The consequence of this is that a new set of 
descriptions is liberated: a whole consideration of 
39 
I--- 
the 'Soul' in the light of the image becomes possible 
as an explication of the interpretation of the 
metaphor. This can be designated as an event which 
enriches the semantic store by which new descriptive 
possibilities are disclosed. or consider another 
example from Wallace Stevens: his poem 'A Weak Mind in 
the Mountains' begins: 
'There was the butcher's hand. 
He squeezed it and the blood 
Spurted from between the fingers 
And fell to the floor. 
And then the body fell. 
So afterward, at night, 
The wind of Iceland and 
The wind of Ceylon, 
Meeting, gripped my mind, 
Gripped it and grappled my thoughts...., 33 
What is being described? It is only after reading the 
stanzas, and after noticing the clue contained in the 
words, 'So afterward, at night', that one realises that 
the first stanza is a metaphor for sunset. No clue is 
given in the elaboration of the metaphor that this is 
the referent; instead, there is only the gory picture 
of the butcher at work. But once the clue is 
perceived, we realise that sunset is described in an 
original and striking way: the disparate, and 
originally distinct, contexts of butchering and the act 
of the setting sun, are brought together in a way which 
invites the reader to engage in a new account of sunset 
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in quite different terms from what he is used to: new 
meaning, new descriptive possibilities, are made 
possible through the event of metaphor. 
Ricoeur's view is that 'only authentic, living 
metaphors are at the same time "event" and "meaning". 34 
This is to distinguish fresh and active metaphors from 
the phenomenon of 'collapsed, metaphors which have lost 
their tensional quality and entered the store of 
Ilanguel: consider, for example, the original 
figurative aspects of common words such as 'influence', 
'tawdry', Imarzipan' or 'revelation'. But living 
metaphors retain the tension between the two networks 
which are brought together in the predication. Ricoeur 
uses the word 'explanation' to designate the action by 
which the living metaphor is construed by the reader: 
'The decisive moment of explanation is 
the construction of networks of 
interactions which constitutes the 
context as actual and unique. In so 
doing, we direct our attention towards 
the semantic event which is produced at 
the point on intersection between 
several semantic fields. This 
construction is the means by which all 
of the words taken together make sense. 
Then and only then, the 'metaphorical 
twist' is both an event and a meaning, a 
meaningful event and an emergent meaning 
in language. v 35 
It is this feature of 'explanation' which makes 
metaphorical interpretation a paradigm for the activity 
of interpreting a literary work: 'We construct the 
to, 
meaning of a text in a manner similar to the way in 
which we make sense of all the terms of a metaphorical 
36 
Both the metaphor and the literary work are statement: T 
verbal structures which create a centripetal, 
inward-directed meaning in which all the elements of 
the structure contribute to the coherence and 
meaningfulness of what is being said. We shall return 
to this point later, when we discuss more fully the 
parallel between the referential quality of metaphors 
and the referential quality of a literary work: both, 
as we shall see, involve the articulation of an 
internal coherence which is indirectly referential: 
they provide the creation of a particular 'sense' by 
which reality is redescribed. They do not mimic 
reality -- in the strict sense of 'mimesis' -- but they 
provide a presentation of reality which is internally 
meaningful, in the light of which external reality is 
viewed differently. 
The second trait of discourse which Ricoeur highlights 
involves the predicative function and the identifying 
function of 'parole'. Language works on the basis of 
the functions by which singular identification is 
linked with predications which are, in principle, 
universal. Thus a proposition can identify a 
particular subject, and predicate of that subject 
qualities, relations, actions and classes. This 
enables description, characterisation and predication 
to be made of an identifiable individual. Ricoeur 
applies this to metaphor: 
'A metaphor is said of a "principal 
subject"; as "modifier" of this 
subject, it works like a kind of 
I attribution I. 1 37 
It is a feature of discourse that this singularising 
function of universal qualities is possible; 
semiotics, which concerns the signs in themselves, 
cannot deal with the particular instance, since the 
verbal sign is considered irrespective of the 
circumstances of individual usage. But by placing 
metaphor within the context of semantics, Ricoeur 
locates it within the context of the discussion of 
predication: 
'.. the predicate, which in itself has a 
universalizing function, only has this, 
circumstantial character to the extent 
that it determines a proper logical 
subject... it is the sentence taken as 
a whole, that which is intended by 
discourse, that carries with it a 
particular application6 even when the 
predicate is generic., 3 
The predicative character of metaphor will be 
considered later when we come to Ricoeur's account of 
the theories of Richards, Black and Beardsley. 
However, we would point to the fact that, in the 
predication of pre-existence, in the different 
figurative forms in which it is expressed in the New 
Testament, a predicate, or series of predicates, which 
42- 
elsewhere in the writings of the period are applied to 
other referents, such as Wisdom or Torah, or Logos, are 
applied singularly to Jesus in Christological usage. 
our interest will be in the character of this 
particularising Christological predication, in what is 
involved in applying terms which, in other contexts, 
were capable of varied application, to this particular 
existent. 
A third pair of traits concerns the locutionary and 
illocutionary aspects of discourse. It concerns the 
way in which the propositional content of a sentence 
can be located within a range of different 
illocutionary modalities, such as question, command, 
promise, etc. The objective aspect of discourse, what 
we have called the propositional content, complements 
the subjective aspect in which the speaker or writer 
communicates to others. Another way of formulating the 




R! l and utterer's meaningr- or, 
Searle's terms, between sentence meaning and speaker's 
meaning. Searle uses this distinction to try to 
describe 'metaphorical meaning': 
'Strictly speaking, whenever we talk 
about the metaphorical meaning of a 
word, expression or sentence, we are 
talking about what a speaker might utter 
it to mean, in a way that departs from 
what the word, expression or sentence 
actually means. We are talking about 
possible speaker's intentions ... Metaphorical meaning is always speaker's 
utterance meaning. P 40 
Searle uses this distinction to distinguish literal 
utterances and metaphorical utterances: 'in literal 
utterance the speaker means what he says; that is, 
literal sentence meaning and speaker's utterance 
meaning are the same. #411n metaphorical utterance, 
however, there is a disjunction between sentence 
meaning and speaker's meaning; according to Searle, 
there is never a change of meaning in the expressions 
used: 
'The metaphorical utterance does indeed 
mean something different from the 
meaning of the words and sentences but 
that is not because there has been any 
change in the meanings of the lexical 
elements, but because the speaker means 
something different by them; speaker 
meaning does not coincide with sentence 
or word meaning. It is essential to see 
this point, because the main problem of 
metaphor is to explain how speaker 
meaning and sentence meaning are 
different and how they are, 
nevertheless, related. Such an 
explanation is impossible if we suppose 
that sentence or word meaning has 
changed in the metaphorical utterance. v 42 
Searle views metaphor as an instance, like ironyr- of 





the--reader or hearer is 
to pass beyond the sentence meaning to arrive at the 
speaker's meaning. Certainly Searle is correct to'say 
that the words in a metaphor retain their lexical 
denotation, but he is wrong to attribute to the 
distinction between sentence meaning and speaker's 
. 444- 
meaning the clue to metaphor. The parallel with ironic 
statements is too strong to do justice to the character 
of metaphor, which works more on the basis of the 
interaction of the two fields brought together in the 
metaphorical statement, rather than on the basis of the 
#unspoken' presence of the speaker's real intention. 
His approach would imply that the meaning of metaphor 
is detachable from the forms of metaphorical 
expression: again, we see the influence of the 
word-centred approach which would, reduce metaphorical 
expression to an ornament which clothes, or according 
to Searle, 'conceals' the speaker's meaning. 
metaphor's capacity to redescribe in a unique way is 
ignored, as is its capacity to generate a wider range 
of connotations than propositional content alone can 
provide. 
But what Searle has'uncovered, in his distinction, is 
an aspect of the strategy for explicating a metaphor: 
it highlights the fact that the work of explication is 
an essential element in the consideration of what a 
metaphor is. The tactic of understanding a metaphor 
cannot be ignored in the discussion of the character of 
metaphor. Searle's approach would seem to identify. 1the 
meaning of the metaphor with the reader's being able to 
discern what the creator of the metaphor intended (the 
speaker's meaning). And here, we can point back to our 
discussion earlier of the possibility of entering into 
the 'mind' of an author in order to understand a work. 
Just as we rejected this option with regard to literary 
works, so here, we must reject Searle's Proposal which 
would limit the task of explicating a metaphor to that 
of identifying the speaker's meaning. There are no 
fixed limits to the range of connotations which can be 
created by a metaphorical statement, because the range 
of interpretations rests on the shifting platform of 
the individual reader's aesthetic response. In 
addition, we have to take into account the horizon of 
the interpreter of a metaphor, who across the 
centuries, no longer has access to the 'intention' of 
the author; yet, he is in a position to engage in an 
interpretative engagement which can go in quite a 
different direction from the original trajectory of a 
metaphorical expression or a literary work. 
In the light of this discussion, which is relevant to 
the hermeneutical problem of reinterpreting figurative 
expressions such as those which predicate pre-existence 
of Christ, we might remark that it is difficult to 
identify uniquely, or de-limit exclusively, what in a 
metaphor would-count as the 'propositional content' or 
'thought' in Frege's sense, of a metaphor. The range 
of possibilities opened up by a metaphor cannot be 
easily reduced to a single 'meaning' identified in a 
reductionist manner. The variation, too, in diachronic 
interpretation across the centuries, because of the 
different interpretative horizons brought to bear on 
the metaphor, means that there is constantly an 
open-ended quality in metaphor which must be respected. 
one might think, for example of the diversity of 
interpretations of central Christian metaphorical 
expressions, such as the Johannine Prologue, or the 
Pauline metaphor of justification, which have been 
formulated in Christian theology: the interpreters may 
have intended to uncover the 'speaker's meaning', but 
consciously or unconsciously, they also brought into 
play their own philosophical, theological and cultural 
horizons which shaped their handling of these central 
metaphors. Metaphors continue to live in contexts 
which are far from their original setting, and this is 
part of their vitality. In this respect, metaphor 
comes close to symbol, and Ricoeur makes the connection 
explicity: 
'We readily concede that a symbol cannot 
be exhaustively treated by conceptual 
language, that there is more in a 
symbol; a trait which is eagerly 
embraced by the opponents of conceptual 
thinking. For them, one must choose: 
either the symbol or the concept. But 
metaphor theory leads us to a different 
conclusion. , --It . shows 
how new 
possibilities for articulating and 
conceptualising reality can arise 
through an assimilation of hitherto 
separated semantic fields. Far from 
being a part of conceptual thinking, 
such semantic innovation marks the 
emergence of such thought... There is 
no need to deny the concept in order to 
admit that symbols give rise to an 
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endless exegesis. If no concept can 
exhaust the requirement of further 
thinking borne by symbols, this idea 
signifies only that no given 
characterization can embrace all the 
semantic possibilities of a symbol. But 
it is the work of the concept alone that 
can testify to this surplus of meaning. #43 
We need not enter further into the question of the 
relationship of symbol and metaphor, except to note 
that if one of the defining features of symbol is its 
capacity to focus and generate a range of secondary 
significations, equally metaphor generates a range of 
meanings through the interpretative response of the 
reader to the metaphorical expression. In Christology, 
the range of secondary meanings which derive from the 
implications of pre-existence language, form the body 
of Christological reflection and debate: they are the 
attempts to explicate satisfactorily and consistently 
how this predicative form is to be developed in more 
conceptual terms. It would be foolish to consider that 
this process has reached the limit of its development, 
since the horizons of subsequent interpretation will 
continue to shape the ways in which this predication is 
to be understood. The history of Christology is a 
confirmation of Ricoeur's point that metaphor is an 
endlessly generative way of articulating and 
conceptualising reality. 
The fourth trait of discourse is the Fregean 
distinction between sense and reference. Frege was 
concerned with the relationship between a sign, its 
sense and its reference. This relationship is 'of such 
a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite 
sense, and to that in turn a definite reference, while 
to a given reference (an object) there does not belong 
only a single sign. v44Jt *is a 'characteristic of 
discourse that there is not a perfect one-to-one 
relationship between sense and reference: thus in 
Frege's classic example, a particular referent such as 
a star, can be referred to by two senses, 'the Morning 
Star' and 'the Evening Star'; these senses may, 'in 
turn refer not to a star but to two- different 
newspapers. Although'this example is an example of the 
distinction applied to names or definite descriptions, 
Frege's concern was also with the application of the 
distinction to whole sentences., Hans Sluga'has argued 
that the distinction has much more to do with the 
semantics of whole sentences, as this quotation from 
Frege himself shows: 
'That we are concerned at all with the 
reference of-- a sentence part is an 
indication that 
*, 
in general, we 
recognise and demand a reference for the 
sentence itself ... Why do we require 
that every proper name should have a 
reference and not merely a sense? Why 
are we not satisfied with the thought? 
Because, and in so far as, we are 
concerned with its truth-value .... the 
striving for truth is therefore what 
drives us everywhere from a sense to a 
reference. 1 45 
Frege's application of this distinction to sentences 
led him to view the sense of a sentence as a thought 
which can be shared by others. Its reference, on the 
other hand, is to its truth value. 'Truth and 
falsehood stand to sentences as objects do to names. 146 
Thus, one might say of the sentence 'Socrates is wise' 
that the sense-- provides the truth conditions, the 
satisfaction of which achieves the reference of the 
sentence. Michael Dummett argues that it would be a 
mistake to think of truth values as 'objects of the 
same "logical type" as names or definite descriptions'; 
the relation between a sentence and its truth value is 
only analogous to that between a proper name and its 
bearer: 
I ... proper names and sentences, although both complete expressions in Frege's 
sense, very obviously function in very 
different ways. Anyone, unless in the 
grip of a theory, would be disposed to 
say that they were linguistic 
expressions of quite different logical 
type; all the more should Frege have 
been ready to acknowledge this fact, 
when his whole account was based on the 
unique and central role which sentences 
play in our language. 147 
v 
Dummett, clarifies the way in which sense and reference 
relate in the understanding of a sentence: 
'According to Frege, when I grasp the 
way in which the reference, and thus the 
semantic role, of an expression, is to 
be determined, then I grasp its sense; 
in particular, when I grasp the way in 
which the truth-value of a sentence (as 
uttered on a particular occasion) is to 
be determined, then I grasp the thought 
which it expresses. ' 48 
Applying this to metaphor: it is when we are able to 
construe the statement correctly that the sense-of. the---, ---- 
metaphor is grasped. The activity of construing the 
metaphor consists of grasping the ways in which the 
object is seen as the predicate, or the ways in which 
it is seen in the light of the predicate. If this is 
achieved, then there has been a 'semantic gain', the 
creation of a new sense which can be added to the 
already existing store of descriptive possibilities 
which can be used to describe the referent. It is 
important to relate the question of the truth value of 
metaphor to this process by which a new sense is 
disclosed applicable to the referent. Ricoeur insists: 
I ... one must adopt the point of view of the hearer or reader and treat the 
novelty of an emerging meaning as his 
work within the very act of reading or 
hearing. If we do not take this route, 
we do not really get rid of the theory 
of 
' 
substitution... I would rather say 
that metaphorical attribution is 
essentially the construction of the 
network of interactions that causes a 
certain context to be one that is real 
and unique. Accordingly, metaphor is a 
semantic event that takes place at the 
point where several semantic fields 
intersect., 49 
What then of the truth of metaphors? To answer this 
question, we must broaden the discussion to include the 
parallel with aesthetic experience: the insight into 
how the metaphor is applicable to the referent is one 
which parallels the response associated with aesthetic 
experience, involving dimensions of insight, emotion, 
surprise and delight, all of which are part of genuine 
artistic experience. It is no accident that Aristotle 
included metaphor among the feature of Lexis, the 
stylistic means by which the Muthos of tragedy is 
created. 
The parallel between metaphorical interpretation and 
aesthetic interpretation is a key notion in Ricoeur's 
theory: he sees the process of interpreting a metaphor 
as analogous to the process by which we make sense of a 
literary work: - 
'We construct the meaning of a text in a 
manner similar to the way in which we 
make sense of all the terms of a 
metaphorical statement... In both cases, 
it is a question of "making sense", of 
producing the best possible 
intelligibility from an apparently 
discordant diversity., 50 
He formulates the distinction between' sense and 
reference in terms of the immanent pattern of an 
artistic work and its capacity to create a 'world' 
which is a particular redescription of reality, and 
which at this distance refers back to the familiar 
world. We might express the same distinction in 
Northrop Frye's terms: the sense of a literary work is 
its centripetal, inward-directed pattern, its verbal 
structure. But at the same time, this centripetal 
pattern relates to the world outside the text, and 
engages the reader in-a-Ifictivel redescription or 
mimesis of an aspect of the familiar world. While one 
aspect of the truth of an artistic work lies in its 
ability to give us insight into the world outside the 
text, at the same time, it should be recognised that 
this is achieved precisely by the work remaining within 
its own limits, within the internal coherence which it 
creates. 
The action of King Lear happens nowhere outside the 
text, and more importantly outside the production of 
the play, yet it is the very coherence of the piecer 
the internally directed 'sense', which is redescriptive 
of the reality outside the work. Similarly, Emily 
Dickinson's poem, which we examined earlier, exists 
only in its verbal pattern, but a sensitive response to 
the internal cohesion of the poem cannot but resonate 
with, and illuminate, the reader's own experience, of 
the self. It is in this sense that the truth of 
metaphor retains the same distinction from the external 
world as does a poetic work, and, in the same way, 
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the world, which is analogous to thatýprovided by an 
artistic work.. Ricoeur quotes with approval 
Beardsley's dictum that metaphor is 'a poem in 
miniature', and sees in the power of metaphor to 
generate a fresh and significant vision of the 
referent, an instance of the wider power of aesthetic 
expression to engage in a redescriptive involvement 
with the-world. 
However, while adopting this perspective, there is also 
another aspect concerning the propositional truthý of 
metaphors. Some metaphors do not raise the question of 
whether they are true or not. For example, Donne's 
metaphor of the sun as a 'busy old fool' is unlikely to 
provoke the reader to ask whether this is true or not, 
whereas the adage, homo homini lupus est is likely to 
stimulate agreement or disagreement over the truth of 
this assertion. Here, the truth or falsity of the 
metaphor is considered at the level of the proposition 
which the metaphor seems to imply: is man really as 
nasty as a wolf, cunning and voracious, a predatory 
creature who survives, at the expense of his fellow men 
and women? In this case, the truth or falsity of the 
metaphor is conducted through an examination of the 
implications of the metaphorical predication, after it 
has been construed, and the senses to be derived from 
it are made explicit. At this level, there is likely 
to be agreement or disagreement with the propositional 
5'4! 
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aspect of the metaphor. Here we are involved in the 
relationship between metaphor and the more conceptual 
aspects of its dynamism: Ricoeur's insistence on the 
inter-relationship between figurative and symbolic 
expression, on the one hand, and the conceptual 
articulation arising out of such expression, on the 
other hand, points to the oscillation of metaphor and 
symbol between figurative and conceptual discourse. 
That metaphor can give rise to propositions which can 
be judged true or false is part of its contribution to 
our semantic store. So, for example, the predication 
of pre-existence has given rise, in the history of 
Christology, to propositions which were rejected by 
mainstream Christian tradition as wrong: the Arian 
option, for example of the Son as the highest created 
being, or the Ebionite view that the Son's status was 
angelic, were rejected on grounds of falsity. if 
metaphor provides a wide range of descriptive 
possibilities for articulate expression to use, then 
part of that process will be the critical judgment as 
to the truth or falsity of the propositional content to 
be retained as how the metaphor is to be understood. 
one must recognise this aspect, at the same time as one 
recognises the power of metaphor to set in motion new 
descriptions which otherwise would not come to light. 
An appreciation of the value of metaphor does not 
necessarily involve the suspension of critical activity 
associated with the activity of judging truth and 
falsity. 
The metaphorical statement can be seen as offering a 
'hypotheticall-*5lworld, to use Northrop Frye's phrase, a 
particular conjunction and interaction of two different 
sets of connotations. The interaction takes place 
through the response and interpretation of the reader 
who may, after he has come to an understanding of the 
sense of the metaphor, regard the propositional aspect 
(or 'thought', in Frege's sense of the word) as true, 
false, limited,, banal, evocative -- a whole range of 
assessments of the value of the metaphor. But what is 
important is that the metaphor relates to the world in 
an 'indirect' way, just as the artistic work has a 
'suspended' reference to the world outside the text. 
Ricoeur pursues the parallel between the issues raised 
in the interpretation of metaphor, and the issues 
raised in hermeneutics by the interpretation of a text: 
I ... to what extent can we treat the 
metaphor as a work in miniature? The 
answer to this question will then help 
us to pose the second: to what extent 
can the hermeneutical problems raised by 
the interpretation of texts be 
considered as a large-scale extension of 
the problems condensed in the 
explanation of a local metaphor in a 
given textV52 
This relationship becomes important because the meaning 
of a text has to be constructed in the context of the 
asymmetrical relationship between the text and the 
reader: in the absence of the dialogical relationship 
characteristic of speech, the text is not addressed to 
a particular person, and the writing takes the place of 
speech: 
'The relation between message and 
speaker at one end of the communication 
chain and the relation between message 
and hearer are together deeply 
transformed when the face-to-face 
relation is replaced by the more complex 
relation of reading to writing, 
resulting from the direct inscription of 
discourse in 
, 
littera. The dialogical 
situation has been exploded. The 
relation writing-reading is no longer a 
particular case of the relation 
speaking-hearing. o53 
Let us try to express this more simply: the use of 
language between two people engaged in dialogue is 
directed towards establishing clear and full 
communication between them. But once a text is written 
down, and once it passes into the hands of those who 
cannot engage in a face-to-face dialogue with the 
author, the relationship between the reader and the 
words of the text is not the same as that which exists 
in the context of direct dialogue. How are we to 
understand the activity of interpreting the text in a 
situation such as this? And how are we to understand 
the relationship of the text to the world, since the 
context in which it was written no longer exists? To 
clarify this hermeneutical problem, Ricoeur 




'In spoken language, that to which a 
dialogue ultimately refers is the 
situation common to the interlocutors, 
that is, the aspects of reality which 
can be shown or pointed to; we then say 
the reference is ostensive. 154 
Texts and literary works are also referential in that 
they are about the world, but the ostensive reference 
is suspended, and reference is freed from the confines 
of the particular situation. So, for example, the 
reading of John's Gospel by a member of the Johannine 
community at the time of the composition of the work, 
would be far closer to the 'dialogical' model of 
interpersonal communication, than would the reading of 
this Gospel in Edinburgh in 1985, because for the 
member' of the community, the context of the work would 
be the context of his life, whereas for the inhabitant 
of Edinburgh, there is a disjunction between these two 
contexts which must affect his reading of the Gospel. 
Ricoeur, as does Northrop Frye whom we quoted earlier 
on this point, rejects the notion that the 
hermeneutical circle is to be viewed as the circle 
between two subjectivities, between that of the reader 
and that of the author, and that the act of 
interpretation is to be seen as the projection of the 
reader's subjectivity into that of the author. Instead 
the interpretation of the work must culminate in some 
form of appropriation, through 'a process by which one 
makes one's own what was initially other or alienJ5It 
involves allowing the horizon and autonomy of the text 
to enlarge one's own understanding of oneself and, of 
the world in which one lives: 
'To understand oneself in front of a 
text is quite the contrary of projecting 
oneself and one's own beliefs and 
prejudices; it is to let the work and 
its world enlarge the horizon I have of 
myself .... The circle is between my mode 
of being beyond the knowledge I may 
have of it and the mode opened up and 
disclosed the text as the world of 
the work. ' 5 
This model of interpretation is transferred by Ricoeur 
to metaphor: he draws the parallel between the way in 
which the text is appropriated through opening oneself 
to the 'alien' horizon of the text, and the way in 
which one construes the lalienness' of the metaphor, by 
allowing the descriptive range at one's disposal to be 
enlarged and enriched by the possibilities of the 
metaphor. In the metaphor, something known and 
familiar in other terms is redescribed in an unfamiliar 
and surprising way, through a predication drawn from a 
quite different context; in the interpretation of the 
text, the horizon of the reader is brought into contact 
with a quite different horizon offered by the text. 
Metaphor is one of the non-ostensive procedures by 
which reality is redescribed: its meaning is not 
immediately obvious in all its fullness, and its sense 
is contained within the limits of the figurative 
expression. The act of construing it requires from us 
that, after entering into the confines of the statement 
and making sense of it, we allow our vision of the 
reality outside the metaphorical expression to be 
altered by the categories offered in the metaphor. The 
indirectness of its, reference to the world is shared by 
artistic works and by texts: 
'... poetic language is no less about 
reality than any other use of language, 
but it refers to it by the means of a 
complex strategy which implies, as a 
necessary component, a suspension and 
seemingly an abolition of the ordinary 
reference attached to descriptive 
language ... The suspension of the 
reference proper to ordinary descriptive 
language is the negative condition for 
the emergence of a more radical way of 
looking at things. @57 
Ricoeur extends this parallel between metaphor and 
literary work through his consideration of Aristotle's 
analysis of Tragedy. He points out that Aristotle 
included metaphor as one of the parts of Lexis, as one 
of the discursive procedures by which the diction of 
the tragedy is composed. The various parts of Tragedy 
-- plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle and 
Melody -- 'form a network, as it were, in which 
everything centres on one dominant factor: the fable, 
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the plot, the Muthos. t-The fundamental trait of Muthos 
is its power to organise the various constituent parts 
of the tragedy into a unified whole; the role of 
Lexis, the stylistic characteristics and the 
constituent elements of the work, is to make explicit 
through the diction the coherent pattern of the Muthos: 
'Tragedy, in the form of a poem, has 
sense and reference. In Aristotle's 
language, the "sense" of tragedy is 
secured by what he calls the "fable" 
(MUTHOS). We can understand the latter 
as the sense of tragedy because 
Aristotle constantly emphasises its 
structural characteristics. The MUTHOS 
must have unity and coherence; it must 
make of the represented actions 
something "whole and complete" .... The MUTHOS is thus the principal "part" of 
tragedy, its "essence". All the other 
parts of tragedy -- the "characters", 
the "thoughts", the "delivery", the 
"production" -- are linked to the myth 
as the means or conditions, or as the 
performance of tragedy qua myth. We 
must draw the consequence that it is 
only in relation to the MUTHOS of 
tragedy that its LEXIS, and hence 
metaphor, make sense., 59 
-The MUTHOS, in turn, is subordinate to the aim of 
Tragedy, which Aristotle calls MIMESIS; Ricoeur 
insists that this is not to be interpreted in a 
naturalistic sense as though it meant limitation'. It 
is rather to be understood as Iredescription', as an 
account of reality which stands at a distance from it, 
but which is nevertheless directed towards describing 
it. our discussion of the 'non-ostensive' reference of 
i9- 
literary works, and of the complex strategy which they 
use in order to create a particular internal meaning, 
or sense, has shown that they refer to the world 
precisely through their internal coherence or sense. 
We might tabulate the features which Ricoeur 
distinguishes as characteristics of literary works and 
of metaphor: 








The left hand column designates the features which are 
the internally-directed characteristics of works and 
metaphors, and the right hand column designates how 
these characteristics relate to the world outside the 
text. Thus, Ricoeur is able to present metaphor as a 
particular instance of the more general characteristic 
of literature, namely, that it creates its own 'space', 
in the creation of a particular sense or meaning, which 
then can be used to redescribe an aspect of reality. 
How a metaphor does this is our next concern. 
THE WORKINGS OF METAPHORICAL PREDICATION 
Ricoeur discusses . the views of several major 
commentators on how metaphorical predication is to be 
understood. He begins with I. A. Richards whose work, 
The Philosophy of Rhetoric firmly places metaphor in a 
contextual theory of meaning. He denies that words can 
be said to have a meaning independently of the context 
in which they are used. He regards 'word-meaning' as 
the abridgement of the meaning which words possess in 
particular contexts; in each new context they carry 
with them the meaning they acquire in other contexts, 
so that the creation of new meaning in a particular 
sentence can be viewed as the interaction of the 
contexts which each word brings; he speaks of the 
60 
linteranimation of words'--in a sentence. According to 
the language being used, the 'abridged contexts' 
interpenetrate in different ways: discourse can be 
regarded as a spectrum which ranges, on the one hand, 
from technical language, in which the words tend to 
have a stable meaning because of their limited range of 
uses, to poetic language in which the words interact 
with a richer depth of reference because of the wider 
range of contexts from which the words derive. Thus 
the univocal definitions, characteristic of. technical 
language, contrast with the fluidity and allusiveness 
of poetic language. 
our interest in this lies in the way in which Richards' 
picture of the interaction of interpretative 
possibilities within a sentence is applied to metaphor, 
so that metaphor is seen as a 'transaction between 




'According to one elementary 
formulation, metaphor holds two thoughts 
of different things together in 
simultaneous performance upon the stage 
of a word or a simple expression, whose 
meaning is the result ýof their 
interaction. Or, to bring this 
description and the theorem of meaning 
into accord, we can say that the 
metaphor holds together within one 
simple meaning two different missing 
parts of different contexts of this 
meaning. Thus we are not dealing any 
longer with a simple transfer of words, 
but with a commerce between thoughts, 
that is a transaction between 
contexts. 191 
Clearly, this particular description could be applied 
to any pair of thoughts which are brought together: 
for example, a simile or a paradox could be described 
in these terms. To clarify the distinctive quality of 
metaphor, Richards turns to the structure of metaphor: 
he uses the word 'tenor' to refer to the 'underlying 
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idea or principal subjectr'-of the statement, and the 
word ', vehicle' to refer to the 'idea under whose sign 
3 
the first idea is apprehended4-So in the metaphor, 
'man is a wolf'. man is the tenor, and wolf the 
vehicle. The metaphor is constituted by the 
simultaneous presence and interaction of the tenor and 
vehicle. Ricoeur expresses justified reservations 
about the ability of Richards' theory to distinguish 
adequately between-metaphorical meaning and what we 
could call 'literal' or non-metaphorical meaning. 
moreover, it seems excessive to speak of words as 
abridgements of their contextual meaning, the full 
weight of which is brought to bear on any subsequent 
use of the word: the process of diachronic change, 
with levels of 'stable meaning' in which the word is 
constant in its meaning, requires that we recognise 
limits to the degree to which previous contexts are 
brought into play. The word 'silly', for example, does 
not always bring with it the notion of 'saintly', nor 
does 'influence' require the reader to attend to the 
astrological connotations of the word. 
Richards' description of a metaphor is: 
'When we use a metaphor we have two 
thoughts of different things active 
together and supported by a single work, 
or phrase, whose meaning 4T the 
resultant of their interaction. '- 
Rikhof comments that, although Richards' intention is 
to begin with discourse, and move from there to the 
meaning of words, he simply ends up with a theory of 
word-meaning in which words do not have any fixed 
meaning, 'but the meanings they have are the result of 
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interanimation. 1 in the definition quoted above, the 
resultant meaning can only be the change in the meaning 
of the word or phrase through the interaction of ýthe 
'thoughts of different things' -- a view which seems to 
repeat the view of the Rhetorical Tradition that 
'5- 
metaphor is primarily a change in the meaning of a 
word. As we have indicated, it is better to think of 
metaphor as a predicative operation, rather than as 
something that happens to a word. 
Max Black develops Richards' concentration on the 
structural, features of metaphor, and formulates what he 
calls an 'interaction' theory of metaphor. His 
starting point is that metaphors are sentences or 
expressions 'in which some words are used 
metaphorically while the remainder are used 
non-metaphorically#66 The words used metaphorically are 
called by Black the 'focus' while the remainder of the 
sentence is called the 'frame'. In the metaphor, the 
focal word 'obtains a new meaning which is not quite 
its meaning in literal uses, not quite the meaning 
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which any literal substitute would have The 
interaction is located in the focal word, and Black 
describes this as a 'change of meaning' for an 
'extension of meaning'. However, there are 
difficulties about speaking of a 'change in meaning' of 
a word: it is not clear that one can speak other than 
diachronically of such a change. Nor is it much help 
to speak of a 'change of meaning' for an individual 
occasion; Rikhof comments: 
'The assumption that a word receives a 
new meaning or acquiýres a special 
meaning in these cases is contrary to 
the observation that words retain their 
standard meaning when used in a 
metaphor. This observation corresponds 
to the points already mentioned with 
regard to the order of recognition: the 
ordinary senses of words, distilled from 
past use, are the only ones available. 
The assumption is also incoherent: a 
word does not lose its ordinary 
dictionary sense(s), nor does it 
exchange its sense(s) for another sense 
just for one occasion. #68 
Moreover, as we saw in our discussion of metaphor and 
discourse, only sentences can be said to have meaning 
on particular occasions; words have meanings which are 
specified in particular instances of discourse. 
I ... terms like "occasion" cannot be used in connection 
with word meaning. "Occasion" and "event" are terms 
that belong to sentence meaning., 69 
Black develops an interaction theory which concentrates 
on the functioning of the metaphorical statement, on 
the action of the 'frame' on the 'focal' term. Ricoeur 
outlines Black's proposal: 
'Let our metaphor be, "Man is a wolf. " 
The focus "wolf" operates not on the 
basis of its current lexical meaning, 
but by virtue of the 'system of 
associated commonplaces" -- that is, by 
virtue of the opinions and 
preconceptions to which a reader in a 
linguistic community, by the very fact 
that he speaks, finds himself committed. 
6z : -C-ý This system of commonplaces, added to 
the literal uses of the word, which are 
governed by syntactic and semantic 
rules, forms a system of implications 
that lends itself to more or less easy 
and free invocation. To call a man a 
wolf is to evoke the lupine system of 
associated commonplaces. one speaks 
then of the man in "wolf-language". 
Acting as a filter or screen, "the 
wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, 
emphasises others -- in short, organizes 
our view of man. "v70 
In Black's own words, 'the metaphor works by applying 
to the principal subject a system of "associated 
implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject 
... The metaphor selects, emphasises, suppresses, and 
organizes features of the principal subject by implying 
statements about it that normally apply to the 
subsidiary subject. 
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We have mentioned our reservations about the notion of 
applying the term 'change of meaning' to the focal word 
within a metaphorical statement; other features of 
Black's account give rise to a similar hesitation. For 
example, his account of the system of 'associated 
commonplaces', which organize our view of the principal 
subject, would seem to be applicable principally to 
trivial metaphors lacking in originality. It is not 
clear that Black's account can do justice to new 
metaphors in which there is an original transfer of 
meaning between the elements of the predication. 
Ricoeur comments that Black's account seems inadequate 
when faced with the new configurations of meaning 
arising from metaphor. Black recognises this weakness, 
and in a later article, he speaks of the implicative 
complex of the secondary subject: 
'The making of metaphorical statements 
selects, emphasises, suppresses and 
organizes features of the primary 
subject by applying to it statements 
isomorphic with the members of the 
secondary subject's implicative 
complex... In the context of a 
particular metaphorical statement, the 
two subjects "interact" in the following 
ways: 1) the presence of the primary 
subject incites the hearer to select 
some of the secondary subject's 
properties; and 2) invites him to 
construct a parallel "implicative 
complex" that can fit the primary 
subject; and 3) reciprocally indices 
parallel changes in the secondary 
subject. 1 72 
This is more satisfactory, since it envisages a greater 
degree of interaction between the elements in the 
creation of meaning. Philip Wheelwright's distinction 
between two aspects of metaphor is relevant here: he 
distinguishes between the lepiphoric' and the 
Idiaphoric' dimensions of a metaphor. The epiphoric 
aspect is 'the outreach and extension of meaning 
through comparisonlYThe comparison may be no more than 
what Black calls the 'accepted commonplaces' of the 
subsidiary subject which provide a basis of resemblance 
for the application to the principal subject 
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So, Blake's aphorism, 'Prudence is a rich ugly old maid 
courted by incapacity, ' is partly founded on a 
comparison of the lack of opportunities of both the 
virtue and the old maid. The diaphoric dimension is 
'the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition and 
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synthesis. r-- The insights into the moral life, provided 
by Blake's aphorism extend far beyond the simple 
similarity, into a whole analysis of what may lie 
behind the adoption of a prudential moral position. 
Black recognises this creative dimension of metaphor: 
I ... it would be more illuminating in 
some of these cases to say that the 
metaphor creates the similarity than to 
say that it formulates some similarity 
antecedently existing. 05 
But, how is this new meaning created? Ricoeur answers 
this by depending on Douglas Berggren'S analysis of the 
tensional character of a metaphorical statement: 
I ... as a result of the process of 
metaphorical construing, both the 
principal and the subsidiary subjects 
are transformed and yet preserved. To 
construe life as a play or a dream is 
not only to organise or interpret life 
in different ways, but also to give 
plays and dreams a significance that 
they might otherwise not have. Or, as 
Black correctly argues, "if to call a 
man a wolf is to put him in a special 
light we must not forget that the 
metaphor makes the wolf seem more human 
than he otherwise would. " Yet at the 
same time, if the initial differences 
between the two referents were not 
simultaneously preserved, even while the 
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referents are also being transformed 
into closer alignment, the metaphorical 
character of the construing process 
would be lost. The possibility or 
comprehension of metaphorical construing 
requires, therefore, a peculiar and 
rather sophisticated , intellectual 
ability which W. Bedell Stanford 
metaphorically labels "stereoscopic 
vision": the ability to entertain two 
different points of view at the same 
time. That is to say, the perspectives 
prior to and subsequent to the 
transformation of the metaphor's 
principal and subsidiary subjects must 
both be conjointly maintained. It is 
precisely this transformation of both 
referents, moreover, interacting with 
their normal meanings, which makes it 
ultimately impossible to reduce 
completely the cognitive import of any 
vital metaphor to any set of univocal, 
literal, or non-tensional statements. 
For a special meaning, and in some cases 
a new sort of reality, is achieved which 
cannot survive except at the 
intersection of the two perspectives 
which produced it. v 76 
Berggren's criterion for a vital metaphor is that a 
'reduction of the metaphor's cognitive import to 
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non-tensional statements"'-is impossible: the action of 
construing is necessary because of the interaction of 
what are, at first, incompatible elements brought 
together in the predication; the incompatibility is 
not removed -- there still exists a distinction between 
two elements, and each retains its own connotations and 
normal sense and reference. But for the space of the 
metaphor, the assimilation of the two elements suspends 
their incompatibility in such a way that one can be 
seen as the other. The dialectic of approximation and 




the other, is constitutive of 
metaphor. Ricoeur uses the term 'logical 
contradiction' to point to what Berggren calls the 
'tension' between the constitutive elements of a 
metaphor: 
Now metaphor reveals the logical 
structure of "the similar" because, in 
the metaphorical statement, "the 
similar" is perceived despite 
difference, in spite of contradIZE-tion. 
Resemblance, therefore, is the logical 
category corresponding to the 
predicative operation in which 
"approximation" (bringing close) meets 
the resistance of "being distant". In 
other words, metaphor displays the work 
of resemblance because the logical 
contradiction preserves difference 
within the metaphorical statement. v78 
The incompatibility between the elements of the 
metaphor -- the 'semantic clash' -- is resolved through 
the emergence of an interpretation which makes sense of 
the sentence as a i4hole. This element of 
incompatibility acts as a signal to the reader that a 
metaphorical interpretation is called for, as Le Guern 
points out: 
'Metaphor, on the other hand, on 
condition that it be a living and 
image-triggering metaphor, strikes one 
immediately as being foreign to the 
isotopy of the context in which it is 
inserted ... Semantic incompatibility 
plays the role of a signal that invites 
the receiver to select, among the 
constitutive meaning elements of the 
lexeme, 4 ose not incompatible with the 
context. ' - 
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But Ricoeur goes further than Le Guern and regards the 
tension within the metaphor as more than just a signal 
to the reader: it is the other side of the process by 
which the assimilation of the elements takes place. He 
makes a great deal of the idea of the 'logical 
absurdity' of interpreting the metaphor 'literally'. 
This discussion, common among many writers on metaphor, 
often centres on the way in which the metaphor, if 
taken 'literally', is nonsense. The discussion seems, 
however, to be needlessly complex, and to be something 
of a red herring. The point at stake here is that 
metaphor is, in Barfield's words, 'a deliberate yoking 
of unlikes'-80 The assimilation of the features of the 
statement cannot take place with the same ease as the 
interpretation of a more conventional sentence. But, 
it seems excessive to introduce notions of the 'logical 
absurdity' of a literal interpretation of a metaphor, 
since, in my experience, no one is likely to be 
deceived into taking the metaphor in this way. More to 
the point is the character of metaphor as the 
resolution of the task of bringing two disparate 
semantic areas into a relationship which is 
redescriptive, in a radically new way, of the principal 
referent: 
I ... metaphor is an instantaneous 
creation, a semantic innovation which 
has no status in already established 
language and which only exists because 
of the attribution of an unusual or an 
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unexpected predicate. Metaphor 
therefore is more like the resolution of 
an enigma than a simple association 
based on resemblance; it is constituted 
by the resolution of a semantic 
dissonance. 181 
The creation of metaphorical sense is the disclosure of 
the ways in which the referent can be viewed in the 
light of the associations and connotations of the 
network of signification offered by the predication. 
The internal sense arises out of the transfer of 
descriptive possibilities from one area, in which they 
are customarily employed, to another area where they 
provide a new range of expressive possibilities. What 
is strange about metaphor is its capacity to effect 
this redescription in a way which discloses, within the 
'fictive' mode characteristic of metaphor,?, the referent 
as though it were the subsidiary subject or predicate: 
there is a form ofýliconicl representation. Paul Henle 
highlights -this aspect: he takes an example from 
Keats' poetry: 
'When by my solitary hearth I sit, 
And hateful thoughts enwrap my soul in 
gloom... I 
Henle comments: 
'... there are two distinct situations 
evoked by the second line, the one of 
someone or something enveloping a person 
in something. It may be a cloak or 
blanket or something of the sort. it 
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may be a net in which the person is 
caught or it may even be a monstrous 
web, but, at any rate, it is something 
concrete. The other situation is that 
of hateful thoughts making one gloomy. 
The second is presented in terms of the 
first and this metaphor is developed. In 
terms of quite distinct situations. ' - 
The metaphorical expression 'functions iconically, by 
indirectly designating another similar situation ... 
the thing in focus is thought of as what the icon 
describes. - 
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It. is this which distinguishes metaphor 
from simile, in which the parallelism operates by 
holding the two things separately; in metaphor, 
however, there is an iconic dimension which brings the 
two planes together so that one is seen as the other. 
The referent does not lose its characteristics in this 
process, but rather gains a new figurative sense which 
can be developed to provide an additional, and 
potentially ' rich, vocabulary about the referent. 
Ricoeur elaborates this iconic aspect, by introducing 
Hester's Wittgensteinian analysis of 'seeing as'. 
Hester draws an analogy between Wittgenstein's 
discussion of the duck-rabbit gestalt and the 
interpretation of metaphor. (This is only an analogy, 
since clearly the perceptual aspects of the gestalt and 
the semantic aspects of interpreting metaphor are only 
partially similar. ) Hester labels the duck W, the 
gestalt IBI and the rabbit ICI: 
'In Wittgenstein's example, we are given 
B and the problem is to see A and C. In 
metaphor the problem is different though 
the act of seeing as is similar. 
I 
In 
metaphor we are given A and C and- tiT-e 
problem is to see B. B in the 
duck-rabbit is the common Gestalt form 
between ducks and rabbits. In the 
metaphor B is the relevant sense in 
which A is like C ... In reading 
metaphor with openness we let the image 
auras of A and C play aga nst each other 
in order to discover B. 1 
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Even though this is only an analogy, it is a useful 
image which highlights the assimilation of two distinct 
semantic networks in the metaphor. 'Seeing as' 
designates the event in which the predicative 
assimilation issues in the insight that the 'tenor' can 
be seen as the 'vehicle': the incompatibility between 
the elements of the predication is overcome through 
their approximation in redescribing the referent as the 
predicate. The explication of a metaphor is then the 
enumeration of all the appropriate'senses to be derived 
from this innovative, ' heuristic device. In this 
respect there is a parallel with the role of models in 
scientific thinking. Ricoeur draws on the work of 
Black and Hesse: 
'The central argument is that, with 
respect to the relation to reality, 
metaphor is to poetic language what the 
model is to scientific language. Now in 
scientific language, the model is 
essentially a heuristic instrument that 
seeks, by means of fiction, to break 
down an inadequate interpretation and to 
lay the way for a new, more adequate 
interpretation. 185 
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The parallel can be permitted within certain limits, 
but since the status of models in scientific thinking 
is itself a controversial epistemological question, and 
since- it is unwise to develop 'the comparison too 
strongly, because of the different categories of 
imaginative thought involved, we shall let it remain-at 
the level of a parallel or comparison. As with 
Hester's use of the duck-rabbit gestalt, scientific 
models frequently involve a spatial or perceptual 
dimension: one canýalign this only partially with the 
semantic and verbal aspect of metaphorical predication. 
However, one can say that metaphors do permit a range 
of systematic observations, based on the transfer of 
connotations from the subsidiary to the principal 
subject, which is analogous to the role of scientific 
models; it may be doubted, however, whether metaphors 
can be said to have the explanatory and comprehensive 
role of models. Ricoeur relates scientific models to a 
'metaphoric network', rather than to the isolated 
metaphorical statement: 
'What on the poetic side corresponds 
exactly to the model is not precisely 
what we have called the "metaphorical 
statement", that is, a short bit of 
discourse reduced most often to a 
sentence. Rather, as the model consists 
in a complex network of statements, its 
exact analogue would be the extended 
metaphor -- tale, allegory. What 
Toulmin calls the "systematic 
-deployability" of the model finds its 
equivalent in a metaphoric network and 
not in an isolated metaphor. ' 86 
We might think, for example, of the extended 
metaphorical scheme found in the poem by Emily 
Dickinson we discussed earlier, as an example of the 
deployability of the redescriptive metaphorical 
network, analogous to the organising ability of a 
scientific model. The capacity of metaphor to shape a 
range of systematic descriptions in a coherent 
developed manner is characteristic of what Ricoeur, 
following Pepper, calls a 'root metaphor': 
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a rich and 
generative metaphor which can be developed and extended 
in a controlled fashion, in a whole range of statements 
which proceed from the dynamic established by the 
initial image. We need look only at the Christological 
image of Jesus as 'Son', and at the theological image 
of 'begetting', to find an example of an. image which 
shapes discussion in a developed and systematic manner, 
offering the capacity for ontological and philosophical 
clarification across the whole range of Christological 
and Trinitarian thought. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study of metaphor has presented metaphorical, 
predication as a, conjunction and interaction of- two 
'networks', brought together in such a way as to enable 
the reader to see the principal subject as the other 
subsidiary subject. It is one of the ways in which a 
new set of descriptions can be developed, in the light 
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of which the principal subject can be described in 
terms which otherwise would not have been used. In 
what way is this analysis applicable to Christological 
pre-existence language? 
First of all, we should note the figurative basis of 
the predication. The term 'Pre-existence' is a 
shorthand form, used to encapsulate a series of 
descriptions of Jesus, such as 'Wisdom', 'Logos', 'Son 
of man't 'he who comes from above', and a series of 
things said about him in conjunction with these 
phrases, such as 'through him all'things were made', or 
'in him all things were created', or 'he is before all 
things'. These descriptions and phrases involve, in 
their application to Jesus, 'seeing him' in terms which 
are strangely 'different'. It is likely, for example, 
that before the notion of 'pre-existence' crystallised 
in Christological language, there were descriptive 
procedures employed which spoke of Jesus in these 
terms, inviting the hearer or reader, for example, to 
think of Jesus as Wisdom, as the one who had been 
present in the heavenly realm, as the Son of Man given 
authority in Daniel 7, as the one who had been with God 
until the appointed time. All of these involve a 
procedure which is analogous to-that found in the 
structure of metaphor, in which a principal subject 
(Jesus) is seen as a subsidiary subject (concisely, a 
1pre-existent' one, although covering a range of 
hypostatic identities, such as angel, Wisdom, word, 
mediator of creation). It is beyond the scope of our 
study to delineate the genesis and the variety of New 
Testament formulations; it is sufficient to point to 
the way in which these Christological expressions can 
be presented as metaphorical in character. 
Secondly, we would point to the tension which exists 
between the connotations of Jesus as a particular 
temporal existent, and the connotations applied to him 
by a predication which considers him in pre- or 
supra-temporal terms. The transfer of the new set of 
predicates to the referent involves allowing them to 
shape the way in which we see Jesus: they become an 
additional and radically innovative descriptive network 
which can be developed in order to speak differently 
about him. The incompatibility of the predication with 
what would normally be considered readily acceptable 
language about a temporal existent, is analogous to the 
way in which, in metaphor, a quite different set of 
connotations ai? e introduced as descriptive of the 
referent. The task of construing the metaphor involves 
the creation of a metaphorical sense in which the new 
connotations are taken to be redescriptive of the 
referent which, in this process, does not lose its 
already known characteristics, but rather gains a new 
set of predicates from the image. 
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Thirdly, metaphor involves both a figurative element -- 
that of 'fictive' portrayal -- and, as part of the 
process of specifying the senses to be drawn from the 
metaphor, a consequent determination of the 
redescriptive possibilities offered by the new 
predication. We saw the way in which, in Emily 
Dickinson's poem, and in Stokes' aphorism, the original 
metaphor can organise and stimulate discussion of the 
referent in terms drawn from the image: the soul' can 
be discussed through a consideration of the images of 
decaying machinery in Dickinson's poem, and the moral 
experiences of emptiness and loss, in Stokes' aphorism, 
can be illuminated by the image of the lightning flash 
across the waste land. The reader is thus enabled to 
develop the implications of these metaphors in his 
appropriation of their application to the matters under 
discussion. Similarly, the consideration of 
pre-existence language, as we shall see, gives rise to 
an account of the identity of Jesus as 'eternal Son', 
which makes it possible to develop a Christology along 
these lines, in conjunction with a revision of 
theological language in Trinitarian terms. The 
figurative presentation is the occasion for the 
emergence of a consideration of the identity of Jesus 
in ontological terms: the capacity to oscillate 
between figurative and more conceptual reflection is 
part of the semantic contribution which metaphor makes 
to language. 
It is, of course, possible to consider pre-existence 
language in other hermeneutical terms. Our choice of 
metaphor is guided by the presence within pre-existence 
language of a 'visual' or figurative dimension, which 
sees Jesus as a pre-existent One, by the tension 
between his status as a temporal existent, considered 
as a pre- or supra-temporal existent through the 
predication, and by the capacity of this way of 
speaking about him to generate a whole range of 
considerations about his identity arising out of this 
image. While other ways of viewing pre-existence 
language are possible, nevertheless, there are 
sufficient indications that this way of examining the 
character and dynamic of the language may be fruitful. 
Pre-existence Language and_Metaphorical Predication 
Let us begin with a problem which occurs in the Gospel 
of Mark: 
'And as Jesus taught in the temple, he 
said, "How can the scribes say that the 
Christ is the Son of David? D&vid 
himself inspired by the Holy Spirit, 
declared, 
'The Lord said to my Lord, 
Sit at my right hand, 
till I put thy enemies under thy feet. ' 
David himself calls him Lord; so how is 
he his son? "' (Mk. 12.35-37) 
The editorial redaction comments that'the great throng 
heard him gladly, but does not indicate that the throng 
felt that the incompatibility of the two metaphors had 
been resolved for them. For indeed in the logion, the 
two metaphors are not taken to be compatible: one is 
taken to be more significant, to the exclusion of the 
other. The 'designation of Lord as the determinative 
interpretation of 'the Christ' is given priority over 
the less satisfactory designation Son of David. The 
logion suggests that the clash between the two 
metaphors, which is surely to be taken as a clash 
between Christologies with conflicting connotations, 
should be resolved through the affirmation of the 
priority of one, Lord, over the other, Son of David. 
The roots of the conflict in the Markan and pre-Markan 
communities are lost to us; the matter is further 
complicated by the fact that the Royal Davidic 
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character of Jesus is a major theme of the Markan 
Passion narrative which follows -- so it is not as 
though Mark eschews Davidic overtones in his 
presentation of Jesus-i The problem, as posed by the 
logion and solved in its own cryptic way, concerns the 
hermeneutics of diverse metaphors applied to Jesus: 
how can they be harmonised in a way which allows some 
consistency in the interpretation of who Jesus I is, if 
they present connotations both of inferiority and 
superiority to David? The solution offered is the 
choice of one in preference to the other. 
This is not the end of the story, however: the same 
interpretative nexus of Christ, Son of David, Lord, and 
the person of David, occurs again in the sermon of 
Peter at Pentecost in Acts 2.29-36: 
'Brethren, I may say to you confidently 
of the patriarch David that he both died 
and was buried, and his tomb is with us 
to this day. Being therefore a prophet, 
and knowing that God had sworn an oath 
to him that he would set one of his 
descendants upon his throne, he foresaw 
and spoke of the resurrection of the 
Christ, that he was not abandoned to 
Hades, nor did his flesh see corruption. 
This Jesus God raised up, and of that we 
all are witnesses. Being therefore 
exalted at the right hand of God, and 
having received from the Father the 
promise of the Holy Spirit, he has 
poured out this which you see and hear. 
For David himself did not ascend into 
the heavens; but he himself says, 
"The Lord said to my Lord, 
Sit at my right hand, 
till I make thy enemies a stool for thy 
feet. " 
Let all the house of Israel therefore 
know assuredly that God has made him 
both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom 
you crucified. ' 
But this time, there is an acceptance of two different 
metaphors: the first, the Christ, is justified by an 
appeal to the prophecy of David that the statements of 
Psalm 16, which precedes our quotation, refer to a 
descendant of David, and not to David himself (v. 29). 
The second metaphor, that of Lord, is justified by 
interpreting Psalm 110 with reference to the exaltation 
of Jesus in the resurrection. Thus descent from David 
and Lordship are not treated as mutually exclusive and 
competing predicates. 2 
The differences between the two treatments of 
metaphorical compatibility are worth pursuing: in the 
first instance, the Markan logion has no way of 
adjusting the perspective in which the metaphors are 
placed, but in the passage from Acts, the-resurrection, 
with the contrasting death of the patriarch which 
proves that the quoted Psalms cannot refer to David 
himself, is used to validate the double, designations of 
Christ and Lord: the rescuing of Jesus-from corruption 
and his exaltation at the right hand of the Father -- 
two aspects of the resurrection kerygma -- are the 
instances which confirm the use of the two metaphors. 
The more sophisticated interpretation of the sermon in 
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Acts resolves the impasse disclosed in the simple 
opposition of the metaphors in the Markan logion. The 
difference clearly lies in the framework within which 
the relationship of the metaphors is considered: the 
simple contrast of the metaphors in the Markan logion 
allows no rapprochement at the level of a higher 
viewpoint, whereas in the treatment in Acts, the 
reference point of the resurrection, and the evaluation 
of the patriarch David as a prophet speaking, not of 
himself, but of one of his descendants, enables the 
double metaphor to be treated at a higher level of 
organised description. 
Another example of contrasting NT passages can be found 
in the ways in which the Gospel of Luke establishes and 
values the Davidic Sonship of Jesus, 'while, on the 
other hand, the Gospel of John treats, it as of no 
importance -- in fact the implication in the Fourth 
Gospel is that those who try to understand Jesus in 
this way are deluded. We shall take it that the Lucan 
treatment is well known and uncontroversial; John's 
treatment of the theologoumenon, however, requires from 
the reader that he read the signs, implicit in the 
narration, of the inability of the Jews to reach the 
required understanding of the origin and identity of 
Jesus. only the person who knows that Jesus 'comes 
from above' can identify him: this is the ironical, 
unspoken theme of the Johannine pericope: 1 
'When they heard these words, some of 
the people said, "This is really the 
prophet". others said, "This is the 
Christ". But some said, "Is the Christ 
to come from Galilee? Has not the 
scripture said that the Christ is 
descended from David, and comes from 
Bethlehem, the village where David was? " 
So there was a division among the people 
over him. ' (in. 7.40-3) 
These Christologoumena simply exhibit the confusion of 
the crowd in their directionless questioning about the 
identity of Jesus. He himself is absent from their 
discussion, and no resolution of the conflicting proof 
texts is offered -- a furthei indication of the 
futility of such 'searching of the scriptures' (5.39) 
unless one is given the gift of being born from above 
(3.3), and is thus able to interpret Jesus from the 
point of view of heavenly revelation. The 
Christologoumena are thus presented as 
counter-testimonies, to be contrasted with Jesus' own 
teaching about where he comes from and who he is 
(7.28-9). Here, too, as in our other example, the 
significance of the metaphors is dependent on the 
framework within which they are placed, and on the 
Ability of the reader 
'to 
evaluate individual 
metaphorical elements within the context of the work as 
a whole. 
Our examples have raised the question of the ways in 
which, by an adjustment of the framework within which 
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metaphors are interpreted, their meaning is altered. 
More importantly for our purpose, compatibility between 
metaphors, or conversely, incompatibility between them, 
is dependent' on the presence of a structure which 
permits or negates their simultaneous predication. In 
the contrast between Mark and Acts, the adoption of a 
higher viewpoint allows the simultaneous use of 
metaphors which, at a lower level, were felt to be 
incompatible; in the Johannine passsage, the complex 
of the Davidic and Messianic significance of Jesus is 
presented as fruitless, unless one proceeds from the 
controlling testimony of the Johannine Jesus about 
himself -- then these other metaphors can be 
incorporated as significant, because they are 
subordinated to another explanatory Christological 
scheme. 4 
The question we have uncovered is the relationship 
between a metaphor and the framework within which it 
occurs. we can relate this to our discussion in the 
first chapter of the Aristotelian examination of the 
features of tragedy: the features of LEXIS contribute 
to the MYTHOS of the drama, which in turn is related to 
the MIMESIS at which it aims. There is an 
interdependence between aspects of a work, which 
requires that the workings of the individual features 
of a work be considered in the light of their 
contribution to the work as a whole; 'equally, and just 
as importantly, the work as a whole acts as an 
interpretative framework within which the individual 
features gain a particular significance and meaning 
from the perspective of-the total character of a work. 
Imagery in a tragedy can only be appreciated in the 
light of the whole complex of the MYTHOS of the work, 
and the differences between the same images in 
different plays results from the contexts in, which they 
are used. 
There is, no need to rehearse in detail the. arguments we 
produced earlier to show that the character of metaphor 
shares in this dependence on the wider context: , we 
have shown that metaphor is not the use of one word to 
stand for another; nor is it to be thought of as a 
word-centred phenomenon., It exists in the wider 
context of a predication, in which the disposition of 
thought in a sentence is the requirement for 
metaphorical meaning to exist at all, and it involves 
the presentation of a particular description of a 
referent in the light of a particular predication which 
stands in tension with it. The dependence of metaphor 
on the wider context of the predication is the first 
instance of its dependence on context for its meaning. 
Its character as a 'context-centred' use of language 
requires that it be viewed in the light of the wider 
context in which it is placed, and to which it 
contributes its particular quality. 
The dependence of metaphors, especially potentially 
competing metaphors, on the structure within which they 
operate, raises the question of the character of the 
structure and how it is to be viewed. At this point, 
we turn to a distinction made by Northrop Frye about 
the two different ways in which the totality of a work, 
its MYTHOS, can be handled. He points to two 
operations which are part of the art of reading a text: 
the first stage is that of sequential readin_q, in which 
the flow of the narrative is followed from the 
beginning, through the middle, right to the end, with 
attention being paid to the exposition or unfolding of 
the linear quality of a work. The second operation 
involves reading the text as a unit, as a composite 
whole, grasped in its totality. It is at this level 
that the process of considering the relationship of the 
individual elements of a text to the text as a whole 
takes place; simultaneously, there is a review of the 
quality of the individual elements in the light of the 
work as a whole -- thus, a two-way process takes place 
in this second operation: 
'once a verbal structure is read, and 
reread often enough to be possessed, it 
"freezes". It turns into a unity in 
which all parts exist at once, which we 
can then examine like a picture, without 
regard to the specific movement of the 
narrative ... A great mass of additional detail that we missed in the sequential 
reading then becomes relevant, because 
all the images are metaphorically linked 
with all the other images, not merely 
with those that follow each other in the 
narrative. 95 
Frye applies this to the Bible as a whole: the act of 
reading it sequentially, from the act of creation to 
the emergence of a new heaven and a new earth, is 
related to the 'mythical' character of narrative, while 
the act of reading it as a simultaneous unit, is 
related to its 'metaphorical' character, as the 
creation of a complex verbal structure whose 
inter-relationships within its text present a 
centripetally dynamic sense: 
'If we read the Bible sequentially, the 
Bible becomes a myth, first by 
tautology, in the sense in which all 
myths are mythoi or narratives, and 
second in a more specific sense of being 
a narrative with the specially 
significant material that we find in all 
mythologies ..... If we freeze the Bible into a simultaneous unit, it becomes a 
single, gigantic, complex metaphor, 
first by tautology, in the 'sense in 
which all verbal structures are 
metaphorical by juxtaposition, 'and 
second, in a more specific sense of 
containing a structure of significantly 
repeated images. o6 
our interest in this distinction between the sequential 
reading of a text and the reading of it as a 
simultaneous unit lies in its implications for the 
relationship between metaphors and the structure within 
which they operate. Frye characterises sequential 
7 
reading as 'pre-criticallr-- as a form of reading in 
which the whole structure of a work has not yet been 
grasped in a way which permits the assessment of the 
q2, 
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relationship of the part to the whole. The operation 
of reading the text as a unit, however, is precisely 
the means by which the appropriation of the influence 
of the part on the whole, and conversely, of the whole 
on the part, takes place: it is this operation which 
permits the evaluation of the significance of the 
metaphor in its particular structure, which enables the 
reader to determine the contribution, and the sense, of 
the metaphor-. Prior to the grasp of the totality of 
the work, the evaluation of the individual elements 
which compose the work cannot, be undertaken. 
Consequently, the evaluation of metaphor is dependent 
upon the contribution of the whole structure to the 
working of particular metaphorical predications within 
the structure. The consideration of an individual 
metaphor will be incomplete and inadequate as long as 
this task, the act of reading the whole structure as a 
unit, remains to be performed. 
How do these, comments relate to the use of 
pre-existence language? There is a parallel between 
the dilemma presented in the Markan logion between the 
compatibility of 'Son of David' and 'Lord', and the 
dilemma described by several critics with regard to the 
compatibility of pre-existence language and an 
affirmation of the full humanity of Jesus. The Markan 
logion suggested that you could have one of the 
predicates, and it prefers the use of 'Lord', but you 
q5 
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cannot have both, since they do not cohere with one 
another. Similarly, the criticism has been offered 
that you can have either pre-existence language or the 
full humanity of Jesus, but you cannot successfully 
have both. And so, our question will focus on the 
validity of these objections by considering the ways in 
which several commentators present this 
incompatibility. As we shall see, the problem in their 
objections is the absence of a structure within which 
both pre-existence language and an affirmation of the 
full humanity of Jesus can be maintained satisfactorily 
and complementarily. We shall suggest that the issue 
with regard to pre-existence language is incorrectly 
posed when it is framed in terms of an incompatibility 
between the predicates, in the absence of a structure 
which permits a coherent and discriminatory use of both 
predicates. The real point is not the conflict between 
the predicates, but the character of the structure 
which can be developed out of the pre-existence 
metaphor. As we shall see later, the structure which 
permits the predications to cohere involves a mutually 
reinforcing redescription of both God and Jesus, a 
circular process in which the features established in 
one area are brought to bear in the other area. But 
first of all, we shall consider the critics who block 
this process. 
John Knox presents the case against pre-existence 
language with great clarity. He describes the 
development of New Testament Christology as a movement 
away from the most primitive, and, in his opinion, 
perfectly adequate adoptionism, in which the man Jesus 
is exalted to an exalted status of Lordship at the 
Resurrection. out of this grew the second form of 
Christology, a kenotic Christology, in which 'a divine 
being empties himself of his divine nature and status 
and becomes a man, who then in virtue of some 
characteristic or achievement of his human career is 
exalted, just as in the earlier story, to the same high 
office. 18 This Christology, however, although intended 
to be a prologue to the human story of Jesus, grounded 
in a desire to locate Jesus in God's eternal plan, is 
such a strong pattern that it reshapes the 
Christological field by threatening to undermine the 
reality of Jesus' humanity: kenoticism begets 
docetism. 
'Once that ascription was made, however, 
it is clear that only two possibilities 
remained -- kenoticism and docetism. 
Either a divine being (called by 
whatever name), in an act of self-giving 
incomparably radical and 'complete, 
became a human being, one of us in all 
respects, or else he appeared to do so. 
There is no middle space. 19 
Unfortunately, according to Knox, we cannot assert that 
this divine being' became one of us in all respects, 
q! T 
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since the predication of pre-existence so qualifies the 
humanity of Jesus that it ceases to be recognizably a 
humanity which is ours: 
'Manhood, to be sure, has been affirmed 
of him, but, generally speaking, it has 
been so amplified, supplemented, or 
otherwise altered as no longer to be 
recognizable as the manhood we know. In 
our formal christologies, however truly 
"human" Jesus is alleged to have been 
according to some chosen, and possibly 
defensible, definition of that term, he 
has not been regarded as human in the 
ordinarily accepted sense, as being a 
man "like his brethren in all 
respects".... If it is true that the 
belief in the pre-existence of Jesus is 
incompatible with a belief in his 
genuine normal humanity, then it is 
clear that an affirmative answer to our 
questions about the humanity will 
require some reassessment of that 
belief. ' 10 
A final quotation from Knox will complete our 
presentation of his case: 
I ... there is no way of distinguishing Jesus' humanity as different from ours, 
whether in its origins, its structure, 
or its quality, whether in virtue of 
something added to it or taken from it, 
whether as regards its actuality or its 
potentiality -- there is no way of 
distinguishing Jesus' humanity from ours 
which does not deny the reality of his 
manhood in every sense which makes the 
affirmation of it significant. But the 
idea that Jesus' existence as a man was 
in some self-conscious way continuous 
with his earlier existence as a heavenly 
being -- and this is surely what has 
usually been meant by "pre-existence" -- 
this idea does distinguish his humanity 
from ours... We can have the humanity 
without the pre-existence and we can 
have the pre-existence without the 
humanity. There is absolutely no way of 
having both. 111 
Let us identify the blockages in Knox's interpretation: 
first of all, the proposal that pre-existence language 
and the humanity of Jesus are mutually exclusive comes 
from his resistance to any qualification of the 
humanity of Jesus which might, in any sense, remove his 
humanity from the category of our humanity. As Stephen 
Sykes has shown, principally against John Robinson, the 
action of affirming the humanity of Jesus is not the 
assertion of an empirical fact, free from theological 
judgments. L2 The business of Christology requires some 
specification of the difference of Jesus. To assume, 
as Knox does, that, first of all, we know what we mean 
by 'humanity', and, secondly, that an unspecified 
descriptive term such as 'the humanity of Jesus' will 
suffice for Christological inquiry, is to betray 
considerable myopia. Even within his own terms, some 
understanding of what is meant by 'humanity', in its 
capacity to be 'exalted' at the resurrection, is 
required if he is to be able to speak of the humanity 
of Jesus becoming 'a divine and divinely redeeming 
thing'13at the resurrection. Knox's reluctance to 
postulate the divinity of Jesus prior to the 
resurrection leads him to redefine the divinity of 
Jesus as a 'transformed, a redeemed and redemptive, 
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humanity'-L4 Such formulations, according to Knox, are 
'not in the least incompatible with the acceptance of 
the full reality and normality of his earthly manhood', 
although to an untutored eye, they seem to pose as many 
problems as those he tries to avoid. One can only with 
difficulty collapse divinity-statements into 
humanity-statements, and, at the same time, avoid the 
Feuerbachian chasm. 
Secondly, Knox cannot find a way of avoiding viewing 
the Incarnation either as a metamorphosis,, which would 
defeat the purpose of Incarnational language, or as a 
synthesis of divine and human natures, which would 
compromise the integrity of Jesus' life as a man, or as 
a continuity of self-consciousness of a divine being, 
which would be logically impossible to reconcile with 
human growth. All of these options are mythological, 
and are excluded by the Chalcedonian definition. 
Knox's reading of orthodoxy is Apollinarian and 
Eutychean, and he would presumably share 
Schleiermacher's way of approaching the question: 
... how can the unity of life coexist 
with the duality of natures unless one 
gives way to the other, if the one 
exhibits a larger and the other a 
narrower range, or unless they melt into 
each other, both systems of ways of 
action and laws really becoming one in 
the one life? -- if indeed we are 
speaking of a person, i. e. of an Ego 
which is the same in all moments of its 
existence. 115 
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Thirdly, Knox works with an undefined notion of the 
Trinitarian character of God's being: he admits some 
'complexity'16(j) in God, part of which complexity is 
the Logos, 'the self-expressive activity of God', 'God 
himself continuously and everywhere acting to create 
and redeem'17 which was active in the human life of 
Jesus, but is not to be thought of as identical with 
Jesus in any hypostatic sense: 
'.. the reality of the Logos was fully 
present in the Event of which the human 
life of Jesus was the centre and 
therefore pre-eminently in that human 
life itself, but without being simply 
identical with Jesus. 118 
Knox goes on to say that 'we cannot simply identify 
Jesus, for all his importance, with one of the 
"Persons" of the Trinity', because 'that belief would 
be as formidable an obstacle to our acceptance of the 
full authenticity of his humanity on earth as the 
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doctrine of his pre-existence can be. -4 Knox works with 
a circle of interpretation which moves between the two 
poles of saying that the humanity of Jesus must be 
completely like us in all respects, and this excludes 
the notion that God, in the mode of being of the Son, 
can exist as a completely human person, and of saying 
that God is such that his relationship to creation 
precludes his capacity to enter into the conditions of 
his creation while remaining himself. 
These three points are the staple diet of the opponents 
of pre-existence language: it is incompatible with the 
humanity of Jesus, resulting in docetism or 
monophysitism; the pattern of the union of the eternal 
Son with the human person Jesus is incoherent and 
logically unthinkable; it compromises monotheism, by 
which is usually meant Unitarianism. Geoffrey Lampe's 
attack on pre-existence language is based on these 
three points; his vigorous retrieval of the 
possibilities of a Spirit theology and a Spirit 
Christology is, however, marred by an impatience and 
tiredness with orthodox formulas. Arguing that 'God 
has always been incarnate in human creatures, forming 
their spirits from within and revealing himself in and 
through them, w20he presents Jesus as the highest 
actualisation of the communion of God as Spirit with 
the human spirit. With this model 'we do not need the 
model of a descent of a pre-existent divine person into 
the world: 121 
'When Jesus is identified with the 
pre-existent Son, belief in a true 
incarnation of God in Jesus is weakened. 
Not only does it become harder, as we 
have said, to recognize that it is truly 
God himself, and not his partner (1) 
whom we encounter in Jesus; it also 
becomes more difficult to ascribe 
authentic humanity to the God-man., 22 
Lampe argues that the human nature of a divine person 
'can scarcely be human in the same sense in which the 
too 
human nature of a human person is humanLL- the first 
point we highlighted in Knox's treatment. Moreover, 
according to Lampe, the concept of the' pre-existent Son 
assuming human nature 'involves the idea that the will 
of this divine person is a divine will, but that he has 
assumed a second will belonging to his human nature and 
24 
added this to his own personal pre-existent will., The 
logic, then, would be to change Jesus' prayer in 
Gethsemane from 'not my will, but thine' to 'not my 
human will, but my divine will'25- the incoherence of 
the language of Incarnation, as in Knox. The root of 
the problem, according to Lampe, is the transposition 
of the human qualities of Jesus onto a hypostatised and 
anthropomorphically conceived Logos-Wisdom within the 
being of God, which vitiates monotheism: 
'God the Son is conceptualised as Jesus 
the Son of God; the obedience of Jesus, 
the Servant and Son of God, the true 
Adam indwelt and inspired by God the 
Spirit, is attributed to God the Son; 
God the Son becomes eternally the 
subject of Jesus' self-dedication to his 
Father's will, and eternally the object 
of the Father's love which Jesus 
experienced so fully and communicated in 
turn to those who shared his own 
discipleship. This means in effect the 
abandonment of monotheism, for such a 
relation between God the Son and God the 
Father is incompatible with the 
requirement of monotheism that we 
predicate of God one mind, one will, and 
one single operation. @26 
Such a transposition of the relationship of Jesus to 
the Father into an intra-Trinitarian relationship 
vitiates the significance of the prayer of the man 
Jesus in Gethsemane, which is 'a disclosure of God 
inspiring and moving and acting through the mind and 
will, the conscience and the resolution of a 
consecrated man in a human situation. E7 To -introduce 
this relationship into the being of God is to engage in 
inconsistency -- because the Son would have to be 
'essentially other than the Father' -- and, at the same 
time, it is to remove from the human realm the 
'archetypal revelation of the manner in which God acts 
in and through the spirit of man'2.8- Lampe's conclusion 
is that the use of pre-existence language leads to an 
impenetrable complexity in God which cannot be 
reconciled with the requirements of a monotheistic 
faith, and, at the same time, it leads to an 
undermining of the humanity of Jesus, thus removing him 
from the -realm of the recognisably 
human. The 
metaphor, therefore, gets out of control, and dictates 
an interpretaion of the being of God which is 
destructive of his simplicity; secondly, it 
establishes a misleading pattern of the action of God 
by making God's action with regard to Jesus 
qualitatively different from his action in the rest of 
humanity; thirdly, it presents Jesus as 'a kind of 
invader from outer space. v29 
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Such an onslaught, goes beyond the criticism Rahner 
levels at the ways in which Chalcedonian Christology 
fosters a monophysitism in Christian piety and 
attitudes: in Lampe's view, it is not that when it is 
badly understood, it is subversive of Christian belief, 
but that the pattern itself, speaking of Jesus as the 
incarnation of God in his mode of being as Son, is 
wrong, inconsistent, and should be abandoned. The 
implications of pre-existence language are too 
dangerous to 'be allowed any further life 'in the 
Christian community. 
What has gone wrong with the handling of pre-existence 
language in Knox and Lampe? Firstly, both of them 
stumble over the Christological pattern in which a 
pre-existent referent, the Son or Logos, I is brought 
into unity with a human being or a human nature. They 
read this pattern, sequentially, 'from above to below', 
to use the much overrated distinction. Consequently, 
they balk at the difficulty of trying to make 'one plus 
one equal one. ' Later we shall adopt a modified version 
of Pannenberg's proposals as a way of avoiding the 
logical and semantic impasses which face Knox and 
Lampe. It is not clear 'that the predication of 
pre-existence need follow this route within the 
Christological arena. 
Secondly, both of them present highly distorted 
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versions of Incarnational Christology. it is 
remarkable how frequently in contemporary theology 
ancient heresies surface as expositions of the very 
doctrine which was intended to refute them. The 
mysterious margin between God's life and his creation 
is crossed by Knox and Lampe, in their interpretation 
of Incarnational doctrine, in the most crude fashion. 
They share this with the writers of 'The Myth of God 
Incarnate', whose interpretation of Incarnational 
language confounds their claim to be skilled readers, 
versed in metaphor and imagery. Lampe and Knox 
understand the images of 'taking', 'becoming', 
'assuming', 'being united with', in the most crudely 
literalistic fashion, denoting actions which correspond 
to either a process of fusion (Eutyches), synthesis 
(Apollinaris) or metamorphosis (monophysitism). Both 
fail to take seriously the quadruple adverbs of the 
Chalcedonian definition -- 'without confusion, without 
change, without division, without separation' -- as 
regulative both of the Christological mystery and of 
the relationship of God to hisý creation. In 
Grillmeier's words: 
'The Chalcedonian unity of person in-the 
distinction of the natures provides the 
dogmatic basis for the preservation of 
the divine transcendence, which must 
always be a feature of the Christian 
concept of God. But it also shows the 
possibility of a complete immanence of 
God in our history, an immanence on 
which the biblical doctrine of the 
ý p30 economy of salvation rests. - 
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Thirdly, Trinitarian theology receives rough treatment 
from them for its incoherence and its violation of 
monotheism. Lampe, in particular, interprets 
Trinitarian thinking as polytheistic and misconceived, 
arising from an illegitimate transposition or 
projection of theýdistinctively human response of Jesus 
to God into an intra-divine realm, in which the human 
is lost from view. 
I ... the characteristic attitudes of 
Jesus to God are ascribed to the eternal 
Son. This concept of the Son is then 
read back again, by a reverse process, 
into the context of the Gospels and 
applied to the historical Jesus, so that 
his sonship comes to be understood as a 
reflection of the eternal sonship of the 
Logos-Son. 1-31 
According 
32 to Lampe, Trinitarian language relocates the 
human-divine interchange of Jesus and God within an 
intra-divine realm in which the human dimension of the 
relationship becomes lost from view. The higher 
modality of Trinitarian relationships undermines the 
original focus of the human-divine communication, which 
is located in the experience of Jesus; the result is 
that the descriptive categories of pre-existence 
language give rise to an account of a relationship 
between two divine beings, the Son and the 'Father, 
which cannot be maintained in conjunction with our 
account of the human-divine relationship of the 
historical Jesus and God. But if, in the above 
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quotation, we replace the phrase 'ascribed to the 
eternal Son', which implies that the eternal Son is a 
different referent from Jesus, by the phrase 'seen as 
those of the eternal Son', in which the introduction of 
the category of 'eternal Son' is the introduction of a 
different referring expression, rather than a different 
referent, then the perspective is altered. Trinitarian 
language is then less a matter of the introduction of a 
reality which '. reflects' that which takes place in the 
history of Jesus: it becomes, rather, a way of 
describing that which-takes place there, by means of 
different referring expressions, rooted in the 
metaphorical character of pre-existence language. 
Language of eternal Sonship is more a matter of 
introducing different 'senses' or 'referring 
expressions' which refer to the communication between 
Jesus and the Father, than a matter of describing a 
different 'referent, to be distinguished from this 
communication. Lampe's interpretation, and rejection, 
of Trinitarian language derives from the 'reflection' 
model in which there are two distinct realities -- that 
which occurs between the eternal Son and the Father, 
and that which occurs between Jesus and the Father -- 
set side by side, in apparent competition with one 
another. But if, instead, the introduction of 'eternal 
sonshipl language is regarded as a way of describing 
Jesus, as the introduction of a metaphorically based, 
referring expression, as the creation of a particular 
'sense' to be applied to the single referent, Jesus, 
then the duality and 'reflection' pattern, criticised 
by Lampe, can be avoided. 
Against the views of Knox and Lampe, we shall propose 
that pre-existence language is to be taken, within 
Christological speech, as descriptive of Jesus, as a 
predication which stands in a relationship to the 
referent, Jesus, which can be described as 
metaphorical. The predication of pre-existence does 
not establish a referent distinct from Jesus, such as 
eternal Son or Logos, who must then be brought into 
union with the historical existent, Jesus. Nor should 
it be used in a way which suggests that such a 
combination of referents is taking place. Schoonenberg 
sees this clearly; though we shall have reservations 
about his argument when he discusses the Trinitarian 
question, he is correct to insist Christologically that 
the referent cannot be other than Jesus: 
'Consequently, everything that is said 
about his (Jesus') divinity Fn-his 
pre-exTs--tence isdone i-n connection with 
Jesus Christ, and nothing is said 
outside this connection... Thus we can 
say that everything about the Son, even 
in his pre-existence, must be 
interpreted only in connection with the 
concrete God-man. 
It is now only a matter of drawing a 
conclusion- from, this association, 
namely, that what is contained in 
scripture, tradition and the teaching 
magisterium, on the divine and 
pre-existent person of the Son can never 
tol 
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be in conflict with what is preached 
about Jesus Christ. Thus it cannot be 
in conflict with the most primary views 
on Christ, which we have previously 
stated, that he is one person and that 
he is a human person. What is said of 
the pre-existent person can never 
nullify this One and human person. We 
must then never conceive the divine 
person as added to the man Jesus in such 
a way that Christ would no longer be 
one, or no longer man. Q3 
The simple Fregean distinction between sense and 
reference is as corrective to the misinterpretations 
which can arise in this context: language about the 
pre-existence of Jesus is the creation of a particular 
sense or meaning applied to the one referent Jesus, not 
the introduction of a new referent into the field of 
view. What of the Christological texts which speak of 
the Logos or Son 'assuming' flesh or human nature, or 
entering into unity with the humanity of Christ? This 
has been the dominant form in. which pre-existence 
language has been given expression in Christology. 
Within the discussion of metaphorical language, we have 
proposed that the wider context of an indi vidual 
, stylistic' feature depends upon the interpretation of 
the text as a whole; applying this to the narrative 
patterns of Christological texts which move 'from 
above' to 'below'. we might propose that it is not 
clear that such texts necessarily imply a distinction 
of referents, since narrative structures have their own 
stylistic features. This point should be seen in 
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connection with Northrop Frye's distinction between the 
two acts of reading: sequential reading, in which the 
text flows from one point to the next, and which is 
precritical in that the individual items are not yet 
seen in the light of the internal coherence and sense 
(MYTHOS) of the whole. This contrasts with the act of 
reading the text as a unit, in which the contribution 
of the individual items, and consequently their meaning 
as part of a unitary narrative, is evaluated in the 
light of the structure within which they are framed. 
Sequential reading is part of the second operation, and 
achieves its value only insofar as it contributes to 
the grasp of the text as a whole 34 
Now, if we apply this distinction to the way in which 
pre-existence language functions, the suggestion may be 
made that the relationship between, for example, the 
first stage of a Christological pattern, e. g., the 
Eternal Son in his relationship to the Father, and the 
second stage, the Eternal Son in his incarnate human 
condition, will be inadequately treated as long as the 
reading of this narrative is an act of sequential 
reading. The handling of pre-existence language is 
bedevilled by the inherent tendency of the language to 
focus attention on the succession of steps between one 
stage and the other, with the-result that attention is 
concentrated on the images such as 'assuming' or 
'becoming', or 'entering into unity with', through 
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which the flow of the narrative is achieved. Now, the 
flow of the narrative is not to be taken as equivalent 
to the significance of the whole narrative which has 
its own coherence and meaning, in the light of which 
the individual items of the narration are to be 
interpreted. Unless the particular image, which 
connects the first-and second stages of the narration, 
is interpreted in the light of the senses deriving from 
the whole, narrative, i. e., from the redescription of 
both Jesus and God, it will become either incoherent or 
falsely mythological. In other words, unless the whole 
structure of the Christological and ' theological 
narration is brought to bear on the interpretation of 
particular elements of the narration, the reading will 
be incomplete. This brings us back to the point we 
raised earlier about the dependence of metaphors on the 
structure within which they are placed. 
To some extent, then, the reading of a Christological 
narrative which moves sequentially from one stage, for 
example, from a pre-existent stage, to an incarnate 
stage cannot be read satisfactorily as long as the 
narrative is not read as a unit, as a revision of our 
accounts of God and Jesus which uses the genre of 
sequential narrative. If pre-existence language is 
used in a Christological narrative, then it will- be 
inadequately dealt with as long as the sequence is 
followed, without the controlling influence of the 
/ ý, o
whole 'sense' which the narration creates. Can we 
identify the features of the structure which enables 
pre-existence language to be handled non-sequentially? 
One of the points we shall establish in Barth's use of 
pre-existence language is the way in which it 
establishes a double hermeneutic-moving from Jesus to 
God and back again. We describe it as a circle of 
mutual interpretation which facilitates the development 
of a language about God in the light of this particular 
image being used of Jesus, and this in turn shapes the 
way in which Jesus is to be viewed. It has a double 
focus: proceeding in one direction, it provides the 
basic image for describing Jesus as 'belonging to the 
being of God, ' or 'one with God', inseparable from 
God's knowledge of himself, if it is in Jesus that God 
has revealed himself; proceeding -in the other 
direction, as the other aspect of the revision, it 
establishes Jesus as the hermeneutic of God's being 
which must be described as differentiated in order to 
account for his self-revelation. This is a 
co-ordinated revision of language about Jesus and God, 
which requires that the language about one coheres with 
the language about the other. 
The particular character of the image, placing-Jesus in 
a pre- or supra-temporal relationship to God, with a 
consequent revision of our language about God, provides 
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the stimulus and the direction for a speculative and 
conceptual clarification of the implications of the 
metaphor: Ricoeur's dictum, 'The symbol gives rise to 
thought' expresses the relationship between the 
possibilities initiated by metaphor and the speculative 
discourse which emerges from the trajectory of the 
metaphorical redescription. Our interest in the 
controlling structure which permits the use of 
pre-existence language is advanced by Ricoeur's 
comments on the relationship between metaphor and the 
resulting speculative and conceptual framework which 
can arise from it: 
'The particular intention that directs 
the system of language functioning in 
metaphorical utterances includes a 
demand for elucidation to which we can 
respond only by approaching the semantic 
possibilities of this discourse with a 
different range of articulation, the 
range of speculative discourse. It can 
be shown that, on the one hand, 
speculative discourse has its condition 
of possibility in the semantic dynamism 
of metaphorical utterance, and that, on 
the other hand, speculative discourse 
has its necessily in itself, in putting 
the resources of conceptual articulation 
to work .... In other words, the 
speculative fulfils the semantic 
exigencies put to it by the metaphorical 
only when it establishes a break marking 
the irreducible difference between the 
two modes of discourse. 05 
The relationship between the metaphor and the 
conceptual articulation which derives from it is, then, 
one of the metaphor providing the possibilities of 
112 
expression which enable a 
terms to take place: the 
senses and implications of 
non-metaphorical form 0 
nevertheless, dependent on 
metaphor: 
development in conceptual 
process of explicating the 
a metaphor gives rise to a 
E discourse which is, 
the generative power of the 
I ... the conceptual articulation proper to the speculative mode of discourse 
finds its condition of possibility in 
the semantic functioning of metaphorical 
utterance ... The resultant gain in 
meaning is not yet a conceptual gain, to 
the extent that the semantic innovation 
is not separable from the switching back 
and forth between the two readings, from 
their tension and from the kind of 
stereoscopic vision this dynamism 
produces. We might say that the 
semantic shock produces a conceptual 
need, but not as yet any knowledge by 
means of concepts. o36 
The metaphor requires interpretation through the 
conceptual schemata which develop out of the dynamism 
of the metaphor; expressing this another way, we might 
say that the interpretation of a metaphor must involve 
consideration of the non-figurative statements which 
form part of the explication of metaphorical 
statements. The metaphorical predication of 
pre-existence sets up the conditions by which a 
particular way of describing Jesus, and a particular 
way of describing God, can be developed. The 
circularity of the procedure means that the metaphor 
can be handled correctly only when the conceptual 
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expression which arises out of the metaphor is used, in 
turn, to shape the way the metaphor is used. The 
failure of the approaches of Knox and Lampe lies in 
their inability to relate the oscillation between the 
figurative and conceptual aspects of the pre-existence 
predication. what Ricoeur calls the 'stereoscopic 
vision' -- the switching between the predication and 
the conceptual articulation which arises out of it -- 
is described in analogous terms by D. M. MacKinnon: 
'The heart of the problem facing anyone 
who essays a treatise de verbo Incarnato 
is the oscillation, tFe alternation of 
language that is abstractly ontological 
with language that is mythological, 
crudely anthropomorphic. In part the 
former provides the means of 
disciplining the latter, or rendering 
its use aseptic, proof against the 
corruption of the imagination. But 
there is more to it than that: for the 
anthropomorphic is as it were penetrated 
by the ontological styles, bent and 
twisted till the very concept of God as 
he is in himself is suffused by its 
emphases. t37 
MacKinnon points to the way in which in the Nicene 
creed, the homoousion precedes the lapse into the 
mythological idiom of descent from heaven: 'the 
category of substance is invoked to insist that the 
faith of Trinity and of Incarnation is monotheistic. t38 
He speaks of the use of ontological categories to 
'complement and discipline' the imaginative portrayal 
of the image, in a way which is parallel to our 
I)- 
proposal of the relationship between the predication of 
pre-existence and the conceptual controls which make it 
possible to use such language coherently. 
The co-presence of the figurative and conceptual 
dimensions of the predication is part of the heuristic 
character of pre-existence language: it enables 
certain aspects of the significance of Jesus to be 
brought to expression, out of the dynamism of the 
metaphor. A way is provided by which statements 
bearing on the ontological identity of Jesus as the Son 
of the Father can find expression; within the 
tradition, this has issued in the accounts of Jesus as 
the eternal Son or Word. This designation of the 
ontological reality of Jesus' existence arises as an 
explication of the more figurative image which presents 
Jesus as the pre-existent Son or Word, which enables 
the hearer or listener to construe the predication 
coherently. 
The coherence necessary to make the predication 
meaningful requires that the characteristics of Jesus 
as a temporal existent be affirmed, and that they be in 
no way undermined by the implications of the new 
predicate which is brought into a metaphorical tension 
with the already known referent. But at the same time, 
the predication offers a presentation which has a 
fictive character: presenting the reader with a 
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figurative portrayal of this temporal existent, asking 
him to think of Jesus in these unfamiliar terms, in 
order to open the way towards an account of the 
identity of Jesus which is derived from the descriptive 
possibilities offered by the image. One cannot remove 
the imaginative, figurative or metaphorical aspect of 
the -predication of pre-existence, nor can one remove 
the tensional aspect between the implications of the 
referent as a temporal existent and the implications of 
the predication which posit a pre- or supra-temporal 
existence. But, as we have seen with metaphor, the 
tension is overcome or resolved through allowing the 
process of interpretation and conceptual formulation to 
occur. Unless the interpretation of a metaphorical 
statement passes beyond the level of tension and 
incompatibility between the referent and the 
predication, then the semantic process is blocked, and 
no coherent meaning can be given to the metaphor. With 
Lampe and Knox, we have seen that they remain at the 
level of incompatibility between the two sets of 
connotations which the predication of pre-existence 
initially presents. Yet if it is seen that the process 
of interpreting the metaphor includes the oscillation 
between the figurative and the conceptual, then the 
interpretation of the predication depends upon 
construing the implications of the description in 
non-metaphorical-ways. In addition, the interpretation 
of the predication will depend upon the presence of a 
(1k' 
co-ordinated revision of the theological language and 
the Christological language which arise out of the 
dynamism of the metaphor, for unless both poles are 
included within the scope of the semantic innovation of 
the language, then no coherent interpretation of 
pre-existence will be possible. Put simply, unless 
pre-existence language is allowed to propose a 
viewpoint which affects our language of God, at the 
same time as it proposes a view of the identity of 
Jesus, then the supporting framework necessary for its 
interpretation will be absent. 
Thus the requirements ' for, handling pre-existence 
language within the Christological area can be 
summarised: 
- l/ the predication should be seen as the 
introduction of a particular 'sense', in the light of 
which the referent Jesus is to be viewed. 
2/ In common with metaphorical statements, 
the particular character of the referent is not 
abandoned or subverted in any way by its juxtaposition 
with the connotations of the predicate. The humanity 
of Jesus, then, is not threatened by its being viewed 
in a pre-existent context. 
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3/ In common with metaphorical statements, 
there will be an oscillation between the figurative and 
conceptual aspects of the predication. The predication 
must issue in some non-metaphorical statements which 
control the way in which the referent is to be 
construed in the light of the connotations of the 
predication -- otherwise the redescriptive power of the 
metaphor will be blunted. 
4/ The scope of the dynamism of the metaphor, 
and the necessary conceptual structure for its coherent 
use, will include a co-ordinated revision of 
theological and Christological lanaguage. As we shall 
see in our study of Barth, the dynamism of 
pre-existence language in the theological area is that 
it enables an account of the orientation of God's being 
towards expression in the Incarnation of the Son to be 
affirmed. , Without this corresponding dimension, the 
Christological affirmations become detached from their 
necessary context. 
How are we to think of the relationship between the 
figurative and conceptual aspects of pre-existence 
language? This is an important question, since a 
failure to appreciate the movement between the two 
aspects deprives the language of its character as the 
figurative source of the ontological designation of 
Jesus as the eternal Son of the Father. It is beyond 
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the scope of our study to examine the genesis of the 
notion in the NT period, but it is instructive to note 
that commentators frequently fail to appreciate the 
interdependence of the two aspects in the account they 
give of the development of the notion in the NT. Part 
of the difficulty lies in the choice of 'myth' as the 
central interpretative category. The inherent 
difficulty with discussing pre-existence language as 
'mythical' is the fluidity of the definition of 'myth'; 
a case can be made for saying that the meanings 
attributed to the category are so diverse that it has 
ceased to possess a precise, shared meaning for it to 
be an adequate hermeneutical instrument. The nuances 
it has acquired from its use in so many disciplines 
give it a particularly slippery quality, which can be 
countered only by each commentator taking the trouble 
at the outset to define the way in which he is going to 
use the term. This is admirable in itself, but it only 
increases the proliferation of definitions and usages, 
thus compounding the confusion. In addition, it is not 
clear that the category of 'myth' can do justice to the 
emergence of the conceptual designation of Jesus as the 
eternal Son. There is of course, in some NT 
expressions of pre-existence, a narrative structure 
such as is found in the Johannine Prologue-39and the 
Philippians hymn40which is characteristic of mythical 
language, whatever more precise definition of myth one 
is using. But even here there is a dimension of 
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'literary composition' in which there is a careful 
delineation of the significance of Jesus with reference 
to certain established parallels, such as Wisdom or 
41 angelic obedience/disobedience-or the Adamic parallel, 
which is not easily reduced to simply mythical 
expression: there are elements of poetic imagination, 
simile and metaphor which defy univocal categories. 
Even in the narrative expression of the pre-existence 
theme, and particulaily in the doxological formulations 
of the Colossians hymn and the opening verses of 
Hebrews, what is central is the expectation that the 
reader will engage in an interpretation in which Jesus 
is seen as a pre-existent figure, whether this is 
directly predicated of him as the sole referent, such 
as in Philippians, Colossians or Hebrews, or whether 
there is the introduction of a hypostatic referent who 
from the eternal realm is brought into view in the 
historical realm as Jesus (Johannine Prologue). Even 
in the Prologue, however, and before the Incarnational 
formula of 1.14, there is an overlapping of the 
features of Christ and Wisdom in 1.10-11, which is 
characteristic of metaphorical expression. In an as 
yet unpublished paper, John Ashton writes: 
'The hymn resonating as it does upon two 
registers, is asserting throughout, but 
subtly and implicitly, the identity of 
the Logos and the Revealer. But until 




In my view there can be no satisfactory 
interpretation of the Prologue that 
fails to recognize the author's double 
interest: it is a meditation on wisdom 
offering a variation on a traditional 
theme; it is also a hymn to the 
Incarnate Word. ' 
This is surely correct, and leads one to suggest that 
the Prologue must be considered to possess features of 
'stereoscopic vision' in which Jesus and Wisdom are 
brought together so that one may be seen as the other; 
this can only with difficulty be included within the 
category of myth. At the very least, it points to the 
need to attend to the metaphorical element within the 
NT forms of expression. 
If 'myth' is an unwieldy category which copes badly 
with the figurative dimension of NT pre-existence 
language, there is, at the other extreme . of 
interpretation, a tendency to concentrate on the 
element of conceptual necessity which pushes 
Christology in the direction of pre-existence themes. 
H. M. Schenke portrays the development in a 
ratiocinative manner: 
'Meines Erachtens dÜrfte nun der 
Ansatzpunkt fUr die neu entstehende 
Pra'existenzchristologie innerhalb der 
bereits vorhandenen christologischen 
Konzeption die Vorstellung vom ErhÖhten 
sein; und die Gedankenbewegung müsste 
gewesen sein: ein himmlisches Wesen 
kann man ei entlich nicht werden, 
sondern muss man immer schon sein. Der 
Gedanke bewegt sich sozusagen in gerader 
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Linie, oberhalb, unter Uherspringung der 
irdischen Existenz, von der himmlischen 
Postexistenz auf eine himmlische 
Praexistenz ZU. @42 
Along similar lines, Martin Hengel gives the impression 
that the initial developments took place through a 
process of ratiocination, unrelated to, and indeed 
prior to, the figurative expressions of pre-existence: 
'Thus there was an inner necessity about 
the introduction of pre-existence into 
christology... Once the idea of 
pre-existence had been introduced, it 
was obvious that the exalted Son of God 
would also attract to himself the 
functions of Jewish Wisdom as a mediator 
of creation and salvation., 43 
Hengel's approach is to affirm JUngells statement made 
from the standpoint of systematic theology: 'It was 
. 
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more a matter of consistency than of mythology', and it 
is the sign of a correct approach that Hengel eschews 
the view that pre-existence language is an alien 
accretion on the simple kerygma, in favour of thinking 
through the dynamism which lead towards these 
formulations of pre-existent status. However, one must 
ask whether-he over-estimates the conceptual dimension 
of the language, and does not attend sufficiently to 
the ways in which the figuration of pre-existence 
provides the impetus for the development of the 'inner 
necessity' which Hengel detects in the development of 
(zz 
NT Christology. Because he opposes 'inner necessity' 
and 'mythology', he fails to take account of the fact 
that the figurative and the conceptual may be related 
in a way which is complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive. A more satisfactory approach would be to 
view the figurative expressions as the material through 
which the conceptual dynamism of Christology was worked 
out. Before, the concept of pre-, existence was reached, 
there were descriptive procedures analogous to 
metaphorical statements, which pointed towards, and 
impelled, the movement towards Christological 
pre-existence. 
The relationship between the figurative and conceptual 
dimensions of pre-existence language may be clarified 
through the Hegelian treatment of the relationship 
between Vorstellunq and Begriff which has been 
influential in Pannenberg's treatment of pre-existence 
language,, and in Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory. 
The Hegelian term Vorstellung designates a certain kind 
of reflective cognition characteristic, primarily, of 
religious expression, in which we think of t. he Absolute 
not in concepts but in images. We might think of 
Vorstellung as a representation of an object in mental 
activity, drawn from the world of sensible experience, 
and used in order to enable us to speak and think, 
albeit inadequately, about the Absolute. The religious 
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Vorstellung retains its reference back to the context 
in which it was first apprehended, but at the same time 
it provides the basis for a conceptual clarification 
and interpretation of the specifically transcendent 
referent which it is used to designate. Thus the 
Vorstellung characteristic of religion -is figurative, 
while at the same time it provides a dynamism for 
conceptual development. In Charles Taylor's words, 
'Religious thought is a representative 
mode of consciousness. It uses sensuous 
images, but not just to contemplate 
their sensuous referents, rather as 
symbols which strain to render a higher 
content... 
Vorstellung is thus a mode of 
consciousness which is freeing itself, 
as it were, from the merely sensible in 
order to reach the universal. But it 
has not yet fully succeeded, it is still 
caught in the sensible, and must use 
-sensible images. s45 
The opacity of Vorstellung -- its inability to free 
itself fromý its sensible origin -- requires the 
activity of philosophy to move beyond the limitations 
of the image towards 'thought' and the 'concept': in 
Hegel's own words, 'Philosophy can be said to do 
nothing other than to transform Vorstellungen into 
thoughts (Gedanken) -- though indeed it transforms the 
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bare thought into the concept (Begriff)-. -l" He speaks of 
the movement from the Vorstellung to the pure concept 
and back again: 'ein Heruber- und Hinubergehen.. von 
der Vorstellung zum Begriffe und von dem Begriffe zum 
1Z) 
Vorstellung. . 'L4-7 The mediate position of Vorstellung -- 
between sense and thought -- is the necessary process, 
the necessary step by which the religious consciousness 
presents itself with the materials which enable it to 
rise to a purer and more adequate thinking 'on thinking 
itself', the characteristic activity of the 
philosopher. it is the whole purpose of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit to show the final growth of 
this process: a self-conscious reflection on the 
ontological status of our thinking reason in relation 
to the ontological status of the world and God. 
Vorstellung represents a stage in this process, a form 
of thought in which man 'is already reflectively a step 
above the deceptive presentational immediacy of 
sensuous perception, while yet still a step below the 
speculative world of pure thought. o48 
Religious Vorstellungen provide the mind with objects 
of thought which, in Hegel's interpretation, enable the 
thinker to become aware of his activity of reflection 
-- to reflect upon reflection and thus to become 
aware of thought as thought. 
I ... Hegel clearly means to say that Vorstellung is that mode of 
consciousness in which man is 
universally -- albeit, from a 
speculative point of view, only 
implicitly -- "at home" with the 
reflective truth that the "rational is 
the actual". Vorstellun2 is a form of 
reflection in- which this truth is 
latent, but it is not the highest or 
(2c 
purest form of such truth. Philosophy, 
moreover, begins with this conviction 
about Vorstellung. What it does in 
contrast to it, generally speaking, is 
to move further inward and upward toward 
the side of the constitutive power of 
thought in consciousness in order to 
discover by a more thorough reflective 
analysis the epistemological and 
ontological implication of that 
self-constitutive power. In this 
process it "transforms" Vorstellungen 
into Gedanken and the Begriff. 
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Thus, the relationship of philosophy to Vorstellung is 
one of the completion of the truth inadequately 
expressed through the medium of Vorstellung, which is a 
proximate form of truth, and which provides the ground 
for the attainment of conceptual truth free from the 
mediate character of imagery. The range of meanings 
which Johnston and Struthers give to Vorstellung in 
Hegel's usage testifies to the figurative and fluid 
character of the term: 'sensuous representation, 
image, imagination, presentation, idea, general idea, 
ideation. 1-50 The relationship of philosophy to 
Vorstellungen is one of completion of the truth 
inadequately expressed through the figurative medium: 
the mediate character of Vorstellung, involving both 
sense and understanding, as yet inadequately 
distinguished, means- that it is a proximate form of 
truth which, nevertheless, provides the grounds for the 
attainment of speculative truth, free from the 
limitations of imagery. One need not subscribe 
entirely to Hegel's confidence in the capacity of 
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philosophy to effect an Aufhebung of figurative 
expressions at the level of concepts, to appreciate the 
point at issue: religious language begins with the use 
of images, metaphors, models, symbols, all drawn from 
the finite world and applied to the transcendent realm 
in an indirect analogous manner which continuously 
requires control and specification. In order to engage 
in a more accurate delineation of the meanings one 
wants to establish with regard to this transcendent 
realm, the figurative character of the language is 
accompanied by, not replaced by, a vocabulary which 
co-ordinates and controls the working of the 
Vorstellungen. The images set up the basis on which a 
speculative system can be developed; indeed, the 
images require conceptual clarification, if the process 
of understanding is to take place at all. 
Although thought, at the level of Vorstellung, is 
inadequate, it is still a form of thinking which has a 
role in the whole process of attaining truth. Hegel's 
account of the oscillation between Vorstellung and 
Begriff, of the movement from the figurative expression 
to the concept and back again, is the basis of 
Ricoeur's discussion of the dynamism of religious and 
symbolic language, 'thanks to which all symbolic 
51 
language calls for an interpretation. ' HIS dictum, 'the 
symbol gives rise to thought' is Hegelian in its 
estimate of the dependence of conceptual clarity on the 
figurative, metaphorical or symbolic expression: 
iv; ' 
'This dynamism is the primary condition 
for any move from figurative expression 
to conceptual expression. This process 
of interpretation is not something 
super-imposed from outside on a 
self-contained expression; it is 
motivated by the symbolic expression 
which gives rise to thought. It belongs 
to the essence of a figurative 
expression to stand for something else, 
to call for a new speech-act which would 
paraphrase the first one without 
exhausting its meaningful resources., 52 
The Hegelian legacy is also influential in Pannenberg's 
treatment of pre-existence language: he works with a 
distinction between the figurative character of 
pre-existence language and the higher viewpoint in 
conceptual terms of the revelatory unity of Jesus with 
God. As with Hegel, the Vorstellung is not dismissed 
as false or misleading, but rather it is the material 
expression of a formal concern which can be drawn from 
the image and which, in turn, shapes the interpretation 
of the image. The controlling conceptual formulation, 
which enables us to come afresh to the notion of 
pre-existence and find it possible to use pre-existence 
language comfortably, is the revelational unity of 
Jesus with God, as disclosed in the resurrection: 
'From the idea of revelation 
(offenbarungsgedanken) we attain access 
to the understanding of the old concept 
(Vorstellung) of Jesus' pre-existence. 
At least this concept appears as a 
meaningful expression (sinnvoller 
Ausdruck) that we, too, must retain, 
namely for Jesus' full and complete 
affiliation with the eternal God. 
Jesus' revelational unity with the God 
who is from eternity to eternity forces 
us conceptually to the thought 
(Gedanken) that Jesus as the "Son of 
God" is pre-existent. This is true even 
if we must characterise the idea of 
pre-existence taken by itself as a 
mythical concept (eine mythische 
Vorstellung) . 153 
In his brief account of the origin of Christological 
pre-existenceýi Pannenberg traces its development from 
the confession of the Resurrection, that Jesus is 'Son 
of God': it is from its subsequent relocation within 
the Baptismal tradition and the Annunciation tradition, 
and its further deployment in connection with the 
Christologoumenon of 'sending' (Gal. 4.4; Rom. 8.3), 
that the situation is created within early Christianity 
which requires the use of pre-existence language to 
account for the significance of Jesus as Son of God. 
His account of this development is far too linear to be 
a comprehensive delineation of the various figurative 
patterns which constitute the NT material, but his 
account is programmatic: he aligns the 
Traditionsgeschichte with the inner logic, or the 
conceptual necessity, which he posits as the core of 
the pre-existence Vorstellungen: 
'In this process in the history of 
traditions the recognition of the fact 
that Jesus belongs to the sphere of God, 
which was established through the 
revelatory character of his 
resurrection, expresses -itself. Viewed 
from the confirmation of Jesus' claim by 
his resurrection, the inner logic of the 
12q 
matter dictates that Jesus was always 
one with God, not just after a certain 
date in his life. And in view of God's 
eternity, the revelatory character of 
Jesus' resurrection means that God was 
always one with Jesus, even before his 
earthly birth. Were it otherwise, Jesus 
would not be in person the one 
revelation of the eternal God. v55 
Pannenberg here uses a Barthian argument -- from the 
form and character of the self-revelation of God, which 
leads to the articulation, of the inseparability of the 
person of Jesus from God's being -- linked with his own 
view of the retroactive power of the future. , He 
invokes an opaque ontology in which the truth is 
established teleologically, at the limits of universal 
history, and in which the reality of the present is 
determined by the future which is open to it. The end 
of history determines the truth of all that takes place 
within it, with retroactive power. The Christological 
variant on this is obvious: 'If Jesus as a person is 
"the Son of God", as becomes clear retroactively from 
the -resurrection, then he has always been the Son of 
God. 'ý_6Thus the identity of Jesus as Son of God, 
eternally united with the Father, is established, not 
only noetically but also ontologically, from the event 
of the resurrection. In an important passage, he 
writes: 
'What is true in God's eternity is 
decided with retroactive validity only 
from the perspective of what occurs 
temporarily with the import of the 
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ultimate. Thus Jesus' unity with God -- 
and the truth of the Incarnation -- is 
also decided only retroactively from the 
perspective of Jesus' resurrection for 
the whole of Jesus' existence on the one 
hand (as we have already seen) and thus 
also for God's eternity, on the other. 
Apart from Jesus' resurrection, it would 
not be true that from the very beginning 
of Jesus' earthly way God was one with 
this man. This is true from all 
eternity because of Jesus' 
resurrection., -ý" 
Thus the principle of the retroactive power of the 
future extends, not only to the being of Jesus which 
precedes the resurrection, but also to God: 'What 
turns out to be true in the future will then be evident 
as having been true all along. This applies to God as 
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well as to every finite reality. " The implication of 
this would seem to be that God's being seems to share 
the condition of temporal'reality in being open'to an 
ontological determination through the future: it is 
the resurrection which, Christologically, makes it true 
that Jesus has always been Son of God, and which, 
theologically, makes it true that God's being includes 
a differentiation between Father and Son. And it does 
this because the resurrection is the proleptic 
occurence of the' end of history, which Pannenberg 
equates with the self-revelation of God. Out of the 
nexus of the resurrection, then, proceeds the 
determining features which exercise an ontological 
effect on the being of Jesus -- making it true that he 
is the eternal Son of God. 
There are considerable difficulties with the ontology 
59 which Pannenberg proposes+-- in the first place, he is 
in danger of applying univocal metaphysical thought 
both to God and to created reality. Deus non est in 
genere -- this tag is contradicted by Pannenberg's 
application of a retroactive ontology both to God and 
to creation. Secondly, it is difficult to establish 
what sort of causality is envisaged in his description 
of the future affecting the past retroactively. The 
image would seem to be that of the future constantly 
making space for the present to come into existence and 
receive ontological determination. Pannenberg presents 
this as a principle applicable to all reality, and not 
just to the resurrection, but it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that there is an extension of a 
principle which belongs within the peculiar dialectic 
of Christological speech to cover the whole of reality 
in which case, it is, the application -of a 
christological configuration to ontology, rather than 
the reverse. Thirdly, the principle of retroactive 
ontology seems to imply a Hegelian interdependence of 
infinite and created reality, located at the terminus 
of universal history at which point both the infinite 
and the finite receive their ontological determination. 
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Pannenberg seems to place process of God's becoming -- 
in particular, the process of 'becoming Trinitarian, 
through his union with the man Jesus -- within the 
limits of the process of the world's becoming: 'in a 
restricted but important sense God does not yet 
exist ... God's being 
is still in the process of coming 
to be. o60By his insistence on futurity as the mode of 
God's being, Pannenberg is in danger of conceptualising 
the Trinitarian relations as achieved retroactively at 
the end of the process of universal history, and hence 
of making them dependent on, history for their 
ontological grounding. 
Finally, it is difficult to avoid the impression that 
Pannenberg's Christology is a form of eschatological 
adoptionism which, by the retroactive power of the 
future, is enabled to encompass statements about the 
divinity of Christ, while at the same time it permits 
him to assert the full humanity of Christ, untrammelled 
by what he sees as the distorting effects of beginning 
with a 'descending' Christology. The debate he 
presents about the comparative merits of Christology 
'from above' and Christology 'from below' has been 
effectively undercut by Nicholas Lash's analysis of the 
spuriousness of the proposed opposition between these 
two procedures-L However, it is interesting to ask 
whether,. if one rejects the ontology Pannenberg 
proposes as a means of holding together the 
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Christological and theological structure, one can still 
find value in the procedural steps he makes in the 
handling of pre-existence language. 
For Pannenberg, the resurrection is the proper locus of 
Christological articulation. Consequently, 
Christological statements are derived from the nexus 
implied in the rdsurrection as the self-revelation of 
God, and they are to be controlled by the conceptual 
expression to which an analysis of the logic of 
self-revelation gives rise. He fully approves of 
Barth's 'demonstration of Jesus' divinity with the 
concept of revelation ... Barth quite rightly has built 
the doctrine of Jesus' divinity and the doctrine of the 
Trinity on the concept of God's revelation in -jesus., 
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Since the resurrection, which Pannenberg interprets in 
terms of its character as the self-revelation of God, 
plays this role as the centre and focus of the range of 
Christological statements, language of pre-existence is 
to be interpreted as an explication of what is involved 
in the event of the resurrection/revelation complex. 
Language of eternal Sonship, then, is to be taken as an 
account of the structural differentiation within God's 
act of self-revelation of the relationship of Father 
and Son. Expressed figuratively, this emerges in 
formulations about the pre-existence of Jesus; 
expressed at the higher level of Begriff, this emerges 
in statements which attempt to speak ontologically 
about the identity of Jesus as the Son who is united 
with the Father in his revelation. The 
resurrection/self-revelation of God requires language 
to be found which expresses this; the figurative 
expression of, what is involved is found in statements 
which speak of Jesus as pre-existent, and the 
conceptual, or ontological, expression of the same 
concern is found in statements about Jesus as the 
Eternal son who is inseparable from God, if God has 
revealed himself. 
Statements about the pre-existence of Jesus are thus 
figurative expressions of the truth which is 
appropriated more fully at the higher level of 
conceptual articulation: at this level, the 
Vorstellung of pre-existence issues in the concept of 
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the 'unity of the divine essence with the man jesus-r in 
the act of God's self-revelation. The difference 
between the two levels, and their patterns of 
expression, is brought out by Pannenberg: at the level 
of Vorstellung, pre-existence language can only 
establish a distinction 'between Jesus' community with 
God as something eternal, and his temporal and 
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transitory human persoriL. --J This distinction, operating 
at the level of figurative expression, can only create 
an Incarnational Christology with an insoluble problem: 
13c 
'The concept of pre-existence stands 
under the suspicion of conceptually 
separating Jesus' community with God as 
a special being (the pre-existent Son of 
God) and his temporal appearance. The 
two distinct things are then reunited 
through the idea that the divine being 
has, in the incarnation, joined himself 
at a particular point in time with the 
earthly corporeality of the man Jesus. 
Thus the distinction between a 
pre-existent divine being and the man 
Jesus or his earthly appearance 
conceptually divides precisely that 
which belongs together in Jesus' 
existence. This constitutes the 
mythical element of the incarnational 
Christology: it conceptually divides 
the eternal Son of God and the earthly, 
human appearance of Jesus, which 
together constitute the concrete 
existence of Jesus, into two separate 
beings. Therefore, what is thus divided 
must be subsequently brought together 
again. v65 
Pannenberg buttresses his argument with a spurious 
comment about the character of myth W-hich 'separates 
the essence of reality as a special prototypal essence 
from the appearance in order to reunite the two through 
a dramatic process especially conceived for the 
purpose. 166 He does not need such comments in order to 
substantiate his argument. The character of 
Vorstellung, of figurative description, is a sufficient 
support for the point he is making: the distinction 
between the eternal Son and the man Jesus, as long as 
it remains at the level of narrative, imaginative 
presentation, works as a distinction between two 
separate referents who, in the working of the 
narration, are brought together to constitute the 
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person of Jesus. This distinction, inherent in the 
flow of narration, creates an expression of 
Incarnational Christology in which the sequential 
ordering of the narration gives the impression that two 
separate referents are involved in the 'creation' of 
the person of Jesus. This poses a difficulty for a 
Christology which must resist dividing the person of 
Jesus, or of speaking of him as 'composed' of distinct 
principles. Pannenberg insists rightly that the 
distinction between the eternal Son and the man Jesus 
is inevitable: 'Christology involves precisely the 
conjunction of these two elements. ' 
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But it is a 
distinction which must work at the level of the 
concepts which deal with the problematic of how to 
speak adequately of Jesus in the light of his 
revelatory unity with God. At this higher level of 
conceptual or ontological expression, it is a 
distinction not of referents, as in the mode of 
figurative or narrative expression, but of two aspects 
of a single concrete life. Through the controlling 
concept of the revelatory unity of Jesus with God, it 
is made clear that the figurative/narrative distinction 
between the eternal Son and Jesus is a distinction 
between aspects of the life of the one referent, Jesus: 
'All Christology must keep in view that 
the two aspects distinguished here, the 
eternity of the Sonship and the earthly, 
human mode of Jesus' existence are a 
part of a single concrete life. 118 
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The term 'aspects' requires some precision: I take it 
that what Pannenberg means by the term (Momente) is 
clarified later in the volume when he discusses the 
formula of the divinity and humanity of Jesus: 
'The formula of the true divinity and 
true humanity of Jesus begins with the 
fact that one describes one and the same 
person, the man Jesus of Nazareth from 
different points of view. The unity of 
the concrete person Jesus of Nazareth is 
given, and both things are to be said 
about this one person: he is God and he 
is man., 69 
Thus the distinction which, at the level of 
Vorstellung, suggested two referents, is relocated as a 
distinction of predicates made of the one referent, 
Jesus, as a distinction of what is to be said about him 
in the light of the revelatory unity of Jesus with God. 
This adjustment, made in the direction of clarifying 
the linguistic rules which are to operate in a 
Christology which has its point of departure in the 
nexus of the resurrection/self-revelation of God, 
enables one to avoid the 'mythical' suggestion that 
Jesus is composed of an eternal Son and a human 
reality. Eternal Sonship and the full humanity of 
Jesus are thus predicated of the historical referent, 
Jesus, as explications of the logic of God's 
self-revelation. 
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With this revisionary reading of the procedures for 
handling Incarnational Christology, Pannenberg intends 
to preserve the integrity of the humanity of Jesus, 
which functions untrammelled by the presence of a 
'divine self-consciousness' which has to be brought 
into union with the humanity of Jesus -- a form of 
Unification Christology to which he is opposed20- while 
at the same time, he is able to rework the Chalcedonian 
formulas as necessary explications of the 
resurrection/revelation nexus of God's action. The two 
state Christology of the Patristic period is modified 
in the direction of a two stage Christology which 
enables him to affirm the status of Jesus as vere Deus 
and vere homo: Jesus is confirmed in the resurrection 
as 'the one who had been wholly and completely obedient 
to the Father, as he also is henceforth. #71 
'Just as the one completely obedient to 
the Father, he is the revealer of God's 
divinity and thus himself belongs 
inseparably to the essence of God. Thus 
is he the Son. t72 
In this way, Pannenberg is able to develop the 
distinction between the use in the figurative/narrative 
mode of two referents, the Eternal Son and the human 
person of Jesus, and the use in the conceptual mode of 
Eternal Sonship and full humanity as predications and 
explications of God's self-revelation in the 
resurrection. The figurative/narrative mode, because 
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it involves speaking of an Eternal Son who then has to 
be united with the human existence of Jesus, suggests 
two referents, but this needs to be controlled, if a 
'composite' picture of Jesus is to be avoided, by the 
affirmation that they are 'one and the samell in 
Chalcedon's terms. 
We would not support Pannenberg's strictures on 
Patristic Christology, and on the pattern of 
'descending' Christology: within the terms we have 
already proposed, narrative Christological patterns 
which begin, as does the Johannine Prologue, with the 
Logos, and then move on to an enfleshment of the Logos, 
have to be read as a unit, in a way which avoids the 
sequential reading of the narrative, as Northrop Frye 
has proposed. Nevertheless, the handling of a pattern 
involving a pre-existent Son who becomes incarnate is 
open to a variety of misinterpretations and confusions, 
as the history of the Patristic discussion shows. 
Pannenberg identifies the Achilles' heel of 
Christologies which follow this way of uniting the 
pre-existent Son and the human person Jesus: 
'The question of the unity of the man 
Jesus with the eternal Son of God cannot 
be put and answered directly. That is 
the common mistake of all theories that 
attempt to conceive of the unity of God 
and man in Jesus on the basis of the 
concept of the Incarnation of the 
Logos ... The unity of the man Jesus with 
the eternal Son of God results rather by 
way of a detour. @73 
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In contrast with these attempts, Pannenberg proposes 
that the most appropriate sequence and coherence of 
Christological language involves making a distinction 
between the relational dependence of Jesus on the 
Father, which was an experiential content and 
orientation of the consciousness of the man Jesus, and 
the ontological dependence of Jesus on the Son, which 
becomes operative retroactively at the resurrection. 
We have already expressed our reservations about 
Pannenberg's use of retroactive ontology, and indicated 
that we cannot support his view of the influence of the 
resurrection on the preceding identity of Jesus. But 
this distinction between the relational dependence of 
Jesus on the Father and his ontological dependence. on 
the Son is a distinction which identifies what, in the 
human experience of Jesus, is to be taken as the 
communication between Father and Son, and how this is 
to be described. 
Pannenberg's description of the indirect identity of 
Jesus and the eternal Son, established 'by way of a 
detour', has as its linguistic correlate, the tension 
which exists between the referent and the metaphorical 
predication in the structure of a metaphorical 
predication. The 'indirectness' or the 'detour' is the 
distance which exists between the subject and the 
innovative predication, in which there- is a 
reinterpretation of the subject in the light of the 
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descriptive possibilities offered by the new framework. 
When we remove, as we must, the Hegelian retroactive 
ontology as the supporting ground offered by 
Pannenberg, we are, nevertheless, in the presence of a 
way of speaking of Jesus as the eternal Son which 
respects the metaphorical tension of the predication of 
pre-existence: Jesus is seen as the pre-existent Son 
or Word, and in the construing of the senses in which 
this is to be taken, there is a transfer of figurative 
attributes from the pre-existent Son or Word to Jesus. 
This does not take place in a way which destroys 'the 
characteristics of Jesus as a human referent, but it is 
to take place in a way which permits the humanity of 
Jesus to be seen in a different way. 
We derive another point from Pannenberg: in order to 
avoid the impasses and confusions which can arise 
through 'the Patristic two natures Christology, 
pre-existence language should be handled in a way which 
respects its predicative character. In particular, 
since it has the open-ended quality of a metaphor, 
precision is required in order to determine the senses 
in which the predication is to be taken. We have 
identified, as part of the dynamism of metaphorical 
predication, the emergence of non-metaphorical 
statements from the initially figurative predication, 
and we have suggested that the Hegelian treatment of 
the relationship of Vorstellunq and Begriff is to be 
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seen along these liýes. In addition, we have 
distinguished the figurative treatment of Jesus as 
pre-existent from the ontological statement to which it 
gives rise, namely that Jesus is the eternal Son. From 
Pannenberg's discussion of the revision of 
pre-existence language as an explication of the 
self-revelation of God in the resurrection, we have 
identified a conceptual structure which can be used to 
control the interpretation of pre-existence language: 
the conceptual and ontological designation of Jesus as 
the eternal Son, which arises out of the figurative 
image, marks a shift towards a non-metaphorical 
modality in which the figurative character of 
pre-existence language is sublated and transformed: 
for example, the temporal or pre- temporal aspect of 
the predication gives way to a designation which links 
Jesus with the totality and finality of God's action 
towards the world. The dynamism from Vorstellung to 
Begriff, from figurative expression to ontological 
designation, is a shift away from the imagistic aspect 
of the predication towards an assessment of the 
identity of Jesus as the one who is inseparably united 
with the Father in his self-revelation. Wiederkehr 
touches on this in his excellent analysis of the 
eternal Sonship of Jesus; he identifies the figurative 
aspect of pre-existence language, and the modification 
which is to be made if such language is to be taken in 
a non-mythical way: 
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'Le terme "preexistence",,, avec le ', sens 
nettement temporel du "pre", nlest pas 
heureux. Il designe plus un effet que 
le veritable fondement de la provenance 
divine du Christ, et il designe cet 
effet conformement a la maniere humaine 
dR se representer le temps. Quand on 
cede, naivement a la pente du mot 
"preexistence", lleternite divine est 
representee comme le prolongement du 
temps dans le passe. Dans une telle 
vision des choses, il est effectivement 
difficile dle"chapper au soupgon de chute 
dans la mythologie. La preexistence est 
comprise de fagon plus correcte quand 
elle est d6finie d1une faqon personnelle 
et relationelle ... 174 
Instead, the concentration on the relationality of 
Jesus and the Father within the act of self-revelation, 
avoids the figurative suggestion of two sequential 
periods of time which flow into each other, and directs 
our attention towards the mission and communication 
between Father and Son, expressed in the event of 
salvation and grounded in the differentiation within 
the being of God. 
The distinction between the 'personal community of 
Jesus with the Father and the identity of person with 
the Son' is a distinction'between what is taken to be 
the central feature of the consciousness of Jesus -- 
his dedication and obedience to the Father -- and what 
is to be said about who he is on the basis of that 
relationship. In other words, Jesus' identity as the 
Son who belongs to God's essence is arrived at, not by 
considering how Jesus is to be related to a referent 
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known as the Son, but by considering the implications 
of the fact that within God's definitive act of 
salvation, there is a special communication of his love 
to Jesus and a corresponding response of Jesus to the 
Father. The proper order of Christological 
articulation, then, is to see language about Jesus as 
the Eternal Son who belongs to God's essence as an 
articulation of what is involved in the personal 
community of Jesus wK the Father; language of 
pre-existent Sonship is a particular way of describing 
the relationality between Jesus and the Father which is 
grounded in the historical Jesus' experience of his 
mission. The ontological statements about the identity 
of Jesus as the Eternal Son are ways of characterising 
what is involved in the relationality, which 
characterises God's saving and revelatory action in 
Jesus. Within the Christological area, this language 
about the eternal Sonship of Jesus, which is the 
principal conceptual clarification of the implications 
of the image of pre-existent status, functions as the 
development of a particular sense applied to the 
referent Jesus, as an interpretation of who he is, 
through the mediation of the image of pre-existent 
status. 
Kasper, too, approaches the question of the identity of 
Jesus from the perspective of the relationality between 
Father and Son, which issues in the indirect expression 
of his identity with the Logos: 
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I ... Jesus, dedication to the Father 
presupposes the Father's 
self-communication to Jesus. This 
self-communication, which constitutes 
the unity as well as the enduring 
distinction between Father and Son, is 
called by tradition the Logos, the 
second divine person... The unity of 
the man Jesus with the Logos is 
expressed in the New Testament only 
indirectly as the inner ground of the 
unity between the Father and Jesus. We 
shall therefore have to understand the 
personal communion between Jesus and the 
Father as a communion in essence but the 
community of essence as personal 
activity. 1 75 
He goes on to consider the Chalcedonian dogma 'as an 
interpretation of Jesus' historical reality and of his 
relation to the Father. For Jesus' human consciousness 
is turned not directly to the Logos, but to the 
Father. ' 2-q3y interpreting pre-existence language as an 
explication of the relationship between Father and Son 
-- an explication which issues indirectly in statements 
about Jesus as the eternal Son -- we are following the 
direction given by the Fourth Gospel. The evangelist 
uses pre-existence language' as a framework or 
descriptive network within which the relationship 
between the Father and Jesus is elaborated and 
expressed. The principal patterns used by the Fourth 
Gospel to describe the character and status of Jesus in 
his relationship to the Father, are those of the agent. 77 
empowered by God to act with God's own authority, and 
the Son78 , -uniquely 
in the bosom of the Father, who alone 
has seen God and is able to speak of the things of God. 
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Von Balthasar is correct in presenting the referential 
focus of this descriptive network as the experience of 
, Tesus in receiving the communication of the Father's 
love, and responding through his obedience: 
'The statements concerning Jesus' 
experience of God, therefore, should not 
be understood in the sense that, in his 
"exegesis" of God (Jn. 1.18), Jesus 
makes utterance about what he saw and 
heard in God "before" his incarnation; 
rather he is speaking about what he, as 
the only one who comes from God, has 
experienced of God in his coming and in 
his going. These experiences, 
consequently, are inseparably divine and 
human. They are not first divine, only 
later to be translated into human terms: 
this would constitute the Platonic 
doctrine of pre-existence and anamnesis; 
but John comes from the Old Testament 
and pot from Plato. 1 79 
This is a correct emphasis. Bultmann's interpretation 
of the Gospel -- that the evangelist demythologises 
80 
mythological themes , can be reformulated in our 
terms: the referential focus, Jesus, is subject to a 
revisionary description by being presented in a 
framework of descent-revelation-ascent. This framework 
stands as-a figurative way of characterising Jesus in 
his relationship to the Father, which the evangelist 
highlights as the clue to the identity of Jesus. 
Bultmann's classic summary of the revelation given by 
Jesus -- that the revealer reveals only that he is the 
revealerýL'-- needs to be amplified: the revelation is 
that Jesus is the Son whose relationship with the 
I 
Father is inseparable from the whole history of God's 
dealings with creation and his revelation -in history. 
The affirmation of the Prologue, which is a consonant 
expression of the Gospel's revelatory theme, interprets 
God's relationship to Jesus as eternally characteristic 
of God's whole action ad extra. Logos in the Prologue 
hypostatically presented as a wisdom figure, also 
extends its meaning to cover the whole plan of God, 
closely related to, if not identical with Col. 1.26, 
where -rov XOYO-1 stands in apposition to 
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John Ashton notes that 'the meditation of the Prologue 
begins in heaven with the Logos at the side of God; 
that of the Gospel begins with Jesus. They reach the 
same point from different endsJ-3 We might also add that 
the insight which informs both perspectives centres on 
the inseparability of Jesus from, God's action and 
revelation, both in what temporally precedes the 
lifetime of Jesus and what occurs during his lifetime. 
The Prologue and the 'Gospel, in their use of 
pre-existence, exemplify the double-determination of 
the predication: the Gospel, centring on Jesus, 
expresses the belief that the identity of Jesus is 
illuminated only by the Father's communication to him 
of all that he has and is, and this evokes in return 
the corresponding obedience and dedication of Jesus to 
14-?, 
the Father. The Prologue presents the obverse of this 
insight, centring on God, whose whole preceding and 
V. 
continuing action vis-a-vis his creation bears the 
stamp of his climactic action in Jesus. 
There is, in both the Gospel and the Prologue, the 
figurative use of pre-existence in its temporal 
connotation, but what is central in both is the 
relationship between Jesus and the Father which is 
taken to be determinative of the identity of Jesus 
(Gospel) and of the identity of God (Prologue). In the 
Gospel, pre-existence language, with its accompanying 
structure of descent-return, is a figurative framework 
which describes what is an event in the experience of 
Jesus: his relationship to, and communication with, 
the Father; in the Prologue, there is a consonant and 
complementary figurative expression of the implication 
of this relationship for our treatment of the being of 
God, portraying God's eternal being as marked by the 
accompanying presence of that which has been revealed 
in Jesus, his Logos. The rich resonances of Wisdom 
speculation, bearing connotations of creation, 
salvation and revelation in God's preceding action, 8z4are 
introduced in order to present the relationship between 
Jesus and the Father as constitutive of God's entire 
action towards the world. 
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At a figurative level, the pre-temporal aspect acts as 
an imaginative framework within which Jesus is viewed 
as pre-existent; this is still present in the 
Johannine Gospel and Prologue. But at the same time, 
there is also the crystallisation or Aufhebung of the 
figurative predication in the direction of a statement 
about the identity of Jesus as eternal Son. This takes 
place, as we have indicated, within both the 
theological and the Christological arenas. Later we 
will consider the necessity of making a formal 
distinction between these two interrelated discourses 
if the being of God is not to be dissolved within time 
or constituted out of the temporal process. The issue 
will centre on the question of whether it is necessary 
to posit a referent other than Jesus, the eternal Son, 
or whether all language about the eternal Son refers to 
Jesus alone. The difficulty is posed by the Johannine 
insight into the coinherence of the two realms of 
discourse, and by the presentation of the double 
perspective of the Prologue and the Gospel. Later we 
shall argue that it is necessary within the theological 
realm to speak of the eternal Son as a referent 
distinct from Jesus, but our concern at the moment is 
with the Christological realm, and we would argue that 
within Christological speech, language of eternal 
Sonship or pre-existence should be interpreted as a 
predication, made of the referent Jesus, which stands 
in a relationship to the referent which can be 
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illuminated by being viewed as a metaphorical 
predication. Pannenberg's proposal of the 'indirect' 
relationship of the eternal Son to Jesus is, if -one 
removes it from his ontological context, indicative of 
the relationship between a referent and a metaphorical 
predication, which is exemplified in the relationship 
of Jesus to the pre-existent Son or Logos. We are 
dealing with the linguistic procedure which, frequently 
in the discussion of how Jesus and the pre-existent Son 
are related, is ignored or remains unexamined as a form 
of metaphor. The ontological difficulties experienced 
in Christology frequently relate to semantic confusion, 
and, in the case of pre-existence language, the 
confusion which is experienced when the matter is 
consdiered as an ontological difficulty may be 
partially removed by a consideration of the character 
of the language. 
By our proposal, we are locating pre-existence language 
within the continuum of New Testament metaphorical 
Christology -- as part of the range of descriptive 
Christologies, such as Son of David, Son of Man etc. 
-- which form the basis of the subsequent tradition. 
What is unique about the pre-existence predication, 
however, is its capacity to extend the significance of 
Jesus in conjunction with a corresponding theological 
revision. However, this theological, as opposed to the 
Christological development, carries with it the danger 
that the Christological use of the language tends to 
lose its identity as metaphorical speech, centred on 
Jesus as the referent. As many commentators have 
shown, the difficulty lies in the positing of two 
referents, the eternal Son and Jesus, and Patristic 
Christology shows the dilemma of avoiding the 
suggestion of two Sons (Nestorianism), on the one hand, 
and of avoiding a monophysitism which collapses the 
identity of Jesus, on the other hand. By restoring, 
within the Christological arena, the metaphorical 
character- of- pre-existence language, we suggest that 
the language can then be used with greater confidence 
and accuracy. , 
The question of referents is an elusive one, for a very 
simple reason: within a metaphor, there is an 
intention to view a referent differently as something 
else. What is being redescribed is viewed as the 
predicate: Jesus is viewed as the pre-existent One. 
This is part of the fictive, heuristic character of 
metaphor, to -introduce a form of stereoscopic 
overlapping of two referents, only one of which is, 
within the intentionality of the metaphor, -being 
redescribed. (There can be, of course, the reverse 
procedure, in which the connotations of the primary 
referent are transferred 'backwards', in such a way as 
to bring about a revision of the predicate. This 
corresponds to the hermeneutical question of how to 
speak of the pre-existent Son within the 'theological 
arena. Barth, as we shall see, insists that, 
hermeneutically, we must not allow the pre-existent 
Logos asarkos to be viewed other than through the 
features of the person of Jesus. ) We must distinguish 
the fictive, heuristic status of the pre-existent One 
within' the Christological arena, from the referential 
status of the eternal Son, who is-to be distinguished 
from Jesus, within'the theological arena. We would 
endorse again Schoonenberg's insistence that 
'everything that is said about his (Christ's) divinity 
in his pre-existence is done in connection with Jesus 
Christ, and nothing is said'outside this connection. 035 
However, -the slide from the fictive referential 
treatment of the, pre-existent One within the 
Christological arena to full referential status within 
the theological arena is easily achieved, 'and this* is 
part of the difficulty of dealing with metaphorical 
language and its dynamism. 
An additional elusive element concerns, as we have 
indicated, the oscillation between figurative and 
conceptual language, which is derived from the tendency 
of metaphorical statements to issue in non-metaphorical 
statements', and to move beyond the tension of 
metaphorical predication towards working 'with the 
appropriated designations which, although they begin as 
metaphors, are to be treated as identifying 
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designations. We have presented the statement 'Jesus 
is the eternal Son' as the principal clarificatory 
sense to be derived from the pre-existence predication, 
and we have suggested that this is to be developed as 
an explication of the logic of God's self-revelation. 
we should now address the question of how this 
statement is to be characterised: is 'Jesus is the 
eternal Son' a metaphorical statement? If we answer 
this in the affirmative, then the conclusion suggests 
itself that in reality, Jesus is not the eternal Son, 
but that he can be viewed in this way. This would 
correspond with Ricoeur's insistence on the presence of 
negation within the positive affirmation of 
metaphorical identity. Metaphors work because there is 
always a distinction between the referent and the 
predicate: man is not a wolf, and this makes it 
possible to engage in a metaphorical account of man as 
a wolf. on similar lines, would it be true to say that 
if 'Jesus is the eternal Son' is a metaphor, then the 
unstated implication is that he is not the eternal Son? 
In which case, is this not destructive of the whole 
weight of Christian tradition which has affirmed with 
Hilary of Poitiers, 'Non alius filius hominis, quam qui 
filius Dei est; neque alius in forma Dei, quam qui in 
forma servi perfectus homo natus estl? 86 By relating 
pre-existence language to the workings of metaphorical 
predication, are we able to secure what has been held 
to be essential in orthodox Christology, namely, that 
.1% . 31 'the one and the same' is K-L, MOTL. Ls K,, 11 C-K 
ejs-, ý'Lj 7 The Nicene creed, following the antithetical 
pattern of Ignatius, predicates of one and the same 
subject eternal procession from the Father and a birth 
in time from Mary. 'In the Nicene creed itself it is 
clear enough that there is "one and the same" subject 
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to whom these sets of predicates refer. ' For this 
pattern of Christological reflection to be maintained, 
which asserts that we are speaking about the same 
referent, both in generation from the Father and in his 
birth from Mary, it is necessary that the statement 
'Jesus is the eternal Son' be taken as an identity 4-- 
statement and not as an association of two referents. 
otherwise, we would be countenancing a version of the 
, two sons' problem which bedevilled Patristic 
Christology. 
There is no reason to think that a metaphor cannot 
function as an identity statement. If metaphor is one 
of the means by which the linguistic store is enriched 
through the creation of new epithets and expressions -- 
the phenomenon of 'collapsed metaphor' has made 
language a diachronic entity which continuously expands 
and contracts as words enter and depart from usage -- 
then what begins life as a metaphor, with all the 
tension between referent and predicate present in every 
new metaphor, can be used in a way in which the tension 
has given way to an identity and interchangeability 
k. Uot- ý,. 
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between the referent and the predicate. The predicate, 
in this case 'the eternal Son', can function as a 
designation or referring expression which identifies a 
particular referent, in this case, Jesus, without there 
being the implication that we are dealing with two 
referents brought together in a particular speech act. 
Christology possesses the characteristics of what 
Saussure labelled 'parole', as opposed to Ilanguel, in 
that it has the linguistic fluidity to use metaphors in 
the same way as other aspects of 'parole' use them, 
namely, as referring expressions and identity 
statements. We might note Scipioni's interpretation of 
Nestorius' distinction between various Christological 
expressions: according to Grillmeier's account, 
Scipioni reads Nestorius in a way which avoids the 
suggestion of a referential distinction between 'Logos' 
and other designations as though different entities 
were spoken about: 
'According to him, Nestorius does not 
want to make a real distinction between 
the "Logos" on the one hand and "Son", 
"Lord", "Christ" on the other. The 
Antiochene simply gives these words 
different terminological significances: 
"Logos" denotes the Son, considered in 
his divine nature; "Son" stands for the 
designation of the "person" of the Logos 
as distinct from that Father. "Christ" 
is the same person in the status of the 
incarnation. ' 87 
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This attempt to introduce precision and differentiation 
among the designations is correct; at the same time, 
it refuses to countenance the view that a different 
logical subject is involved in each case. it still 
leaves, however, as Grillmeier points out, the 
ontological question of the unity of subject in Christ. 
This is a difficulty which arises in conjunction with 
certain ways of speaking about Christ as the eternal 
Son, in particular when there is a 'unification' 
pattern which attempts to unite the Logos and the 
humanity of Jesus. Heidegger's description of language 
as the house of being has a possible corollary in the 
ways in which certain linguistic usages evoke certain 
ontological implications. An alteration in the way of 
using language of eternal Sonship may not necessarily 
be confronted with the same ontological problem as 
Patristic Christology faced; it may, for example, 
evade the ontological problem which arises in other 
ways of proceeding, or it may simply admit an inability 
to come to any satisfactory answer about a question to 
which previous generations devoted considerable 
attention. 
Our suggestion that 'Jesus' and 'eternal Son' be taken 
as referring expressions within an identity statement 
can be given support by an appeal to the Incarnational 
formula used by Augustine: ipsa ass umptione creatur 
points to the fact that the humani 
) 
of Christ has no 
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hypostatic identity other than in its being the A 
humanity of the Logos. In Rahner's formulation, God 
'creates the human reality by the very fact that he 
assumes it as his own. ' 8_8 The dialectic of the verbs, 
, assuming' and 'creating', and the refusal to separate 
them in their application to the Incarnation, insists 
that the person of Jesus is the self-manifestation of 
the Logos within the created order, without the 
suggestion that there are two logical subjects 
involved. Rahner's examination of the hypostatic union 
,89 as an 'original unity r-rather than a subsequent unity 
of two already constituted, and different, hypostases, 
can be aligned with our comments from a different 
perspective concerning the unity of reference, between 
the designations 'Jesus' and 'the eternal Son' in 
Christological speech. 
In support of this view, we point to a parallel between 
our proposal and the structure of the Chalcedonian 
definition. In metaphorical predication, the referent 
is described as the predicate, in order to effect -a 
redescription of the referent in the light of the 
connotations which can be transferred to it from the 
predicate. The referent does not lose its 
characteristics, but simultaneously these 
characteristics are viewed 'through the filter' of the 
connotations offered by the predicate. It is a 
heuristic device, moving between the already known 
referent and' the 'newly known' or disclosed referent 
which is brought into view. Within the working of 
metaphorical predication, there is a tension between 
the referent and the predication which is resolved 
through construing the senses in which the metaphor 
'makes sense', through identifying the ways in which 
the predication is a meaningful redescription of the 
referent, and through permitting the 'fictive' quality 
of the predication to shape our view of the referent. 
Similarly, in the Chalcedonian definition, there is a 
'deliberate yoking of unlikes', a conjunction of two 
sets of predicates which are brought together in order 
that their simultaneous presence should be descriptive 
of Jesus. In our chapter on metaphor, we spoke of the 
lassimilation of words or phrases which are drawn from 
disparate semantic fields and are juxtaposed in order 
that the interpreter might be led to a new descriptive 
vision of some aspect of reality. ' The construing of 
the metaphorical predication comes about by overcoming 
the distance which exists between the connotations of 
the referent and the predicate: the initial 
incongruence gives way to a perceived, congruence 
between the sets of connotations insofar as they can be 
descriptive of the referent. In other words, it is 
through the referential focus that the incompatibility 
between the sets of predicates -- those which belong to 
the referent already, and those which are introduced in 
the metaphor -- is overcome. 
15-q 
As we said earlier, 'the new compatibility between the 
elements of the metaphor, which results from the 
construing of the metaphor, does not mean that the 
initial distance between the elements has been 
abolished: the words still retain their previous sense 
and reference, but at the level of the whole sentence 
there is the production of a meaning which we call the 
metaphorical sense. ' If we recall the objections made 
by Lampe and Knox to the question of the compatibility 
of statements about Christ's humanity and his 
pre-existence, then we can suggest that it is precisdly 
the function of metaphor to bring about a resolution of 
the cognitive dissonance between incompatible 
predicates. Where two sets of predicates are blocked 
at the level of mutually exclusive connotations, 
metaphor can, by organising their conjunction, make it 
possible for them to co-exist meaningfully. This is 
not to say that any combination of incompatible 
predicates can, by force of will, be reconciled, but it 
is to suggest that the working of metaphorical 
predication involves precisely such an opposition 
which, in the process of construing the metaphor, is 
the condition for semantic innovation and 
redescription. Part of the process of successfully 
construing a metaphor lies in so arranging the elements 
that the connotations of the predication can be the 
means by whiýh the designated referent is reconsidered 
within a new perspective. 
1ý 
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If we turn to the Chalcedonian definition, 90we find that 
the structure inherent in metaphor is maintained. 
First of all, there is the designation of a referent of f 
whom two sets of predications are made: the referent 
is pointed to, rather than explained by the phrase, 
'our Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same Son'. This 
recurs later in an expanded form, 'one and the same 
Christ, Son, Lord, Only begotten', and by the 
appropriation of the terms 6V 7-, eou'wTi-ov 
Kbk 1 f-, 4- 
which designate the single referent who is 
being spoken about. 
These phrases designate the one who is to be taken as 
the logical subject of the predications. The use of 
TI ý C_ > the phrase eis o vLo -tos twice, and the use of 
5 four times in the formula, while they do not 
explain the ontological principle of unity in the 
person of Christ, nevertheless affirm that it is the 
same subject who is the bearer of the double 
predications which follow. The unity and singularity 
of the referent is stressed, while there is a strict 
distinction made between the predicates: the 
distinction between 'person' and 'nature' is a verbal 
expedient which locates the distinction at the level of 
the predications, and not at the level of -the 
reference. of the one prosopon or hypostasis, an 
antithetical set of predications are to be made at the 
level of phusis: of the referent, two sets of 
predications are to be made: 
(11 




begotten of the Father 
Perfect in manhood 
Truly man 
homoousios with us 
(sin excepted) 
born of Mary 
The definition lays down rules for the use of these 
predications: they are to be made in a way which does 
not imply that the connotations of one set infringe on 
the connotations of the other set (dcroy)ýu, 7-coS). ý We 
might paraphrase the linguistic rule in the following 
terms: 'what is said of Jesus in his relationship to 
the Father must not interfere in any way with what we 
say about him in his relationship to us, and vice 
versa. ' The connotations associated with his divinity 
must not be thought to diminish in any, way the full 
predication of human reality to Jesus (sin alone 
excepted), nor must we speak of the humanity of Christ 
in a way which undermines what we say about him in his 
eternal relationship to the Father. 
The rejection of Monophysitism through this controlling 
negative principle has, as its linguistic correlate, 
the rejection of the mingling of the connotations of 
divine and human predicates, as though our language 
about Christ could avoid maintaining both affirmations 
in their fullness. The distinction, and we might say, 
tension, between the two sets of predicates, is not to 
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be diminished, since at an ontological level, ' this 
would imply a naturalistic fusion of natures. 91 with 
profound implications, both for our treatment of God's 
transcendence and for our evaluation of the 
soteriological significance of the humanity of Christ. 
The Apollinarian fusion of the distinction corresponds 
to a blending together of divinity and humanity as 
though they are distinct referents which required a 
mutual modification of the properties of each in order 
to constitute the person of Jesus. This is rejected by 
Chalcedon through its referential/predicative structure 
which maintains the distinction at the level of 
predicates, rather than referents. 
The second controlling principle is given with the word 
MO 
I -, Los this affirms that the predications are 
not to be taken as implying two referents. The double 
set is jointly descriptive of the one person Jesus. We 
have insisted that the Christological use of 'eternal 
Son' is a referring designation applied to Jesus, and 
not to a hypostasis who is taken to be distinct from 
him. We might paraphrase the meaning of 
in the following terms: 'language about the divinity 
of Christ is not to be taken as referring to anything 
other than the person of Jesus; nor is language about 
his humanity to be taken as dealing with anything other 
than the divine person Jesus. ' The connotations of the 
double predications -- in the terms of the definition, 
'the properties of each nature' -- are to be maintained 
and applied fully to Jesus as descriptive of his 
identity. They are to be taken as 'concurring' in 
their application to the 'one person and hypostasis, 
one and the same Son and only begotten, the divine 
Logos, the Lord Jesus Christ. ' 
The mono/dyo/thelite controversy which arose out of the 
Chalcedonian definition's insistence on the maintenance 
of the two natures in the one person of Christ 
exemplifies the danger of allowing the distinction 
between the natures to threaten the unity of the person 
of Christ. The logic of the Chalcedonian definition is 
that it is necessary to say, along with Leo the Great, 
lagit enim. utraque forma cum alterius communione quod 
proprium est, I(DS 294) and that it is necessary to 
concur with the Lateran Synod of 659 and Constantinople 
(680-1) in positing in Christ two wills and two 
operations. However, with our proposal that the 
distinction of the natures is not a distinction between 
distinct referents, but rather a distinction of 
predicates which must both be made about Jesus, the 
controversy can be avoided in the terms in which it was 
originally posed. Two wills were taken to imply two 
subjects, and one will was taken to vitiate the 
Chalcedonian distinction of natures. But if the 
distinction is taken to be a distinction of necessary 
and complementary predicates, then the proposal can be 
made that the orientation of 
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Jesus to the Father is to be described as both the 
orientation of the human person who stands at a created 
distance from God and as the orientation of the Son to 
the Father. The human self-consciousness of Jesus is 
not the double of the divine self-consciousness of the 
Logos, overlapping or tangentially related to a 
different divine relationship, but rather the human 
relationship of Jesus to the Father is to be taken as 
the expression of the Son's relationship to the Father 
within the divine being, now expressed in the economy. 
Wiederkehr corrects the inherent tendency of the terms 
of the discussion to focus attention on how the human 
nature relates to the divine nature: like Pannenberg, 
he insists that it is the relationship between Jesus 
and the Father which is the referential focus of the 
matter: 
'Il ne slagit donc pas de se demander 
comment connaissance et volonte humaines 
et divines se repartissent entre la 
nature humaine de Jesus et la nature 
divine du Fils, se distinguent, se 
relient, s intearent et se compenetrent, 
main bien plutot comment les actes tout 
entiers filiaux du Christ, sa 
connaissance et son vouloir, se situent 
par rapport a la connaissance et au 
vouloir originels du Pere. C'est 
I seulement a llinterieur de cette 
perspective relationnelle et trinitaire 
que se pose ensuite la question de la 
distinction des natures et de leurs 
modes dlagir. ' 92 
We want to point to the continuity which exists between 
the figurative presentation of Jesus as pre-existent, 
the'conceptual clarification of this metaphor expressed 
in the phrase 'Jesus is the eternal Son', and the 
structure of the Chalcedonian definition. In all three 
instances, there is a development of a structure which 
has its roots in the form of a metaphorical 
predication. We presented the pre-existence 
predication as metaphorical, in that it offers a 
descriptive framework within which the person of Jesus 
is viewed metaphorically and figuratively as the 
pre-existent One. There is a single referent, the 
person of Jesus, and a predication which stands in a 
certain tension with the attributes of Jesus as a 
particular temporal existent, because it offers a 
supra-temporal perspective. This requires -a 
determination of the senses in which the predication is 
to be taken, and we have presented 'Jesus 
0 
is the 
eternal Son' as the conceptual clarification which 
issues from the figurative language of pre-existence; 
in this form of expression, the temporal element has 
given way to a concentration on the identity of Jesus 
as the Son who is inseparable from God in his act of 
self-revelation. Again, in this instance, there is 
only one referent, and the phrase 'eternal Son' is a 
metaphorical referring expression which designates 
Jesus. We insisted, through our formal distinction 
between Christology and theology, that language of 
/ 
eternal Sonship is a qualification of the person of 
Jesus, which arises out of a consideration of what is 
implied in a revelatory model of God's action. We 
concurred with Pannenberg in his insistence that, 
within Christology, 'eternal Son' does not designate a 
distinct hypostasis other than Jesus. 
Finally, we indicated that the Chalcedonian definition 
can be approach ed in a way which relates its linguistic 
procedures to the same structure of metaphorical 
predication. In our view, the definition is most 
successfully reinterpreted as providing the rules for 
Christological speech, for ensuring that our language 
about Jesus is both accurate and adequate. We showed 
that the referential focus of the pattern is, again, 
Jesus, and that a range of referring descriptions, 
including 'Son and Only-begotten, the divine Logos', 
are used to affirm the unity of the one referent. A 
double set of predications is made of this referent, 
covering his divinity and humanity, which are treated 
of, and, distinguished, within the category of 
predications. Guidance is provided by means of the 
four adverbial insertions -- 'without confusion, 
without change, without division, without separation' 
-- which are intended to effect a conjunction between 
the predications, at the same time as they insist that 
the predications must not be interpreted in a way which 
damages the integrity of each set. This has its roots 
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in the form of metaphorical predication in which the 
known characteristics of the referent are not impaired 
by the 'new' characteristics which result from the 
construing of the referent as the predicate. The 
integrity of both is maintained, while they are brought 
together as descriptive of the referent. 
We should also note that the Chalcedonian definition 
has the character of an explication of the senses which 
are derived, ultimately, from the figurative language 
of pre-existence, mediated by the conceptual Aufhebung 
which we have identified as 'Jesus is the eternal Son. ' 
Pre-existence language, in itself, leaves open the 
question of what form of identity is to be attributed 
to Jesus: in itself, the predication is capable of 
being interpreted as, for example, attributing an 
angelic identity to Jesus, or an Arian identity as the 
highest member of the set of created reality. The 
Chalcedonian definition, while clarifying this point, 
provides direction for the ways in which this 
predication is to be made of Jesus, in conjunction with 
the affirmation of statements about the reality of his 
human existence. 
Our quest, then, for an interpretative structure which 
would permit the affirmation of pre-existence, in 
conjunction with the affirmation of the full humanity 
of Christ, has moved from the proposal that 
8 
pre-existence language be taken as a metaphorical 
predication which redescribes Jesus, to an analysis of 
the linguistic controls proffered by Chalcedon. We 
detected a continuity of structure between the 
figurative language and the conceptual controls of the 
Chalcedonian definition, which suggests that our 
proposal about the metaphorical character of 
pre-existence language may illuminate the wider 
category of Christological language. At the same time, 
we suggest that by highlighting the metaphorical 
character of pre-existence language, a number of the 
difficulties and impasses experienced in Christology 
can perhaps be avoided. 
t ý-ý 
Xarl Barth's Treatment of the 
Pre-existence of the Man Jesus 
17 b-. 
Barth's treatment of the pre-existence of the man Jesus 
is a major theme in the Church Dogmatics, clearly 
expressed, but frustratingly elusive nevertheless. 
There is no doubt about what Barth says -- indeed he 
says it several times in different sections of the 
work. In this respect, the Church Doqmatics stand 
comparison with Ezra Pound's Cantos, with their 
repetitions, internal references and modulations of 
major themes. one may push the comparison further and 
suggest that, in the minds of many readers, the theme 
of the pre-existence of the man Jesus is as resistant 
to interpretation as the Chinese ideograms which leap 
out from the pages of the Cantos: what are we to make 
of these squiggles? There is no doubt about the 
seriousness of Barth's statements on this topic: one 
cannot say that they are instances where the preacher 
has escaped from the theologian's leash. His 
statements about the pre-existence of the man Jesus are 
central to the architectonic quality of the Church 
Dogmatics, integral to its central, purposes and 
concerns: it is a theme which integrates his doctrine 
of God, his Christology and his 'treatment of the 
soteriological importance of the Election. 
Yet, although his statements on this topic are clearly 
expressed, there is considerable difficulty about how 
they are to be understood. No less an authority than 
Eberhard JUngel admits the difficulty of speaking of 
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the temporal existent, Jesus, in these terms. It is 
significant that he himself, as we shall see, resorts 
to an explanation in terms of anhypostasis and 
enhypostasis which Barth himself does not use. 1 This 
fact in itself encourages us to think that, if these 
statements are to be accurately understood, we shall 
have to go beyond Barth's own explanations and engage 
in a prior investigation into the character of these 
statements. Barth himself does not provide guidance on 
this matter, and none of his commentators address&J 
A 
themý, Aves to the question, with the result that often 
discussion centres on the validity or invalidity of 
speaking in this way without a consideration of the 
nature of this form of predication. We shall propose 
that they may fruitfully be illuminated as a form of 
metaphorical statement. 
Because of the mutually reinforcing quality of the 
sections of the Church Dogmatics, and the s piralling 
character of Barth's argumentation, it will be 
necessary at times to cast our net into deep waters, in 
order to bring to light the dynamism which prompts 
Barth's statements. A failure to do this would lead 
only to the bemusement expressed, for example, by A. T. 
Hanson who dismisses Barth's treatment of pre-existence 
with a wave of the hand: 
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I ... we should note that Karl Barth's doctrine of pre-existence assumes not 
just the pre-existence of the divine 
Word, but of the Word existing in some 
(non-incarnate) mode as man and as 
therefore bearing the name Jesus Christ 
long before the historical character of 
Jesus of Nazareth appeared on the scene. 
This seems to me to have no necessary 
warrant in Scripture, and to add an 
unnecessary and incredible element to 
the doctrine of the Incarnation. '! 
Barth deserves to be considered with more subtlety than 
this, and clearly Hanson has not addressed himself to 
the contexts in which Barth treats of the pre-existence 
of Jesus. He fails to point out that Barth's formal 
exposition of his Chalcedonian Christology is worked 
out without the use of this theme, and that the notion 
of the pre-existence of the man Jesus occurs in 
contexts where the focus of interest lies in 
soteriology and the Election, the hermeneutics of 
Logos-statements, and the time-eternity relationship. 
It is in the interest of developing these themes that 
this particular Christological notion is -deployed. 
Consequently, attention must be paid to the role 
pre-existence statements are intended to play.,. in their 
contexts if Barth's serious intentions are to be 
respected. 
Barth's teaching about the Election contains his most 
extensive treatment of the pre-existence of Jesus. He 
regarded himself as responsible for a major 
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re-statement of the doctrine of the Election, as the, 
first dogmatician to place the Election within the 
context of the doctrine of God. Calvin himself thought, 
that such a location would be inopportune, and instead 
dealt with it in Book III of the Institutes in his 
exposition of the believer's appropriation of the grace 
of Christ. 
The reasons for Barth's reinterpretation of the 
doctrine are well known: if all that we know about God 
is given in Jesus, then it is impossible that the 
Election should be considered outside the doctrine of 
God derived from his revelation in Jesus. Barth wants 
to avoid the implication that there was a 'prior' 
decree about salvation which 'preceded' the grace given 
in Jesus, and he wants to counter the suggestion that 
there was a decretum absolutum which could be invoked 
independently of' God's saving action in Jesus. The 
Christological concentration required of all systematic 
theology leads to a revision of the Calvinist position: 
Barth insists that the doctrine of the Election be 
grounded in the revelation given in Jesus, and, as a 
further consequence, that it be located in the act by 
which God determines his being. According to Barth's 
interpretation, the soteriological character of the 
Election requires that it be placed in the free act of 
God by which he determines to be 'God-for-us', and 
nowhere else. The original and uniquely characteristic 
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act of God is to relate to that which is other than 
himself -- hence, every other aspect of God's action, 
the nexus, of creation/ covenant/ redemption/ Election, 
has its source in the free act by which God expresses 
his being in love and freedom: , 
'... in the primal and basic decision in 
which He wills to be and actually is 
God, in the mystery of what takes place 
from and to all eternity within Himself, 
within His triune being, God is none 
other than the One who in His Son or 
Word elects Himself, and in and with 
Himself elects His people. In so far as 
God not only is love, but loves, in the 
act of love which determines His whole 
being God elects. And in so far as this 
act of love is an election, it is at the 
same time and as such the act of His 
freedom. ' (CD 11/2, p. 76. ) 
John Thompson expresses it in these terms: 'It is a 
relationship in which God in activating himself ad 
extra determines and defines himself ad intra. v3 
Provided this is not understood as implying the 
succession of two separate 'events' in which the 
relationship ad extra leads to a self-determination ad 
intra, and provided this is seen more as a 
co-determinative relationship, this may be accepted. 
Colin Gunton, in a useful image, describes it as 'a 
single movement with two aspects, both "inside" the 
being of God and "outside", and they belong inseparably 
together. P4 Thus the ground of what God does in his 
revelation and redemption is established in the act by 
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which God determines to be himself, the God of grace 
revealed in Jesus: -'God's Urentscheidung, his primary 
determination, is also the Urgeschichte, the primary 
history, of the act of grace. ý5- In Jenson's lucid 
formulation, 'the "decree of predestination" made in 
God about us is in fact identical with the decision in 
which God chooses to be God. What God chooses is to be 
God as Jesus Christ. o 6 
While there is a negative aspect here -- the denial of 
the decretum absolutum as an independent principle 
separable from God's revelation in Jesus -- the 
positive development and integration of the Election 
with the doctrine of God exhibits characteristically 
Barthian concerns: the correspondence of God's 
revealed being with what he is in himself; the 
impossibility of articulating a soteriology derived 
from a foundation other than that established by the 
implications of God's self-revelation in Jesus; the 
resistance to a consideration of the relationship of 
God and humanity which does not proceed from the 
concrete particularity of God's self-interpretation in 
Jesus: 
I ... before all created reality, before 
all being and becoming in time, before 
time itself, in the pre-temporal 
eternity of God, the eternal divine 
decision as such has as its object and 
content the existence of this one 
created being, the man Jesus of 
Nazareth, and the work of this man in 
His life and death .... In this function this man is the object of the eternal 
divine decision and foreordination. 
Jesus Christ, then, is not merely one of 
the elect but the elect of God .... His 
election is the original and 
all-inclusive election. ' (CD 11/2, 
p. 116-7. ) 
This election is 'the beginning of all the ways and 
works of God' (CD 11/2, p. 3), the foundational act in 
which God decides that he will be a God who relates, in 
freedom and love, to that which is other than himself: 
'The Subject of this decision is the 
Triune God -- the Son of God no less 
than the Father and the Holy Spirit. 
And the specific object of it is the Son 
of God in His determination as the Son 
of Man, the pre-existing God-man, Jesus 
Christ, who is as such the eternal basis 
of the whole divine election. ' (CD 11/2, 
p. 110. ) 7 
Not only is Jesus the pre-existing God-man insofar as 
he is the object of this election; he is also involved 
as the subject of the election -- he is 'the electing 
God' (CD 11/2, p. 103). As J5ngel points out, this is 
required by the perichoresis of God's three modes of 
being, in order to avoid suggestions of inferiority or 
tritheism. 1 God, in his triune being, determines 
himself to be in Jesus both the electing God and the 
elected man, both the subject and the object of the 
election: 
'The choice or election of God is 
basically and properly God's decision as 
that described in in. 1.1-2 the Word 
which is the same and is called Jesus, 
should really be in the beginning with 
Himself, like Himself, one with Himself 
in His deity .... This choice was in the beginning. As the subject and 
object of this choice, Jesus Christ was 
at the beginning. He was not at the 
beginning of God, God indeed has no 
beginning. But He was at the beginning 
of all things, at the beginning of God's 
dealings with the reality which is 
distinct from Himself. Jesus Christ was 
the choice or election of God in respect 
of this reality. ' (CD 11/2, pp. 102-3. ) 
Barth's programmatic insistence on Jesus being both the 
subject and the object of the election leads him to 
exclude certain ways in which this pre-existence is to 
be understood: for example, it cannot be treated 
within the general rubric of God's foreknowledge of all 
created reality. He rejects Aquinas' proposal that 
'praedestinatio attribuatur personae Christi non quidem 
secundum se vel secundum quod subsistit in divina 
natura, sed secundum quod subsistit in humana natura. 19 
The limitation of this view is that it cannot establish 
'that the Son, too, is an active Subject of the aeterna 
Dei praedestinatio as Son of Man, that He is Himself 
the electing God ... that only in this way and for 
this reason is He the Son of Man establishing and 
fulfilling the will of God in the world' (CD 11/2, 
p. 107). If we restrict ourselves to Aquinas' proposal, 
'then we have knowledge only of the election of the man 
Jesus as such, and not of the election and-personal 
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electing of the Son of God which precedes this 
election. And once again we make the election of grace 
a divine mystery detached from the person of Jesus 
Christ' (ibid. ). Barth insists that, although there is 
a way in which Jesus can be considered within God's 
foreknowledge, this must be supplemented by his unique 
status as the one in whom all creation and redemption 
takes place. The criterion is one of adequacy: 
'Jesus Christ was in the beginning with 
God. He was so not merely in the sense 
that in view of God's eternal knowing 
and willing all things may be said to 
have been in the beginning with God, in 
His plan and decree. For these are two 
separate things: the Son of God in His 
oneness with the Son of Man, as 
foreordained from all eternity; and the 
universe which was created, and 
universal history which was willed for 
the sake of this oneness, in their 
communion with God, as foreordained from 
all eternity. on the one hand, there is 
the Word of God by which all things were 
made, and, on the other, the things 
fashioned by that Word ..... We can and 
must say that Jesus Christ was in the 
beginning with God in the sense that all 
creation and its history was in God's 
plan and decree with God. But He was so 
not merely in that way. He was also in 
the beginning with God as "the 
first-born of every creature" (Col. 
1.15), Himself the plan and decree of 
God, Himself the divine decision with 
respect to all creation and its history 
whose content is already determined. ' 
(CD 11/2, P. 104. ) 
just as Barth rejected the Thomist view of the 
inclusion of Christ's humanity within God's 
foreknowledge, because it could not establish the 
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positive role of Jesus as the electing God, so here he 
refuses to place it within the sphere of creation and 
the history of salvation, because the logic of God's 
revelation requires that Jesus be presented as the one 
in whom and for whom creation takes place. Therefore, 
Jesus must stand 'on the side of God' in relation to 
all created reality: he is the one through whom God 
wills to give himself to that which is other than 
himself. The requirement that our statements about 
Jesus be adequate expressions of this truth impels 
Barth to insist that 
'the true humanity of Jesus Christ, as 
the humanity of the Son, was and is and 
will be the primary content of God's 
election of grace, i. e., of the divine 
decision and action which are not 
preceded by any higher, apart from the 
trinitarian, happening of the life of 
God, but which all other divine 
decisions and actiofi-sfollow, and to 
which they are subordinated. ' (CD IV/2, 
p. 31; punctuation emended, and my 
emphasis. ) 
This is a clear statement of the logical form of 
Barth's argument concerning the Election. He begins 
with the datum established in God's self-revelation in 
Jesus, that Jesus is the full *expression of God's 
being, and that therefore God's relationship to the 
whole of created reality -- in creation and salvation 
-- cannot be treated outside the initial determinative 
act in which he elects to be God-for-us. It is a form 
of argumentation which is analogous to the Kantian 
transcendental deduction in which the conditions of 
possibility for a particular event or phenomenon are 
investigated. Barth moves from his starting-point -- 
God's self-revelation and self-interpretation in Jesus 
-- to a consideration of 'what must be the caseV if 
this has happened. As we have seen, the impetus of his 
argument leads him to reject descriptions or 
assessments of Jesus which do not encompass what must 
be said about him, if he is to occupy the central 
position in God's dealings with all reality other than 
himself; on the positive side, Barth is equally 
impelled to the use of assessments which express the 
priority of Jesus. His use of pre-existence language 
is justified, therefore, by its ability to delineate 
and characterise the unique and distinct role of the 
humanity of Jesus as the origin, focus and goal of 
God's whole action ad extra. 
J16ngel struggles to express the logic of Barth's 
argument: 
f 
'But revelation is just that historical 
event in which God's being shows itself 
as a being which is not only able to 
bear historical predicates, but demands 
theml .... Barth's understanding of 
revelation as God's self-interpretation 
is the systematic attempt to think of 
God's being-in-itself as event in such a 
way that God's being is capable of 
possessing historical predicates, 
although these as such are not capable 
of predicating the being Of God. In 
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that God in revelation interprets 
himself, God's being is reiterated with 
the help of historical predicates. 110 
JUngel's use of the word 'predicates' is not easy to 
understand. I take him to mean that God's being is 
capable of being expressed fully in the historical 
person Jesus, and in that sense the 'subject', God, can 
properly be called the subject of the action 
constituting the person of Jesus. Since Jesus is 
'historical', and is a 'temporal existent', one has to 
speak of God 'interpreting' or 'reiterating' himself in 
a historical mode. God, therefore, since he has 
expressed himself historically, must be a being who is 
capable of doing this, and one is led to consider, as 
JUngel does with an unrivalled opacity, the conditions 
of the being of God which make this possible. Then the 
way is open for an examination of God's being as 
eminent historicality. A similar pattern of 
transcendental deduction can be conducted with regard 
to the self-relatedness of God's being, which is the 
condition for God's action in Jesus. "--, In this way, the 
doctrine of the Trinity is the answer to the, question 
'Who is God? ', which derives from his self-revelation 
in Jesus. We will not rehearse the whole Barthian 
scheme at this point, but what should be noted is the 
similarity of the pattern of argumentation Barth uses 
to work out the transcendental deduction of Trinitarian 
doctrine, with that which he uses to work out the 
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pre-existence of the man Jesus. It is as though the 
argument is reverse, or perhaps more accurately, the 
completion of the hermeneutical circle is achieved. 
If, in the articulation of Trinitarian doctrine, Barth 
works from the historicality of God's action in Jesus 
to an examination of the conditions which must obtain 
in the being of God to make this possible, here, in his 
articulation of the theme of the pre-existence of 
Jesus, he moves in the other direction: if Jesus is 
the original and central focus of God's relationship to 
all other reality which has time as the form of its 
existence, then Jesus must be related to God's eternity 
in a way which is not only different from other created 
reality, but actually makes them possible at all. if 
Barth's Trinitarian doctrine is a redescription of God 
in the light of his historical self-expression, then 
his pre-existence doctrine is a redescription of Jesus 
in the light of what has been established about God's 
relationship to time. If God elects to be himself the 
electing God and the elected man, in the determinative 
act of his being, and if it is as Jesus that he is the 
electing God and the elected man, then Jesus must be 
described in terms which denote this status: he must 
stand at the beginning of God's relationship to 
everything else; he must be the initial, central and 
complete focus of God's action ad extra. 
If I may refer to an iconographical and mystical 
example, to illustrate what Barth is doing with his 
application of pre-existence language to the man Jesus: 
the German 12th century mystic, Hildegard of Bingen, 
describes her vision of the Trinity in her book 
Sciviaýs, illustrated by an artist who painted her 
vision under her direction. It is a remarkably 
original image, in which she sees a bright circular 
light which represents the Father; there is a smaller 
circular shape, a fiery red flame, which moves in and 
out of the circular light, interpenetrating it 
(perichoretically), representing the Spirit. Within 
this movement -- it is a kinetic vision -- appears a 
human figure, the Son: 
'Next I saw an exceedingly bright light 
and in it a human form which was glowing 
through and through with the soft red 
from a sparkling flame. The bright 
light streamed through the sparkling 
flame, and the sparkling flame through 
the bright light. And both suffused the 
human form, coloured in sapphire-blue -- 
all three as one light, being of one 
power and might. ' 11 %. 
The brief commentary provided by Adelgundis Fuhrkotter 
explains: 
'The white light in an enclosed circle 
is a symbol of God the Father, the 
unoriginated Origin. The human form 
flooded in this light is the image of 
the Son, procreated in the eternal Today 
within the bosom of the Father; that is 
why the circle above the head of the 
human form is not closed. The Son 
became man within time, born of the 
Virgin Mary, who was overshadowed by the 
power of the Holy Spirit, represented by 
the fiery red circle. All three are one 
light, one single God. 112 
Out of the ineffability of God's own being comes God's 
expression of himself, the human person of Jesus 
proceeding directly from within the perichoresis of the 
Trinitarian life: he already bears the human features 
of Jesus of Nazareth as he emerges from the Trinity. 
God's complete expression of his being is an historical 
person. Jenson's summary of Barth's position, to which 
we shall return later for further comment, is admirably 
suited to Hildegard's vision: 'The historical event of 
Jesus' existence is the eternal event of the life of 
God. '-L3There is no other event, nothing prior, because 
the humanity of Jesus is the original and complete 
expression of the divine life, the beginning of all the 
ways and works of God. 
The peculiarly Protestant genre of 'table talk' is 
fruitful in revealing another important aspect of this 
matter. Barth is recorded as saying, in answer to the 
question 'Does the Incarnation make a change in the 
Trinity? ': 
'No, the Incarnation makes no change in 
the Trinity. In the eternal decree of 
God, Christ is God and man. Do not ever 
think of the second Person of the 
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Trinity as only Logos. That is the 
mistake of Emil Brunner. There is no 
Logos asarkos but only ensarkos. 
Brunner thinks of an Logos asarkos and I 
think this is the reason for his natural 
theology. The Logos becomes an abstract 
principle. Since there is only and 
always a Logos ensarkos, there is no 
change in the Trinity, as if a fourth 
member comes in after the Incarnation. ' 14 
Barth elsewhere admits the value of a Logos asarkos 
only in a very limited and functional context -- 'when 
we have to understand the revelation and dealings of 
God in the light of their free basis in the inner being 
and essence of God' (CD IV/1, p. 52). But the 
limitation of the concept is that it does not designate 
the way in which God has revealed himself in Jesus: it 
does not derive from the particularity and character of 
God's self-revelation, and can therefore be used in an 
agnostic way to speak of God apart from the fullness of 
his own self-interpretation: 
. 1. 
... it is pointless, as it is impermissible, to return to the inner 
being and essence of God and especially 
to the second P6rson of the Trinity as 
such, in such a way that we ascribe to 
this person another form than that which 
God Himself has given in willing to 
, reveal himself and to act outwards... 
We must not... imagind a "Logos in 
itself" which does not have this content 
and form, which is the eternal word of 
God without this form and content. We 
could only imagine such a Logos. Like 
Godhead abstracted from its revelation 
and acts, it would necessarily be an 
empty concept which we would then, of 
course, feel obliged to fill with all 
kinds of contents of our own arbitrary 
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invention. Under, the title of a 
N" yos ccr-c-epcos we pay homage to a Deus 
absconditus and therefore to some image 
of God which we have made for 
ourselves. ' (ibid. ) 
Barth's concern here is hermeneutical: how to ensure 
that our language about the Logos is correct. It can 
only be, correct if we complete the circle and return to 
the Trinity with an understanding of the character of 
the Logos, derived from Jesus and from nowhere else, 
since Jesus is the only, and complete, expression of 
the being of the Father. The Logos cannot be 
considered in terms other than those manifest in the 
person of Jesus -- otherwise, we do not respect the 
correspondence of God's revelation with God's being in 
itself. Again, the familiar pattern of argument 
emerges as a factor motivating Barth's assumption of 
pre-existence language: if God has revealed himself 
fully in the person of Jesus, then the 
self-differentiation within the being of God enables us 
to bestow the characteristics of Jesus onto our account 
of the eternal Word. This is not a matter of 
'projection', as Lampe suggests, but a matter of 
establishing the appropriate hermeneutical procedure 
for ensuring that we speak about the God who has 
expressed himself in the existence of Jesus. In 
JUngells account, the logic is as follows: 
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'If that primal history is real history 
between God and man, then the Son of God 
. cannot be thought of in his history, 
without the man Jesus, and the eternal 
Word ( Xoýo$ ) cannot be thought of as 
the Word without flesh ( 
If God in this history is already with 
man, then this man on his part must 
already be with God. ' 15 
The structure of this argument is given exegetical 
support in Barth's interpretation, of the Johannine 
Prologue: it is a notorious crux interpretu to 
establish at what point in the-Prologue Jesus is spoken 
about. Barth cuts- throughý the debate with the 
7 assertion, that- ob-, o5 of in. 1.2 refers to Jesus. He 
is emphatic that the designation 'logos' cannot be 
taken in a way which breaks or loosens its link to the 
C referent Jesus. His discussion of ob-105 
-, 
ýv OC-'Ov is as fOllOws: 
'And this reference in v. 2 shows us that 
v. 1 is meant as the marking off or 
reservation of a place, for it,. points to 
that which fills the place indicated by 
the concept Logos. The statement tells 
us, then, that "the same", ýhe One who 
no more needs to be made known as a 
person than the One described as b 9&6v, 
the One whom we all know because He-has 
come forth to all of us, "the same" was 
in the beginning with God, and "the 
same" was Jesus.... V. 2 is, thefi, a 
part of the third assertion of v. 1, but, 
it is not a repetition of it. What v. 2 
does tell us, with backward reference to 
v. 1, is that "the same", Jesus, is the 
Word which partakes of the divine 
essence. What it tells us is that "the 
same", Jesus, was in the beginning 
because as this same divine Word He 
belongs legitimately to God. ' (CD 11/2, 
p. 98. ) 
The statement in v. 2-is taken as answering the two 
questions, 'Who was in the beginning with God, sharing 
his divine nature? ' and 'Is it true that there was 
anyone in the beginning with God, sharing the divine 
essence? ' (ibid. ), and the answer to both questions is 
unmistakably Jesus. - The Logos in the opening verses of 
the Prologue is compared by Barth to the unknown factor 
1x1- in an equation, which is identified only when the 
equation has been solved (ibid., p. 97). The Logos is 
identified only by our taking the rest of the Prologue, 
and indeed the rest of the testimony of the-Gospel with 
its assertions of the pre-existence of Jesus, as the 
means of identifying Jesus as the only interpretative 
key to the equation. 'He is the beginning of God 
before -which there is no other beginning apart from 
that of God within himself .... He, Jesus Christ, is the 4 
free grace of God as not content simply to remain 
identical with the inward and eternal being of God, but 
operating ad extra in the ways and works of God (CD 
11/2, pp. 94-5). 
Barth clearly interprets the Prologue through the prism 
of the Chalcedonian definition: the insistence on 'the 
same' echoes its central referential role in Chalcedon: 
... the Same perfect 
in Godhead, the Same perfect in 
manhood, truly God and truly man, the Same (consisting) 
of a rational soul and a body; homoousios with the 
Father as to his Godhead, and the Same homoousios with 
to- 
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us as to his manhood-. -r In chapter 2, we showed that the 
Chalcedonian formula can be analysed as a regulative 
guide for Christological language. Its referent is 
Jesus, 'our Lord, Jesus Christ ... one and the same Son 
and Only-begotton, the divine Logos, the Lord Jesus 
Christ. ' To this referent two sets of predicates are to 
be applied, the first describing his Godhead, the 
second describing his humanity. The double predication 
must be made in ways which avoid the suggestion that 
the application of one set interferes with the 
application of the other set-. The distinction between 
predicates is made at the same time as it is affirmed 
that there is only one referent of these predications. 
The definition thus establishes a controlling 
linguistic usage to be used when speaking about Jesus. 
Barth's interpretation of the Prologue, on the other 
hand, is concerned with the establishment of rules for 
speaking about the Logos. We saw his concern to'hvoid 
the importation of notions about the Logos which do not, 
derive from the only, and full, expression of- the 
identity of the Logos, namely the person of Jesus. His 
concern is to avoid the autonomy of the Logos image, 
and to restrict the extent to which it becomes detached 
from Christological roots. It is strange to find Barth 
being accused by-Pannenberg of a restoration of Logos 
Christology 
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- since he is emphatic that the only valid 
way of controlling this elusive concept is by letting 
one's interpretation of the Logos be guided by the 
historical person of Jesus, and-indeed, by treating the 
Logos in its 'pre-incarnate' state as Ichristic'. God 
is as he has revealed himself, and therefore his 
revelation in Jesus requires that we speak about the 
Logos with predicates which bear the mark of Jesus, and 
no one else. If one of the hermeneutical concerns of 
Chalcedon was to establish how to speak of Jesus in 
terms of the Logos, Barth's concern here is how to 
speak of the Logos in terms of Jesus. It is the 
completion of the, circle, consistently worked out, 
which is established by Barth's starting point in the 
character of revelation. 
We are thus given a double hermeneutic, in which the 
person of Jesus must be described as the Logos, and the 
person of the Logos must be described as Jesus. Jesus, 
the referent, must be described with predicates which 
speak of him as pre-existent -- otherwise his status as 
electing God and elected man cannot be established -- 
and, as a consequence of this, whenever the eternal 
Word is the referent, he must be described with 
predicates derived from the human person Jesus. Both 
parts of the hermeneutical procedure create the 
conditions for the other part to be possible and 
accurate, through the creation of a circle of mutual 
interpretation. The conditions for any appropriate 
speech about Jesus and the Logos depend upon allowing 
this circle to operate as an active principle in 
Christological discourse: being able to speak 
appropriately about Jesus depends upon starting from 
the principle that God has interpreted himself for us 
in the person of Jesus, and, as the second step in the 
procedure, being able to speak appropriately about the 
Logos depends upon working with the Ichristic' 
character of his revelation as the interpretative key 
to the Logos 'in himself'. This is a method of doing 
theology and Christology which refuses to separate 
them, and which suggests that the purported distinction 
of 'Christology from above' and 'Christology from 
below' is misconceived: Christology must be done 
theologically, and theology must be done 
Christologically. 
with this analysis, we have begun to answer the 
question about why Barth feels the need to go beyond 
the Chalcedonian Christology of an Alexandrian cast, 1-8 
which he expounds in the Christological section of CD 
I/I, and develop the theme of the pre-existence of the 
man Jesus. The concerns which prompt this are 
soteriological and hermeneutical: how to establish the 
status of Jesus as electing God and elected man, and 
how to speak of the Logos. His treatment of the 
pre-existence of the man Jesus must be seen against 
this background. To return to the vision of the 
Trinity which Hildegard describes: Barth's picture of 
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the relationship of the humanity of Jesus to the 
intra-Trinitarian life is remarkably similar to this 
image. out of the perichoretic life of the Trinity 
emerges first of all the person of Jesus, at the 
beginning of all God's dealings with created reality, a 
human person who is the fullness of God's self-giving, 
the first and complete point of outreach to the world 
which is made through him and for him. 
To complete our examination Of Barth's use of 
pre-existence language, we shall turn to his treatment 
of the'relationship of time and eternity. One of the 
difficulties in reading Barth is that one readily 
assumes that, when he talks about time and eternity, he 
should be taken as meaning the same things as we might 
meanl In fact, the Barthian revolution involves 
re-casting the ways in which we use these terms in 
theological discourse, if theology is to maintain the 
method appropriate to its object. The process of 
Inachdenkenl-o, characteristic of the Barthian way of 
proceeding, involves allowing our use of terms to be 
controlled by the act of God's self-revelation in 
Jesus, moving from the concrete act of Jesus' existence 
to the implications of this on our language about time 
and eternity. We saw an instance of this in his 
treatment of the Logos, where he places very strict 
controls on the centripetal tendencies of this 
designation. In a similar wayr Barth rejects a 
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consideration of time and eternity which is based on 
generalised notions originating outside the circulum 
veritatis of God's self-revelation: 
'There has been a failure to see that in 
answering this question we cannot start 
with the general phenomenon of time, or, 
as it has been called, history. We 
cannot assume that we know its normal 
structure on the basis of comparative 
observation, and then go on to ask 
whether and how far the phenomenon of 
revelation discloses itself, perhaps, to 
the said comparative observation at a 
specific point. ' (CD 1/2, p. 56. ) 
Instead, Barth develops a view of time and eternity 
which derives from the implication of God's act in 
being Deus praesens et pro nobis in Jesus. 
Consequently, time and eternity must be construed in a 
way which respects this, and which enables us to speak 
about time and eternity consistently with this datum of 
revelation. His consideration of time and eternity 
begins from the established fact that they are related: 
we deduce this from the Incarnation, from the logic of 
God's self-revelation. According to the cardinal 
principle of Barthian hermeneutics, if God has revealed 
himself within the temporal sphere in the person of 
Jesus, then this temporal event must be made possible 
by qualities of God's being which 'permit' such a 
self-expression in time. The task, then, for Barth is 
to work out an understanding of time and eternity which 
can do justice to a theology with this starting point. 
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One can, of course object to the starting point which 
he chooses, but Barth's consistency on this issue of 
theological method has to be taken seriously if his 
views on, and use of, pre-existence language are to be 
properly understood -- otherwise they lend themselves 
to misunderstanding from critics who see here only an 
idiosyncratic, ruminative confusion. One cannot 
presume that one knows what Barth means by 
'pre-existence' unless one considers the relationship 
of this language to his way of doing theology, any more 
than one can presume the same of his use of 'time' and 
'eternity' without considering the revision of these 
terms which he offers. It is as though Barth is 
saying, 'If you want to know'how to speak of time and 
eternity in a theology which is a consistently 
Christian theology, then you will be forced to speak in 
these terms , and with this understanding of"time and 
eternity'. otherwise you will not be sure that your 
views of time and eternity are shaped by the fact of 
God's revelation, and you will most likely be importing 
into your use of these terms various notions which most 
properly belong outside the limits of valid Christian 
speech. ' 
How does Barth go about re-shaping our use of time and 
eternity in the light of Jesus? We have already 
pointed to the Christological focus which he works 
with, and to his starting point, God's revelation, from 
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which he deduces that they are related. We can be more 
specific and say that the heart of his teaching about 
the hermeneutics of time and eternity is in his 
treatment of the Resurrection. It is from his 
interpretation of the period of the 40 days between 
Easter and the Ascension that the core of his 
interpretation of the time-eternity axis develops. one 
can say with some justification that Barth's 
understanding of eternity arises from the quality of 
this period, from the implications. of the, open 
manifestation of Jesus which is given in the 
Resurrection appearances, and from the faith of the 
disciples which was generated through these events. It 
is part of Barth's method to move from the implications 
of the revelatory event of Jesus to a consideration of 
what 'there is in God' which must be spoken about as a 
consequence of the events of the life of Jesus. His 
rejection of the generalised considerations of the 
relationship of time and eternity is accompanied by a 
corresponding articulation of a theo-logy which is 
shaped by the character of God's action in time: if 
God has been fully present in our time, then that 
instance of his presence requires that certain 
descriptions be made of what we can call 'God's time' 
in order to express the unique quality which obtains 
since this has happened (since is used in a causal, not 
temporal sense). From the descriptions of the time 
'assumed' by God in the event of Jesus- there arise 
implications for our language about God: our account 
of the quality of his life --, eternity -- is validated 
and required by the character of his revelation in 
time: this is a familiar Barthian move. And so one 
must also say that the account of God's eternity is 
made possible by the account of the particular instance 
when God was fully present in our temporal existence, 
namely in the person of Jesus who, in his risen 
manifestation, appears to the disciples 'in the rpode of 
God' (CD 111/2, p. 448). In the resurrection 
appearances, there takes place the 'total, final, 
irrevocable and eternal manifestation of God Himself$ 
(op. cit., p. 449). 
This manifestation must be treated as historical, as 
taking place in time -- hence, for Barth, the 
Bultmannian reduction of the resurrection to a 
parthenogenesis of faith, uncaused by events in time, 
must be rejected (op. cit., pp. 442-7). But it is not 
simply a question of a confrontation between Barth and 
Bultmann about the lliteralness"ý, pr 'historicity' of 
the resurrection: Barth's affirmation of a 'real and 
therefore physical resurrection' is accompanied by an 
attempt to characterise the resurrection and the 
subsequent appearances as 'genuine history in its own, 
particular time' (op. cit., p. 447, my emphasis). The 
question, of course, concerns the quality of this time, 
'the time in which God Himself was this man, and 
therefore had time, a life-time' (op. cit., p. 455), the 
time 'of the appearance and presence of God' who 
'taking flesh of our flesh, also took time, at the 
heart of what we think we know as time' (ibid. ). 
The Christological derivation of theological truth, 
expounded and practised by Barth, enables him to 
establish this time as the truth about all time: the 
concentration on the particularity of God's action in 
Jesus, on the quality of time manifest in 'God's time 
for us' provides a way of understanding the truth about 
time. The correct theological method must be to move 
from the time of Jesus to our time, because the time of 
Jesus is the revelation of the true character of time, 
'because what God does in it is the goal of creation 
and therefore of all created time' (ibid. ). Using his 
familiar opposition between natural truth and revealed 
truth, Barth insists that it is only by considering the 
time of Jesus that we are able to evaluate correctly 
our time: Chronos is dethroned as a figure set in 
opposition to the God who has time for us in Jesus and 
who shows us that time is a 'dimension of a life in 
communion with Himself' (CD 111/2, p. 526), a dimension 
which is capable of expressing the full presence of the 
divine eternal life: 
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'There is no time in itself, rivalling 
God and imposing conditions on Him. 
There is no God called Chronos. And it 
is better to avoid conceptions of time 
which might suggest that there is. On 
the other hand, we need not be surprised 
if the nature and laws of all other 
times, and all that we think we know as 
time, are seen to be illuminated and 
relativised by this time .... But as all 
creation has its goal in what God 
purposes and will do and does within it 
for man, for us, so time as its 
historical form has its meaning in the 
particular time which God once took for 
establishing His covenant with man. 
This is the hidden meaning of all time, 
even of all other time. ' (CD 
111/2, p. 456) 
Because this time of Jesus is the time in which God's 
plan for creation is realised, it stands against the 
rest of time as having a completeness and a fulfilment 
lacking in the other instances of created time: it is 
time brought to perfection, since in the existence of 
Jesus there is the unique historical event 'in which 
'God is Himself, God is alone, God is directly the 
Subject, the temporal reality of which is not -,. only 
called forth, created, conditioned and supported by the 
eternal reality of God, but is identical with it! t.. (CD 
1/2, p. 182). Consequently, this time must be spoken 
about in ways which affirm that it takes place in our 
time, but also in ways which designate it as unique: 
'We do not understand it as God's 
revelation, if we do not state 
unreservedly that it took place in "our" 
time. But, conversely, if we understand 
it as God's revelation, we have to say 
that this event had its own time; in 
this event it happened that whereas we 
had our own time for ourselves as 
always, God had time for us, His own 
time for us -- time, in the most 
positive sense, i. e., present with past 
and future, fulfilled time with 
expectation and recollection of its 
fulfilment, revelation time and the time 
of the Old Testament and New Testament 
witness to revelation -- but withal, His 
own time, God's time; and therefore 
real time. ' (CD 1/2, p. 49. ) 
Barth's statements on the quality of this 'time of 
revelation' are justified by the parallel between God's 
assumption of human nature in the Incarnation and his 
assumption of time in order to make it a mode of divine 
self-expression. In the section of CD II/1 dealing 
with God's eternity, after indicating the importance of 
the doctrine of the Trinity in enabling us to work with 
a positive understanding of God's eternity as 'eminent 
temporality' in which there is order, succession and 
relatedness, he turns to the value of the doctrine of 
the Incarnation in re-casting our notions of time and 
eternity: 
'The fact that the Word became flesh 
undoubtedly means that, without ceasing 
to be eternity, in its very power as 
eternity, eternity became time. Yes it 
became time. What happens in Jesus 
Christ is not simply that God gives us 
time, our created time, as the form of 
our existence and world, as is the case 
in creation and in the whole ruling of 
the world by God as its Lord. In Jesus 
Christ it comes about that God takes 
time to Himself, that He Himself, the 
eternal One, becomes temporal, that He 
is present for us in the form of our own 
ql 
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existence and our own world, not simply 
embracing our time and ruling it, but 
submitting himself to it, and permitting 
created time to become and be the form 
of his eternity ..... 
He was not only able to have and give 
time as the Creator, but in Jesus Christ 
He was able Himself to be temporal ... 
True eternity has the power to take time 
to itself, this time, the time of the 
Word and Son of God. It has the power 
itself to be temporal in Him. ' (CD II/l, 
pp. 616-7. ) 
This time is the goal of the whole of creation, since 
it is the sole purpose of there being anything at all 
that God should enter into a relationship with his 
creation in this temporal way; time, the form of our 
existence, becomes the form of existence of the God 
'whose will and resolve it is to give man a share in 
this time of His, in His eternity' (CD 111/2, p. 451). 
one of the consequences of this datum of revelation is 
that 'the myth of infinite or endless time is shattered 
by revelation' (CD 1/2, p. 69); in its place Barth 
proposes a view of eternity interpreted, in the only 
way we are entitled to interpret it, as the fulfilled 
time of Jesus. We have already seen the circle of 
mutual interpretation which Barth proposes between the 
Logos and the person of Jesus. In a parallel way, he 
proposes that eternity be interpreted and spoken about 
by the only hermeneutical key we possess, namely, the 
fulfilled time of Jesus, and that the time of Jesus be 
spoken about as the time of the eternal God. Thus the 
relation of the time of Jesus to 'lost time' is 
developed in terms of a relationship which, in 
Christian tradition, is that of eternity itself to 
time: 
'It is a life lived for God, and 
therefore for men. And as He lives this 
life in His time, it ceases to be 
exclusively His time. His time becomes 
time for God, and therefore for all men. 
The question which God addresses to all 
men, and the question which they address 
to God, finds its conclusive answer in 
the life which Jesus lived in the 
service of God and man... The answers 
given by the life of Jesus to the 
questions of God and man make His time 
the time which always was when men 
lived, which always is when they live, 
and which always will be when they will 
live.... The man Jesus has therefore 
His time, but He has more than just His 
own time. He lives in His time, and 
while it does not cease to be His time, 
and the times of other men do not cease 
to be their times, His time acquires in 
relation to their times the character of 
God's time, of eternity, in which 
present, past and future are 
simultaneous. (CD 111/2, pp. 439-40. ) 
The life of Jesus is 'at once the centre and the 
beginning and end of all the times of all the lifetimes 
of all men' (ibid. ), and this triple characterisation 
corresponds to the dimensions of present, past and 
future whose divisions mark the incompleteness of 'lost 
time': the time of Jesus is thus portrayed as the 
'fulfilled time' in which these divisions are overcome, 
because it is the time in which eminent temporality, 
characterised by a simultaneous possession of present, 
past and future, takes the form of our time, without 
ceasing to be itself. Barth interprets eternity in a 
way which presents it as fulfilled time: 
'Eternity does not lack absolutely what 
we know as present, as before and after, 
and therefore as time. Rather this has 
its ultimate and real being in the simul 
of eternity. Eternity simply lacks the 
fleeting nature of the present, the 
separation between before and after. ' 
(CD II/l, p. 613. ) 
And this, in turn, through the circular form of Barth's 
argumentation, becomes the way in which the time of 
Jesus is described. We saw earlier that Barth feels 
compelled to say that the time of Jesus is to be 
regarded as historical, unreservedly temporal in the 
way in which all other time is temporal: 'Only a 
docetic attitude to Jesus can deny that His being in 
time also means what being in time means for us all' 
(CD 111/2, p. 463). But at the same time, it is to be 
distinguis. hed from all other time. The distinguishing 
characteristic of this time is that it carries 
predicati, qns which denote it in terms appropriate to 
eternity's simultaneous grasp of the three dimensions 
of time: 
'The Word spoken from eternity raises 
the time into which it is uttered 
(without dissolving it as time), up into 
His own eternity as now His own time, 
and gives it part in the existence of 
God which is alone, real, self-moved, 
self-dependent, self-sufficient. It is 
spoken by God, a perfect without peer 
(not in our time, but in God's time 
created by the Word in the flesh, there 
is a genuine, proper, indissoluble, 
primal perfect), and for that reason 
there is coming into the world a future 
without peer (for not in our time, but 
rather in this God's time created by the 
Word in the flesh there is a genuine, 
proper, indissoluble, primal future). 
And so it is a present that is not a 
present without also being a genuine 
perfect; and a perfect and a future, 
the mean of which constitutes a genuine 
indestructible present. ' (CD 1/2, p. 52; 
my emphases. ) 
Thus one of the implications to be drawn from the 
Incarnation is that the time of Jesus must be described 
in a way which permits us to understand it as the time 
of the eternal God, who, while remaining himself, 
'became temporal and had time' (CD 111/2, p. 455). it 
must therefore be understood as having a status which 
differentiates it from 'lost time' which is marked by 
the effects of the Fall (CD 1/2, p. 47). Does Barth 
then collapse the distinction between time and eternity 
through the descriptions he offers of the time of 
Jesus? Does it stand centaur-like, as a peculiar 
combination of the features of its parents? Certainly 
some of his statements about the time of Jesus appear 
to isolate it from any comprehensible relationship with 
'our time' Roberts points to this as a major defect 
in Barth's treatment of the reality of the Incarnation.. L9 
However, the matter is not so simple. We have already 
mentioned that Barth begins his revision of the 
theological use of 'time' and 'eternity' from the datum 
of revelation that they are related. He then develops 
his account of time and eternity in a way which 
co-ordinates them, rather than collapses them, in order 
to articulate the doctrine of the Incarnation. He sets 
out to renew our language about time and eternity, 
negatively, by rejecting a distinction between them in 
terms of eternity being a 'negation of time' or a 
'timelessness', and positively, by distinguishing 
between them in terms of their capacity to encompass 
the three dimensions of past, present and future: 
'The being is eternal in whose duration 
beginning, succession and end are not 
three but one, not separate as a first, 
a second and a third occasion, but one 
simultaneous occasion as beginning, 
middle and end. Eternity is the 
simultaneity of beginning, middle and 
end, and to that extent it is pure 
duration. Eternity is God in the sense 
in which in Himself and in all things 
God is simultaneous, i. e., beginning, 
middle and end, without separation, 
distance or contradiction. Eternity is 
not, therefore, tim6, although time is 
certainly God's creation or, more 
correctly, a form of God's creation. 
Time is distinguis-4 
, 
ed from eternity by 
the fact that in it beginning, middle 
and end are distinct and even opposed as 
past, present and future. Eternity is 
just the duration which is lacking to 
time. ' (CD II/l, p. 608. ) - 
The Trinitarian basis of Barth's description of 
eternity is clear: the perichoretic life of the 
Trinity is the unique instance of the overcoming of the 
division of temporal duration -- the three modes of 
being -- in an uncompromised simultaneity of divine 
life. The repetitio aeternitatis in aeternitate, the 
relatedness of God in the begetting and the procession 
of Son and Spirit, is grounded in the unity of the 
divine nature which expresses itself in a distinction 
of modes of being (CD I/l. pp. 348-75). The 
Trinitarian basis for Barth's use of the opposites 
'simultaneity' and 'duration' seems to have eluded 
Colin Gunton in his comments on this passage; his 
question, 'But what, conceivably, is simultaneity that 
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is pure duration? "can be answered only with the help 
of an articulated Trinitarian doctrine: 
'It is this "all", this God, who is the 
eternal God, really the eternal God. 
For this "all" is pure duration, free 
from all the fleetingness and the 
separations of what we call time, the 
nunc aeternitatis which cannot come into 
being or pass away, which is conditioned 
by no distinctions, which is not 
disturbed and interrupted but 
established and confirmed in its unity 
by its trinity, by the inner movement of 
the begetting of the Father, the being 
begotten of the Son and the procession 
of the Spirit from both. Yet in it 
there is order and succession. The 
unity is in movement. There is a before 
and an after. God is once and again and 
a third time .... This is His time, the 
absolutely real time, the form of the 
divine being in its triunity, the 
beginning and ending which do not mean 
the limitation of Him who begins and 
ends, a juxtaposition which does not 
mean any exclusion, a movement which 
does not signify the passing away of 
anything, a succession which in itself 




This account of God's eternity, 'the absolutely real 
time, the form of the divine being in its triunityl 
(ibid. ), can then be brought into conjunction with the 
account he offers of our time, 'lost time', in which 
the divisions of past, present and future mark the 
incompleteness of our existence. Thus a co-ordinated 
description of time and eternity in terms of their 
respective capacity to cope with the structural 
divisions of time can be offered, which enables the 
truth of the Incarnation to be articulated. The 
criterion Barth works with here is that a concept of 
time must treat it, not merely as 'the product of man's 
existence interpreted as a distentiol the 
Augustinian approach (Conf. XI, 23) -- but as a 
'proper reality, as accessible to God as is human 
existence' MD 1/2, p. 46). In Barth's revision of the 
theological use of the concepts of time and eternity, 
they are co-ordinated in a way which allows a 
comparison and a contrast to be developed: they Cap be 
compared insofar as they are the same sort of reality 
a form of existence characteristic of God's being 
and our being -- and they are then contrasted in their 
respective ability to achieve a simultaneity in 
relationship to duration. In spite of Barth's 
celebrated protests that he rejects analogical 
language, his treatment of the relationship of time and 
eternity seems to be pre-eminently analogical, but it 
is an analogy which is grounded in the Incarnation; 
nevertheless, from this starting point he goes on to 
develop a view of time and eternity which is analogical 
in character. 
We have spoken of the 'co-ordination' of time and 
eternity in Barth's revision of the concepts: this is 
a more satisfactory way of describing what Barth is 
doing than other characterisations since it takes 
account of the double hermeneutic Barth uses -- the 
circularity between our language of time and eternity, 
the correspondence of God-in-his-revelation with 
God-in-himself, and the requirement that we work from 
the starting point of the Incarnation which means that 
we must recognise that time and eternity are related 
and modify our concepts accordingly. 
This is much more a matter of co-ordinating our 
language of time and eternity, than of collapsing the 
distinction between them. The point is hermeneutical: 
how to find a language which is appropriate to the 
Incarnation and to the implications of the Incarnation 
on our language about God's time and our time. What 
Barth does, with the co-ordination of our account of 
God's time and our time, is to describe the time of 
Jesus in terms which characterise God's time in his 
triune being: the time of Jesus is a time which 
overcomes the divisions of past, present and future in 
the way in which God's eternity is said to do. it 
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acquires, in relation to other time, 'the character of 
God's time, of eternity, in which present, past and 
future are simultaneous' (CD 111/2, p. 440). It is the 
time in which 'God had time for us, His own time for us 
-- time in the most positive sense, i. e., present with 
past and future, fulfilled time with expectation and 
recollection of its fulfilment, revelation time and the 
time of the Old Testament witness to revelation -- but 
withal, His own time, God's time; and therefore real 
time' (CD 1/2, P. 49). 
This whole network of designations is applied to this 
new referent, the time of Jesus, quite validly because 
of the mutual interpretation which exists between 
God-in-his revelation and God-in-himself. once this 
circle is established, a sharing of predicates between 
God's time in his triune being -- eternity -- and the 
time of Jesus, can be developed. It is important to 
remember that Barth is using 'time' and 'eternity' in 
the light of their revision by the datum of revelation: 
the time of Jesus is our key to God's time, since it is 
a time in which there takes place the 'total, final, 
irrevocable and eternal manifestation of God Himself 
(CD 111/2, p. 449). Consequently, the time of Jesus is 
open to a revision in terms of the eminent and 
perfected temporality of God's eternity: 
'We have called this time of His at the 
heart of other times the time of God: 
eternal time; the time which God 
assumed for us, and thus granted to us, 
the men of all times; the time of His 
covenant; or, as the Bible sees it, the 
great Sabbath; the year of salvation; 
fulfilled time' (CD 111/2, p462). 
This does not mean that Barth identifies the time of 
Jesus with the life of the Trinity: this would be an 
illegitimate confusion of referents, and he retains a 
doctrine of the Immanent Trinity which prevents the 
divine life necessarily possessing our temporality as 
the mode of its being. Moreover, such an 
identification would ignore the hermeneutical nature of 
Barth's procedure which concerns the development of a 
language about each referent in the light of the other, 
without collapsing or identifying them. The time of 
Jesus continues to be temporal and historical within 
the bounds of human existence -- it is not wafted away 
to a timeless realm. It remains itself, and the 
designations appropriate to its historical character 
continue to apply: this is required by the character 
of revelation: 'He not only is in time and has time 
like other men, but He is also Lord of time' (CD 111/2, 
p. 464). A similar pattern of double predicataion 
occurs elsewhere: * 
'God's revelation is the event of Jesus 
Christ. We do not understand it as 
God's revelation, if we do not state 
unreservedly that it took place in "our" 
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time. But conversely, if we understand 
it as God's revelation, we have to say 
that this event had its own time. ' (CD 
1/2, p. 49. ) 
Again, it is the pressure of what must be said that 
generates the need for a double description of the time 
of Jesus in terms of its being unmistakably 'in our 
time', and equally, it has its own character which must 
be expressed in terms of the quality of God's time. If 
we ask about the character of a statement in which the 
referent retains its own characteristics, while 
receiving predicates which were originally applied to 
another reality; which requires the interpreter to 
construe the statement intelligibly as a valid 
description of the referent; which invites him to see 
the referent as having the characteristics of the other 
reality involved -- if we ask these questions, which 
are all applicable to Barth's presentation of the time 
of Jesus as God's time, then we are in the area of the 
logic and workings of a metaphoricalpredication. 
Barth's combination of descriptions which must, in his 
view, be applied to the time of Jesus, is a combination 
which makes sense only as a form of metaphorical 
predication in which the time of Jesus, while 
continuing to be regarded as 'time' in our temporal 
continuum, is described as another form of temporal 
existence, namely, the eminent temporality of God's 
eternity. 
Is this a correct interpretation of what Barth is 
doing? We should note, first of all, that he himself 
does not explain his procedure in terms of the logic of 
a metaphorical predication; his lack of explanation, 
in fact, has given rise to the criticism that his 
treatment of the time-eternity relationship evacuates 
history of its intrinsic significance, since he seems 
to be imposing 'eternal' categories in a way which 
overwhelms the historical particularity of the temporal 
referent, Jesus. Roberts is particularly vehement: he 
presents the 'negative' influence of eternal 
categories, portrayed first of all in Barth's 
commentary on Romans, as still colouring the treatment 
of the Incarnation in the Church Dogmatics: 
'Eternity still annihilates time, but 
now instead of explosive demolition, a 
vast and "unnatural" theological growth 
chokes and smothers the natural order 
and its reality, for grace consumes 
nature in putative, but merely apparent 
recreation ... Like some cancerous 
Doppelganger, the*ological reality 
appears to inflate itself, drawing life 
from the reality it condemns, perfecting 
in exquisite form what could be seen as 
the most profound bin 
,d 
systematically 
consistent theological alienation of the 
natural order ever achieved. v 21 
Rhetoric here appears to have blunted understanding. 
on similar, but better controlled lines, we might cite 
the earlier criticism of the encyclopaedic Bouillard 
that Barth tends towards a monophysitism, in, which the 
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time of Jesus is leternalised at the expense of the 
historicity which is essential to it,: 
'Mais,, quand Barth expose que le temps 
de Jesus-Christ, "ce temps d1un homme, 
est egalement (zugleich) temps de Dieu, 
temps eternel", nous reconnaissons la 
des traits qui nous ont deja mainte fois 
laisses perplexes. L'ambiguite du temps 
eternel de Dieu. Celle de la 
preexistence de 11homme Jesus (quand on 
nous dit que cet homme ftait deja avant 
sa vie terrestre). Enfin une apparence 
0, de monophysisme- La fOi Chretienne 
tient assurement que Jesus-Christ, 
temporel en sa qualite d1homme, est .1 le eternel en sa qualite de Dieu, et que 
son existence terrestre est presence du 
Verbe eternel au sein de notre temps. 
Mais en lui, de meme qulhumanite et 
divinite ne fusionnent pas dans un terme 
mixte, temps et eternite ne fusionnent 
pas dans un temps eternel. Ne 
risque-t-on 
, 
pas d1induire llesprit a 
operer ce melange, quand on declare que 
le temps de 11homme Jesus, sans cesser 
dletre le temps de sa vie, revet la 
caractere de lleternite, pu passe, 
present et avenir sont interieurs les 
uns aux autres? ' 
This is a perceptive criticism which highlights the 
originality of what Barth is doing. Bouillard's 
reservation comes from the point of view of a 
Christology which affirms a relationship between, on 
the one hand, the 'divinity' of Jesus and his 
'eternity', and on the other hand, his 'temporal 
existence' and his 'humanity'. The Chalcedonian 
bi-polarity of predicates corresponds to the 
'temporality' and the Isupra-temporalityl of Jesus. 
Bouillard is correct to point out that Barth goes 
beyond this way of handling the matter: as we noted at 
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the beginning of this chapter, Barth goes beyond the 
limits of what would be the familiar way of relating 
the predicates of pre-existence to, Jesus. He affirms 
clearly that the predicates of pre-existence are to be 
taken as referring to the human person Jesus, and not 
to a prior divine 'Logos asarkos'. Barth makes the 
puzzling step of speaking of the human, and therefore 
temporal, existence of Jesus in ways which seem to 
violate the temporal limitations of his existence. 
Thus he can say with startling conciseness: 
11. The life of Jesus begins, and 
therefore it was once future. But the 
man Jesus already was even before he 
was ... 
2. The life of Jesus has duration, and 
therefore it was once present. But for 
all its singularity this present reaches 
back to His past when His time was still 
future, and forward to His future when 
His time will be past. The man Jesus is 
as He was and will be... 
3. The life of Jesus comes to an end, 
and therefore there was a moment when 
His time became past. But its end is 
such that it is always present and still 
future. The man Jesus was as He is and 
will be... 
This means, however, that from the 
standpoint of the three dimensions ýof 
every conception of time, His time is 
not only the time of a man, but the time 
of God, eternal time. ' (CD III/2, p. 464. ) 
Although this passage moves from the three paradoxical 
statements covering the relationship of Jesus to past, 
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present and future, ending with the conclusion that his 
time is a human time and eternal time, the argument 
really goes the other way: it is because the time of 
Jesus must be described with the help of a double 
predication which affirms both that this is a time 
which is 'the time of a man', and that it is a time 
which is 'the time of God, eternal time', that the 
previous statements have a validity. The focus of our 
interest, the pre-existence statements, are 
intelligible only in the light of the requirement that 
the time of Jesus be described in a way which affirms 
unequivocally that, while it is a human time, it must 
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Bouillard's criticism of a Imonophysitism of history, 
would be valid only if the tension between the 
connotations of the referent, the actual human 
existence of Jesus, and the connotations of its 
predicates of eternity, is allowed to collapse. We 
propose that an understanding of the working of a 
metaphorical statement precisely allows this tension to 
be maintained -- indeed, it requires that it be 
maintained in order to bring about a redescription of 
the referent in which it is seen as the reality denoted 
by the predicate. The criticism voiced by Roberts is 
countered by pointing out that attention must be paid 
to the double predication as a structural feature of 
Barth's Incarnational Christology, which requires that 
Z ýf, 
both predicates be affirmed without the distortion of 
one overwhelming the other -- a similar point to that 
which we make against Bouillard. Roberts' interest in 
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the 'inner logicl:; ý, ýf Barth's theology is not developed 
in terms of the way in which complementary predicates 
are thought to refer to the person of Jesus: where 
Roberts sees ambiguity in Barth's treatment of the 
relationship of time and eternity, we are more inclined 
to see complementary predications in the interest of 
establishing a revision of our concepts of time and 
eternity in the light of their relationship in the 
Incarnation. His criticism is worth pursuing: 
'The tension between eternal work and 
temporal realization is still 
problematic, however, so long as all the 
interpretative categories are grounded 
in and derived from the divine and 
eternal being of God. Thus a great deal 
depends upon the adequacy of Barth's 
conceptual distinction of, and relation 
between, eternity and time... #24 
But is it clear that there is such a tension between 
eternal work and temporal realization in Barth? The 
difficulty lies in the fact that when we speak in two 
different ways about Jesus, we are sometimes led to 
think that we are speaking about two different 
referents -- Barth's retusal to consider a Logos 
asarkos is a counter to such confusion. The difficulty 
arises in particular when we speak about Jesus being in 
the beginning with God, and then speak of him as having 
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a life in our time: our language tends to. lead us to 
think that we are talking about two different referents 
-- one an 'eternal' referent and the other a 'temporal' 
referent. 
Heinz Zahrnt exemplifies the confusion perfectly: he 
interprets Barth as a Platonist who locates reality 
first of all in the eternal realm, in a world, or a 
theatre, where things happen before being manifest in 
the lower world of time: 
'Consequently everything is anticipated, 
has already happened in this original 
perfect tense, which one is tempted to 
call a pluperfect tense. Everything is 
not merely decreed in eternity, but 
already perfected; what takes place in 
time is merely the carrying out of, the 
original divine decree, a repetition of 
the original and eternal pattern. 
Reduced to a formula, we might say that 
the divine Trinity devised a drama in 
eternity, and gave its first performance 
within itself, played by the three 
divine persons. Now this drama is to be 
re-enacted on earth, as it has been in 
heaven. 1 25 
Applying this criticism in particular to Barth's 
treatment of pre-existence and Incarnation, Zahrnt 
continues: 
'Since, unlike the New Testament, he 
does not begin in history, with the 
event of the incarnation itself, going 
back from there to the pre-existence of 
Christ as something perfected at the 
beginning of time, deriving from it 
everything that has followed after, he 
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sees Christ as equally and permanently 
present at every stage of the history of 
redemption, so that for him the 
incarnation is not a really new event, a 
new intervention of God, the turning 
point of history, but only a new mode of 
something that had been permanently 
present ..... The incarnation of Christ 
merely recapitulates, clarifies and 
reveals what has always been. o 26 
The frequency with which one encounters this opinion 
should alert us to the possibility that we may be 
dealing with a received opinion and a presumed 
judgement, rather than a careful analysis of what Barth 
is doing. Such an interpretation seems to go counter 
to the impetus of Barth's theology which is to take the 
historicity of God's action in Jesus so seriously that 
it requires a revision of our language about God's 
eternity. It is crucial for Barth to remove the 
antithesis of time and eternity, to abolish the notion 
that there is any 'prior' event in the life of God 
other than the reality of Jesus. It is Jenson who has 
seen this most clearly: the eternal act of the divine 
life is directed towards the historical person, Jesus. 
'In all eternity, before -- and for 
Barth, the "before" is decisive -- all 
time, God chose to be one with man in 
the existence of Jesus Christ. But just 
this act of choice closed the covenant 
with man; and since the existence of 
Jesus Christ and the subsistence of the 
covenant are the same thing, God's 
eternal_act of choice and the existence 
of Jesus Chrl-s-tare the same event-. -'--7T- 
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How then are we to think of the relationship of time 
and eternity? How does our language about God's 
eternal decision and our language about the revelation 
of that decision, the existence of Jesus, cohere? 
Zahrnt says that Barth resorts to a Platonic model, in 
which, by implication, the pre-existent Jesus has the 
status of an eternal Form. Jenson highlights the 
radical strand in Barth's theology, on the other hand, 
and interprets the relationship of time and eternity 
not against the background of Plato, but against a 
Bultmannian starkness of the Idass' which echoes 
through the following passage: 
'It is true that reconciliation happens 
in eternity before time, so that what 
happens in time can only be the 
revelation of what is eternally 
accomplished; but what eternal- 
reconciliation achieves materially, is 
precisely that its temporal revelation 
shall occur. Jesus' temporal life is 
only the mirror of his eternal being in 
God's act of choice; but what is in 
eternity chosen is that there would be 
such a mirroring. Temporal history's 
reality is communication of eternal 
history; but that God communicates 
himself is what eternal history 
achieves. ' 28 
This is surely the correct way to interpret Barth's 
treatment of the relationship of time and eternity. 
God's temporal revelation of himself in Jesus requires 
us to say certain things about God's being which must 
be said if this revelation has taken place, and the 
doctrine of the Trinity is a way of revising our 
language about God, and of controlling it, in order to 
preserve the Christological character of our theology. 
Hence the importance for Barth of establishing which 
God we are speaking about, of identifying which being 
we are speaking about when we are doing theology; this 
leads him to place the doctrine in the prolegomena, in 
the discussion of revelation. Moreover, as we have 
seen, our language about God's eternity is shaped in 
the light of the Incarnation. Barth's language about 
God's eternity, and indeed his language about the 
Triune differentiation within God's being through a 
process of investigating how we must speak about God if 
he has revealed himself in this way. 
The statements we make about God's eternity are similar 
to transcendental deductions which portray the 
conditions which must obtain if God's temporal 
revelation has taken place; they are means of ensuring 
that our language of God is adjusted in the light of 
his revelation in Jesus, and that God's being is 
described in a way which is consistent with his 
revelation. From the event of Jesus certain 
implications follow for our language about God's being, 
and equally, certain implications follow for our 
language about Jesus: our language about God's eternal 
decision can only be the establishment of ways of 
speaking consistently with his temporal revelation, and 
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our language about Jesus must involve a process by 
which Jesus is described in the light of what we have 
established about God's being. This circularity is a 
denial of a form of Platonic division of eternity and 
time as proposed by Zahrnt. Barth is more correctly 
interpreted in Jenson's terms: 'The historical event 
of Jesus' existence is, he teaches, the eternal event 
29 
of the life of God. --We cannot take this as an identity 
statement -- Jesus cannot be the Triune God -- but it 
expresses the rule we must follow if we are to ensure 
that we are speaking correctly about the eternity of 
God: our only key to it is the event of Jesus' 
existence. 
The next step in this process validates the transfer of 
qualities, which have been established with regard to 
God's eternity, to the time of Jesus. What controls. 
are there on this transfer? Can we simply predicate 
anything, established as a valid way of designating 
God's eternity, of Jesus? To some extent we have 
already answered this question: predicates can be 
applied provided they are taken to be in a ýparticular 
metaphorical tension with the historical referent Jesus 
who must be regarded as still possessing the qualities 
associated with our humanity. Thus, for example, the 
quality of 'perfected time' can be attributed as a 
characterisation of the time of Jesus, provided we 
realise that we are still talking about this particular 
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human life which retains its character of human 
temporality. A redescription of this life can take 
place in ways which require us to see this life in 
terms of the qualities of God's eternity. This is 
justified by the Barthian principle enunciated by 
Jenson: 'God's eternal act of choice and the existence 
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of Jesus are the same event. 'Consequently, Jesus can 
be described through the use of predicates which foster 
a redescription of his time in terms of the 
Isupra-temporalityl of God's eternity; and all this 
must' be done with an understanding that the time of 
Jesus continues to be a human time, described in a 
radical and original way, but is now seen as a time 
with the characteristics of God's time. Using Frege's 
distinction of sense and reference, we can say that the 
descriptions of Jesus as 'pre- and post-existent' are 
the developments of new senses, new meanings, which are 
to be taken as qualifying the referent, Jesus. They 
are not characterisations of a different referent -- we 
recall Barth's insistence that the notion of a Logos 
asarkos is a misleading fiction: our statements about 
the pre-existent Jesus are statements about Jesus in 
his time. This is reinforced by the way in which Barth 
recasts our uses of the concepts of time and eternity, 
and by the circular hermeneutic he establishes between 
God-in-his-revelation and God-in-himself. Thus our 
investigation proposes that the confusion about how to 
understand the character of Barth's pre-existence 
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statements can be solved through viewing them as 
metaphorical descriptions of Jesus which express what 
needs to be expressed if he is the full self-expression 
of God. They are best understood as the creation of 
new, and intelligible, senses, in which the mutual 
interaction of God's time and our time are expressed -- 
senses which are to be taken as redescriptions of the 
person of Jesus. 
The question which must be answered, after we have 
given some account of the theological and 
Christological concerns which underlie Barth's 
reworking of the notion, is, of course, the question of 
the character of these statements. One cannot 
presuppose that this point is obvious. J5ngel, for 
example, in the magisterially obscure interpretation he 
provides of how these statements are to be understood, 
omits such a consideration and launches immediately 
into an explanation of the intelligibility of the 
statements in terms of the patristic notions of 
ANHYPOSTASIS and ENHYPOSTASIS. A consideration of 
intelligibility requires, first of all, that you 
establish the sort of statement you are dealing with, 
and the lack of such reflection leads to an 
ever-spiralling opacity: 
'But if the being of the man Jesus in 
the beginning with God is not to be 
understood in the sense of a projection 
of a temporal existence into eternity, 
then we must speak of this temporal 
existence of Jesus in the sense of the 
anhypostasis. Jesus' existence would 
not be what it is if it were not alreadv 
in the "eternal decision of God which is 
the basis and governor of time". But it 
is precisely in the eternal decision of 
God in the sense of the enhypostasis 
that this existence is really temporal 
existence. As he who "by nature is 
God", the man Jesus is in the beginning 
with God. In this way he corresponds as 
elected man to the electing God and in 
oneness with the Son of God "not in 
abstracto '31 but in concreto, he is Jesus 
Christ". ' - 
J6ngells interpretation revives the patristic notion of 
the human nature of Jesus lacking an identity of its 
own independently of the Logos; thus, the logic goes, 
we can speak of the humanity of Jesus pre-existing 
lanhypostatically' in the hypostasis of the Logos. The 
difficulty about this proposal is that the concepts of 
anhypostasis and enhypostasis only make sense within a 
certain way of speaking about the unity of the 
incarnate Logos: they are a way of ensuring the unity 
of the person under the hegemony of the Logos, and 
thereby avoiding the implication -of a duality of 
independent realities (hypostases) in the Incarnate 
One. They are categories which depend upon an initial 
conceptual distinction between the Logos and the person 
of Jesus, and which attempt to avoid the 
misunderstanding of a duality within the person of 
Jesus. But can they be used in the way JUngel 
proposes, to deal with the relationship of the humanity 
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of Jesus, considered as pre-existent-, to the 
pre-temporal Logos? The function of these concepts is 
to deal with misunderstandings about the Incarnate, 
Logos, and it is not clear that they solve the question 
of how you can speak of the temporal Jesus in terms 
which consider him in pre-temporal ways. The question 
still remains of the nature of' this predication. 
JUngells proposal looks respectable, but it is an 
evasion of the central difficulty. A similar lacuna is 
found in the interpretation offered by John Thompson 
who invokes a principle of Christological grammar to 
cope with Barth's statements: 
'It has, of course, always been an 
accepted rule in Christology that what 
one can affirm of either "nature" or 
"mode of being" of the person of Christ 
can be affirmed of the God-man in his 
unity. Hence we can say that Jesus 
Christ is with the Father from the 
beginning since he is the eternal Son. 
Barth, however, takes this a stage 
further and says (correctly, I believe) 
that, since in the light of the 
incarnation we cannot think of God at 
all apart from man, this man is at the 
beginning of God's ways and works ad 
extra. 132 
There is some confusion here in Thompson's application 
of this Christological rule: his statement, applies to 
the Incarnate Word, thus enabling us to-predicate of 
the person of Jesus what we would want, to predicate of 
one of the 'natures'. In this way, the identity of 
Jesus as the Incarnate Word, in himself, is maintained; 
to refuse to do this would be to withhold assent to the 
integrity of the Incarnation. But can this rule be 
applied to the man Jesus when he is being considered in 
pre-temporal terms? Can one say that, since we 
consider the eternal presence of the Word within the 
being of God before time began, we are thus entitled to 
affirm that his incarnate existence can also be spoken 
of in this way? The question which must be faced first 
of all is what we think we're doing when we make 
statements about the temporal existent Jesus which 
predicate a pre-temporality in some form. 
Moreover, from the logic of Thompson's subsequent 
statement that 'we cannot think of God at all apart 
from man', we are surely entitled to affirm the 
pre-existence of all humanity just as strongly as he 
affirms the pre-existence of the man Jesus. In which 
case we return to the notion which Barth himself 
rejected, that the humanity of Jesus can be considered 
within the general foreknowledge of God of created 
reality. Thompson himself would reject this as an 
insufficient interpretation of Barth's meaning, but he 
does not provide a way of distinguishing the 
inevitability of statements about the pre-existence of 
Jesus from statements about the pre-existence of all 
created reality in the mind of God. one cannot move 
from a hermeneutical statement about how we know God to 
an affirmation of the pre-existence of the man Jesus, 
as Thompson, does, although, as we have seen, the 
hermeneutical concern is central to Barth's treatment 
of pre-existence. 
Both JUngells and Thompson's solutions are 
unsatisfactory, since they do not address themselves to 
the character of the predication involved. R. D. 
Williams, whose article on Barth's doctrine of the 
Trinity is exemplary, neverthless confesses bemusement 
as to how the pre-existence statements are to be taken. 
The root of his difficulty, and the difficulty of this 
whole matter of the predication of pre-existence, 
consists in the incompatability of the predication with 
the features of the referent, the historically 
contingent life of Jesus. Against Barth's discussion 
of the eternal election of the man Jesus, he raises the 
following objection: 
'Nor, it seems, does it cope fully with 
the problems raised by the fact that the 
existence of Jesus is historically 
contingent, a point in the interrelated, 
interdependent system of worldly events, 
from which it can in no way be 
abstracted. It is an existence of a 
certain character, with its own 
historical singleness, because of its 
occupation of a certain point of 
convergence for innumerable systems of 
worldly causality. 933 
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Williams' point here is not contradicted by Barth's own 
treatment, as he seems to think; Barth has no interest 
in 'abstracting' Jesus from the particularity of his 
historical context. Indeed Barth makes a point of 
highlighting the 'secularity' of God's Word in its 
revelatory function. In a remarkable passage, Barth 
expounds the importance of the historical contingency 
of Jesus as required by the character of God's 
revelation which is mysterious in its secularity: 
'The speech of God is and remains the 
mystery of God supremely in its 
secularity. When God speaks to man, 
this event never demarcates itself from 
other events in such a way that it might 
not be interpreted at once as part of 
these other events. The Church is also 
in fact a sociological entity with 
definite historical and structural 
features. Preaching is also in fact an 
address. The sacrament is also a symbol 
in compromising proximity to all other 
possible symbols. The Bible is also in 
fact the historical record of a Near 
Eastern tribal religion and its 
Hellenistic offshoot. Jesus Christ is 
also in fact the Rabbi of Nazareth who 
is hard to know historically and whose 
work, when He is known, might seem to be 
a little commonplace compared to more 
than one of the other founders of 
religions and even compared to some of 
the later representatives of His own 
religion .... We do not have the Word of 
God otherwise than in the mystery of its 
secularity. 
This means, however, that we have it in 
a form which as such is not the Word of 
God and which as such does not even give 
evidence that it T-s -the form of the word 
of God. In other words the 
self-presentation of God in His Word is 
not direct, nor is it indirect in the 
way in which a man's face seen in a 
mirror can be called an indirect 
self-presentation of this man. ' (CD I/l, 
p. 165, my emphasis. ) 
If we ask what is being referred to in Barth's 
pre-existence statements, it is clearly the human 
person Jesus, who is the self-presentation of God in a 
form distinct from himself, and who is not 
transparently the Word of God because of the mystery of 
the secularity of human existence. 'Revelation means 
the incarnation of the word of God. But incarnation 
means entry into this secularity' (CD I/l, p. 166). The 
objection raised by Williams that the eternal election 
of the man Jesus, and consequently his pre-existence, 
vitiates the -historical contingency of Jesus' life, 
does not take account of the fact that Barth's use of 
pre-existence language is deliberately applied to the 
Word in its secularity. It is deliberately used to 
describe Jesus, the person in whom God gives himself to 
be known 'in an, objectivity different from His own, in 
a creaturely objectivity (CD II/l, p. 52). A failure to 
take seriously that it is the Incarnate Word who is 
spoken of as pre-existent, leads to a misunderstanding 
of what Barth is doing with this language. Our study 
of metaphor has shown that in a metaphorical 
predication there is a tension which is maintained, not 
undermined, between the characteristics of the 
referent, and the characteristics of the predication 
made of the referent: the referent retains its 
characteristics, but it is seen in a different light, 
as something else. The characteristics of the human 
person Jesus, as a historically contingent individual, 
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are not dissolved by the predication of pre-existence, 
but they are portrayed in a different way. The point 
can be clarified if we examine Barth's presentation of 
the referent of the predication, the Word of God, who, 
in the secularity of our existence and time, is the 
revelation of God 'in a creaturely objectivity' (CD 
II/l, p. 52). 
It is essential to Barth's rebuttal of the viability of 
the analogia entis, and of the shifting sands of 
Liberal Protestantism, that God be portrayed as making 
himself objectivel known: our human incapacity to 
deal with the mystery of God's being means that our 
efforts to use our language to speak of God are 
shapeless. Yet, the mystery to which Barth returns 
again and again, in his discussion of revelation, is 
that we are able to speak of God because God has 
interpreted himself for us, and enables us to interpret 
this self-revelation. Theology has the character of a 
Nachdenken, a 'thinking after' the order and structure 
of the character of the revelation in which God makes 
himself known to us in his 'taking form' as Jesus; the 
doctrine of the Trinity is the specification of the 
nature of God who can reveal himself in this way, in 
the 'reiteration' of his being in a 'form distinct from 
himself' (CD II/l, p. 52). 
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'Since the One who unveils Himself is 
the God who by nature cannot be unveiled 
to men, self-unveiling means that God 
does what men cannot do in any sense or 
in any way: He makes Himself present, 
known and significant to them as God. 
In the historical life of men He takes 
up a place, and a very specific place at 
that, and makes himself the object of 
human contemplation, human experience, 
human thought and human speech... The 
God who reveals Himself here can reveal 
Himself. The very fact of revelation 
tells us that it is proper to Him to 
distinguish Himself from Himself, i. e., 
to be God in Himself and in concealment, 
and yet at the same time to be God a 
second time in a very different way, 
namely, in manifestation, i. e., in the 
form of something He Himself is not. ' 
(CD I/l, pp. 315-6; my emphasis. ) 
The actuality of this revelation is that God makes 
himself Imediately objective to us in His 
revelation, lin which he meets us 'under the sign and 
veil of objects different from Himself*(CD II/l, p. 
16). In the early volumes of the Church Dogmatics, 
Barth's discussion of the objectivity of the revelation 
given in Jesus concentrates on the creaturely 'form' 
which God takes to himself, namely, the humanity of 
Jesus, in order to make himself Imediately objective' 
through the medium of the created humanity of Jesus in 
which he can be known: 
'When God gives Himself to us to be 
known in the truth of His 
self-knowledge, He permits some one of 
His creatures or a happening in the 
sphere and time of the world created by 
Him to speak for Him. The basic reality 
and substance of the creatureliness 
which He has commissioned and empowered 
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to speak of Him, the basic reality and 
substance of the sacramental reality of 
His revelation, is the existence of the 
human nature of Jesus Christ.... 
The humanity of Jesus Christ as such is 
the first sacrament, the foundation of 
everything that God instituted and used 
in His revelation as a secondary 
objectivity both before and after the 
epiphany of Jesus Christ. ' (CD II/l, 
pp. 53-4. ) 
The key notions in this presentation in the early 
volumes of the Church Dogmatics, dealing with the 
revelation in Jesus, are those of the mediate 
objectivity of God's self-interpretation in the 
creaturely form of the humanity of Jesus, and of the 
secondary objectivity of this revelation. By the first 
notion, Barth intends to characterise revelation in a 
form different from God's own being, which, while it 
unveils him, still does not remove the hiddenness of 
his inexhaustible mystery. The Lutheran dialectic of 
the Deus revelatus and the Deus absconditus receives 
full approval in Barth's exposition: 
'When the creature in its objectivity 
becomes the representative of the 
objectivity of God Himself, it hides it. 
When God makes Himself visible for us 
through it, He accepts the fact that He 
will remain invisible as the one He is 
in Himself and as He knows Himself. He 
makes Himself known to us, but in the 
means and sign which He uses to be known 
by us, He makes Himself foreign and 
improper to Himself ... In revealing Himself in this way, He also conceals 
Himself. ' (CD II/l, p. 55. ) 
Because of this objectification in a form different 
from his own, does God's revelation lack veracity? No, 
according to Barth, because it is grounded in the 
primary objectivity of God's own knowledge of himself 
in the Trinity. God can make himself known in the 
medium of a creature, because first of all, he is 
objective to himself in his own being: the eternal 
presence of the Son to the Father is a self-knowledge 
in the relationality of the Triune life, which can then 
be posited 'in a very different way, namely, in 
manifestation, i. e., in the form of something He 
Himself is not' (CD I/l, p. 316). JUngel correctly 
characterises this as a process of lintratrinitarian 
inferencee. 34 by which we move from the actuality of 
God's self-reiteration in the person of Jesus to the 
inference that this is grounded in the fact that God is 
an object-to-himself in the relationality of the 
Trinity. The secondary objectivity of the knowledge 
God gives us, by becoming an object of our knowledge in 
Jesus, 'is distinguished from the primary objectivity, 
not by a lesser degree of truth, but by its particular 
form suitable for us, the creature. God is objectively 
immediate to Himself, but to us He is objectively 
mediate' (CD II/l, p. 16). Thus by the act of God's 
self-revelation in Jesus, we share indirectly in God's 
knowledge of himself. In JUngells words: 
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'That God gives himself sub contraria 
specie to be known in his work is, for 
Barth, a sacramental subject matter... In 
so far as God reiterates his "actual 
objectivity" in the objectivity -- which 
is strange to him -- of his creature, 
God's being-as-object is sacramental 
reality... 
The sacramental priority of the man 
Jesus consists in the fact that God is 
objective in the existence of this man 
uniquely. But the uniqueness of God's 
being-as-object in the humanity of Jesus 
Christ "means God's self-humiliation and 
self-alienation" and therewith "the 
concealment of his objectivity by the 
quite different objectivity of the 
creature". v 35 
The somewhat constricted framework in which this 
self-objectification of God in the humanity of Jesus is 
discussed in the earlier volumes of the Church 
Dogmatics, is removed when Barth gives himself the 
narrative space to develop the theme in Volume IV 
through the image of the way of the Son of God into the 
far country. The differences between the treatments 
are clear: Volume I works with an interpretative model 
of the Trinity, in which revelation is considered as 
the self-utterance of a single subjectivity. Volume 
IV, on'the other hand, considers the Trinity more as a 
system of relations involved in the journey of the Son 
into the far country where 'He takes into unity with 
His divine being a quite different, a creaturely and 
indeed a sinful being'-(CD IV, p. 203). The narrative 
mode allows a greater expansiveness in the development 
of the theme of the 'otherness' of the Incarnate Word, 
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than was possible within the limitations 'of the 
interpretative model of the early volumes. The ideas 
tersely expressed in terms of the 'mystery of the 
secularity' of the Word are better treated in the 
narration of the journey of the Son' of God. In 
particular, it allows Barth to present the 
self-humiliation and condescension of God, manifested 
in Jesus, as 'the dominating moment in our conception 
of God' (CD IV/1, p. 199): 
'It corresponds to and is grounded in 
His divine nature that in free grace He 
should be faithful to the unfaithful 
creature who has not deserved it and who 
would inevitably perish without it, that 
in relation to it He should establish 
that communion between His own form and 
cause and that of the creature, that He 
should make His own its being in 
contradiction and under the consequences 
of that contradiction, that He should 
maintain His covenant to sinful man (not 
surrendering His deity, for how could 
that help? but giving up and 
sacrificing Himself) and in that way 
supremely asserting Himself and His 
deity. ' (CD IV/1, p. 187. ) 
We move even further away from the Trinitarian model of 
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Volume I. with Barth's account of the impact of the 
suffering of the Son on the Trinitarian relations 
between Father and Son: 
'It is not at all the case that God has 
no part in the suffering of Tesus Christ 
even in His mode of being as the Father. 
No, there is a particu. 1a veri in the 
teaching of the early Patripassians. 
This is that primarily it is God the 
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Father who suffers in the offering and 
sending of His Son, in His abasement. 
The suffering is not His own, but the 
alien suffering of the creature, of man, 
which He takes to Himself in Him. But 
He does suffer it in the humiliation of 
His Son with a depth with which it never 
was or will be suffered by any man -- 
apart from the One who is His Son... 
This fatherly fellow-suffering of God is 
the mystery, the basis, of the 
humiliation of His Son; the truth of 
that which takes place historically in 
His crucifixion. ' (CD IV/2, p. 357. ) 
The Trinitarian narratives of Volume IV constitute the 
most profound and influential doctrine of God in 
contemporary theology: they provide a line of 
investigation, and a point of departure, for the work 
of von Balthasar and Moltmann, in the way that 
Beethoven's late piano sonatas inspire the most 
significant musical innovations of the 19th century. 
The radical characteristic of Volume IV is the 
exploration of the Trinitarian implications of the 
history of Jesus. This is the full flowering of 
Barth's initial method, which in Volume I was conceived 
in terms of the relationship of the Trinity to the 
structure of the act of revelation; in Volume IV, 
however, the pattern of investigation is a narrative 
base which enables Barth to co-ordinate the narration 
of the history of Jesus with the history of the 
Trinitarian relations expressed and affected by that 
temporal event. The historical experiences of the Son 
are taken seriously as events which affect the 
intra-Trinitarian relations of Father, Son and Spirit, 
as events which do not simply 'reflect' or 'mirror' the 
condition of the immanent Trinity, but involve the 
Trinitarian God in the time which he. takes to himself 
in the life of Jesus. Von Balthasar's statements show 
the potential of this co-ordination: 
'God causes God to go into abandonment 
by God while accompanying him on the way 
with his Spirit. The Son can go into 
the estrangement from God of hell, 
becat4se he understands his way as an 
expression of his love for the Father 
and he can give to his love the 
character of obedience to such a degree 
that in it he experiences the complete 
godlessness of lost man. o36 
The model of the self-reiteration and 
self-objectification of God in the act of revelation, 
conceived as the utterance of a single subject, gives 
way to a model of Trinitarian experience in the history 
of the Incarnate Son. We have seen several themes in 
the Church Dogmatics which prepare the way for this 
developme'nt: the refusal to consider a Logos asarkos, 
the insistence that God's determinative act of being is 
the determination towards being God-for-us as Jesus, 
the refusal to contrast time and eternity in a Platonic 
way, and the attempt to co-ordinate them in terms of 
comparative perfection of simultaneity and 
comprehensive grasp of the dimensions, of past, present 
and future. Especially, we noted Barth's insistence 
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that the time of Jesus is the dimension, within our 
created temporal existence, in which God takes a part 
of our time as the centre of all time and bestows on it 
the perfection of his own eminent temporality: the 
existence of Jesus is not a mirror of an eternal 
existence, reflecting and manifesting something else -- 
it is the working out of the deepest instincts of the 
God who loves freely to the extent of making himself 
fully present and active in the humiliation of the 
Cross. Jenson's formulation, which we have approved 
before, is exact: 'the historical event of Jesus' 
existence is the eternal event of the life of God. ' 37 
It is in the light of these concerns that the theme of 
the pre-existence of the man Jesus is to be viewed: it 
is an image which presents the man Jesus at the 
beginning of God's whole relationship to that which is 
outside himself, and which speaks of the significance 
of the humanity of Jesus, and the history involved in 
the life of Jesus, for the revelation of the character 
of the Triune God: 
'It is essential and integral to this 
event that it is not only the act of God 
but that as such it includes a human 
history, the history of the true man, 
which means the existence of the man 
Jesus. This is what we learn from our 
glance back at God's eternal election of 
grace. It shows us that there can be no 
dissolving of the unity of this human 
history with the act of God with which 
we have to do in the Christ-event. This 
human history is not merely a mode or 
vehicle of revelation, as against which 
that which is revealed is something 
higher, non-worldly, purely divine and 
eternal and spiritual, so that the human 
history can and must be distinguished 
and even separated from it, withdrawing 
and finally disappearing as a mere 
economy of only provisional and 
practical significance ..... 
The truth is that this human history, 
"the earthly life of Jesus", belongs 
with the act of God to that which is 
revealed. ' (CD IV/2, p. 35. ) 
The metaphorical description of the pre-existence of 
the man Jesus brings a visual, or pictorial, dimension 
in which, as in Hildegard's vision, the human person of 
Jesus stands as the first visible expression of the 
being of God, as the focus, then, of everything else 
which is created -- the world itself, and the history 
of salvation enacted therein. God reconciles the world 
to himself in himself, in the election of Jesus as the 
Son of God who goes into the far country in order to 
return to his exaltation as the Son of Man: Jesus as 
the_ electing God and elected man, the Son of God who 
will manifest the condescension of the Triune God, and 
the Son of Man who will lead an exalted humanity into 
union with the divine life, stands in the image of 
pre-existence as the literal embodiment of both God's 
divine kenosis and humanity's exaltation. He is the 
one who as Son of God reconciles, and as Son of Man is 
reconciled on behalf of his brothers and sisters. 
The image presents the existence of this man as 
integral to the character of God: Jesus' history is 
inseparable from the existence of God himself, 'since it 
is an aspect of God's self-determination to be God as 
Jesus, in the humanity of this man, and in the history 
which will be enacted through him: 'At no level or 
time can we have to do with God without also having 
also to do with this man' (CD IV/2, p. 33). We have 
insisted throughout this chapter on the presence in 
Barth's writings of a 'double hermeneutic' which moves 
from the man Jesus to the Triune God and back again: a 
circle of mutual interpretation, which facilitates the 
development of a language about the being of God, 
which, in turn, is used to make the necessary 
statements about the person of Jesus. The 
pre-existence of the man Jesus is not only a 
characterisation of the status of this man in the plan 
of God: it is also a statement about the orientation 
of God 'towards' this man and towards the history which 
will express the Trinitarian life. The Triune 
relationality will be deployed and expressed in the 
history of Jesus; Barth's insistence that the 
Incarnation makes no change in the Trinity, is an 
expression of his view that the identity of Jesus is 
eternally involved in the being of God. There is no 
God whose whole orientation is not to be God as Jesus, 
and so the humanity of Jesus is portrayed as 
'pre-existent', figuratively portrayed thus in order to 
express the hermeneutical principle that the process of 
divine becoming in the Incarnation is not a secondary 
or incidental moment in the event of God's life. The 
image of the pre-existent humanity of Christ expresses 
the truth that the event of the existence of Jesus is 
the definitive and characteristic event of Trinitarian 
life. Williams struggles to find adequate expressions 
for this truth: 
'He wills freely to elect Jesus; but 
this is no arbitrary act, accidental to 
his nature. He is eternally -- how 
might it be said? -- "liable" to elect, 
"tending" or "intending" to elect, and 
so, in some sense, e: kternally exposed to 
the suffering of his creature Jesus, to 
the "negation" involved in his own 
judgment upon the fallen creation. 
Eternally and in himself he meets and 
contains and overcomes the possibility 
of negation., 38 
Williams' struggle here is precisely the struggle to 
paraphrase a metaphor which expresses more succinctly 
and pregnantly what needs to be said than can a 
non-metaphorical statement. The image of the 
pre-existence of the man Jesus is a metaphorical 
description of the referent whose history is particular 
and contingent, but whose existence is inseparable from 
the being of God in its Trinitarian mode. God is 
oriented towards a kenotic expression of his being in 
the Incarnation; the image provided by Hildegard's 
vision of the Trinity is an imaginative correlative to 
.; ý 
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the verbal and metaphorical account of the pre-existent 
man Jesus in Barth's writings, and both the visual and 
the metaphorical portrayals open the way towards a 
Trinitarian theology deeply appreciative of the 
significance of the history of Jesus for the history of 
the Trinitarian relations. Far from removing the 
person of Jesus from the arena of humanity, 
pre-existence language in fact has the opposite effect 
of inviting us to consider the openness of divine life 
towards expression in our time. The range of concerns 
which the image touches cover Barth's central themes: 
the revision of the doctrine of the Election as part of 
the doctrine of God; the soteriological status of 
Jesus as electing God and elected man; the 
hermeneutics of Logos-statements and the necessity of 
interpreting God through his self-revelation in Jesus; 
the revision of the theological concepts of time and 
eternity in the light of their given relationship in 
the time of Jesus. These are all involved in the 
deployment of the pre-existence theme. In particular, 
the image enables us to articulate a Trinitarian 
doctrine in which the history of Jesus is the form of 
God's self-expression, chosen in the very act by which 
he is himself. He is, in his Triune being, as an 
expression of his freely chosen love, 'oriented 
towards' this self-expression and involvement in the 
world of created existence. Barth's Trinitarian 
narratives in Volume IV show the implications which can 
be derived from the history of the death and 
resurrection of the Son for the Triune God: 
I ... in the mercy in which the Father has known and anticipated and Himself 
suffered even the most impotent sighing 
and most foolish weeping of the most 
useless creature in His eternal decree 
and its execution on the cross of 
Golgotha in the determination of his Son 
to humiliation for the sake of its 
exaltation, transcending it by the agony 
which He Himself feels at it, and taking 
-it wholly and unreservedly to Himself; 
and in the majesty in which the Son in 
His humiliation, Himself becoming a 
groaning creature, has exalted and 
magnified the creature in Himself, 
investing it with the reflection of His 
glory, which is also that of the Father. 
The deepest divine mercy and loftiest 
divine majesty coincide exactly at the 
basis of the existence of Jesus Christ. ' 
(CD IV/2, p. 358. ) 
The image of the pre-existent Christ, towards whom the 
whole being of God is eternally oriented and 
determined, is developed in the direction of the 
involvement of the Trinitarian relationships in the 
experience of the death of the Son as the high point of 
the selflessness -of the divine love. The way is 
prepared for the subsequent reflections of. von 
Balthasar, Jangel and Moltmann, whose writings on this 
theme are elaborations of the sketches provided by 
Barth in Volume IV. It is important to note this 
development, and to see the place of the theme of the 
pre-existent Christ in permitting the formulation of 
narrative Trinitarian theologies which focus on the 
z1-l 
significance of the death of Christ for our concept of 
God. All too often, the theme of pre-existence is 
treated as inherently docetic in its tendency, and as 
destructive of the reality of Christ's humanity. Yet, 
within Barth's treatment, its value is to intensify the 
Trinitarian significance of the humanity, history and 
death and resurrection of Christ, opening the way, in 
conjunction with other themes, for a revised 
understanding of the Trinitarian life as directed 
towards expression in the Incarnation. We might point 
to idngells line of questioning as indicative of the 
value of this approach: he present. s the subsistence of 
God as 'self-movement', a process of 'becoming' whose 
goal is the Son's identification with those who are 
perishing: 
'In the affirmation of his creature, as 
this affirmation becomes event in the 
incarnation of God, God reiterates his 
self-relatedness in his relation to the 
creature, as revealer, as becoming 
revealed, and as being revealed. The 
Christological relation to the creature 
is also a becoming in which God's being 
is. But in that God in Jesus Christ 
became man, he is as creature exposed to 
Fe-rishing. Is God's being in becoming, 
here, a being unto death? ' 9 
JUngells answer, and Barth's too, is that God's being 
becomes involved in the perishinq of the crucifixion in 
a way which shatters the Greek notions of the 
impassibility of God: 
, 7-f3 
'God's existence as man is not oI nly 
God's existence as creature, but at the 
same 'time God's surrender of himself to 
the opposition to God which 
characterises human existence. The 
consequence of this self-surrender of 
God is God's suffering of his opposition 
which is directed against human 
existence in opposition to God -- a 
suffering even to death on the Cross. 940 
Clearly, the process of 'reiteration' of God in the 
person of Jesus is not to be interpreted in Hegelian 
terms, although Hegel is much more of a shadowy 
presence in Barth than he acknowledged: the 'object' 
whom he posits at a distance from himself is not the 
world, but the Son as Jesus, destined to be a temporal 
existent in the world and identified with humanity in 
its distance from God. It is in the Son that the world 
is reconciled through the obedience of the One who 
takes on himself the judgment of God on the world. 
Barth distances himself from Hegel and insists that 
this is not to be taken as implying a 'contradiction 
and conflict in God Himself' (CD IV/1, p. 185), but 
rather it is the expression of 'the freedom of His 
divine love' (ibid., p. 187). It is in the free 
self-determination of God that the Hegelian option is 
avoided: the freely chosen orientation of the Triune 
God towards expression in the man Jesus is grounded in 
the freedom in which God loves, not in an ontic 
necessity required by the structure of reality. The 
history of the Son, designated by the image of the 
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pre-existence of the man Jesus, which takes place in 
our time, belongs inseparably to the character of God's 
being as the dimension of created temporality in which 
he freely elects to bestow himself: 
'There is no divine, eternal, spiritual 
level at which the Christ-event is not 
also "worldly" and therefore this human 
history... The humanity of Jesus Christ 
is not a secondary moment in the 
Christ-event. It is not something which 
happens later, and later again it will 
pass and disappear. It is not merely 
for the purpose of mediation. Like His 
deity, it is integral to the whole 
event. ' (CD IV/2, p. 35. ) 
It is so integral to the character of God, too, who in 
his Son 'descends so deep down to man in order to lift 
him up so high' (ibid., p. 43), that this movement into 
created time must stand as characteristic of God's 
being, and fully expressive of whatever is meant by 
God's 'eternity'. This is what the metaphorical 
description of the pre-existent man Jesus establishes 
and signifies. By its assertion of the eternal 
presence before God of the man Jesus, the metaphor, far 
from undermining either the status of history or- the 
humanity of Christ, in fact breaks through the dualism 
which can affect the account of the relationship 
between the being of God and our history. It goes as 
far as possible, while avoiding Hegel's determinism, 
towards inserting the historical dimension into the 
divine life, by presenting the history of Jesus as 
eternally the goal of the divine becoming. 
Colin Gunton's unacknowledgedly Barthian expression 
ýWatL 'Something happens in timeLcompels interpretation as 
the actuality of the eternal41 describes the 7_ 
Christological component, which then enables Barth to 
portray the history of Jesus as the event towards which 
the Triune relationships are directed: 'The truth is 
that this human history, "the earthly life of Jesus, " 
belongs with the act of God to that which is revealed. 
It is manifest with it in time,... but it is also with 
it as the content of the eternal decree and will of 
God' (CD IV/2, p. 35). The predication of the 
pre-existence of Jesus enables Barth to present the 
humanity of Jesus as the indispensable expression of 
the relatedness of the Triune life. The visual image 
of Jesus standing at the beginning of all things, as 
their origin, focus and goal, and as the temporal form 
through whom the Trinitarian life will be made present 
within creation, is thus a double image: it speaks of 
Jesus as electing God and elected man, and it speaks of 
God as the Triune relatedness oriented towards 
historical expression in the events of the life of 
Jesus. The double focus of the description -- working 
Christologically and theologically -- receives a 
particularly Barthian treatment, in which it is 
integrated into the central concerns of the Church 
Dogmatics, providing a focus for a range of 
inter-dependent themes, and bringing them together in a 
coherent relationship. It is in the light'of these 
themes that the Barthian treatment of pre-existence 
should be -viewed, since, as with any metaphor, its 
interpretation depends upon the validity of the 
conceptual and non-metaphorical statements which 
accompany its interpretation, and upon the surrounding 
context in which the description is placed. 
Conclusion 
The remarkable feature of Barth's use of the 
pre-existence theme is that it is a retrieval and 
rehabilitation of a New Testament Christological motif 
which, at first sight, seems to offer little of value: 
its supposedly 'mythical' character and its origin in a 
world-view , more characteristic of late antiquity's 
religious patterns of 'descending redeemers' who enter 
an alien world, would seem to preclude its being 
significant in the present century. But, in fact, as 
we have seen, Barth uses the motif boldly: he is not 
content simply to repeat the assertion of the 
pre-existence of Christ, but engages in a creative use 
of the theme. He 'works with'-the theme, thinks it 
through with a characteristic originality and respect 
for the expressions of the Christian theological 
tradition, and, most remarkably of all, uses it as a 
central motif which acts as an integrating expression 
uniting a range of theological concerns. We have noted 
the place of the theme in his revision of the doctrine 
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of the election, in his formulation of the 
soteriological status of Jesus as electing God and 
elected man, in his concern for the correct treatment 
of the pre-incarnate Logos, in his re-working of the 
theological concepts of time and eternity, and in the 
relationship of the Triune God to human history. In 
all these concerns, the pre-existence of the man Jesus 
occurs as a theme or a harmony accompanying the 
development of articulated expression. The thoroughly 
incarnational character of Christian theology is 
reinforced by his insistence that this predication must 
be made of the person of Jesus Christ, as part of the 
necessary statements we have to make in order to 
characterise Jesus adequately in the light of God's 
self-revelation; and, in turn, the pre-existence of 
Jesus also functions as a motif which lays a foundation 
for re-thinking the character of God's being in the 
light of God's eternal orientation towards the history 
of the man Jesus. 
The metaphorical character of the predication is seen 
through the tension between the denotation of the 
referent, the temporal existent Jesus, and the 
connotations of the predicate, the pre- and 
supra-temporal status of this man as the centre of 
God's relationship to everything else. It is also 
manifest in the visual image which is an indispensable 
part of the predication: the picture of Jesus standing 
at the beginning of the visibility of the invisible 
God, as in the vision of the Trinity described by 
Hildegard of Bingen. Like all good images and 
metaphors, it is able to express concisely a range of 
non-metaphorical statements. Far from being an 
ornamental device, the use of the pre-existence motif 
in the Church Dogmatics is an integral and integrating 
expression of surprising value. 
2q 
Pre-existence Language in the Epistle to the Hebrews 
2 ýV, 
Erich GrAsser's compendious review of the history of 
the interpretation of the Epistlal -witnesses to the 
difficulty and complexity of situating Hebrews within 
the world of Late Antiquity and Early Christianity. 
What milieu provides the best setting for the 
assumptions and pattern of argumentation of the 
Epistle? The uniqueness, within the NT, of the dualism 
of heaven and earth, the notion of pilgrimage on earth, 
and the highly developed imagery of High Priesthood, 
point towards a shared background with a range of 
non-Christian writings, but there is disagreement about 
how specific such an attribution can be. The two 
options are personified in the approaches of Kisemann 
and Spicq: Kase........ 
2 
posits a Gnostic background for 
theth eme sofu cr, 5and &coz -. 64'Ti-6 6/ q V4, C( andfor 
the High Priestly Christology of the Epistle; he 
concludes Idass sowohl die Konzeption des Gesamtthemas 
wie insbesondere die Christologie unseres Briefes nur 
auf einem von Gnosis vorbereiten Boden m3glich war. 93 
Although recent studies have questioned the simplicity 
of K5semann's identification of Gnosticism, which is 
shown to be a more diffuse, and later, phenomenon, than 
the Religionsgeschichte school supposed,.! Gra"sser points 
to the Nag Hammadi texts as evidence that Ka"semann's 
hypothesis is correct: the presence there of themes of 
wandering, rest, Himmelsreise and perfection, with 
?- 5-1- 
close parallels to Hebrews' Christological schema, are 
not easily discounted. Theissen5 r- too, accepts a 
modified version of Ka'semann's hypothesis, 
concentrating on the Epistle's dualism with regard to 
creation, but the difficulty, as always, is that of 
distinguishing Gnosticism from currents on which it is 
*dependent, and other- currents with which it shares 
certain themes almost by osmosis: - Thompson points, for 
example, to the difficulty of distinguishing Gnostic 
and Platonic dualism, which makes a simple appeal to 
Gnosticism less convincing as the dominant influence on 
6 
Hebrews. Where there is fluidity and shared language, 
the attribution of direct dependence, as opposed to 
common background, becomes more problematic. 
7 
on the other hand, posits a dependence on the 
Alexandrian Judaism of Philo, because of the range of 
parallels he presents to the style, vocabulary, 
exegetical techniques and themes of Hebrews. The 
extent of the comparison may not be sufficient to 
demonstrate, as Spicq claims, that the author of 
8 Hebrews was a Philonian convert to Christianityr- yet 
there is sufficient evidence of a common intellectual 
background to warrant a strong case to be made for this 
milieu as the setting for Hebrews, as Williamson shows. 2 
This line of inquiry into the milieu of the Epistle is 
more productive than the problematic investigation into 
the Gnostic background; for our purposes, the 
Z 572- 
Christological concerns of the Epistle need little 
explanation beyond what can be found within the 
religious world of Hellenistic Judaism, as exemplified 
in the work of Philo. Lala Dey has presented a 
convincing demonstration of an 'analogous frame of 
10 
religious thought in Hebrews and Philol-, his interest 
is centred on the conceptual framework of both writers, 
and he avoids the question of literary dependence or 
direct literary influence. He argues that the 
recipients of the letter were familiar with a religious 
thought world in which speculation about a heavenly 
figure or figures presented problems about the 
relationship of Jesus to these other intermediaries. 
He describes the imaginative world thus: 
'Here angels, logos, heavenly man, 
wisdom, etc. have to a large degree 
synonymous titles and interchangeable 
functions and they constitute the 
intermediary world between God and man. 
As intermediaries they are the agencies 
of creation and revelation. To this 
correspond two levels of religious 
existence. The intermediary world 
(logos-wisdom-archangel-heavenly man - 
son) mediates an inferior revelation and 
religious 
* 
status of a secondary order. 
The higher level or perfection is 
characterized by unmediated and direct 
access to God and participation in the 
primary gifts. The supreme-exemplars of 
this perfection were Moses who 
communicated with God face to face, 
Aaron who as high priest divests himself 
of the robe (= universe) and enters the 
Holy of Holies, the upper limits of 
heaven where God dwells ( i. e., 
allegorically understood), Isaac who 
typified self-learnt and self-taught 
wisdom (automath6s and autodidaktos) as 
did the priesthood of Melchizedek. 111 
53 
If Hebrews is composed against this background, 'then 
the points at issue in the Epistle are the relationship 
of Jesus to these other figures -- is he identical with 
them, or superior or inferior to them? -- and the 
status of the salvation which he has effected -- how 
can it be superior to that of other intermediaries, 
since it involves suffering and the abandonment of 
death? These problems arise, 'according to Dey, because 
of the acceptance of pre-existence language in the 
Christology known to the communityi. it is because 
Jesus has been presented as pre-existent Wisdom and 
Word that the question of his relationship to these 
other figures becomes acute: 
'In primitive Christianity the 
identification of Jesus with wisdom and 
logos provided the basis for the 
conception of his pre-existence, agency 
in creation and divinity (Phil. 2.6-11; 
1 Cor. 8.6; Col. 1.15-16; Jn. 1.1-18). 
To those addressed in'Hebrews, however, 
this would mean that Jesus was a 
representative figure ' of the 
intermediary world and could easily be 
identified with any one of them. 
Therefore, the revelation and salvation 
he mediates would be inferior and a 
lower stage which could be surpassed on 
the path to perf ection. 1 12 
The threat then to the community's faith comes from 
both a reduction of the-uniqueness of Jesus, ý_placing 
him lower than these other heavenly or intermediary 
figures on account of his involvement in suffering, -and 
from a tendency to minimise the particularity of Jesus, 
Z 5-1 
perhaps fusing his identity with these others in -a 
syncretistic amalgam of the various nomenclatures 
associated with a heavenly agent. Philo's treatment of 
13 the names of the Logos in Conf 14&: -: -would be an 
illustration of this latter tendency, in which several 
historical and heavenly figures are seen as the various 
manifestation of a heavenly being under different 
guises. The issues at stake are solved by the author's 
exegetically based proof of the superiority of Jesus to 
the angels, Moses and Aaron, since Jesus alone is the 
Son, and, as part of the same- programme, by the 
author's proof of the superiority of the salvation 
effected by Jesus, since he alone is the High Priest 
who has entered the presence of God, and is capable of 
making the perfect offering for the sins of others. 
The problem of the relationship of Jesus to other 
intermediaries who threaten the Christian claim for the 
uniqueness and superiority of Jesus is also a feature 
of the Fourth Gospel: there the predication of 
pre-existence is the motif which validates the 
revelation given by Jesus, and, at the level of the 
commun ity-synagog ue_ debate, distinguishes, as does a 
shibboleth, those within the community of believers 
from those who are incapable of belief (Jn. 12.37-41). 
This form of argument is missing from Hebrews, perhaps, 
if Dey's proposal is correct, because the affirmation 
of the pre-existence of Jesus, rather than resolving 
the difficulty, as in the Johannine treatment, gives 
rise to further problems which have to be addressed in 
a different way. 
The author of the Epistle gives a brief assessment of 
the needs of his recipients: he distinguishes between 
what is already known and appropriated, and what they 
must learn in order to be brought c-Tri -., qv 
In the former category he includes 'rcsz 
OLP)6 S -400 XPIUTOO 
X01YO, / (6.2). Rather than T-ý 
understanding this as 'the rudiments about Christ', it 
is possible to see here a reference to teaching about 
'the beginning or origin of Christ': the phrase may 
well express the author's judgment that a familiarity 
with pre-existence Christology can be presumed among 
his readers. Confirmation of this is found in the 
formulaic and lapidary presentation of Wisdom 
predications in 1.2-3b, combined with a confessional 
statement, a 'Weglied' similar to that given in Phil 
2.6-11 (1.3c-4). L4 Certainly the absence of a systematic 
presentation of pre-existence themes, combined with a 
way of handling them which presumes that these points 
do not have to be developed for the benefit of his 
readers, indicates that the author is working at the 
level of a second stage following the introduction of 
pre-existence themes. Erich Gra*sser characterises 1.3 
as lein vorformuliertes Bekenntnis', and notes that 
'die christologischen Pr9dikationen von V. 3a. b im 
Nterem Brief nirgendwo thematisiert werden, sondern spa 
allein die in Mc. d gemachten Aussagen, bleiben davon 
unber5hrt. ' 
15 
Exactly so: the author, like the 
characters in John Le Carrels novels, works on the 
basis of 'need to know', and briefings are referred to, 
never repeated. 
Graisser sees the content of 1.3c as exercising leine 
Schl5sselfunktion' for the rest of the EpistleI6 This 
is correct, but there is a teasing question, which has 
fascinated commentators, about the relationship of the 
high Wisdom Christology of 1.2-3b to the dominant 
pattern of the Epistle's argumentation. The 
retrospective horizon of pre-existence Christology, 
pointing towards what precedes his earthly life, 
locates his identity as Son in God's address to the 
world (1.2a), while the orientation of the pattern in 
1.3c-4 is prospective, focusing on his status as Son in 
the exaltation. Given that the dominant soteriological 
pattern of the Epistle -- the association of the images 
of Sonship and High Priesthood, with its associated 
ZI 01 descriptions of Jesus as (2.9) and 
--(6.20)----- --is- prospective, - 
is -there a- 
tension between the two patterns in the hands of the 
author? This is the opinion of Hans Windisch: 
2 ý: 7, 
'Die Christologie des Hb beruht auf der 
Zusammenschau zweier Wesen: 1/ des 
himmlischen Gottessohnes ... 2/ eines 
Menschen, der (etwa wie Herakles) auf 
Erden ein Werk verrichtet hat und zum 
Lohn dafÜr Über die Engel erhohen worden 
ist. 8 17 
As we shall see, it is the function of the midrash on 
Melchizedek (7.1-3) to mediate between the potentially 
conflicting implications of the two patterns, but the 
Christological tension has a soteriological 
counterpart, as Loader points out: 
'Einerseits musste Jesus gerettet, 
auferweckt, erhöht und als Sohn 
eingesetz werden. Anderseits ist er der 
unsterbliche Sohn göttlichen Ursprunges, 
der gekommen ist, um ein Opfer für die 
Sunde darzubringen, und nach dem Tode in 
den Himmel zurÜckgekehrt ist. 118 
Loader's delineation of these patterns is valuable, but 
he ignores an important feature of the Epistle's 
integration of the different images: the author 
nowhere presents the entry of Jesus into the heavens as 
a return to where he was before. Indeed, if such a 
statement were made, it would conflict with the 
implications of the High Priestly image which is 
central to the author's validation of the superior 
salvation wrought by Christ: the salvific value of the 
death of Christ, and his entry into the presence of 
God, consists in the fact that it is only through his 
suffering that this access is gained. Jesus the High 
Priest makes this offering once for all and because of 
this sacrifice on the Cross, a stable and trustworthy 
salvation is achieved (4.14-16; 7.26-28; 9.14,24-26). 
The constraints imposed by the author's soteriological 
images distinguish his treatment of the relationship of 
pre-existence and exaltation from that of the Fourth 
Gospel: in the Johannine figuration, there is a 
circular pattern of descent and subsequent return to 
heaven: 'I came from the Father and have come into the 
world; ý again, /I am leaving the world and going to the 
Father. ' (16.28) 'And now, Father, glorify thou me in 
thy own presence with the glory I had with thee before 
the world was made. ' (17.5) Hebrews, on the other hand, 
cannot use the circular figuration without infringing 
the connotations of its principal soteriological image: 
the right of Christ to enter into the presence of God 
on our behalf (9.24) is justified, not by his prior 
presence there before 'the days of his flesh' (5.7), 
but by his qualification as a holy High Priest who 
sacrifices himself (7.26; 9.26) and thus opens the way 
for his followers (6.20) to join the 
(12-23). 
The absence of a circular descent-return pattern-as a 
thematic development within the Epistle raises 
questions about the accuracy of Grasser's confident 
appeal to a Gnostic pattern in 1.3: 'der gnostische 
Erlöser hat mit seiner RÜckkehr zum Vater sein 
2-3-1 
Erl8sungswerk vollbracht. -II-9-Apart from the difficulty of 
establishing such a Gnostic pattern earlier than the NT 
a difficulty which vitiates Ka'semann's 
over-ambitious proposals too -- such a view ignores the 
distinctly un-Johannine justification for the entry of 
Christ into the true sanctuary: the vocational 
qualification -- for such an entry is 
found in the words of the oath in Ps. 110.4 (5.5) and 
in the experience of flesh and blood (2.14), 
20 culminating in the school of suffering (5.8-9)-w- The 
Johannine validation of the exaltation of Jesus with 
reference to his descent (3.13) proves his superiority 
to other ascending figures such as Moses; Hebrews 
neglects this argumentation in favour of the strength 
of its soteriological images, although the author has 
at his disposal all the elements of a Johannine scheme: 
pre-existent Sonship and Wisdom Christology (1.2-3), 
the taking of flesh and blood (2.14; 5.7) and the 
eternal attributes of having neither beginning of days 
nor end of life (7.3). 
We have indicated that the place of the 
pre-existenc-e-exaltation scheme-in the Fourth'Gospel is-- 
a more dominant, structural feature of the Johannine 
presentation than it is in Hebrews, where the same 
pattern although present, plays a more muted role 
because of its association with soteriological themes 
which evoke different connotations. If we take as a 
summarising statement of the MYTHOS of Hebrews, that 
Christ alone gives access to the heavenly world through 
his death, then this shapes the handling of the 
pre-existence predication in the Epistle: the image is 
developed only insofar as it contributes to the 
author's argument. Its contribution is carefully 
gauged to provide support for the dominant 
soteriological and exaltation patterns which are the 
central concerns of the author. 
ESTABLISHING THE REFERENT 
We shall take it that the purpose of this section is, to 
establish Jesus as the only one who is to be spoken of 
in certain ways: the concern is to appropriate to 
Jesus as the referent, a range of predications and 
designations which, in other circles, were being used 
of other figures. In this, we are following Dey's 
assessment of the issue: in a Hellenistic Jewish 
environment, similar to that found in Philo, the 
question of which, intermediary merits these 
descriptions attracts the attention of the author: 
I ... the author has to argue the case for the superiority of Jesus over against 
the world of angels, logos, wisdom, etc. 
with whom Jesus was identified and 
especially Moses who was the supreme, 
exemplar of perfection... (the author) 
attempts to prove that Jesus is uniquely, 
the one who has these attributes and 
titles 21 
The affirmations of the author, and the arguments he 
adduces from the Scriptures (v. 5-13), are a way of 
appropriating this range of 'floating' predicates as 
valid designations of 'the Son' through whom God has 
spoken: it is to this Son that both the triple Wisdom 
predications and the Weglied are applied, which the 
author derives from his traditions. The trajectory of 
Wisdom speculation, applied to Jesus in Jn. 1.1, Col. 
0 JI 1.15f, provide the hapax legomena m: Tz-oLoy-ca-ý--oL and 
X "t- ýc - ozT-, bwyca-[A_tý_ , deriving from Wis. 7.26, -ce 119e belongs within the NT tradition of Christ as the 
C-1 P, =W\( of God (Col. 1.15; 2 Cor. 4.4): the Son is 
22 Ile reflet lumineuxI of the divine being, Philo's use 
of this term describes human reason as a reflection of 
divine Reason (De opificio mundi 146), the physical 
world as a reflection of the archetypal world (De 
plantatione 50), and the human spirit as a reflection 
of the Spirit which emanates from God's nature (De 
Specialibus legibus, IV, 123). Xyw-&c-roy is also 
found within Philo's scheme of archetype-copy: the 
rational soul is signed with God's seal whose stamp 
f) is the Logos (De plantatione 18); the 
human spirit -created in the image of God is a stamp 
of divine power (Quod deterius 83). 
Hebrews' use of these terms, which show parallels to 
the Philonic meaning, is a simple Christological 
metaphor, employing philosophical terms in a 
metaphorical way. One should be careful not to press 
the distinction between philosophy and metaphor too 
far, especially in this genre of Wisdom speculation 
which delights in the poetic treatment of terms which 
have philosophical connotations. To say, as does 
Ronald Williamson, that the term X_eýýxTjp 'has been 
pressed into the service of a wholly unphilosophical 
23 
presentation of the doctrine of'the Incarnation' by the 
author of the Epistle, is to be blind to the capacity 
of- philosophical metaphors both , to function 
metaphorically, and to open up the topic in the 
direction of philosophical 'discourse. The 
philosophical categories -of Platonism, for example, 
depend upon images and metaphors which 'give rise to 
thought', in Ricoeur's words: it is not clear that 
philosophical discourse and metaphorical discourse are 
such incompatible bed-fellows as Williamson seems to 
think. 
But what of the fact that these terms are predicated of 
the Son, who is then taken as the subject of the saving 
action of making atonement for sins, and as the one who 
is S ubsequently exalted? - One could say, in the 
language of later theology, that the Son is conside-red' 
within the economy of salvation, and not as an immanent 
divine hypostasis: so, the application of the Wisdom 
categories is focused on the Son in his role within the 
econom The absence of a developed narrative 
exposition 'of the hypostasis of Wisdom, eternally with 
2,1.3 
I-- 
God, such as is found in the Johannine Prologue, would 
confirm that the author's attention is economically 
orientated, and that these Wisdom predicates are 
metaphorical descriptions of the Son through whom God's 
address to the world is given. If we bear in mind the 
later theological axiom which validates the identity of 
the economic and immanent Trinity, then we can say that 
it is the metaphorical descriptions of the Son in the 
economy which provide the basis for a consideration of 
the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son within the 
immanent Trinity: within the economy, language of 
pre-existence is metaphorical; in its application to 
the immanent Trinity, it designates a referent other 
than the person of Jesus. The author of Hebrews, in 
his handling of pre-existence language, works within 
the framework of the economy, and provides no 
examination of the relationship of the Son to God 
before the economy; Loader suggests that he may have 
envisaged this relationship as that of Wisdom to God as 
24 in the Sapiential works known to himr;.. but he is more 
concerned to deal with the economy, than to ground the 
economy in a narration deriving from pre-existence 
predications such as is found in the Hypostatic 
treatment of the Logos in the Johannine Prologue. 
In support of this view, we may draw upon a distinction 
made by Aelred Cody in his study of the heavenly 
sanctuary and liturgy in the Epistle. When 'heaven' is 
2! ýý 
opposed to 'earth' in the Epistle, the primary 
analogate for the distinction is, obviously, the 
visible heaven and the visible earth, the division of 
'above' and 'below'; but the distinction is developed, 
through the influence of Platonic dualism, to 
characterise an laxiologicall distinction -- a 
distinction of value: 'the axiological heaven is a 
heaven whose perfection is distinguished against the 
relative imperfection of the earth. e 25 'Heaven' 
used axiologically, designates the status of reality, 
permanence, truth and value, in contrast with 'earth' 
which denotes an imperfect approximation to what is 
'real'. Cody adds: 
I ... it is important to note here that the range of subjects of which 
"heavenly" can be predicated 
axiologically is not necessarily 
coextensive with those of which 
"heavenly" can be predicated 
cosmologically. A person, object, or 
action that is cosmologically "earthly" 
can be axiologically "celestial" -- 
Christ on earth, for instance, or the 
sacraments, or the Christian life and 
the earthly life of Christ Himself. v26 
--Cody goes on toapply this distinction with refererf6e 
to the Epistle's treatment of the divine and human 
natures of Christ (the anachronistic flaws in his 
approach prevent us from following him in this respect, 
but his application of the axiological distinction to 
the Christological realm encourages us in the use we 
will make of the distinction): 
2- C 
I ... the divine nature and divine Person 
of our Lord are axiologically heavenly, 
and His human nature is axiologically 
earthly until it enters heaven at the 
term of the Ascension ..... the historical 
actions and sentiments of our Lord on 
earth are already axiologically heavenly 
in that they are the acts and sentiments 
of a divine Person who sits at the right 
hand of the Father in all eternity. 927 
The axiological contrast of heaven and earth uses the 
primary analogate of the physical heaven and earth as 
an image for a conceptual distinction, as a framework 
for comparisons and contrasts which are intellectual 
and philosophical: this procedure is clearly 
metaphorical in character. Cody's statement that a 
cosmologically 'earthly' person can be described as 
axiologically, 'heavenly' is another way of saying that 
the imagery of heavenly status can be used to speak 
metaphorically of the person in a way which carries 
some conceptual implications concerning his identity. 
The metaphor of axiological 'heavenly status', applied 
to the earthly Jesus, is a way of speaking figuratively 
about his identity. 
If- we return to the application of' the Wisdom 
predicates to the Son in 1.3, they can, be seen as 
examples of this procedure, involving the attribution 
of axiological 'heavenly' status to the Son in whom God 
has spoken in these last days -- the Son in the economy 
of salvation. The predicates are ways of speaking 
figuratively about the superiority of Jesus' revelation 
to the imperfection -o, \O ý-C-eL: IS KoLl -rj OXOTPOWO S 
[1.11) of God's communication through the prophets and 
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angels. we shall see later that Hebrews uses language 
of incarnation (2.14; 10.5) as a way of supporting the 
requirements of the soteriological imagery of the 
Epistle; what is noticeable in the opening section of 
the Epistle is the absence of such language between the 
affirmation of Wisdom predications and the Weglied of 
his death and exaltation, where, logically, it should 
be placed. The entire complex of Christologoumena is 
set' within the context of God's eschatological speech 
_ý -1 C" C; L) L 4,0 this has the effect of intensif ing the 91 y 
referential status of Jesus as the sole bearer of this 
range of predicates, and of insisting that he alone, as 
Son, is the one to whom the double perspective of 
pre-existence and exaltation predications can be 
fittingly attributed. Loader sees this clearly and 
says succinctly, 'Diese Traditionen reden schliesslich 
alle von derselben Personl, 28 Precisely so: both 
pre-existence and exaltation traditions are predicated. 
of the one referent. 
Within this proemium, there is a fusion 'of 
pre-existence and exaltation traditions; strangely, it 
seems 
--that 
the superiority of__Jesus to Moses is 
affirmed with particular reference to pre-existence, 
and his superiority to the angels is expressed with 
particular reference to the exaltation, although, as we 
shall see, the author uses pre-existence language as a 
support for the superiority of the exalted Christ over 
297 
the angels. In Philo, Moses rules the world as heir 
(Mos. 1,155) and receives as his portion ( VC, \,? eO, 5, ) 
the whole world (op. cit., 157); his partnership with 
God delegates to him a share in God's authority, so 
that he can rightly be called OC-051 (op. cit., 158-9; 
cf., Heb. 1.8 where 06-o'S is reserved for Christ); he 
is regarded as the maker of the archetypes (Leg. All. 
iii, 102), and has the divine character ( )(OkeoL<T-jr) 
imprinted on his soul. These traditions are in view in 
V. 2b-c: ý0%/ 
jýTjw_&-I 
C-_jrOIVIqzV -10057 OLLtO-, raLq although Moses is 
not mentioned by name, his presence as an inferior 
comparison is evident. When the author turns in 3.2-6 
to contrast explicitly Moses and Jesus, he relies upon 
the tradition of Jesus as 'the son of the house', 
entitled to exercise his inherited authority over the 
creation. This theme, found too in the Fourth Gospel, 
as is the affirmation of pre-existence as designating 
the superiority of Jesus to Moses, is built upon the 
foundation laid in the opening section of the Epistle. 
The integration of pre-existence and exaltation 
traditions- in-the opening section of the Epistle 
highlights the contrast with the Johannine scheme: in 
the Fourth Gospel, pre-existent Sonship is the 
determinative focus for the interpretation of the 
exaltation. The exaltation is explained from the 
perspective offered by Jesus' prior presence in the 
oy 
heavens. In Hebrews, however, the exaltation is the 
determinative focus, and pre-existence language is used 
as a consonant affirmation of the significance of the 
exaltation. Thus, the superiority of the Son to the 
angels is developed in the catena with particular 
reference to the exaltation, and in the course of the 
argumentation, pre-existence themes provide a support 
and confirmation of what is asserted of the exalted 
Son. The catena is to be understood as an explication 
of the confessional formula of v. 3, which refers to the 
exaltation by its allusion to Ps. 110.1, to which the 
author has added the spatial image 
'&v This 
motif is used elsewhere in the Epistle to express 
Christ's heavenly exalted status (8.1; 10.12; 12.2). 
The significance of the exaltation is interpreted in 
v. 4 'as the reception of a name and simultaneous 
superiority to the angels. 
The name bestowed on him, justified by an appeal to the 
Resurrection testimonium, Ps. 2.7 (cf Acts 13.33), is 
identified as UCLO14; ; clearly the exaltation is in view 
as the moment when-this dignity is conferred. Are we 
to take it then that 
- 
the author's extension -of- -this 
title to the pre-existent Sch6pfungsmittler (1.2) and 
to the earthly Jesus (5.8) is a proleptic use in which 
the significance of the exaltation is extended 
retrospectively over the preceding life, as Ka'semann 
suggests? ýL ýSuch a view may form part of a 
traditionsgeschichte well before the writing of the 
Epistle; the author is writing at a time when the 
image of Sonship has acquired a range of connotations 
over the dimensions of pre-existence, earthly life and 
exalted status, and he is able to be creative in his 
use 'of Sonship as implying neither 'beginning of days 
nor end of life', in his comparison of Christ and 
Melchizedek (7.3). Moreover, the two activities of 
investigating the development of traditions -- showing, 
for example, the association of Sonship with the 
exaltation -- and examining how the metaphor of Sonship 
is aI pplied to Jesus in NT texts are not the same thing: 
the aetiology of a title does not determine or limit 
the scope of the connotations it acquires. 30 
'I 
Within the catena of quotations, there is a pattern of 
nomenclatUres appropriated to Jesus alone: Son (v. 5), 
God (v. 8) and Lord (v. 10), and although the exaltation 
is in view, the catena also introduces, as a 
concomitant perspective, that of Pre-existence: both 
exaltation traditions and pre-existence traditions are 
presented as descriptive frameworks which establish 
____. _these 
designations as belonging to Jesus_ alone, and 
provide some indication as to the clarificatory 
implications to be derived from these titles. The 
conjunction of the two perspectives is seen in v. 6, 
where the quotation 'Let all God's angels worship him' 
is introduced by the phrase, 
C/ .7 11 % 11 ol-i-tV cicrocyocy, 
ZI 
70v T-IE)cý)*i-D-rO`O'/ C'S-41v 
2-70 
Thompson argues that C) I #CCXýF'C-V-qV- 
should be taken to refer to the heavenly world, making 
0' ' V& &00 CULV I OCO L) tA-C-V41 V it equivalent to in 
2.5A This would interpret the angelic worship as a 
feature of the exaltation of the Son. In support of 
this, the designation Wpu) --V TOK-OS is used of Jesus 
in -a resurrection context in Col. 1.18- (cf Heb. 
12.23: Pc i< >\, vl cr& c& Trp Lo To -to vc to 
Yet, if Thompson's own correctly judged principle for 
the interpretation of the catena is adopted -- that the 
quotations be understood 'against the background of the 
argumentation of the entire epistleo32__ then a 
reference to the entry of Christ into the world cannot 
be -avoided as part of the evocation of the-phrase from 
Deut. 32.43 (LXX): to deny this would be to, deny one 
of -the obvious meanings of oLicc)Lip-ývq-t the inhabited 
world, corresponding- to KOTý-Ov (10.5). The 
overlapping of the two perspectives,, the entry of 
Christ into the world at the Incarnation, and his entry 
into the heavenly world at the Exaltation, affirms the 
superiority of the Son over the 'sons of God' (Gen. 
6.2; Ps. 29.1; 89.7; Job 1.6). - 
If the exaltation is the dominant perspective of the 
first half of the catena, with the pre-existence 
perspective playing a consonant, but subordinate, role, 
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in the second half (v. 7-12) the affirmations of the 
role of the Son as Sch6pfungsmittler (v. 2) establish 
the theme of the permanence of the Son in contrast with 
the transitoriness of the creation of which the angels 
form part. Ps. 104.4 was used in Rabbinic writings to 
affirm either the transcendence of God or the power of 
the angel L3 sJ7 but in our text, it is quoted to show the 
mutability and hence imperfection of the angels. 
C o 7Totýov refers back to the agency of the Son in 
creating the aeons (1.2; cf 12.27). The angels 'do 
not stand above the created order, as does the exalted 
son. As objects ol God's creative activity, being made 
into Ti- v&v and 140POS they belong to 
the created order. @34Thompson points to the phrase 
I in 12.18, with its negative vcE-YcOLvFLc--, fO%/ '11"-Je 
connotation 'as representative of the material world 
%V -qXCI qpy) t. LC`%10%1) and is contrasted with the heavenly, 
35 
non-material and non-transitory world. --Contrasted with 
the transitory and material angels is the Son who, as 
L C 6) possesses a throne - Is 
-44DNr VI I W%/tW- "ro U 
at IW VtIS. This phrase is of central importance for the 
argument of Hebrews, especially with reference to its__ 
occurrence in Ps. - 110. -4, -- the confirmation of the 
priesthood of Christ after the order of Melchizedek 
(5.5; 6.20; 7.17,21,24,28). The contrast between the 
unchangeable Son and the changeable angels has a 
counterpart in the contrast between the unchangeable 
Priest and the earthly and imperfect priests of the 
27z 
Aaronic order: the presumption for both contrasts lies 
in the quality of permanence which is attributed to the 
Son alone, and, by extension, to Melchizedek who bears 
the lineaments-of the Son of God (7.3). 
Thus there is a parallel between the soteriological 
argument of the Epistle which affirms the abidingness 
of the salvation effected by Christ through his death, 
and the Christological argument which affirms his 
abidingness through pre-existence terminology. The 
permanence of the throne of the Son (v. 8) is echoed in 
the affirmation of Ps. 102.25-27 in v. 10-12: the 
transitoriness of the earth and the heavens belongs to 
the physical world -- a theme which is picked up and 
developed in- the treatment of the earthly tent 
( >(C--t()07rO('q 
/ -. 00,9.11,24) into which the Aaronic 
priests enter. The destiny of the earthly world is 
described as ý, L&-, C; 0'0-6d-L5I in contrast with the 
stability of what cannot be shaken (12.27). The 
presence of Platonic dualistic assumptions, which 
assert a metaphysical contrast between the stability of 
the intelligible world and the mutability of the 
created world, here provide a philosophical support for 
the author's argument which has been predominantly 
, literary'- in character: he works primarily with 
patterns of contrasting features between Christ and the 
priests of the Aaronic order, based on the ability of 
Christ to fulfil the requirements of the priestly 
?- ý3- 
function better than the Levitical priesthood. This 
argumentation is given philosophical support through a 
dualistic contrast- of the comparative metaphysical 
status of what is achieved in the present age (9.9), 
within the order of creation (9.11) by the repeated 
sacrifices of the Aaronic priesthood (10.11), and the 
achievement of Christ in entering the heavenly 
sanctuary not made with hands and therefore permanent 
(9.24), to make a single sacrifice for sins (10.12; 
9.26). 
From a different perspective, this contrast is 
presented in the application of Ps. 102.25-27 in 
1.10-12: the earth ýand the heavens, the places of 
angelic mutation (1.7) are contrasted with the Son: 
OCT, -O/\C; u': -'('I# j 
(3-ý) L OL t-L C- ýfe IS (ro 
V 
Or- Lj TO 
The quotation of the psalm thus establishes the 
permanence of the exalted Son by invoking the earlier 
description of the Son as Sch6pfungsmittler: the 
pre-existence theme is recalled here in order to 
support the author's treatment of the exalted Son by 
providing a_-Scriptural-and-figurative image for- the 
theme of the permanence of the Son,, which will be 
central to the author's soteriological argument in the 
body of the Epistle. The stability of the Son 
C contrasts with the order of creation which ws 
C_ LtA,. L-, u3V (v. 11)... The same verb is 
2-74- 
used in 8.13 to affirm the inferiority and obsolescence 
of the old covenant and its dispensation. Thompson 
rightly comments that the author has read Ps. 102 
'with Platonic assumptions in order to interpret the 
exaltationo36 but he minimises the significance of the 
appeal to the theme of pre-existence which 
distinguishes the 'heavenly' character of the Son, and 
his consequent permanence, from the 'earthly', and 
evanescent, status of the created order in which are 
included angels and the physical world. The 
affirmation of the permanence of the Son in his exalted 
status is justified by the supporting motif of the 
pre-existence of the Son, and the metaphysical 
argument, 'which is used later in the Epistle to 
contrast the priesthood of Jesus and the Aaronic 
priesthood, is here given a figurative expression in 
the portrayal of the Son as the addressee of God's 
words in the Psalm. What we see in both the exaltation 
and pre-existence traditions is the author's concern to 
use their formulations in order to provide a source of 
imagery which can stand as a support for the 
metaphysical argument he adduces in the Epistle. In 
turn, this metaphysical dimension is rooted -in the 
figurative expressions of the permanence of Christ, 
both as pre-existent Son and as priest according to the 
perpetual order of Melchizedek. The catena of 
quotations in 1.5-13 is presented with an eye on 'the 
philosophical argumentation in the body of the Epistle 
which centres on the abidingness of Christ in his 
exalted status as Son and High Priest and which is 
developed in conjunction with a form of Platonic 
dualism. 1-7 
Thus, -unlike the Fourth Gospel, which in the Prologue 
provides a presentation of the prior presence of the 
Word in heaven, thereby enabling the exaltation to be 
presented as a return to the heavenly realm, Hebrews 
uses pre-existence predications in the opening chapter 
as -a consonant affirmation of a principle 'which is 
developed philosophically in the central argument of 
the Epistle, namely the abidingness of the Son. 
Significantly, the author's formula for the permanence 
of Christ in 13.8 picks up the phrase from Ps. 102.27, 
C 0 quoted in 1.12: 0-0 but in the 
summarising formula,,. the theme of divine mutability from 
Middle Platonism is Christologically developed over the 
three dimensions of temporality. The two horizons 
enclosing the earthly life of Christ, pre-existence and 
the exaltation, are aspects of the metaphysical 
permanence in which he is d This phrase 
surely evokes the perspective of the supra-mundane 
stability of the Son offered in the opening chapter, 
and I. -L r= *4 ei/ has been a refrain throughout the Epistle 
characterising the permanence of Christ's exaltation 
and intercession in heaven. Both figurative patterns 
are brought together to frame a philosophical and 
Z7ý 
ontological designation of Christ as o OLoyog Thus 
the combination of the figurative patterns of 
pre-existence and exaltation -- both involving images 
of Jesus as Son-Wisdom, on the one hand, and as 
Son-High Priest, on the other, support the author's 
philosophical assertion of the permanence of Jesus as 
the divine one who abides. In this respect, 
pre-existence language is the figurative expression of 
the philosophical idea which it suggests and supports: 
in Ricoeur's words, it is an expression which 'gives 
rise to thought', and issues in a primarily conceptual 
articulation of the permanence of Christ through the 
author's integration of the notion with Hellenistic 
philosophy. 
The Figure of Melchizedek 
The Christological pattern we have identified in the 
Epistle is a concentration on the Exaltation, which 
then finds support in the implications of pre-existence 
statements; the resultant pattern then centres on the 
metaphysical permanence of Christ as the one who abides 
a. nd whose salvation is trustworthy and stable. If we 
take this as a pattern which describes the author's 
reshaping of the Christological traditions he inherits, 
then his treatment of the figure of Melchizedek becomes 
more intelligible. one of the puzzles concerning the 
midrash in 7.1-3 is why the author introduces such a 
77 
positive assessment of this shadowy figure, in terms 
which approximate him to Christ almost exactly, when he 
already has a convincing argument about the superiority 
of Christ to the Levitical priesthood: why does he 
then conflate the features of Christ and Melchizedek, 
when in other parts of the Epistle he goes to great 
lengths to distinguish Christ from other figures? 
Moreover, there are questions about the author's 
understanding of the identity of Melchizedek which 
centre on the possibility that he regarded Melchizedek 
as an angelic or heavenly figure, made manifest in the 
Old Testament, as a forerunner of the Son of God. In 
the last century, Franz Bleek took the series of 
expressions in 7.3 -- ck-n6t'-, we, ocp-., q-, wp, etc. -- as a 
plain indication of the heavenly status of Melchizedek: 
'We propose that Melchizedek was placed 
on earth and later removed directly by 
divine omnipotence, as an incarnation of 
a divine spirit or, at least, of a 
heavenly being. v38 
Tholuck raises the objection to this approach which 
would present the author of the Epistle as affirming 
the eternal existence of a figure alongside Christ: 
'Who is able to believe that a Christian apostle would 
attribute an eternal existence to Melchizedek in the 
same way as to God's only begotten SonV39 
Z 
This discussion has been revived in the present century 
through the discovery of the Qumran texts, in- which 
Melchizedek appears to be an angelic figure who engages 
in eschatological conflict with the forces of Belial. 
M. de Jonge and A. S. van der Woude have proposed that 
11 QMelch cast light upon the author's statements about 
Melchizedek: 
'It seems much easier to assume that the 
author really meant what he wrote. On 
the evidence of 11 QMelch, the most 
plausible inference is that he regarded 
Melchizedek as an (arch-)angel, who 
appeared to Abraham long ago. 940 
In order to dissuade his readers from elevating 
Melchizedek above Christ, the author subordinates the 
>J 
OT figure to Christ with the phrase , If 0kw tLC--VO!; 
The difficulty about the 
coherence of this opinion is that it would seem that 
the author's right hand'does not know what his left is 
doing: in the opening chapter of the Epistle, he 
distances Jesus from the status of the angels, and 
refuses to allow any similarities, whereas in the 
-Melchizedek 
midrash, he deliberately approximates Jesus 
and the angel Melchizedek. Horton's judgment is 
accurate on this point, to the effect that if the 
author had known of the sort of Melchizedek speculation 
found at Qumran, 'he might well have rejected 
41 
Melchizedek as a type of the Christ: r- However, the 
2 7ýý 
Qumran text shows evidence of a speculation about 
Melchizedek as a heavenly figure in Jewish circles 
distinct from the Hellenistic treatment of Philo and 
-Josephus; it does not seem possible, however, to be 
more specific about a relationship between Qumran and 
Hebrews, since attempts to assimilate the two texts 
come up against the rampart of the author's explicit 
denial of angelic comparison in Chapter 1.42 
Nor are the attempts to establish a pre-Christian 
Vorlage any more convincing: Theissen's reconstruction 
involves the replacement of 
V, ck vný. I , at -rcý'o &-c-cO by Koi_-'a EL-wý'p-Ov ý u -roo f rom 
v. 16, the elimination of the etymologies of v. 2, and 
the addition of sections from vv. 25-20_3 Such an 
explanation may be ingenious, but the complexity of 
the solution is forced, especially when simpler 
explanations are possible. The midrash is more easily 
explained as a composite mosaic, from different 
backgrounds, constructed by the author himself as part 
of his interpretation of the Scriptural texts. 
The midrash develops two principal characteristics of 
Melchizedek: his priesthood and his 'eternity': 
attempts to relate Hebrews to Qumran focus on the 
second of these at the expense of the former -- hence 
the hypothesis that the author was familiar with a 
non-Christian tradition which had already developed a 
z gy'! ý 
thematic Vorlage similar to that used in 7.1-3. The 
difficulty of identifying such a foundation, and the 
equally daunting task of explaining how the author 
could tolerate such a positive comparison of Jesus with 
a, presumably competing, figure, point in the direction 
of regarding the author's account of Melchizedek's 
eternity as an explication of the similarity between 
Jesus and Melchizedek which is initially focused on the 
theme of priesthood. Once Jesus' priesthood is 
explained in terms of Melchizedek's priesthood, then 
the description of Melchizedek can be construed through 
a transfer of the lineaments of Christ to the figure of 
Melchizedek: a double pattern, then, in which the 
image of Jesus' priesthood takes on the features of 
Melchizedek's priesthood, and the image of the person 
of Melchizedek takes on the features of the person of 
the Son of God. The hapax legomenon in the phrase 
C, % U"o -, 0j 0-ýZ) (v. 3), if taken 
in an active sense ('made like'), records the process 
by which the second stage of the approximation of Jesus 
and Melchizedek occurs. The author sees the priesthood 
of Christ as best described as a Melchizedekian -r-ýkts 
which continues for ever (IA-ýve, tcrec-os, cý, s To 
FLVjV&K&'C fv. 31), and as part of the, same process, the 
metaphor can be developed further by developing the 
similarity so that Melchizedek's sudden appearance in 
the Scriptures can permit the transfer of predicates 
from the Son of God to the figure of Melchizedek. 
zI 
The most obvious point de depart for such a treatment 
is in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition exemplified in 
Philo and Josephus: Philo, in Leg. All. 111,79-82, 
allegorises on Melchizedek's name and office: he is 
'king of peace' and 'the righteous king'. The presence 
of similar etymologising in Heb. 7.2 indicates the 
likelihood of the author's dependence on a Philonic 
tradition -- elsewhere in the Epistle, he shows no 
interest in this form of etymological interpretation, 
so he is likely to be dependent on others for this 
unique instanceýl Philo takes Melchizedek to be a 
representation of the Logos, and in Leg. All. 79-82 
subjects him to an allegorical interpretation in which, 
as Williamson points out, he moves 'a very long way 
from the thought of the historical or legendary figure 
of Melchizedek; Melchizedek is not even an example of 
a certain type of conduct, for he is no more than a 
symbol. ' What lies behind Philo's and Josephus' 
interpretation of Melchizedek is their interest in him 
as the first priest mentioned in the Scriptures: it is 
this which enables Philo to present him as the exemplar 
of an 'unlearned and untutored priesthood' (De 
Cong, 99), and therefore as the image of the Logos whose 
knowledge is given directly from God, independently of 
human agency. Horton comments that the silence of 
Scripture about the origin of Melchizedek's ministry 
enables Josephus 'to present him as 'the first to do 
priestly service to God' (War vi, 438), and Philo to 
develop his allegorising Logos-interpretation, and it 
is this same silence about the life and parentage of 
Melchizedek which gives the author of Hebrews the scope 
to develop the similarity with the Son of God. 
Significantly, however, the author goes beyond Philo's 
interpretation of the Genesis text by reading it in 
conjunction with Ps. 110.4, and it is in this verse 
11. C %. that the author's interest lies: rv tceevS 4? -S 
% r-, Qc-, 4 1< . The quality 
of the priesthood lies in its permanence: in 7.3, 
C% Melchizedek Lc-()6-v. T &, 5 -&v StwIv&i<&S 
In the light of the circularity between the stage of 
describing the priesthood of Jesus as having the 
features of Melchizedek's priesthood, particularly its 
permanence, and the stage of describing Melchizedek as 
having the features of the Son of God, the discussion 
about the author's understanding of the status of 
Melchizedek gains some badly needed clarity. In 
Thompson's opinion, the author brings together those 
features of Gen. 14.18-20 and Ps. 110.4 'which are 
useful for his claim that Melchizedek is a divine 
45 figure'-. Because of the use of the 'divine predicates 
T and in both Hebrews and Philo, he 
argues that 'for both Hebrews and Philo, Melchizedek is 
, 46 a heavenly being v- This approach, which ignores the 
metaphorical basis of the comparison in which Jesus is 
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seen in his priesthood as Melchizedekian, and, in turn, 
Melchizedek is seen as the eternal Son of God in his 
'power of indissoluble life' (cf, 7.16), implies that 
we are dealing with a straightforward and unmixed 
comparison between two individuals who, even before the 
comparison is developed, possess the features which 
justify the simile. In which case, the theological 
problem posed by Tholuck in the last century remains 
untouched by considerations of the literary devices at 
work in the midrash: Tholuck asks, 'Is Melchizedek, 
for the author of Hebrews, alongside Christ or 
47 
subordinate to him? ' We would reject such a question, 
for it ignores the transference of the features of the 
Son of God to the figure of Melchizedek as part of the 
descriptive process glimpsed through the hermeneutical 
clues the author offers concerning what he is doing: 
"D (7.3) and . ý, p"t, ýoujt, c-vos 3c- OL, ý -too IDC-6L) 
C-1- T-Z 
Ir OFA_O, o 
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c-Tc-e05 (7.15), expressly state the approximation of 
Melchizedek to Christ and the approximation of Christ 
to Melchizedek -- the double description of each in 
terms of the other. 
The exchange of features between Melchizedek and Christ 
is dissolved by Hanson who regards the author as 
deliberately withholding from his readers the truth of 
what he 'really' wants to say to them, namely that 
Melchizedech is identical with Christ: 
ga 
'The author believed that Melchizedech 
was the pre-existent Christ, (but) did 
not say* so ... because he did not quite have the courage to do so. It was too 
strong meat for his hearers ... He would 
perhaps prefer his readers to draw for 
themselves the conclusion that he was, 
aiming at. v48 
There are no controls on such an interpretation: if 
what the author means to say contradicts what he 
actually does say, how can one distinguish his intended 
meaning from his explicit statements? But Hanson, 
although he takes the argument too far, has identified, 
perhaps without intending it, the character of the 
metaphorical procedure involved in the author's 
midrash: Melchizedek is portrayed as having the 
features of the Son of God, and the most striking of 
these features is the assertion that he is without 
beginning orýend of days. The basis for this assertion 
is clearly the presence of &Is -. Ov tV_IL; vc in Ps. 
110.4, evoked in 7.3d. Elsewhere in the Epistle, this 
is the controlling philosophical notion applied to the 
status of Christ, as we have seen. Here, too, in 
parallel with the Christological figurative predication 
of pre-existence, there is a figurative treatment of 
the permanence of Melchizedek in terms of pre-existence 
predication. This is done through a transfer of an 
aspect from Jesus to Melchizedek, so that for the 
purposes of the author's midrash, Melchizedek is seen 
as Christ, in order to support the dominant theme of 
Christ being seen as Melchizedekian in his priestly 
ministry. 
The phrases (; (TTai -. wej, tky&%j &uL /\c)yvl -. 0 S apply 
first of all to the author's argument for the 
non-genealogical basis of Melchizedek's priesthood, 
which coheres with the author's assertion of Jesus, 
descent from a non-priestly family (7.14): negatively, 
there is no necessary connection between priestly 
status and physical lineage. Postively, the absence of 
priestly genealogical descent opens the way to 
considering the status of priesthood in relation to a 
permanent form of lifeý_9 The author develops this 
implication in 7.3b, and returns to it in 7.8: in 
contrast with the Levitical priests, described here as 
it is said of Melchizedek 
0 The contrast is repeated in 7.16, where the 
Levitical priests are appointed KtýZ_#4 ' VOF4-0%ý 
CrbL and Jesus who is Kok-,. L -rslv 
0 f" is established 
Sýu V-04 vs- IV wqs oLvcoL-r. LXoTou. This distinction is yet 
another instance of the contrast the author uses 
between the transitoriness, and imperfection, of the 
material order, and the permanence of the divine order. 
The repetition of this contrast, which elsewhere in the 
Epistle involves the contrast between Jesus and the 
lower order of created reality, here involves 
Melchizedek, on the side of Christ, as it, were, 
contrasted with an earthly (a'<Y_pKWrj, 7.16) world. It 
is precisely the transfer of the features of Christ on 
to Melchizedek which accounts for the author's argument 
here: Melchizedek is metaphorically seen as Christ -- 
he is not seen as an angel, since if this were the 
comparison at stake, the angelic Melchizedek would be 
relegated to the sphere of imperfect and transtiory 
reality, which would contradict the Psalmist's 
attribution of permanence to his priesthood. Thus it 
is less likely that the author develops a comparison 
based on an already formulated account of the angelic 
status- of Melchizedek, than that he has developed an 
account of Melchizedek based on the transfer of 
attributes from Christ to him: this process is 
inherently metaphorical, involving the redescription of 
a referent by viewing him, as another referent. This 
approach is to be preferred to Horton's explanation, in 
which Christ is the type and Melchizedek the antitype: 
'The lantitypology' of the author 
involves taking an earthly entity and 
contrasting it or connecting it to its 
heavenly counterpart or type .... We 
gain an understanding of Christ's 
priesthood, the eternal priesthood, by 
understanding the features of the 
earthly perpetual priesthood of 
Melchizedek. Each significant feature 
of the antitype is to be found in its 
true form in the typ6.150 
This is true as far as it goes, but Horton does not 
consider sufficiently the second part of the process, 
the way in which the account of Melchizedek is shaped 
by the author's view of Christ: he fails, for example, 
to consider the implications of the transfer of 
ZF7 
'neither beginning of days nor end of life (7.3), and 
of the assertion 'that he lives' (7.8) to Melchizedek. 
The interaction and dependence of the two descriptive 
schemes -- from Melchizedek to Jesus, and from Jesus to 
Melchizedek -- must be acknowledged and characterised 
as metaphorical. It is a feature of metaphorical 
predication to bring together two distinct subjects, 
and to engage in a description in which there is a 
tension between identity and difference: the two are 
not fused, as Hanson proposes for this midrash, nor are 
they juxtaposed as in a simile, as Horton suggests, 
with his view of lantitypology'; rather, one is seen 
as the other for the purposes of the descriptive 
possibilities which ensue. 
The conceptual basis for the approximation of Christ 
and Melchizedek is the presence of the theme of 
permanence in Ps. 110.4, which can be associated with 
the permanence of Christ as Son (5.5-6). The midrash 
develops a figurative expression of this theme, as in 
the rest of the Epistle, by bringing together the two 
horizons of pre-existence and exaltation (7.3), and 
applying them to Melchizedek, thus intensifying the 
strength of the primary Christological concern of the 
author, namely, the possibility of associating Christ's 
priesthood with a non-genealogical and permanent 
priesthood associated with Melchizedek. By a 
'Christologicall description of Melchizedek, " the author 
gives himself greater justification for his 
'Melchizedekian' description of Christ. 
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The potentially confusing elevation of Melchizedek to 
the eternal level of the Son of God -- raising the 
question about whether there are two such figures -- 
can be defused only by appreciating the metaphorical 
exchange of attributes between the two figures. What 
is the role of the midrash in the Epistle? We have 
indicated that it prepares and establishes the ground 
for the treatment of Jesus as High Priest, and this 
point is well known among the commentators. An 
additional point can be made: the midrash exhibits in 
miniature the pattern of Christological argument 
expressed in the Epistle: 
1/ the controlling conceptual and 
metaphysical notion of permanence is here given 
figurative expression: the phrase is linked with a 
permanence of life, described in v. 3b, and Melchizedek 
is portrayed with reference to the horizons of 
pre-existence and exaltation, just- as in the 
Christology of the, Epistle, Christ's labidingness' is 
grounded in the same figurative patterns. 
2/ the midrash exhibits the same conjunction 
of pre-existence and exaltation patterns as the 
Epistle's Christology: - permanence of priesthood (an 
exaltation image) is clarified and developed by an 
appeal to pre-existence patterns ('neither beginning of 
days.. '). This mirrors the treatment in the opening 
0 Ff 
chapter of the use of pre-existence language to support 
the treatment of the dominant theme of the exaltation. 
Confirmation of permanence in priesthood (exaltation) 
is given in the deployment of pre-existence categories. 
3/ The communicatio idiomatum between Christ 
and Melchizedek is a metaphorical interchange which 
reflects the Christological interchange of 
pre-existence and exaltation perspectives. Just as 
Christ is viewed within the double perspectives of 
pre-existence and exaltation, so this pattern permits 
Melchizedek to be viewed in the same way. In this 
sense, the figure of Melchizedek in the midrash is the 
metaphorical embodiment of the Christology of the 
Epistle:, his permanence of priesthood can be 
figuratively expressed through the use of pre-existence 
predications, 'since the Christology of the Epistle 
works in this way too. The midrash is the symbolic 
mediation of the perspectives of pre-existence and 
exaltation which characterise the Christology of the 
Epistle. 
There remains one final piece of the jigsaw to be put 
in place: the passages where incarnational, or 
quasi-incarnational, language is used to describe the 
significance of the humanity 'of Christ (2.10ff; 
5.7-10; 10.5ff). These sections of the Epistle are 
among the most profoundly appreciative reflections on 
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this theme in the NT. As before, our contrast will be 
with tendencies within the Fourth Gospel, where there 
is an incipient docetism as a result of the tension 
between 'heavenly status' and enfleshment, which 
threatens the integrity of the Incarnation. The Gospel 
itself is not docetic, but it is no accident that it 
gave rise to conflict within the Johannine community 
between those who affirmed the reality of, the 
enfleshment of the Son of God, and those who denied 
that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh (1 in. 4.2). 
The Gospel invests the humanity of the Christ with the 
glory of the pre-existent Son: the translucently 
glorious character of the epiphany of the 
Logos-made-flesh is affirmed after the Incarnational 
formula of 1.14a: 'we beheld his glory'. Ka*semann is 
right to say that the emphasis within the Gospel is on 
this theme rather than on the implied lowliness of the 
Logos' fleshly lbecoming, 51 The verb ýYC'116-ro is to 
be taken as denoting, not a kenotic assumption of a 
condition of humiliation, but rather a manifestation as 
flesh, without diminishment of glory in any way. The 
evangelist does not need an episode of transfiguration 
in his narrative, since the Johannine Jesus is semper 
transfiguratus. 2-2 Consequently, the eschatological 
vision of God is anticipated in the humanity of Christ: 
'whoever sees me, sees the Father' (14.8). Isaiah's 
testimony about the unbelief of the people can be 
2 , ql I-- 
justified 'because he saw his (Christ's) glory and 
spoke of him' (12.41), with the suggestion that 
whenever God's glory was seen in his revelation to the 
OT visionaries, it was the same glory of Christ that 
was seen then, that is now witnessed by his disciples. 
Hebrews, on the other hand, follows the pattern of the 
Philippians hymn, in which the human experience of 
Jesus is an abasement of the one who 'was in the form 
of God', but who is now 'in the form of a slave', 
obedient even unto death on a cross, and it is because 
% of this obedience that he is exalted 
&&ýS Phil. 2.9). The presence 
of a causal element, expressed by the word SLo', 
establishes the exaltation as dependent, not upon the 
prior presence in the heavenly realm, but upon the 
character of the intervening earthly life. The events 
of the earthly life are morally and soteriologically 
significant events which effect the subsequent exalted 
status of Jesus: his self-sacrifice and obedience in 
this kenotic mode bring about his exaltation above the 
angels. In this pattern it is the moral acts of Jesus 
during his earthly life which establish the character 
of his exaltation, rather than his initial possession 
of this dignity: indeed the soteriological value of 
his exaltation is dependent upon the decision of the 
one 'who is in the form of God' not to cling to this 
status, but to take the path of becoming t)Tt-%7scoos f-4c-Xet 
-zq2- 
We have already indicated the dependence on the 
Philippians pattern of the opening summary in Heb. 
1.3-4, but the pattern is also the basis of the 
Epistle's High Priestly Christology, in that the 
earthly; life of Jesus is the period of preparation in 
which Jesus acquires the qualities associated with an 
efficacious ministry of intercession. Consequently, in 
accordance with the demands of this soteriological 
scheme, in which the exaltation is considered primarily 
with regard to the earthly life, the use of 
pre-existence language is different from the Johannine 
presentation: in the Epistle, the act of Incarnation 
is considered in relation to the features of the 
earthly life which validate the efficacy of his exalted 
ministry. There is an explicit emphasis on the way in 
which the act of taking flesh and blood (2.14), the 
entry of Christ into the world (10.5) establishes the 
conditions for an effective High Priestly ministry at 
the exaltation. -Far 
from the Incarnation being an 
event of inherent glory, it is rather the way by which 
the pre-existent Son qualifies himself to exercise a 
High Priestly ministry on behalf of those who follow 
him into the sanctuary (10.19). 
One can view this formulation as the resolution of the 
problem of how to integrate the two descriptive 
accounts inherited by the author -- the pattern of 
pre-existence-incarnation, and the PhiliPpians-like 
gý3 
pattern of obedience rewarded by exaltation. Each 
pattern has its own particular'range of connotations 
and implications: for example, as we have indicated, 
the pre-existence-incarnation pattern is capable of 
being specified in two ways, the epiphanic and the 
kenotic. The author of the Epistle chooses the latter 
in order to achieve an integration of this pattern with 
the requirements of the High Priestly soteriology he 
proposes. Thus his treatment of the Incarnation is 
orientated towards Jesus' qualification ( -r6Ac--jtwa-ss ) 
to exercise the High Priestly sacrificial and 
intercessory role. 
Earlier in our study, we pointed to the distinction 
between the Johannine interpretation of the exaltation 
as a return to the pre-existent heavenly union with the 
Father, and Hebrews' use of pre-existence as a 
consonant affirmation which supports the affirmation of 
the exaltation and permanence of Christ. We must also 
point to the un-johannine way in which the events of 
Christ's earthly, life are taken as determinative of the 
character of the exaltation of Jesus as compassionate 
High Priest. Kasemann's trenchant observation that in 
the Fourth Gospel, the Logos changes, not his 
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condition, but only his locationi4-with the consequence 
that the exaltation is, again, a change of location', 
cannot be laid at the feet of the author of Hebrews, 
for whom Jesuslýidentification with his brothers (2.12) 
is invested with consequences for the exalted ministry 
of Jesus the High Priest (2.17-18). 
The process of cohering two distinct descriptive 
schemes, and of making explicit the implications to be 
drawn from the integrated picture, requires that 
features be highlighted in one scheme which are capable 
of contributing to the requirements of the other 
scheme. In our chapter on metaphor, we introduced the 
notion of a 'root metaphor': an organising 
metaphorical scheme which shapes the perception of a 
particular matter, by drawing out certain features, and 
ignoring others. The author's High Priestly image, in 
its relationship to pre-existence-Incarnation, acts in 
this way, in that it determines the interpretative 
connotations to be derived from 
pre-existence-Incarnation. The initial choice of the 
kenotic, rather than the epiphanic, treatment of 
pre-existence-Incarnation, is followed by an explicit 
presentation of the Incarnation as facilitative of the 
process by which Jesus becomes a compassionate High 
Priest. 
Thus, in 10.5ff, the intention of Christ, 
GIS -10V V--OcrýýV is expressed in the words of Ps. 
40.6-8: God's refusal of sacrificial animals, and 
hence the inadequacy of Levitical sacrifices (10.4), is 
linked with his pleasure in accepting the offering of a 
sacrificed in obedience to his will. The entry 
of Christ into the world is seen as the preparation of 
a body which can be offered in obedience by Christ to 
the Father (9.14,28). The conditions of such a 
sacrifice are given in the Incarnation: it is in order 
to make this offering for sins, that the Incarnation 
occurs, characterised ab initio by the obedient 
self-sacrifice of Christ. The redundant discussion of 
when Christ became High Priest, is undercut by the 
assertion that the Incarnation is directed towards this 
end: the intentionality of the Incarnation is the 
intentionality of Priesthood. Cody's comment is 
accurate: 'The Incarnation has taken place that the 
Son of God may have a humanity with which to begin the 
climactic sacrifice on Calvary... l54 
The organising power of the High Priestly image, in its 
relationship to the pre-existence-Incarnation scheme, 
is shown in the influence of the two characteristics of 
High Priesthood which the author adduces in 5.2-3: the 
capacity to offer sacrifice for sin, and since he 
himself has known weakness, he is compassionate on 
those who are weak. These characteristics are used to 
interpret the Incarnation of Christ: the first 
characteristic of High Priesthood is presented as the 
reaso n for the Incarnation in 10, ýVff, and the second 
characteristic is the dominant concern in the 
interpretation of the Incarnation in 2.10ff and 5.7-10. 
The latter passage has been shown to belong to a 
chiastic structure within 5.1-10, in which the 
'necessary quality' of a High Priest in vv. 2-3 
corresponds to the acquisition of this quality by Jesus 
in vv. 7-8: he is able to be compassionate to the weak, 
as a High Priest, and the evidence for this is given in 
the cameo of vv. 7-8ý-5 These verses are an exegetically 
complex unit, with considerable disagreement about the 
original unity of the section. Brandenburger draws a 
sharp line between v. 7 and vv. 8-9, and argues that v. 7 
was formulated, not on the basis of a Gethsemane 
tradition the most obvious historical basis for its 
statements but as a confession of a Hellenistic 
Jewish community, proclaiming God's action in rescuing 
Jesus from death, based on the terminology of Ps. 116 
56 MXX 114)r- The author then brought it into contact 
with vv. 8-. 9, whose structure follows that of the 
Philippians hymn: 'Son though he was' corresponds to 
'though he was in the form of God'. 
Jeremias, on the other hand, argues that v. 8 is a 
parenthesis introduced as a clarification of the 
difficult phrase, 
&I- S which should be taken to denote Christ's 
piety, - rather than his fear of death. The meaning 
would be land was heard because of his piety (although 
Son, he learned obedience in suffering) and was brought 
v57 to perfection ý If this interpretation is preferred, 
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týen an important contrast can be made with the pattern 
of the Philippians hymn, which, as we have said, lies 
at the root of Hebrews' High Priestly Christology. In 
the hymn, obedience is regarded as the act of the 
pre-existent One who by emptying himself, follows the 
path that leads to death on the cross. Hebrews 
incorporates this notion in its quotation from Ps. 40 
in 10.5ff, but in 5.8, the notion is rather of the Son 
learning obedience in his suffering, which is a 
different notion from Philippians' presentation of 
suffering as the consequence of his obedience. Ulrich 
Luck distinguishes the two treatments: 
V 'Durch die Parechese ocq "j%, 
i'd7-,. t O-C-. ' wird der Zusammenhang mit dem 
Leiden in der Welt als konstitutiv fÜr 
diesen Gehorsam angesehen: Das Leiden 
in der durch Gottferne bestimmten 
Welt ist nicht nur die Folge 
seines Gehorsams, sondern in ihm 
kommt der Sohn zum Gehorsam. Die 
Schwerpunktverlagerung gegenüber Phil. ii 
6ff und Ugm. v 12ff ist nicht zu 
Übersehen. - 
Whence this shift of emphasis? Clearly, one of the 
factors is the influence of the author's parenesis on 
his Christological interpretation. The climax of the 
list of exemplars of faith -- viewed as steadfastness 
in waiting on God -- is the presentation of Christ, the 
pioneer and perfecter of faith, who endures hostility 
against himself because of the joy set before him 
(12.1-3). The Sapiential theme of the Lord chastising 
2q1 
his sons is invoked as a supporting argument derived 
from the Christological presentation. The presence in 
. -J/ 9 v. 8 of the common word play -Lshows 
that this concern is operative in the verse's 
association of sonship and formation-through-suffering. 
In the light of the author's affirmation of the 
obedience of Christ in coming into the world, and in 
the light of his statement about the sinlessness of 
Christ (4.15), the phrase in 5.8 cannot be taken in the 
sense of educative correction which it denotes in the 
Sapiential tradition. Moreover, the context of the 
verse, in chiastic apposition to the theme of 
compassion for the weak (5.2), indicates that what is 
learned by Christ in his self-offering enables him 'to 
administer its benefits ý sympathetically' , 
60 The fact 
that Christ, as Son, responded in faith ) to 
God, in the condition of weakness, enables him to be 
compassionate in his Priestly intercession to those who 
are in similar straits (2.14-16). So the theme of 
kenotic obedience even to death on the Cross, which the 
author inherited, is developed in the direction of the 
author's Christology of Jesus as -rreOSOoý, oS (6.20) 
and o'c_e)(-q-j6s (12.2) with its related parenetic value, 
and in the direction of fulfilling the requirements of 
the High Priestly image. The verse has its roots in 
the Philippians tradition, and this remains the most 
obvious syntactical and thematic parallel to the verse, 
2-,? f 
but other elements in the author's Christological 
repertoire prevent us from seeing in the phrase 
01 jkv J, t a repetition of Philippians' as 
6; V (2.6). 5.8 still retains the 
notion of pre-existent Sonship within its implicative 
complex, but this theme must be set alongside the 
complementary resonances of Jesus, the exemplar of 
steadfastness, and Jesus ) the compassionate High Priest. 
The mutual influence of pre-existence and High Priestly 
patterns is not confined to the action of the High 
Priesthood metaphor on the connotations of 
pre-existence language; it works the other way too, 
and the author uses pre-existence themes to determine 
the interpretation of High Priesthood. Earlier in our 
study, we approved of Dey's opinion that the author 
needed to show the superiority of Jesus to a range of 
figures who were exemplars of perfection in certain 
Hellenistic Jewish circles. Dey argues that within 
such circles, perfection was viewed as withdrawal from 
the realm of the sensible and the physical. The 
Christian kerygma, proclaiming the suffering and 
salvific death of Jesus, would raise questions about 
whether such an involvement on the part of Jesus could 
be reconciled with affirmations of his superiority, 
since, almost by definition, to suffer and die implies 
imperfection: 
300 
'The Christian belief that, the earthly 
Jesus, the man of flesh and blood, is 
the basis of salvation would have 
implied in this tradition imperfection 
rather than perfection/salvation-For 
the author of Hebrews, therefore, it was 
essential to connect the earthly Jesus 
of flesh and blood -- his suffering and death -- with the accomplishment of 
perfection/salvation (2.10). In terms 
of this tradition, it would have been 
necessary to show that Jesus himself 
became perfect in such a state of 
earthly existence -- since that would have been under question. -- and 
accomplished perfection/salvation for 
others. 1 61 
This is an important point, but Dey's consideration of 
the matter omits the place of pre-existence themes in 
the authorlsýaccount of why Christ is involved in the 
realm of imperfection in the first place. His failure 
to include the perspective of pre-existence leads him 
to interpret 5.7ff as presenting Christ as 'the one who 
has achieved salvation for himself (=Perfection) 
through ardent prayer and suffering, i. e., salvation 
from death and perfection through the education of 
suffering ... Any satisfactory interpretation of Hebrews 
must explain this odd feature, namely, that Jesus 
himself needed to be saved/perfected'. 62ý 
Against this interpretation of 5.7, we must point to 
the author's affirmations of the obedience of Christ at 
the Incarnation (10.5ff), his subsequent sinlessness, 
and the value for others, and not for himself, -of his 
self-offering (2.17; 6.20; 9.24; 10.12). In 
addition, there is the portrayal of the Incarnation as 
the decision, from the perspective of pre-existence, of 
Christ to share in the flesh and blood of those whom he 
is not ashamed to call his brethren. His entry -into 
the realm of suffering and death is portrayed as a 
free, compassionate decision to identify with those who 
are subject to bondage (2.14-15). Unlike them, Christ 
enters this realm from outside, in order to become for 
them a High Priest who has suffered as they have, in 
all respects. The only necessity for this is found, 
not in Christ's own need to achieve salvation, but in 
the fittingness of God's decision to bring many sons to 
glory by perfecting Christ through his suffering 
Y&T 2 . 101 
The presence of the perspective permitted by 
pre-existence thus casts its influence on the 
interpretation of the suffering and death of Jesus: it 
safeguards the theme of the gratuitousness of God's 
action, and the freedom of Christ in undergoing the 
experience of suffering, since, from this perspective, 
his suffering is prompted by no necessity other than 
the decision of God to act in this way for our 
salvation. Christ suffers, not because of an 
intramundane necessity to wrestle with the fear of 
death, nor because he is in need of purification 
through chastisement, but because God wills to save 
3o2 
'many sons' through him (2.10). The use of the 
pre-existence perspective in 2.10ff is the 
Christological correlative of God's freedom in electing 
that salvation should be brought through the one who 
chooses to become identified with humanity and 
humanity's experience. In this way, the perspective 
avoids the possible implication that Jesus himself 
needs to be saved, and thus it modifies the 
interpretation of Christ's presence in the realm of 
imperfection and suffering. 
The important section 2.10-18 has been interpreted by 
Kasemann and Theissen as Gnostic in character, 
involving the theme of the purportedly pre-Christian 
Gnostic redeemer and the similarly pre-existent 
redeemed brethren. The argument centres on v. 11, and 
'-t "' v/, on the meaning of the common origin e-- C- Os The 
phrase, if taken to refer to an origin 'in God' -- 
which is not obvious -- would describe the common 
origin of the Son and the sons, the sanctifier and the 
sanctified, as pre-existent souls or spirits (cf: 
12.9, Kise_mann c_onsiders, the 
possibility that 2.11 carries a tradition that Ibei 
Gott ist nicht nur das Ziel, sondern auch die 
63 
ursprungliche Heimat der Erlbsten. 7'r His view that Jesus 
becomes Son at the exaltation, and that consequently 
the sonship of the redeemed is located in their 
salvation, seems to pose problems for Ka'semann's desire 
33 
to speak of a pre-existent relationship between the Son 
and the sons in this context. However, he considers 
the possibility that underlying the verse there is a 
Gnostic view: 
'An dieser Stelle bricht das gnostische 
Mythologem durch, das metaphysisch das 
ErlÖsungsgeschehen aus der gemeinsamen 
himmlischen Präexistenz von ErlÖser und 
Er13sten ableitet. 864 
Theissen appeals to the 
as indicating the objei 
T- / J, - , OLf -t C- S in C- ý C-VO5 
Geister. Ein Teil von 
Epistle's concern with angels 
10 ct of m(otiTe-S in v. 11: Das 
Tr -, %j T C-S umschliesst alle 
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ihnen ist gefallen: r He reads 
the Epistle's discussion of the angelic theme in the 
most unusual way: 
'Die R valitat von Engeln und Menschen 
ist die Rivalitgt des verloren Sohnes 
und des zu Hause gebliebenen -- in 
mythologische Sprache 'Übertragen. Aber 
beide finden wieder zu mmen in der 
(-= bc sr- O\-, O-te_ 74-E>") 4-0 -t m icc- vo .0- t- 
Theissen appeals to 12.9 as an indication that the 
Christological taking of flesh and blood (2.14) 
parallels the act of pre-existent souls 
in their involvement in the material world: 
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'Es l; sst sich kaum bestreiten, dass 
in 2,11 und 14; 12.9 und 13,3 
die Präexistenz des menschlichen 
Selbst vorausgesetzt ist und die 
resultierende dualistische 
Anthropologie. v67 
However, it is debatable whether such an extension of 
the pre-existence theme to humanity is exegetically 
defensible: there is no indication within the Epistle 
that the commonality between Christ and the saved 
involves their prior common origin as souls or spirits 
before their common 'days of flesh' (5.7). Loader 
points to the difference in tenses between the aorist 
of Christ's act C rr)(C- V and the perfect 
which designates the condition of the 
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sons' existence. In addition, the thrust of the 
passage is to affirm that it is in the sharing of 
earthly existence that the commonality, necessary for 
an efficacious exalted ministry, is established. 
Because of this emphasis, it is unlikely that 451-t 
is to be taken as meaning 'from God': the parallel 
phrase in Acts 17.26, meaning 'from Adam', and the 
different prepositional usage in Rom. 5.12 Cr-V, 0ý5, 
of- V5e LAM00 combined with the Adam typology Of 
2.6-8, offer an alternative interpretation6,9 However, 
the undeveloped character of the Adam theme in the 
Epistle, and the presence in 2.16 of the reference to 
the 'seed of Abraham', linked with the author's 
insistence on the Jewish, non-priestly lineage of Jesus 
3a5 
(7.14) make an intra-temporal reference to descent from 
Abraham the preferable interpretationyO The theme of 
the paternity of Abraham is expressed in 11.12: 
E; Y, -ýL 
If the unity between Christ and his brethren is found 
in their common Abrahamic lineage -- thereby perhaps 
pointing to the Jewish Christian character of the 
addressees -- then this. is a delineation which excludes 
the angels (v. 16). Moreover it intensifies the 
significance of the human experience of Jesus as the 
basis of the community's confidence in him (v. 18). It 
seems best to take the verb C-rrLA1, r- t-1 14 C-711L v. 16 )in 
the strong sense of 'take hold, of' or 'deliver', and to 
relate it to the deliverance of those in bondage 
(v. 14-15 The phrase would then define the purpose, 
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rather than the act, of the Incarnationr-and has its 
roots in OT vocabulary: the same verb, used in 8.9, 
and quoting Jer. 31.31-34, is used of God's leading 
his people out of the bondage of Egypt. 
The reference to the Exodus here may be more than just 
an accident, since in other parts of the Epistle, the 
similarity between God's act of redemption in the 
Scriptures and his action through Christ rises to the 
surface. It seems likely, for example, that the image 
of Christ as with the connotations of 
leadership, and the related parenetic theme of the 
3o6 
pilgrimage of the people of God (4.1-10) have their 
roots in an Exodus typology: God leading many sons to 
glory ( Ti-o? v\o0S Octo'OS C-31S can also 
be described as God leading his people to his Sabbath 
rest (4.9). There is also a partial similarity between 
the action of Christ as the Son who chooses to suffer 
with his brethren and the action of Moses, who refuses 
the status of being son in Pharaoh's family, and 
prefers to suffer with the people of God 
X/- 
11.25). The parallel is made explicit when the author 
describes this compassion as a choice to endure ro\r 
dDVC-IFLcr? A-o\(-kc; Lj XecaroýO (11 . 26); parenetically, 
the same ideal is held up before the people in 13.13 -- 
they are to go outside the camp, 
OCO-1 &PC\/ "FC-5 Moses enters into this suffering, 
ý' 00 If 
, 
aware of the reward (11.26), just as Christ the 
suffered, knowing the joy that lay ahead of 
him (12.2) ( oc,,,, T L T-tp a CC & C-'\f VJ S ckL o Tw cý 
In addition, Moses sprinkles the blood as a protection 
for the first born against the power of the angel of 
death; Christ destroys the power of the devil (2.14) 
and effects redemption through the sprinkling of his 
own blood (10.14; 12.24), in order to lead his 
followers into the 6- w r-- t\j Gr). tA, ri- e co -to -ro 12 .23 L 
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We have outlined the parallels between the figure of 
Moses and Jesus, the pioneer of his people, because the 
account of the Incarnation-redemption in 2.10-18 stands 
in a typological relationship to the role of Moses in 
the Exodus tradition. Kasemann and Theissen, whose 
speculations led them to highly unusual, and 
unnecessary ) exegesis about the pre-existence. of souls 
in this section, seem to close their eyes to the 
parallel and model which the author himself supplies. 
The point we want to make is that the kenotic pattern 
of Incarnational language here issues directly into 
soteriological concerns, as a way of developing the 
significance of Jesus as High Priest and as the pioneer 
who identifies with the sufferings of his people. The 
Incarnation, viewed as the sharing of the condition of 
flesh 'and blood, and subjection to death, finds a 
typological echo in the choice of Moses to share in the 
ill-treatment of his people. The very human existence 
of Jesus is an act of condescension which is grounded 
in God's eschatological address to us (1.2); the 
account of the act of Incarnation (v. 14) and of the 
purpose of the Incarnation (v. 16) frame an acccount of 
the character of the Incarnation as a solidarity with 
the condition of humanity, and it is the character of 
the Incarnation which is the author's dominant concern. 
Pre-existence language, and the perspective provided by 
it, is used in order to highlight the features of the 
humanity of Christ required by the other images used by 
3 og, 
the author -- principally High Priest and Leader. Its 
significance is in what it contributes to their 
interpretation and development. 
Our study has shown that the use of pre-existence 
language in the Epistle, far from providing a tension 
with other Christological and soteriological categories 
and patterns, in fact is integrated with them. We have 
indicated, first of all, the interaction between 
pre-existence and exaltation language, and shown that, 
while the -author's dominant concern is with the 
exaltation, he introduces features associated with the 
predication of pre-existence as a consonant affirmation 
supporting his treatment of the exaltation. We have 
indicated that both pre-existence and exaltation act as 
figurative expressions which both give rise to, and 
express, the philosophical concern to demonstrate the 
metaphysical permanence of Christ. The metaphysical 
dualism ofý the Epistle, with its clear distinction 
between the heavenly, permanent world, and the earthly 
transitory world, establishes the contrast between 
Christ and the angels in the opening section, and finds 
expression in the attribution to Christ of a permanence 
which includes both his status as the heavenly 
Sch6pfungsmittler and his status as the Exalted Son. 
Both images express and confirm the metaphysical 
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distinction between Christ and the range of inferior 
mediators -- Moses, Aaron, the Levitical priests, as 
well as the angels -- and thus the pre-existence 
predication is part of the dominant argumentation of 
the Epistle. 
We have indicated that the principal themes of the 
Epistle centre on the character and implication of the 
Exaltation, and that, unlike the Fourth Gospel, the 
Epistle does not derive the Exaltation from the prior 
presence of Christ in the heavenly realm, since that 
would conflict with the implications of the High 
Priestly, image. The pattern is not circular, with 
Christ returning where he was before. This affects the 
way in-which the theme of pre-existence is used in the 
Epistle: consequently, it acts, not as a root 
metaphor, controlling the interpretation. of the 
Exaltation, but as an alternative and necessary 
affirmation of themes which are derived from -the 
soteriological images and from the metaphysical dualism 
of the argumentation. 
Thus the author's argument for the superiority of Jesus 
and his salvation is established primarily through his 
interpretation of -a High Priestly soteriology. In 
addition, there is the related theme of Christ as the 
forerunner and pioneer who has gone before his 
followers in their journey towards the presence of God. 
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The predication-of pre-existence is integrated with the 
concerns which arise out of the connotations and 
implications of these images. So the kenotic model of 
pre-existence-Incarnation opens the way towards 
portraying the entry of Christ into the world as 
precisely the way in which he is able to become an 
effective and compassionate High Priest: he comes to 
make offering for sin through the offering of his body, 
and he experiences suffering and death, and thereby can 
be sympathetic to those who are weak in his 
intercessory role. Equally, his very presence -- his 
very humanity -- can be portrayed as an act of 
solidarity with those who are subject to bondage. The 
image of pre-existence is introduced in order to 
heighten the character of Christ's human experience as 
a preparation for, and an integral part of, his exalted 
ministry. It provides a perspective from which the 
themes of solidarity and compassion can be intensified 
in the portrayal of'Christ as High Priest and pioneer. 
We have indicated the distinction from the Johannine 
handling of pre-existence; the principal factor in 
Hebrews' deployment of the theme is the way in which it 
is geared towards meeting and supporting the themes 
associated-with other Christological and soteriological 
images. This -orientation enables the Epistle to 
provide 'a more satisfactory account of the reality of, 
and significance of, the human experiences of Jesus: 
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-/ 
far from minimising the humanity 
perspective provided by pre-existe 
account of the humanity of Jesus 
significance, since his very existence 
suffering and death is soteriologically 
the quality of his exalted ministry. 
of Jesus, the 
nce enables an 
to gain in 
in the arena of 
significant for 
The absence of a narrative portraying the pre-existent 
Son or Logos, such as is found in the Johannine 
Prologue,, and the consequent concentration of 
pre-existence language with reference to the Son in the 
economy, increases the metaphorical relationship of the 
predication to Jesus. The connotations drawn from the 
pattern of pre-existence-Incarnation are determined by 
their coherence with the connotations of the High 
Priestly pattern. They are also able to make it clear 
that Christ's involvement in the sphere of suffering 
and death comes from no necessity other than God's 
salvific purpose in redeeming his people in this way. 
The freedom the author clearly feels he has, with 
regard to the pre-existence theme, is shown 
particularly in the way he can transfer the features 
associated with Christ's pre-existence to the figure of 
Melchizedek. His midrash in chapter 7 exemplifies in 
miniature the bringing together of the High 
Priestly-Exaltation figuration with the predication of 
pre-existence, which is one of the major features of 
the Epistle's broader Christological reinterpretation. 
Rather than turn in the direction of a Johannine-like 
epiphanic treatment of pre-ex istence-Incarnation, the 
author moves towards developing a kenotic 
pre-existence-Incarnation pattern, under the influence 
of the controlling soteriological and parenetic themes 
of High Priesthood and Leadership. It is in this way 
that the problems associated with the attribution of 
pre-existence are resolved; Dey's account of the 
Christological problem is accurate, and it is 
significant that the author turns towards a soteriology 
and a Christology which intensifies the theme of the 
involvement of Christ in suffering. Correspondingly, 
as we have shown, the theme of pre-existence is 
integrated into a more highly developed account of the 
earthly life and exaltation of Jesus: the 
pre-existence motif feeds directly into the 
argumentation concerning the efficacy and the 
permanence of Christ's salvation. It is to the 
author's credit that he holds such a complex structure 
of Christological images and motifs together so 
consistently. one of the factors which brings -about 
this success is his preparedness to develop the range 
of implications of pre-existence language only in order 
to support and confirm the implications he draws from 
his other principal images and concerns. Thus the 
overall effect is a Christology in which pre-existence 
predications play an important subordinate role: 
'subordinate', not in. the sense of 'unimportant', since 
the Christology of the Epistle would be impaired 
without the theme of pre-existence, but 'subordinate' 
in the sense that the theme is developed in conjunction 
with the Christological and soteriological patterns 
which form the dominant argument of the Epistle. if, 
as Dey suggests, the very predication of pre-existence 
has given rise to problems about the identity of Christ 
and his relationship to other figures, and if, in 
addition, there are problems about explaining Christ's 
presence in the imperfection of suffering and death, 
then these difficulties are resolved by the author 
through his re-working of the Christological and 
soteriological patterns he inherited, in the direction 
of interpreting pre-existence in the light of a High 
Priestly soteriology. By allowing the High Priestly 
image to determine the connotations to be drawn from 
the pre-existence-Incarnation pattern, the author is 
able, on the one hand, to establish the superiority of 
Jesus to the range of competing figures -- since he 
alone has the metaphysical permanence characteristic of 
divinity -- and to establish the superiority of the 
salvation effected by him, since access to God's 
presence can only be through the offering of sacrifice 
by a High Priest whose ministry is 'for ever'. 
Pre-existence predications thus vindicate the 
uniqueness of Jesus as the exalted one, superior to the 
angels, both in his exaltation, and in his status as 
I 
the abiding Son, and, in addition, they vindicate the 
permanence of his High Priestly ministry and its 
consequent superiority to that of the Levitical 
priesthood. 
The Dynamic of Pre-existence Language and the Trinity 
ýlb,, 
In this chapter we shall consider the' other area 
affected by the dynamic of the pre-existence 
predication: the development of a co-ordinated 
theological language in conjunction with the 
Christological language which develops. We have 
already presented our view that this double focus is 
part of the semantic clarification of the application 
of pre-existence language: it both enables Christology 
to articulate the significance of Jesus as the one who 
relates to God in the eschatological act of salvation 
and revelation, and, as part of the same process, it 
also requires and facilitates a corresponding revision 
of theological language in- the light of the 
Christological impetus. 
The interdependence of the two languages has frequently 
been asserted; what has received less attention is the 
distinction between them, with the result that 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations arise because 
of the easy slide from one mode of discourse to the 
other. Language which properly belongs within the 
theologicAl context can sometimes breed confusion when 
it enters the Christological arena. The most obvious 
instance of this, which has bedevilled Christological 
interpretation from the New Testament period onwards, 
is the emergence of a Christology which seems to 
suggest two referents, the pre-existent Son and the 
human person Jesus. From the evidence of the First 
ý 
ý17 
Epistle of John, the pattern of the Johannine Prologue 
gave rise to a confusion in the life of the Johannine 
community precisely on this point. What is the denial 
that 'Jesus Christ has come in the flesh', if not a 
separation of a heavenly being from the reality of the 
humanity of Jesus, based upon the putative distinction 
between them as two referents? -ý 
1 We do not need to. 
rehearse the history of Alexandrian and Antiochene 
Christologies to illustrate the logical and semantic 
problems which arise once pre-existence language is 
used to articulate a Christological pattern in which 
two referents are unified. Our proposal has been that 
within Christological discourse, pre-existence language 
is to be taken as a form of metaphorical predication, 
which gives rise to a referring expression, which we 
have identified as 'eternal , Son' which 
does not 
designate anyone other than Jesus. We endorsed, with 
some modifications, Pannenberg's diagnosis of the 
Patristic impasse: 
'Thus the real problem of the two 
natures doctrine is its attempt to 
conceive what happened in the 
incarnation as the synthesis of the 
human and the divine nature in the same 
individual ... The impasse reached by 
every attempt to construct Christology 
by beginning with the incarnational 
concept demonstrates that all such 
attempts are doomed to failure. We 
found repeatedly that either the unity 
of Jesus Christ as person or else his 
real humanity were lost to view., 2 
s! '8" our reservation about this general criticism is that 
not all expressions of 'two natures' Christology come 
within its scope: what Pannenberg identifies as the 
central flaw of the pattern -- the attempt to 
Isynthesisel the natures to reach a unity of person in 
christ -- is more Eutychean or Apollinarian than 
Chalcedonian. As we have indicated, the Chalcedonian 
definition makes more sense as a correlate to the 
linguistic procedure which would maintain a distinction 
only at the level of the predications made of the one 
referent, who is identified in the definition by means 
of several referring expressions. The regulative 
presence of the four adverbs in the definition excludes 
what Pannenberg calls a 'synthesis' of the divine and 
human natures. Pannenberg is on surer ground when he 
discusses the relationship of divinity and humanity in 
Christological speech: 
'The formula of the true divinity and 
true humanity. of Jesus begins with the 
fact that one describes one and the same 
person, the man Jesus of Nazareth from 
different points of view. The unity of 
the concrete pprson Jesus of Nazareth is 
given, and both things are to be said 
about this one person: he is God and he 
is man. v3 
we have identified the relationship between this way of 
handling these Christological predications, and the 
metaphorical procedure found in the predication of 
pre-existence, and found a continuity there which 
3!, q 
carries through from the figurative to the ontological 
expressions of Christology. Our proposal has been that 
within the area of Christology, pre-existence language 
functions as does a metaphorical predication, and that 
it is possible to gain some clarity in the use of this 
language by considering the character and functioning 
of metaphor. Alone of the range of New Testament 
metaphors, pre-existence language has given rise to 
problems because it raises the question of the 
relationship between Jesus and the predicate, the 
eternal Son or Word. No such difficulties exist when 
Jesus is spoken of as Son of David, Messiah, or even 
Son of Man. We have suggested that within the area of 
Christology, language of pre-existence does not involve 
a referent other than Jesus, and that the designations 
such as eternal Son or Word are to be taken as 
metaphorical referring expressions which designate 
Jesus. Now we must consider whether within the area of 
theological discourse -- the other redescriptive focus 
of pre-existence language -- it is sufficient to say 
that Jesus is the referent of language about the 
eternal Son, or whether it is necessary to speak of the 
eternal Son as a hypostasis distinct from Jesus. Our 
proposal is that whereas in the Christological arena, 
it is correct to consider pre-existence language, and 
its conceptual clarification, language of eternal 
Sonship, as referring only to Jesus, within the 
theological area, we must take the eternal Son or Word 
as a referent distinct from Jesus. By this formal 
distinction between the two areas of Christological and 
theological speech, and by distinguishing the different 
referential focuses of each of the areas, we hope that 
some of the difficulties in handling this language will 
be clarified. 
The obverse of the Christological development which 
provides, through the conceptual clarification of the 
semantic dynamism of the metaphor, an ontological 
account of the identity of Jesus as the Son united with 
the Father, is the development of a Trinitarian 
language about God: what is the most appropriate way 
to speak about God's being, given what is being 
affirmed in the Christological sphere? Our 
considerations in this chapter will focus -on the 
relationship of the immanent and economic Trinity, 
since it is in this context that the question of the 
relationship between the eternal Son and Jesus is best 
raised. If in the course of this chapter, we rely less 
on Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, this will be because 
its primary value lies in the realm of Christological 
clarification, and not in the area of Trinitarian 
reflection; although there is a separate study to be 
made of the role of metaphor in Trinitarian speech, our 
examination will not touch on the images of 'begetting' 
or Ispiration' or perichoresis. Instead, we shall 
examine whether it is necessary to establish the 
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eternal Son as a distinct reýferent, if the being of God 
is not to be constituted out of temporal processes. As 
part of our proposals, we shall consider the 
possibility of developing an understanding of the 
relationship of the immanent and economic Trinity 
through a consideration of the role of the Holy Spirit 
as the one who makes it possible for the 'immanent Son' 
to become 'the Son in the economy'. our interest in 
this theme arises out of a concern to avoid the 
predominantly 'Binitarian' pattern associated with 
pre-existence language. This has been the dominant 
pattern in the tradition, with the result that the 
Spirit's role within the divine being and within the 
economy has been relegated to that of being a 'third' 
element, whose hypostatic identity has been difficult 
to secure. Out of our consideration of the 
relationship of the immanent and economic Trinity, we 
shall propose that the relationship between them can be 
attributed to the character of the Spirit who maintains 
the Father and Son in a relationship of distinction-in 
-identity, and who thus makes it possible for God's 
self-expression in the economy to take place. In this 
way, it may. be possible to align pre-existence language 
and a Spirit Christology more successfully than has 
been generally thought possible. Too often, Logos 
Christology and Spirit Christology have been presented 
as irreconcilable patterns. With our proposals here, 
we hope to indicate that it is possible to work with 
ion of the value of pre-existent 
it Christology, through reconsidering 
the role of the Spirit within the immanent Trinity. In 
this way, our more general retrieval of the value and 
character of pre-existence language can be brought into 
contact with one of the other Christological patterns 
which is attracting attention today, namely, the 
viability of formulating a Spirit Christology. We hope 
to indicate that it is possible to develop the 
implications of pre-existence language fruitfully in 
the direction of another Christological pattern, and 
thus avoid the 'one-sidedness' of the Binitarian 
pattern normally associated with pre-existence 
language. Inevitably, then, our proposals here will 
open horizons beyond our range thus far, but it may be 
no bad thing to point to future developments which can 
be brought into contact with the dynamic of 
pre-existence language. 
Rahner's axiom has entered the common currency-. of 
contemporary theology: 'The "economic" Trinity is the 
"immanent" Trinitv and the "immanent" Trinity is"-. the 
"economiCn Trinity. o4 It is intended to secure the 
Trinity as a mystery of salvation, rooted in the 
character of God's salvific act, delineating the 
economy of salvation as Trinitarian, and presenting 
God's being as present, in its Trinitarian 
relationality, in the economy. If we are dealing with 
God's self-communication, then the economy of salvation 
must be an expression of the threefoldness of God's 
life -- otherwise, there would not be a communication 
of God as he is in himself. Rahner characterises the 
alternative to this view as 'Arian', in that 'it would 
do away with a true self-communication of God, it would 
bring down the eschatological salvific work of Christ 
to the level of forever provisory and open mediations, 
after the manner of prophetic servants, of angelic 
powers, or of gnostic-neoPlatonic descending 
emanations. 15 God's communication of himself in the Son 
and in the Spirit in the economy, if it is truly to be 
a self-communication, must be grounded in God's being 
in itself, and reversing this, his being in itself must 
be truly expressed in the economy -- otherwise we are 
not dealing with God's being. The mystery of the 
Trinity is revealed in the economy: 
'.. the Father is the incomprehensible 
origin and the original unity, the 
"Word" his utterance into history, and 
the "Spirit" the opening up of history 
into the immediacy of its fatherly 
origin and end. And precisely this 
Trinity of salvation history, as it 
reveals itself to us-by deeds, is the 
"immanent" Trinity. v 6 
Using the notion of 'the self-communication of the 
Father', which, takes place in 'the inner, mutually 
related moments L7 of the Incarnation and descent of the 
Spirit, Rahner characterises the Son as 'the economic 
(historical) self-communication of the Father. E This 
procession of the Son 'is two things at once': 
'It is, first of all, for us, the 
economic, free self-communication of the 
divine reality to Jesus as the "absolute 
bringer of salvation. " It is also the 
necessary "immanent" self-communication 
of the divine reality, the Father 
expressing himself in such a way that 
this divine utterance exists from all 
eternity and of necessity, as the Word 
of such a possible free self-expression 
to the world. 19 
The Father's self-expression, then, has a double 
aspect: the utterance of the Word within the divine 
being, and the continuation of this self-expression in 
the reality of Jesus' existence. How are the two 
related in Rahner's presentation? He makes two 
clarificatory points: the first is a rebuttal of 
Sabellianism within the divine being, and consequently 
a rebuttal of a form of Patripassianism within the 
economic self-expression: the Father, while remaining 
the unoriginate and incomprehensible source of the 
divine being, expresses himself in bringing forth from 
his being a word or Son who is distinct from himself. 
This distinction is a primal differentiation within the 
divine being, expressed by the image of 'eternally 
begotten' of the Father, which is the possibility of 
God's self-communication to the creation which he 
brings into being. It is because the Son stands within 
the divine relationality as distinct from the Father, 
yet united with him, that the free gratuitous 
self-communication of the Father can take place: 
because God can express himself to himself, in a 
distinct mode of being, he can express himself ad extra 
- in the communication of his reality to the person of 
Jesus, and in the creation which is the enabling 
possibility of such a full self-expression outside 
himself. 
Rahner's second point retrieves the Apologists' 
distinction between the inner and outer Word: 
I ... this distinction (between the Father 
and his self-expression) "pre-exists" to 
the free gratuitous self-communication 
of God (of the absolutely unoriginate, 
of the Father) as its possibility. The 
ho"yo! s c,, fBLO'LO-e-, os is the condition . of the possibility of the Xe')Yos 7reoq5oe1KoS , 
This does not make the Logos a mere 
principle of creation. For if the 
verbum prolativum (cp. DS 144,147) is 
uttered freely, thus having its 
condition in the Father's immanent 
Word, it must have an "immanent" sense 
and a meaning for the Father himself. 
Otherwise the Father's self-expression 
ad extra would either no longer be a 
%. free grace, or no "immanent" word could 
pre-exist in relation to it as the 
condition of its possibility. Here lies 
the critical point of the whole 
question. Why is the Son as the word of 
the free self-expression of the Father 
to the world necessarily also the Xcý, os 
c-vrFtb&'9, &-, o5 of the Father? Why does 
the possibility of the Father's 
self-expression to the world, even 
as a mere possibility, already imply 
an inner "differentiation" in God 
himself? 1-10 
Rahner's primary answer to these questions is found in 
the transcendental theological argumentation which he 
offers: an account of the conditions within God's 
being, which must be posited if God's 
self-communication in the economy expresses his being 
as he is in himself. Thus, the immanent Trinity is 
'the necessary condition of the possibility of God's 
free self-communication. 1-11 In the Theological 
Investigations, he presents God's free act of 
self-communication in the created order (the 
incarnation and the descent of the Spirit as mutually 
related moments of the one event) as grounded in the 
necessity of God's self-expression inwardly: 'It is 
because God "must" "express" himself inwardly that he 
can also utter himself outwardly ; 
&2 
God's freedom to 
bestow hi mself within his creation is possible only 
because of the necessary inward self-utterance of the 
Logos within the divine being: 'the immanent 
self-utterance of God in his eternal fullness is the 
condition of the self-utterance of God outside himself, 
and the latter continues the former. 113 
This transcendentally necessary self-differentiation 
within God's being -- God 'must' utter himself to 
himself, as a necessity of his being -- is responsible, 
too, for the possibility of there being a creation: 
Rahner presents creation, the bringing into being of 
the non-divine, as ontologically dependent on the 
3! ý 
primal differentiation between the Father and the 
Logos. The distinction between God and the created 
order is grounded in the distinction within the 
immanent Trinity: it derives from the fact that 'God, 
the unoriginated, expresses himself in himself and for 
himself, and so constitutes the original, divine, 
distinction in God himself. 114 
Creation -is 'an element in that wider and more radical 
decision of God's will to impart himself to that which 
is other than himself and not divine. 1_15It is the 
setting, established through the Logos, so that God's 
expression of himself might be extended or continued, 
in such a way that the 'becoming' constitutive of the 
immanent Trinity might be posited within the non-divine 
order: God creates in order to bestow himself, in 
order that the self-utterance of the Logos within 
creation might be a self-communication of the reality 
of God's being. , 
Rahner develops this discussion primarily in order to 
deal with the humanity of'-Jesus as the 'expressive 
presence -of what -- or, rather, who -- God wished to 
be, in free grace, to the world.. '! 
ýHe 
presents the 
immanent self-utterance of the Father and its created 
expression in the person of Jesus as an instance of 
symbolic self-expression. The first principle he 
offers, as part of an ontology of symbolism, is that 
fall beings are by their nature symbolic, because they 
necessarily "express" themselves in order to attain 
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their own nature. -Thus the Logos is the 'symbol' of 
the Father within the divine life: 'the Father is 
himself by the very fact that he opposes to himself the 
image which is of the same essence as himself, as the 
person who is other than himself; and so he possesses 
himself. 118It is because of this Isymbolising' of God 
the Father in the begetting of the Logos that the 
extension or continuation of this self-expression in 
the created order (the Incarnation) can occur: 
I ... the incarnate word is the absolute 
symbol of God in the world, filled as 
nothing else can be with what is 
symbolised. He is not merely the 
presence and revelation of what God is 
in himself. He is also the expressive 
presence of what -- or, rather, who -- 
God wished to be, in free grace, to the 
world. 1-19 
As the Logos is the self-utterance of the Father in the 
Godhead, so the humanity of the Logos in the economy is 
the self-utterance of the Father in the created order: 
the first is the necessary condition for such a 
'becoming' on the part of the Logos: 
'The humanity is the self-disclosure of 
the Logos itself, so that when God, 
expressing himself, exteriorises 
himself, that very thing appears which 
we call the humanity of the Logos. 12O 
sýj, 
God's will to express himself in the created order is 
the event of the human reality of Christ. The humanity 
of Jesus, the self-expressive presence of God in the 
non-divine order, in John Cawte's words, is 'God's 
ek-sistence;, and also, God's ek-sistence is this human 
21 
reality-. -"' For this dialectical account to be valid, two 
principles must be asserted: it must be possible for 
God, in the mode of being of the Son, to 'become 
subject to change-in something else, ' in the created 
reality which is assumed as the form of his 
self-expression. 22 And, concommitantly, it must be said 
of humanity 'that the creature is endowed, by virtue of 
its innermost essence and constitution, with the 
possibility of being assumed, of becoming the material 
23 
of a possible history of God-. r Then we are in the 
familiar Rahnerian territory of the inseparability of 
anthropology and Christology: the constituents of 'the 
theology which God himself has taught, by speaking out 
his Word, as our flesh, into the void of the non-divine 
and sinful. s 24 
What does this approach enable Rahner to do? Clearly, 
within the realm of Christology, it enables him to 
avoid the hidden monophysitism which he fears, lurks 
behind popular interpretations of the Incarnation. 
Like Pannenberg, he rejects the procedure of beginning 
with two 'things', already existing, the divinity of 
the Logos and the human nature, which have to be fused 
into a unity: 'The Christ is split into two 
330, 
possibilities, held together only by the formal and 
empty assertion of their hypostatic unity ... We 
cannot escape from this trap by looking at the unity as 
the (even merely logical) subsequent unity of two 
things to-be united, already existing independently as 
25 
two prior, to the unity. r-He insists that the humanity 
of Christ can be considered as diverse from the Logos 
'only... in so far as it is united to the Logos. '26The 
ground of the unity and diversity must be the same, 
namely the ek-sistence of the divine being in the 
'becoming' of the Incarnation. Elsewhere he explains 
this less densely in terms of the proportionality of 
likeness and distinctness: 
I 'In the incarnation, the Logos creates 
by taking on, and takes on by emptying 
himself. Hence we can verify here, in 
the most radical and specifically unique 
way the axiom of all relationship 
between God and creature, namely that 
the closeness and the distance, the 
submissiveness and the independence of 
the creature do not 21 
row in inverse but 
in like proportion. ' - 
This is the Christological application of the principle 
enunciated at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215): 
1 ... between the Creator and the creature so great a 
likeness cannot be noted without the necessity of 
28 
noting a greater dissimilarity between them. r-Rahner's 
Christological expansion of this principi e is: 'Thus 
Christ is most radically man, and his humanity is the 
freest and most independent, not in spite of, but 
3 ýj 
because of its being taken up, by being constituted as 
29 
the self-utterance of God. --The biblical roots of this 
are found in the account of the creation of Adam in 
Genesis, where the very creation of man in distinction 
from God is an expression of his being in the image and 
likeness of God: the establishment of distinction and 
likeness in direct proportionality. 
The Christological principle at work here is grounded 
in the primal distinction within the immanent being of 
God, between the Father and the Logos whom he posits 
from within his own unoriginated being, distinct from, 
and yet consubstantial with him. It is because of this 
distinction-in-likeness, or, more precisely, this 
distinction-in-identity, that the self-expressive 
presence of God in the humanity of Jesus is able to be 
a self-utterance and a self-communication. Thus, the 
Trinitarian articulation of the immanent distinction 
between the Father and the Son is the 'necessary 
condition for the Christological designation of Jesus 
in the economic context: what takes place in the 
economy is ontologically grounded in the immanent 
'becoming' of the Trinitarian relationality. 
The Christological significance of the dialectic of 
identification and distinction -- the polarity of 
Christological speech which we inherit from the early 





Grillmeier states, always opts for a Ilectio 
difficiliorl of the Gospello- is developed by J6ngel as 
the epistemological and ontological focus of what is at 
stake here. He takes. up Rahner's discussion, and, with 
reference to the Patristic language, proposes: 
'But over against the metaphysics of 
substance which permeates the 
christological doctrine of two natures, 
and based on the existence of Jesus 
Christ in its double substitutionary 
role, his humanity and deity should not 
be understood so much as two sides of 
one person as two poles of an ultimate 
differentiation and tension which 
defines the one godly-human person. The 
oppositeness of God and man is what 
constitutes the unity of the person who 
became man. On the basis of that 
oppositeness, then, all of the 
christological definitions of the being 
of this person are to be understood and 
to be developed further. o3l 
This- oppositeness is concentrated in the death of 
Jesus, in the identification of God with the dead man 
Jesus who dies in Godforsakenness (Gal 3.13; 2 Cor 
ý. 21): 'God has interposed himself in the midst of 
fatal God-forsakenness in order to create a new 
%relationship with Godj32 What takes place in the 
crucifixion, between the Father and the Son, and the 
pouring forth of the Spirit which occurs as the 
'eternally new relationship between the Father and the 
33 Son'r- is 'not a second thing next to the eternal God 
but rather the event of the deity of God. For that 
5ýý 
reason, the "economic" Trinity is the "immanent 
34 
Trinity" and vice versa; "' idngells approach presents 
the immanent Trinity as the Isummarising concept! 2-5 of 
the event of God's deity in the relationality between 
Father, Son and Spirit in the Crucifixion-Resurrection: 
'This eternally new relationship to God is called, 
christologically, resurrection from the dead, and is 
ontologically the being of love itself. only in the 
unity of the giving Father and the given Son is God the 
event of giving up which is love itself in the relation 
of lover and beloved., 36 
JUngel's adoption of Rahner's axiomatic unity of the 
immanent and economic Trinity is intensified by his 
concentration on the fact that what is being worked out 
and expressed in the economy is not just a reflection 
of a divine relationality, but actually is that divine 
relationality: 'For the giving up of the eternal Son 
of God takes place in the temporal existence of one, 
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that is, of this crucified man JesuSZ-*' Language about 
the immanent Trinity, then, is not speculation about 
the intra-divine constitution removed from the economy 
of God's action in Jesus, but is the explication of the 
phenomenon of the differentiation from, and 
identification with, the man Jesus on the part of God: 
I.... God's identification with the 
dead Jesus implies a 
self-differentiation on God's part. The 
being of this dead man defines God's own 
being in such a way that one must speak 
3q 
of a differentiation between God and 
God. ... The differentiation of God from God may not be understood as an 
opposition which is coerced on the being 
of God.... it must be said that God 
defines himself when he identified 
himself with the dead jesus., 38 
Jilngel works out the distinction-in-identity -- or, 
more accurately in his terms, the 
differentiation-in-identification -- with particular 
reference to the Cross: it is in the event of the 
crucifixion that the Son's differentiation from the 
Father is most extreme, and it is at this extremity, in 
the realm of sin, death and nothingness, that the 
identification with Jesus takes place. Through this 
action, which has as its effect the constantly new 
event of love between the Father and the Son which is 
the Spirit, there takes place the process which is the 
event and life of the Triune God. 
Language about God's eternity is reinterpreted by 
iiingel to express this event, 'this coming of God's 
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being to itself', thus avoiding the implication that 
God's proper mode orf being is distinct from the event 
of the economy: 
'God came in the event of 
self-identification with the man Jesus 
from God the Father. And God came to 
Jesus as his beloved Son, and thus came 
to himself, to God the Son, along the 
path which led into the far country. 
And yet God remained totally in the 
process of coming, as God the Holy 
Spirit. That is the mystery that God is 
already in himself, the "mystery of the 
Trinity" (mysterium trinitatis), the 
mystery of his triune nature: that God 
is in that he comes to himself -- from 
God to God as God. o 40 
The conceptuality J5ngel uses to accomplish this 
revision of the traditional terminology -- the 
predominance of language of 'becoming', 'coming', 
'movement' -- enables him to treat the relationship of 
Jesus to the Father as the relationship which 'effects' 
the intra-divine relationship of Father to Son. He 
fully endorses Pannenberg's view, which we encountered 
in an earlier chapter, that 'what is true in God's 
eternity is decided with retroactive validity only from 
the perspective of what occurs temporally with the 
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importance of the ultimate. 1--God's eternal 'becoming, 
takes place in the life and death of Jesus, and thus 
this 'becoming' is of salvific importance for humanity: 
'God comes to himself even in the death 
of Jesus Christ, the Father to the Son. 
And thus he comes to man as his 
eschatological goal. In the death of 
Jesus, God comes in one and the same 
event as God to God as God 
(definitively) to man, as the Father to 
the Son, and as the Son to Jesus. This 
death is the seal of that event in which 
God comes both to God and to man, of 
that event then in which God as man is 
his own goal. e42 
W 
Language about the immanent Trinity, then, would be 
language about how this event is an event in God, in 
the history of God's 'becoming', which takes place 
simultaneously with his communicating himself to us: 
'.. God comes in that he comes to man'. 
1.2 In terms which 
recall both Barth and Rahner, whose dependence on Barth 
is thinly disguised, J5ngel writes: 
'In that the eternal Son is eternally 
from the Father, God is aiming in him as 
well toward a becoming in which God not 
only comes from God, but, beyond that, 
man with his world is made, caused, 
created by God. But God aims in himself 
at what is other. God aims in his 
divine eternal becoming toward the 
incarnation of man, toward the becoming 
of the world. God aims in his eternal 
begetting toward creation. v44 
The whole process of the divine 'becoming', of the God 
whose essence is constituted by the divine relations, 
is inherently soteriological, aiming at the 
communication of himself to the creation which is 
intended by his divine becoming. There is no question 
of thinking of 'God as self-sufficient', as though the 
divine relationality were not -f! ternally directed 
towards self-expression as man in Jesus Christ: as 
, overflowing being' (ibid. ), God expresses his being 
outwards, and this is directly attributed by JUngel to 
the Trinitarian character of the divine being: 
'In this creative being of God the Son 
as the aim of God the Father, God is 
aiming at man. In that God the Father 
loves the Son, in the event of this 
divine self-love, God is aiming 
selflessly at his creation. 1 45 
It would follow, then, that if the divine becoming 
which constitutes God's self-relatedness, is aimed at 
his expressive presence as the human person Jesus, then 
the events of the history of Jesus in his relationship 
to the Father in the Spirit, are the events which 
effect and realise the vrocess of relationalitv within 
the divine being, at the same time as they effect God's 
self-communication to his creation. We might suggest, 
then, that language about the immanent Trinity is a 
concentrated articulation of the significance of the 
events of the economy, insofar as they are seen to be 
constitutive of the process of divine becoming. 
iringells adoption and development of Rahner's 
Trinitarian axiom enables him to formulate the process 
of divine becoming and self-relatedness with particular 
reference to the economy: the ontology of divine being 
can only be an explicitation of the history of God's 
salvific presence -- it detaches itself from this 
foundation at its peril. He shares Rahner's concern to 
interpret the immanent Trinity as the condition of 
possibility which makes the self-relatedness of the 
economy an event of the Triune God, but the emphasis is 
different: Rahner's central image is that of the 
self-communication of the Father in the double moments 
of the Incarnation and the descent of the Spirit which 
belong intrinsically together as the 'what' and the 
'how' of the Father's self-expression. Jungel's 
central image is that of the divine 'becoming', in 
which 'God is in that he comes to himself -- from God 
46 to God as God'_ 
'The statement God's being is in coming 
implies first of all that God's being is 
the event of his coming to himself. 
This event, this coming of God's being 
to itself, is what the tradition has 
meant when it spoke of eternity. But 
eternity is not something distinct from 
God. God himself is eterni%. God is 
eternally coming to himself.!. 4-1 
Jiingel develops an 'event theology' in which God's 
'coming to himself' is interpreted as an event from God 
to God, 'an event in which God is not only his own 
derivation but also his future, 48 Juingells comments on 
the classical Trinitarian doctrine highlight the 
distinctiveness of his own approach: 
'Although the doctrine of the Trinity,. 
originally arose as a confession of the 
man Jesus as true God, it is remarkable 
that this eternal event in the 
theological tradition has not been 
understood on the basis of the being of 
this man who died on the cross. That 
God became man was for the classical 
trinitarian doctrine not the 
constitutively determining event for the 
trinitarian being of God, although it 
then derived from that event as a 
further consequence of the basic 
thought. '49 
The classical Trinitarian doctrine did not take the 
death of Jesus as normative for its formulation of the 
being of God: 'The death of Jesus concerned the 
concept of deity, the divine nature, as little as the 
life of this man was significant for the concept of 
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divine being. 71 In contrast with this, J5ngel offers 'a 
doctrine of God oriented to the man Jesus' which 
develops two avenues of thought: 
'God does indeed come from God and only 
from God, and he is determined by nobody 
and nothing other than by himself; 
however, he determines to be God not 
without man. That is the sense of the 
New Testament statements about the 
preexistence of the Son of God 
identified with Jesus. As the tradition 
correctly asserts, God comes from 
himself to himself without outside help. 
But God comes to himself in accordance 
with his own self-determination in such 
a way that he comes to man and only thus 
does man come to himself. God comes 
from God, but he does not want to come 
to himself without us., 51 
The Barthian roots of this presentation are strong: 
God's self-determination tolbe God for us in Jesus is 
grounded in the act by which God is God for himself: 
God determines himself in electing the man Jesus, as a 
primal decision of his being: 
(God) 'certainly wills to be God and he 
does not will that we should be God. 
But he does not will to be God for 
himself nor as God to be alone with 
himself. He wills as God to be for us 
and with us, who are not God. Inasmuch 
as he is himself and affirms himself, in 
distinction and opposition to everything 
that he is not, he places himself in 
this relation to us. He does not will 
to be himself in any other way than he 
is in this relationship. ' (CD 2/1, p274) 
The conclusion suggests itself, then, that the 
relationship of the immanent and economic Trinity is 
far from being a reflection model, in which the events 
of the economy mirror the relationality within the 
immanent Trinity. Instead, JUngells proposals move in 
the direction of viewing the events of the economy as 
effective, both for our salvation and for the divine 
becoming. There is one process taking place, which has 
two aspects or intentionalities, inseparably bound 
together: the act by which God is God in a triune 
relationality is the same act as that in which God is 
God for us in the economy of salvation. This would be 
a consequence of Barth's view that the act by which God 
is God is to be God-for-us as Jesus. Barth formulates 
this in his discussion of the Election as identical 
with God's act of self-determination as God; JUngel 
develops' this with greater concentration on the 
significance of the Crucifixion as the decisive moment 
in the history of the divine relationality. The 
process of divine becoming is the same process by which 
we are taken into God's love through his identification 
with Jesus in his death and resurrection. 
Does this identificataion of the one process with a 
double intentionalit vitiate language about God's 
eternal being, and does it collapse God's being into 
dependence on temporal processes? J5ngel answers that 
it does not: 
'The task of thinking God in such a way 
that he is conceived of as coming to 
himself and simultaneously coming to man 
cannot be meant in such a way that God 
is thought of as dependent on the 
existence of man. The final result of 
our thought cannot be that ultimately 
man is necessary for God. That God does 
not want to come to himself without man 
does not make man the consummation of 
God. God perfects or consummates 
himself. But it may and must be said 
that God does not want to perfect 
himself without man. 152 
The relationship between the immanent and economic 
Trinitarian languages is that speech about the immanent 
Trinity ensures that it is God who determines his being 
towards the expression in the economy, and speech about 
the economic Trinity ensures that our consideration 
about" the Trinitarian relationality posits the 
'extreme' of kenotic self-expression as constitutive of 
God's' being. Reference to the immanent Trinity is 
designed to designate the freedom in which the divine 
becoming takes place -- out of no necessity other than 
his own character as love -- and, correspondingly, 
reference to the economic Trinity designates the 
kenosis of the economy as integral to the character of 
the divine relationality. In particular, the 
$V, 
complementarity of the two ways of speaking about the 
Trinity ensures that our language about God's 
perfection is modified in the light of his orientation 
to be God-for-us, thus removing the distorting'effects 
which notions of God's 'self-sufficiency' as divine 
being can have on Christian theology: God is always 
God-for-us, and his self-communication in the economy 
is not separable from the divine act of being. 
JCingel presents the image of the pre-existence of Jesus 
as pointing to the eternal orientation of the Trinity 
towards humanity. The dialectic of identity and 
distinction within the eternal generation of the Son 
makes the eternal Son both the image of God and the 
original image of the world. It is because the Son is 
an expression of the Father's being, identical in 
nature, but distinct in his mode of being, that the 
process of divine self-relatedness can be consummated 
in the identification of the Father with the man Jesus, 
across the even greater distance of sin and death in 
the event of the crucifixion. Thus the salvific event 
of our redemption is grounded in the self-relatedness 
of the divine being: that which takes place in the 
economy, the unity in distinction of Father and Son in 
the Spirit, is the working out of the process of 
becoming which is the divine life. The function of 
language about the immanent Trinity is not the attempt 
to peer 'behind' the events of the economy, but to 
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bring them to expression insofar as they are the events 
of the self-relatedness of God's being shown in the 
selflessness of the economy. JEngel refuses the option 
of setting these two poles in opposition to each other 
through an opposition of the immanent and economic 
Trinity. He rejects the attempt to portray the 
immanent Trinity as a divine self-relatedness which is 
detachable from the divine selflessness of the economy: 
'The inner-divine self-relatedness which 
is love takes place as the radical 
relatedness of God to an other which is 
absolutely opposite to him, that is, to 
the human essence which he creates for 
that reason. The radical relatedness of 
God to man is revealed in the giving up 
of what is most particularly his own, 
the sending of his Son to death. In 
this selflessness of the divine being 
the self-relatedness of that same being 
does not end but is rather implemented 
and confirmed to the highest degree.... 
The self-relatedness of the deity of God 
takes place in an unsurpassable way in 
the very selflessness of the incarnation 
of God. That is the meaning of talk 
about the humanity of God. It is not a 
second thing next to the eternal God but 
rather the event of the deity of God. '53 
Consequently, J5ngel can speak of the doctrine of the 
Trinity as 'the dogma of soteriology in an absolute 
sense. '-24Language about the immanent Trinity is not an 
escape from -the Trinity of the economy into a 
speculation which attempts to portray a. divine life 
behind, or over and above, what takes place there for 
our salvation. Rather, it attempts to take the event 
I 
of the Trinitarian economy as,. expressive and 
determinative of the being of God, at the same time as 
it is determinative of our salvation. The events of 
the economy implement, effect and confirm the 
relationality of the triune divine lifep and open the 
divine life to the involvement of the created world in 
that relationality. 
There are clear similarities between Jangel's approach 
and that of J5rgen Moltmann: both want to conceive of 
God only within the context of the economy in which 
God's being is expressed. Jfingel attributes the rise 
of atheism to the failure of Christian theology to 
develop a doctrine of God with reference to the 
crucified Jesus as the focus of the event of God's 
being; Moltmann, too, shares this concern, even 
rejecting the use of the distinction between the 
immanent and economic Trinity -- thus, disagreeing with 
J5ngel -- because it reinforces the desire to think of 
a God 'behind' the God of, the economy: 
'If -the central foundation of our 
knowledge of the Trinity is the cross, 
on which the Father delivered up the Son 
for us through the Spirit, then it is 
impossible to conceive of any Trinity of 
substance in the transcendent primal 
ground of this event, in which cross and 
self-giving are not present ... The thesis 
about the fundamental identity of the 
immanent and economic Trinity of course 
remains open to misunderstanding as long 
as we cling to the distinction at all, 
because it then sounds like the 
dissolution of the one in the other., 55 
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The thesis of the identity of the immanent and economic 
Trinity is wrongly formulated if it is conceived in 
Platonising terms, involving 'the relation of image to 
reflection, idea to appearance, essence to 
manifestation'56 Moltmann also refuses to allow the 
distinction to be used to assert the metaphysical 
distinction between the impassibility and immutability 
of God, who therefore cannot be capable of being 
affected by the world, and the changeable world which 
exists in a relationship of dependence on a God who is 
independent of its influence. To allow the distinction 
between immanent Trinitarian life, designating a 
relationship which is unaffected by the events of the 
history of the economy, and the economic Trinitarian 
life, in which God's being is expressed but not in a 
way which allows a retroactive 'influence' on the 
intra-divine life, is to impose a dichotomy which is 
easily open to a distortion of Christian belief in the 
God who revealed himself in Jesus. Rahner's thesis, 
however, by identifying the immanent and economic 
Trinity, carries implications for a revision of 
Christian theological language, because it forces us to 
consider that God's being is affected by the events of 
the economy: 
'What this thesis is actually trying to 
bring out is the interaction between the 
substance and the revelation, the 
"inwardness" and the "outwardness" of 
the triune God. The economic Trinity 
not only reveals the immanent Trinity; 
3ýý 
it also has a retroactive effect on it ... the surrender of the Son for us on the cross has a retroactive effect on 
the Father and causes infinite pain. on 
the cross God creates salvation 
outwardly for his whole creation and at 
the same time suffers this disaster of 
the whole world inwardly in himself. e57 
Moltmann makes the cross stand 'within the immanent 
58 Trinity' as an event which determines the inner life of 
the triune God from eternity to eternity. The issue at 
stake is whether the relationship of the triune God to 
himself and the relationship of the triune God to his 
world is a mutual one. If, as Moltmann asserts, it is 
mutual, then 'God's relationship to the world has a 
retroactive effect on his relationship with himself -- 
even though the divine relationship to the world is 
59 
primarily determined by that inner relationship. ':! ýUnder 
the influence of this principle, with its consequence 
that the events of the economic Trinitarian 
relationship laffect' the immanent Trinitarian 
relationship, Moltmann reverses the' traditional 
location of the immanent Trinity as the protological 
condition of the economy, and, instead, places it in 
the eschaton, as the completion of the form of God's 
history as it is perfected through the events of the 
economy: 
'The economic Trinity completes and 
perfects itself to immanent Trinity when 
the history and experience of salvation 
are completed and perfected. When 
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everything is "in God" and "God is all 
in all", then the economic Trinity is 
raised into and transcended in the 
immanent Trinity. v 60 
The immanent Trinity would then be the glorified 
Trinity which has brought the whole of creation into 
its intra-divine life. Moltmann uses the 
eschatological narration of the Trinitarian completion 
of history in the eschaton which Paul presents in 1 
Cor. 15.20-8 as the basis of the completed history of 
the Trinity: the Son transfers the kingdom to the 
Father, having overcome every hostile force, and in 
this way 'completes his obedience and his sonshipl 6_1 
The Father receives the completed work of the Son, the 
kingdom which has been brought to its transfiguration, 
and in this way God becomes 
As John O'Donnell puts it, 
'The goal of history then coincides with 
the completion of God's own history, 
that is, the eschatological 
glorification of the Tri , nity... 
In this 
sense, the fulfilment of the mission of 
the Trinity ad extra is not only a 
functional completion but the 
ontological completion of the persons of 
the Trinity themselves, and thus the 
completion of the life of the Trinity ad 
intra as well. v62 
The coherence of the idea of the 'ontological 
completion' of the intra-Trinitarian life is related to 
Moltmann's preference for terminology labout 
the 
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'unification' (Vereinigung Gottes) rather than the 
'unity' of God (Einheit Gottes). ý-3 He considers the 
Trinity, not as a static relationality, but as a living 
history, in which the central point is the delivering 
up on the Cross of the Son, and which is consummated 
with the handing over of the kingdom to the Father: 
the Sonship of the Son is completed co-terminously with 
the entry of the transfigured creation into the 
intra-Trinitarian life. This raises questions about 
Moltmann's fusion of the horizons of world history and 
God's history. At times, he presents the process of 
divine becoming as co-extensive with the process of 
world history: 
'The nature of God thus does not stand 
behind the appearance of history and 
appearance in history as eternal, ideal 
being: it is that history itself. 964 
Moltmann is determined to complement the classical 
doctrine of the Trinity, which is primarily a Trinity 
of sending, with a doctrine of the Trinity viewed 
eschatologically, in which the Trinity of sending is 
interpreted in the light of the eschatological 
completion of the Trinitarian history in the eschaton: 
the Trinity in its protological conceptuality is 
revealed as open to the world and time, not out of a 
deficiency, but because of the overflowing abundance of 
the love which is the character of divine being: - 
'just as the Trinity in the sending is, 
from its very origin, open to the world 
and to man, because it is the 
"threefoldness" of seeking love, so the 
Trinity in the glorification is open for 
the gathering and uniting of men and 
creation in God, because it is the 
"tri-unity" of gathered love. Through 
the sending of Christ and the Spirit, 
the "history of the Trinity" is opened 
for the history of the gathering, 
uniting and glorifying of the world in 
God and of God in the world. v65 
Moltmann contrasts the protological formulation of the 
doctrine of the Trinity with the eschatological 
perspective: in the former, the move is backwards from 
the double mission of Son and Spirit to the threefold 
person, and then to arrive at the divine unity: 'the 
unity of God comes first, as being protologically the 
basis of his threefoldness. 1 On the other hand, 'in' 
eschatological thinking, the unity of God is the final, 
eschatological goal, and this unity contains in itself 
the whole union of the world with God and in God. 
Eschatologically, therefore, the unity of God is bound 
66 
up with the salvation of creation. 7ý So, referring again 
to the Corinthians narrative, Moltmann can write, 
'The transference of the kingdom from 
the Son to the Father at the End-time is 
to be understood both as a 
world-embracing event which completes 
history, and as an event within the 
Trinity itself. t67 
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The relationship between the protological and 
eschatological Trinity is one in which there is a 
formal correspondence, but an increment or deepening of 
the relationships through the experience of the history 
to which God has opened himself in the economy: 'in 
content it goes beyond it, just as the gathering love 
corresponds to the seeking love of God yet goes far 
beyond it through the gathering and uniting of mankind 
-1 68 and the world with God. - 
So, in Moltmann's view, the Trinitarian relationships 
are consummated through the events of the economy and 
the subsequent completion of the work of Christ: they 
reach a completion which is co-terminous with the 
transfigured Kingdom which the Son presents to the 
Father in loving obedience as an intra-Trinitarian act 
-- indeed, as the perfect Trinitarian act- between 
Father and Son made in the communion of the Spirit who, 
through his action, makes the creation a participator 
in the relationship of Father and Son. The destiny of 
creation is to be taken into the Trinitarian life, and, 
if we can express it thus, the destiny of the Trinity 
is to complete its perichoresis through its involvement 
in the events of our temporality. 
Moltmann uses the narrative genre as a way of avoiding 
the distorting effects which the God of classical 
theism has had on Christian theologising. The 
following passage raises considerable questions about 
the compatibility of Moltmann's narration with 
principles derived from classical metaphysical theism: 
(We shall underline the words which require 
explicitation, since, although they are part of the 
coherence of the narration, it is not easy to see what 
content they are to be given): 
'The incarnation of the Son therefore 
brings about something "new" even within 
the Trinity, for God himself. After the 
Son's return the relationship between 
the Father and the Son is no longer 
entirely the same. The Father has 
become different through his surrender 
of the Son, and the Son too has become 
different through the experience of his 
passion in the world. t 69 
But, as Langdon Gilkey points out, narration requires 
clarification through a philosophical articulation of 
the coherence and intelligibility of the symbols and 
narrations which are employed: 'Constructive theology 
requires for its completion the conceptuality of, a 
modern ontology, given to it by loan from some example 
of contemporary philosophy. 00 Clearly Moltmann's 
Trinitarian narrations imply the categories of process 
philosophy and theology, and raise the question of 
whether God is conceived to be dependent on history for 
his fulfilment. Moltmann's-answer to Walter Kasper on 
this point is clear, but he may not be the most 
accurate judge of his own enterprise: 
'If one understands by "himself" his 
abstract being for and with himself, 
then one must deny this question. If by 
"himself" one understands what the bible 
calls his glory, his justice and his 
kingdom, then one must affirm this 
question, even if one would not want to 
pose the question in the sense of the 
"imperfection" of his love and the 
openness of his hope. v 71 
But, it can be pointed out that Moltmann's explicit 
assertions of the status of the immanent Trinity as the 
consummated relationality of the Triune God, involve 
more than God's glory: he clearly envisages a process 
of divine becoming from point A -- the Trinity in 
sending -- through the events of the economy to point 
B, which is the result of the 'new' and completed 
relationality, exceeding in content that which was 
actualised before. The awkward words, of course, are 
those of 'before' and 'after' -- appropriate in a 
narrative exposition of the Trinitarian history, but as 
potentially misleading in their own way as the static 
categories of classical metaphysics which they are 
meant to replace. Barth, in a letter to Moltmann after 
the publication of The t6v(Aý t -., highlights the 
distorting effects of the leschatologising' of God's 
being in Moltmann's approach: 
$My own concern relates to the 
unilateral way in which you s, ubsume all 
theology in eschatology, going beyond 
Blfimhardt, Overbeck, and Schweitzer in 
this regard ... what disturbs me is that for you theology becomes so much a 
matter of principle (an eschatological 
principle). You know that I too was 
ý'ý4xl- 
once on the edge of moving in this 
direction, but I refrained from doing so 
and have thus come under the fire of 
your criticism in my later development. 
Would it not be wise to accept the 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity of God? 
You may thereby achieve the freedom of 
three-dimensional thinking in which the 
eschata have and retain their own weight 
while the same (and not just a 
provisional) honour can still be shown 
to the kingdom of nature and grace. 
Have my concepts of the threefold time 
(CD 111/2, *47.1) and threefold parousia 
of Jesus Christ (CD IV/3, *69.4) made so 
little impact on you that you do not 
give them critical consideration? 972 
Moltmann's assertion that the Incarnation brings 
something new even within the Trinity is, of course, 
the reverse of Barth's assertion, which we quoted in an 
earlier chapter, that 'the Incarnation makes no change 
in the Trinity. ' The divergence between them is 
instructive: by means of the image of the 
pre-existence of the man Jesus, Barth is able to 
present God's being as eternally oriented towards the 
economy. His denial of the Logos asarkos is a refusal 
to consider the being of, God without reference to the 
self-interpretation of the events of the economy. 
God's election of the man Jesus as the electing God and 
the elected man is the primal and determinative act of 
God's being. In this sense, the man Jesus belongs to 
God's historia praeveniens, to 'the attitude and 
relation in which by virtue of the decision of his free 
love God, wills to be and is God' (CD 11/2, p. 9). Barth 
offers to Moltmann the proposal that the doctrine of 
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the immanent Trinity is necessary if God's 'becoming' 
or, expressed another way, the triune relationality, is 
not to be construed as implying that God is dependent 
on history for his actualisation as a relationality. 
Without this doctrine, the danger is that of 
leschatologising' the being of God, and thus 
compromising his freedom and transcendence. Moltmann's 
pattern is that of making God's immanent or economic 
presence a moment in the process by which God's 
transcendence is achieved, and, in particular, of 
making the event of the crucifixion the decisive moment 
which 'affects' God. 
JUngel, whose Barthian view is summarised in his 
statement that 'God's being is in becoming', guards 
against this misunderstanding; if we may express it 
thus, Moltmann asks how the Crucifixion affects God, 
whereas ifingel, following Barth, is more interested in 
how the events of the economy effect the Triune 
relationality.. -,, 
Jangel argues against the view that 
'God would first become that which he is, through his 
relationship . to an other than himself. 
' Moltmann, on 
the other hand, seems to be unable to avoid making the 
process of divine becoming dependent on temporal events 
by which God is affected. His desire to argue in 
favour of 'the pathos of God' leads him to a narrative 
phenomenoloqy of the divine becoming, in which the 
freedom and self-relatedness of the Trinity lose their 
transcendent features. 
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The difficulty which we highlighted in Moltmann's 
approach -- that of making the process of divine 
becoming dependent on the economy -- occurs explicitly 
in Schoonenberg's'work. His interpretation of Rahner's 
axiom could fairly be described as a revisionist 
reading, in which Rahner's safeguards against 
compromising the integrity or freedom of the divine 
life are removed: it is through the economy that the 
Trinity becomes a Trinity of persons. As far as the 
immanent Trinity is concerned, the Father, Son and 
Spirit are modes of deity; these modes of being become 
personal in the economy: 
'Through the history of salvation, there 
is a- Trinity in God himself; through 
his own saving action, God himself 
becomes three-Personal, that is, three 
Persons. ' 73 
Schoonenberg separates the modalistic and personalistic 
approaches as applicable respectively to the immanent 
and economic Trinities: 
'Wahr ist also did-- modalistische 
Trinitätslehre, insoweit sie sich auf 
das innergöttliche Sein in sich bezieht. 
Wahr ist die personalistische 
Trinitätlehre, insoweit sie sich auf 
Gott in der Heils8konomie bezieht. Gott 
ist ökonomisch dreipersbnlich, immanent 
hat er drei Weisen seines Seins, die 
sich durch die Heilsgeschichte als drei 
Personem verhalten, zu uns und auch 
zueinander. , 74 
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Schoonenberg uses 'person' to designate a conscious and 
free subject, capable of relationships with other 
subjects; his argument, then, against applying this 
term to the immanent Trinity is that it would imply a 
tritheism. Instead, God, in his-threefold modes of 
being, is designated as 'personal'; but in the 
economy, there is a different pattern which requires a 
different account: 
'Es bleibt aber, dass Jesus Christus und 
der Vater sich personal gegenÜberstehen 
und dass der Heilige Geist in uns zum 
Vater betet und zum Sohn ruft und ihnen 
also auch personal gegenübersteht. 
Vater, Sohn und Geist stehen sich also 
nach der Schrift in der Heilsgeschichte 
als Personen geg'gnüber. Aus These 23 
folgt, dass dies auch nur durch die 
Heilsgeschichte möglich i97-t. Die 
immanente Trinität ist eine Trinität der 
Personen dadurch, dass sie Ökonomische 
Trinitat ist. $ 75 
Yves Congar is right to point out against Schoonenberg: 
'And how can there be a communication of the three 
Persons if they are not three Persons to begin with? o76 
Schoonenberg treats the economy as the actualisation of 
the triune modes of being, as their transformation into 
three subjectivities over against each other: 'Gott in 
sich ist nicht als drei Personen, er ist es in der 
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Heilsgeschichte: "'-Schoonenberg's apophatic treatment of 
the immanent Trinity does not permit him to transgress 
the rule he sets of speaking of the immanent Trinity 
only within the limits placed by salvation history: we 
3 V, 
simply are not in a position to say anything about the 
'prior' threefoldness of God's being, apart from its 
reference to the economy: 
'Damit ist nicht ausgemachtp ob und 
inwieweit Gott, abgesehen von der 
Heilsgeschichte ("vor der Schöpfung"), 
dreifaltig ist ("war"). Es wurde schon 
betont, dass diese Frage nicht zu 
beantworten ist. v 78 
The result of this is that Schoonenberg is restricted 
to a modalistic discussion of the being of God in 
himself, while engaging in a personalist treatment of 
the being of God in the economy; he does this through 
taking seriously Rahner's axiom as the only sounmd 
hermeneutical rule for speech about God's being in 
himself. There cannot be any discussion of the 
immanent Trinity except through the economic Trinity 
which is to be taken as identical with it. But by 
relating the personalistic character of the Trinitarian 
relationality so closely, and exclusively, to the 
economy -- chiefly under the influence of a particular 
understanding of 'personhood'2-9- is not Schoonenberg 
failing to carry the implications of the fundamental 
axiom to its conclusion? While assenting to the 
axiomatic unity of the immanent and economic Trinity-, 
he, nevertheless, contravenes his hermeneutical 
principle and refuses to recognise the personalist 
character of the immanent trinity, preferring instead 
an apophatism which is at odds with his explicit 
intention. 
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It is Congar who has raised the most acute objections 
against a simple acceptance of the axiomatic unity of 
the immanent and economic Trinity: his reservations 
are relevant to the development of the axiom which we 
have examined in J5ngel, Moltmann and Schoonenberg. 
While accepting unreservedly the first part of the 
axiom, 'the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity', 
in order to affirm that our dealings with God in the 
economy are truly dealings with God as he is, and not 
with an inferior or substitutionary presence, he 
highlights a difficulty about the simple acceptance of 
the umgekehrt of the axiom. If we say that the 
immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, are we 
identifying the kenotic mode of being of the economy 
with the mode of being which is proper to God? His two 
questions are: 
'Can the free mystery of the economy and 
the necessary mystery of the Tri-unity 
of God be identified? .... In addition to this, is it true to say that God 
commits the whole of his mystery to and 
reveals it in his communication of 
himself ?1 80 
The tradition, particularly in the struggle against 
Arianism, speaks of the Trinitarian character of the. 
divine being as yCoc-46t- q>Uýrlv Is that Trinitarian 
life to be identified with the Trinitarian life of 
the economy? Or is the Trinitarian life of the economy 
an 'expression' or 'transcription', within another form 
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of being and temporality, freely chosen by God, - of the 
relationality which properly belongs within its own, 
distinct mode of being? Congar is clear on this point: 
'This self-communication takes place in 
the economy in accordance with a rule 
, of "condescendence", humiliation, ministry 
and "kenosis'l., We have therefore to 
recognize that there is a distance 
between, the economic, revealed Trinity 
and the eternal Trinity. The Trinity is 
the same in each case and God is really 
communicated, but this takes place in a 
mode that is not connatural with the 
being of the divine Persons. 181 
In answer to the second question he poses, Congar 
concludes: 
'The economic Trinity thus reveals the 
immanent Trinity -- but does, it reveal 
it entirely? There is always a limit to 
this, revelation, and the incarnation-, 
imposes its own conditions which go back 
, to its nature as a created work., ' 
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Congar argues for-a qualification, in-, the interpretation 
of the axiom, ýsafeguarding the integrity , Of, the 
immanent life of the Trinity, in its proper mode -of 
being, which is distinct-form its kenotic, expression: 
without this distinction, there is a dissolution of the 
immanent Trinityý in the , economic Trinity, and a 
consequent reduction of God's being to its economic 
expression. Kasper makes the same point,, emphasising 
that 'the "is" in this axiom must be --understood as 
V- 
meaning not an identification but rather a 
non-deducible, free, gracious, historical presence of 
an immanent Trinity in the economic Trinity. 
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treatment of God's being is to avoid being a theogony, 
in which the processes of divine becoming are 
constituted through a dependence on the world-process, 
thus dissolving the distinction between the immanent 
and economic expression of God's being, then a caveat 
of this kind must be operative in the use of Rahner's 
axiom. 
Language about the immanent Trinity, however, does not 
escape from the controls of the economic Trinity: it 
is not a way of peering into the divine life from a 
standpoint which ignores its mysterious and apophatic 
character. To treat it thus would be to invalidate the 
cardinal principle that God is expressed as God in the 
mode of the economy; hence, working from the reality 
of God's presence in the economy, it is better to see 
the *immanent Trinity as precisely that mystery of God 
which is historically present in the economy, but which 
cannot_ be reduced to its economic expression. The 
immanent Trinity is not the God who lies 'behind' the 
economy, but the God who is 'in' the economy; the God 
who is active in the economy is God as he is in 
himself, expressed or 'transcribed' within the created 
order. would it be accurate, then, to describe the 
immanent Trinity as the 'what' that is expressed within 
the 'how' of the economic mode? This is partially 
correct, but is insufficient, since it gives the 
impression that the immanent Trinity is passive in this 
process. This partial answer must be supplemented by 
an attempt to show that the character of the Triune 
relationality, and the character of the persons within 
this Triune life, in fact enable the economic 
self-expression to take place. The hermeneutical 
device of 'appropriation' aims at showing, in 
particular, that the Son and the Spirit must be of such 
a nature that the economic mode of being is possible: 
it is because of the character of the Son and the 
Spirit that there can be an economic Trinity. 
The considerable philosophical problems which centre on 
the notion of God's immutability, and its relationship 
to the Incarnation, are answered best by Rahner's 
proposal that we must attribute to the Son alone the 
capacity to become incarnate: it is proper to the mode 
of being of the Son that in him the unchangeable God 
can become subject to change in something else: 
'The mystery of the incarnation must lie 
in God himself: in the fact that he, 
though unchangeable "in himself", can 
become something "in another". The 
immutability of God is a dialectical 
truth like the unity of God. These two 
truths only -- de facto -- retain their 
validity for us when we think at once of 
the two other truths (of the Trinity and 
the incarnation). But we cannot and may 
not think of either as prior to the 
other. ' 84 
The tension or dialectic is between the unchanging life 
or perichoresis of the Trinity, on the one hand, and 
the capacity of God in one of his modes of being to 
engage in a and )(c- of God himself, who 
can come to be by becoming another thing, 
derivative, in the act of constituting it, 
without having to change in his own proper 
reality which is the unoriginated origin. ' 85 if 
the immutability of God is conceived as the perfection 
of love within the triune relationality, then what 
sense is there in saying that the divine kenosis, in 
the mode of being of the Son, alters or adds to the 
love which is the source of the kenosis in the first 
place? The kenosis of the economy is the expression of 
the love which is the divine being, and it cannot 
coherently be the means by which the love is altered or 
deepened. Donald MacKinnon recognises this when he 
writes: 
'Yet what is the doctrine of the Trinity 
if not the effort so to reconstruct the 
doctrine of God that this "descent" may 
be seen as supremely, indeed 
paradigmatically declaratory of what He 
is in hiiýself? 
I ... the history of this doctrine 
represents the most sustained effort 
made to reconstruct the conception of 
the Absolute under the central 
conviction that the mission of Jesus 
(and here we include his resurrection 
and the coming upon his disciples of the 
Holy Spirit) is, in an altogether unique 
sense, the actuality of the divine 
self-impartation to the world., 86 
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If we are seeking to locate the possibility of the 
economic mode of self-expression within the immanent 
Trinity, in a dynamic way which considers that it is 
the character of the Son and Spirit which provides the 
possibility of there being an economic 
self-communication, then it may be fruitful to consider 
the identity of the immanent and economic Trinity as 
the appropriated work of the Spirit: can we present 
the Spirit as the mode of being which opens the 
Trinitarian life towards expression in the created 
order? The Spirit may then be considered as the one 
who enables the unity-in-distinction of the Son, in his 
relationship to the 'Father, to be 'expressed' or 
'extended' or lactualised' in the kenosis of the 
Incarnation. The Spirit may be the means by which the 
process of God's coming to himself, to use J5ngells 
phrase, takes place not without man, because if the 
Spirit is the one who maintains the distinction of'the 
divine persons, while uniting them in their love, then 
he may be the one in whom a different, and for us 
salvific, expression in the economy may occur. The 
Spirit would then be the mode of being in -which the 
created self-expression of God is enabled to be truly a 
self-expression, in which the relationship of Father 
and Son is enacted through the kenosis. ý 
Both the Son and the Spirit constitute, in distinct 
ways, the possibility of the divine self-communication 
in the mode of the economy: in their distinctness from 
the Father, from whom they derive their being, they are 
together, again in distinct ways, the modes of being 
'through whom' and 'in whom' God's presence is 
actualised ad extra. If this emphasis is given, 'then 
discussion of the immanent relationship of Father, Son 
and Spirit cannot be understood to be about 'God's 
being in itself' detached from the economy; it is 
rather about what there is in God which enables the 
self-communication of the economy to be a 
self-communication of God. 
Rahner's emphasis on the distinctness of the Son as the 
ground of the distinctness of created reality is 
correct, but it may be fruitful to alter the discussion 
to include, first of all, a consideration of the role 
of the Spirit as the one in whom this distinctness is 
constituted within the immanent Trinity, which will 
then enable us to consider the role of the Spirit in 
constituting the distinctnesS. of the incarnate Son in 
his union with the Father. In this way, the Spirit may 
be presented as the -one who enables the immanent 
Trinity to be the economic Trinity,. since it is the 
appropriated work of the Spirit to be, personally, the 
bond of love between the Father and Son, both in the 
mode of being proper to God, and in the kenotic mode of 
the economy. The role of the Spirit in this regard can 
then be aligned with a Spirit Christology as' the 
Christological articulation of the significance of the 
economic Trinity. 
The weakness in current, and past, Spirit Christologies 
is that they avoid adoptionism only with difficulty: 
they are notoriously unable to maintain the hypostatic 
identity of Jesus and the Logos, preferring instead a 
model of the indwelling Spirit sanctifying the humanity 
of Jesus. -2-7 The crucial weakness lies in the 
coordination of a Spirit Christology with a Trinitarian 
theology: if the Christological pattern is Father > 
Spirit > Son, then this will align poorly with a 
Trinitarian pattern of Father > Son > Spirit. The role 
of the Spirit in establishing the identity of the 
immanent and economic Trinity will only be adequately 
expressed if the Spirit is assigned a role within the 
immanent Trinity which will enable a Spirit Christology 
to be a Christological explicitation of the character 
of the economic Trinity. If, as we suggest, the Spirit 
affirms the distinctness-in-unity of the Father and Son 
within the immanent Trinity, then the attribution of a 
similar role within the economic Trinity will be a 
firmer grounding for developing the role of the Spirit 
within Christology. This may have the benefit of 
avoiding the predominantly Ibinitarian' pattern of 
Trinitarian discourse, in which the Spirit's hypostatic 
identity is insecurely established. Graphically, we 
might express it in terms of placing the Spirit between 
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Father and Son, rather than as the third member of a 
predominantly binitarian pattern. If we can develop 
this with reference to the immanent Trinity, then the 
treatment of the pre-existent Son may be expressed with 
greater openness towards a Spirit Christology, thus 
avoiding the' limitations inherent in a Logos 
Christology which undervalues the Spirit. Walter 
Kasper comments on the weak pneumatological dimension 
of Scholastic theology; we could point to the source 
of this weakness in the predominantly binitarian 
pattern of Patristic Christology, which develops a 
Logos Christology prior to a consideration of the 
Spirit: 
'Scholastic theology was hardly able to 
give due prominence to the 
pneumatological aspect of the 
Incarnation, because of its unilaterally 
metaphysical approach based on the unity 
of the divine essence. It could do no 
more than attribute by "appropriation" 
to the Holy Spirit the Incarnation as a 
work of God's love. 1-88 
So, in our examination of the relationship of the 
immanent and economic Trinity, if we caln. develop the 
identity of the immanent and economic Trinity as the 
work of the Spirit, then this will have implications in 
moving pre-existence language towards a more 
pneumatological Christology than has been developed in 
the tradition thus far. 
If we attempt to reshape the role of the Spirit as the 
one who enables the immanent Trinity to be the economic - 
N Trinity through its role vis a-vis the hypostasis of 
the immanent Son, then we can locate this pattern in 
the tradition in the Odes of Solomon: in ode 19, we 
have perhaps the earliest description of the immanent 
Trinity, dating possibly from the early part of the 
second century. It presents the immanent Trinity in 
its relationship to the economy through the mediating 
role of the Spirit, who, within the immanent Trinity, 
enables the Son to be taken from the bosom of the 
Father, and, in the economy, overshadows the Virgin, 
thus enabling her to share in the motherhood of the 
Spirit: the Spirit's role in the economy is portrayed 
as reflecting her role in the immanent Trinitarian 
life, and the latter is presented as the condition of 
the reality of the former: 
'A cup of milk was offered to me, 
And I drank it in the sweetness of the 
Lord's kindness. 
The Son is the cup, 
And the Father is he who was milked; 
And the Holy Spirit is She who milked 
Him; 
Because his breasts were full, 
And it was undesirable that His milk 
should be ineffectually released. 
The Holy Spirit opened her bosom, 
And mixed the milk of the two breasts of 
, the Father. 
And she gave the mixture to the 
generation without their knowing, 
And those who have received it are in 
the perfection of the right hand. 
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1-11ý The womb of the Virgin'took (it),, 
And she received conception and gave 
birth. 
So the Virgin became a mother with great 
mercies... 1 89 
The Scriptural foundation for the Ode lies in the 
association of the Johannine Prologue and the Lucan 
Annunciation narrative: the Son in the 'bosom' or 
'womb' (in Syriac) of the Father; through the Spirit, 
the Son is given without recognition or acceptance (in 
1.10), but in the Incarnation, this communication to 
the Virgin of the reality of the Son (Lk 1.35) brings a 
response from the Church (in 1.11). The Son is 
portrayed as the 'milk' within the being of the Father 
which is brought forth, through the action of the 
Spirit who is a strange female power associated with 
the deity, and is transmitted to humanity, perhaps at 
baptism (cf. the milk imagery of 1 Cor. 31-2; Heb 
5.12; 1 Pet. 2.2-3). 
Drijvers relates the imagery of the Ode to the old 
Syriac version of the Fourth Gospel, in which in 1.18 
is translated as 'the only begotten Son, which is from 
the womb of the Father': 
'The wording that the Son comes "from 
the -womb of His Father" introduces a 
female element into the Father's 
personality. That female element of the 
Father which gives birth to the Son is 
represented by the (female) Holy Spirit 
who functions as the womb of the Father, 
from where His grace and truth, the milk 
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of His two breasts, His only begotten 
Son, are born. Father, Holy Spirit and 
Son are three divine hypostases, who 
function in a sexually coloured 
interacting process to express the idea 
that God's grace and truth are given to 
the world as His only begotten Son, who 
is from the womb of His Father. 190 
He suggests that the relationship between the Prologue 
and the Lucan Annunciation scene comes from a 
similarity in wording between the greeting of the angel 
t 
(Hail, thou that art full of grace) and in 1.14 (the 
glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace 
and truth and also between Lk 1.35 (the power of the 
Highest shall dwell in you) and in'l. 14 6nd the Word 
became flesh and dwelt among us). 
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Unlike the Greek 
which uses different verbs, the Syriac version uses the 
same verb; this suggests an association between the 
presence of the Son in the bosom of the Father, and the 
presence of the Son in the womb of the Virgin, with the 
Spirit being the mediating agent. The Spirit both 
receives the Son from the Father, and overshadows Mary 
in a way which enables her to bear the Son. 
Drijvers dates the ode in the first half of the third 
century, although Charlesworth opts for a dating in the 
early second century, as the earliest Christian hymn 
book. The precise origin of the ode is beyond our 
scope and competence. But what is of interest is the 
expression of a vivid narration which, while expressing 
in imaginative terms what was later formulated as the 
'consubstantiality' of the Son with the Father, links 
the immanent and economic Trinity through the action of 
the Spirit who, as a female figure, receives the Son 
from the being of the Father, and thus is able to 
permit the Virgin to share in the divine motherhood of 
the Spirit. In its own idiosyncratic way, the Ode 
takes the description of the economy given in the 
Annunciation scene as normative for what should be said 
about the immanent Trinity: if the Incarnation takes 
place through the action of the Spirit, then the Spirit 
can be said to perform this role within the immanent 
Trinity. The imagery of the Ode presents-the Father as 
bisexual, and the Spirit as the feminine power who 
mediates the birth of the Son from. the Father, and who 
also enables the Son to be born of the Virgin Mary. 
The image of the Spirit as midwife may suggest itself, 
but there are also suggestions of the Spirit as the 
womb in which the generation of the Son takes place, 
and of the Spirit enabling the Virgin,, to share in her 
motherhood of the Son. There are Gnostic parallels for 
this image, in the Gospel of Truth, f4?. r example: 
'The Father reveals his bosom -- now his 
bosom is the Holy Spirit. He reveals 
what is hidden of him -- what is hidden 
of him is His Son -- so that through the 
mercies 2 of 
the Father the aeons may know 
him. 1 -9 
The Gospel of Philip, too, knows of the tradition of 
the femininity of the Spirit: 
'Some said, "Mary conceived by the Holy 
Spirit. " They are in error. They do not 
know what they are saying. When did a 
woman ever conceive by a woman? Mary is 
the virgin whom no power defiled. 193 
Unlike the Gnostic treatises, however, with their 
complex emanations and syzygies, the Ode presents a 
simpler picture, in which 'the Holy Spirit is a 
feminine power of God whose relation to him is not 
clear, but who is the agent or intermediary through 
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whom the Virgin conceived7l The imagery of the Ode does 
not require explanation in terms of Gnostic sources and 
influences; the treatment of the Spirit as the 
feminine figure who receives the Son from the mystery 
of the Father's being, is a way of cohering the 
patterns of the generation of the Son 'from the bosom 
of the Father' with the Annunciation narrative in whicIf 
the spirit is the active agent in the conception of 
Jesus, but cannot be regarded as 'paternal' in its 
relationship to Jesus. 
Charlesworth points to another Ode which attributes a 
maternal role to the Spirit in the generation of the 
Son in the immanent Trinity: 
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'The Spirit brought me forth before the 
Lord's face. 
And because I was the Son of Man,, 
I was named the Light, the Son of God; 
Because I was the most glorified among 
the glorious ones, 
And the greatest among the great ones. 
For according to the greatness of the 
Most High, so She made me; 
And accordin 
,p 
to His newness He renewed 
me. 5- 
Here, the location of the 'bringing forth' is not so 
obviously heavenly, as Robert Murray points out:. 2-6 it 
could refer to, the Baptism or to the Transfiguration, 
which another Judaeo-Christian text, quoted by Origen 
and Jerome, relates to the action of the maternal Holy 
Spirit: 
'Even so did my mother, the Holy Spirit, 
take me by one of my hairs and carry me 
away on to the great mountain Tabor. v97 
However, given the insistence of the odes on the 
pre-existence-of the son, and given the angelic compýny 
of 'the glorious ones', it is defensible to take Ode 
36.3 as referring to the action of the Spirit described 
in Ode 19. -28 The Spirit cannot be construed, in her 
relationship, to the Father in the generation of the 
Son, as a female consort, through whose union with the 
Father, the Son is begotten. The Ode expresses the 
generation of the Son as an event which, is wholly 'from 
the Father', from his breasts of grace and truth (Jn. 
1.14). Here, as Drijvers points out, there are echoes 
of the blessing of Joseph, 'with blessings of heaven 
above, blessings of the deep that couches beneath, 
blessings of the breast and'of the womb' (Gen. 49.25) ý99 
The Spirit is the'one who receives the Son from the 
Father from whose 'substance he proceeds, and who 
maintains him in distinction from the Father; this is 
done in a way which makes, possible the further 
distinction of the Son in the Incarnation. The 
mediation of the Spirit is the event in the divine 
being which makes' possible the presence of the Son 
within the created order. it is through the 
appropriated action of the Spirit that the immanent 
begetting can also be an incarnate begetting. These 
are the points which can be adduced from the figurative 
imagery of the Ode, which point in the direction of 
developing the role of the Spirit in the relationship 
of the immanent and economic Trinity. 
The theme of the double birth of the Son, from the 
Father and from Mary, is of course a dominant concern 
in Patristic Christology: we can point, for example, 
to Hippolytus who uses the Genesis text of the blessing 
of Joseph to demonstrate that the Incarnation is to be 
understood as 'the unity of the procession of the Logos 
from the mouth, heart and loins of the Father and from 
David or the Virgin Mary. It is not just a matter of 
the Logos coming into the world, but of a procreation 
0 in respect of the worldýýThe Incarnation involves 'the 
twofold birth of the Word, from God and from the 
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Virgin., "--The strength of this double focus is that it 
preser ves the status of the Son within the being of 
God, thus ensuring that the divine being does not 
lbecome"Trinitarian through the events of the economy, 
as Schoonenberg suggests. At the same time, it enables 
an' account of the economy to be derived from the 
character of the immanent begetting which is- directed 
towards kenotic self-expression in the Incarnation. 
Without an affirmation of the immanent begetting of the 
Son, we would be faced with either a Unitarian 
Christology which speaks of the relationship of the 
Father to the man Jesus, or, a theology which moves 
towards being a theogony, in which the process of 
divine becoming is portrayed as the actualisation of 
the (Sabellian) God's capacity towards 
self-differentiation in 'personal' distinction. 
However, the relationship of the Spirit to the eternal 
Son within the dominant Trinitarian tradition is not 
developed along the lines proposed by the 
Judaeo-Christian ode of Solomon. The principal 
patterns areýlinear, in which there is a consubstantial 
derivation of divinity from the monarchy of the Father 
to the Son, and from the Son to the SpiritýE and 
circular, or reciprocal, in which the Spirit is the one 
who completes the divine wholeness as the seal of the 
Trinitarian unitYP the nexus amoris, who is the 
personalised completion of the love between Father and 
Son-M The dominance of this later pattern, of course, 
raises awkward questions about the personal status of 
the Spirit -- is it a hypostasis? -- and about the 
distinction between the Spirit and the divine essence. 
The tendency of this pattern towards a predominantly 
'Binitarian' interpretation leaves the Spirit in a 
precarious position; 1_04 While retaining an affirmation of 
the eternal begetting of the Son within the--immanent 
Trinity, in order to avoid the misconceptions outlined 
above which can result in the absence of such an 
affirmation, it may be possible to articulate the 
relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity 
with greater regard for the role of the Spirit. A 
pneumatological answer may be proposed to the double 
question of how the immanent and economic Trinity are 
related, and of how the immanent and incarnate modes of 
being of the Son are to be viewed. The attribution to 
the Spirit-of the work of ensuring the identity of the 
immanent and economic modes of expression of the Triune 
life could%. then be the Trinitarian grounding for a 
Christological articulation of the pneumatological 
aspect of the Incarnation. 
Although Walter Kasper does not refer to the 19th Ode 
of Solomon, he proposes a close approximation to the 
Judaeo-Christian theologoumenon of-the action of the 
Spirit within the immanent Trinity: 
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'The Spirit thus expresses the innermost 
nature of God God as 
self-communicating love in such a way 
that this innermost reality proves at 
the same time to be the outermost, that 
is, the possibility and reality of God's 
being outside of himself. The Spirit is 
as it were the ecstasy of God; he is 
God as pure abundance, God as the 
overflow of love and grace. On the one 
hand, then, the immanent love of God 
reaches its goal in the Spirit. But at 
the same time, because in the Holy 
Spirit the Father and the Son as it were 
understand and realize themselves as 
love, the love of God in the Spirit also 
moves beyond God himself.... In the 
Spirit God has as it were the 
possibility of being himself by emptying 
or divesting himself. 1105 
The character of the Spirit as the one in whom God has 
the capacity to empty himself is portrayed pictorially 
in ode 19 where the Spirit enables the Son to be 
distinct from the Father. If we can express it thus, 
we might say that the Spirit provides the capacity 
within the divine being which enables the distinction 
between Father and Son to occur, at the same time as it 
maintains this distinction as a distinction-in-unity. 
Kasper continues: 
'At this "extreme" in God, he is at the 
same time God's innermost essence, as 
one must say in the tradition of Latin 
theology of the Trinity. In the Spirit, 
God's innermost essence, his freedom in 
love, impels him outwards. In him, as a 
love that is utterly free, God at the 
same time has the possibility of 
producing something outside, that is, a 
creature, and while maintaining its 
intrinsic creaturely independence, to 
draw it into his love. The Spirit is, 
3 
as it were, the theological 
transcendental condition of the very 
possibility of a free self-communication 
of God in history. In him, God can not 
only reveal but carry into effect his 
freedom in love in an historical manner. 
The Spirit as mediation between Father 
and Son is at the same time the 
mediation of God into history. 1106 
Clearly, the important distinction in this respect 
concerns the relationship between, and the difference 
between, the character of the procession of the Spirit 
and the generation of the Son; a preliminary 
distinction could be made by regarding the Son as the 
'what', and the Spirit as the 'how' of the 
self-utterance of the Fat-her. The Biblical 
distinction between 'Word' and 'breath' suggests this: 
the Word has its existence only in the simultaneous 
breathing forth of the Spirit. The denial of the Arian 
sequential treatment of the divine being, with its 
inherent subordinationism, makes it necessary to treat 
the Trinitarian relationality as the coinherence or 
circumincession of Father,,,,, Son and. Spirit; so language 
about the procession of Son and Spirit from the Father 
does not designate succes. sion within the divine being. 
It is primarily concerned with expressing the unity and 
integrity of the divine being in and through the 
Trinitarian relationships107 The absence of temporal 
succession in God acts as a regulative and 
hermeneutical principle which permits us to describe 
the procession of the Spirit as the very possibility of 
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the generation of the Son. It would seem to be as 
valid to say this as it is to say that the Spirit is 
the 'resultant' love between Father and Son; both 
patterns are attempts to describe a Trinitarian 
relationality which is an actus purus of eternal 
reality. This hermeneutical consideration of the 
status of language of procession can be linked with 
another consideration which works from Rahner's axiom 
of the identity of the immanent and economic Trinity: 
if it is legitimate to argue, as the Latin tradition 
does in its affirmation of the filioque pattern, that 
since, in the economy, the Son has a role in the 
sending of the Spirit (in. 16.7), so the Son 'is 
involved in the procession of the Spirit within the 
immanent Trinity, it is equally valid to assert that 
since the Spirit, within the economy, is responsible 
for the incarnation of the Son (Lk. 1.35), and for 
mediating the Father's good pleasure to the Son M. 
1.10), and for effecting the invincible bond of love 
between Father and Son in the Resurrection (Rom. 1.4; ' 
1 Tim. 3.16; Heb. 9.14), so the Spirit can be 
presented as fulfilling the same role within the 
immanent Trinity. Both of these patterns are validated 
by Rahner's axiom which permits, indeed requires, aU 
correspondence between the features of the Trinity in 
the economy, and the relationality of the triune life. 
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In the Spirit, God has the possibility of expressing 
himself in the distinctness of the Son, in a way that 
can be 'extended'. again in the Spirit, into the 
created order and history. If we take up the principle 
that the greater the union with God, the greater the 
degree of distinction and selfhood, and apply this to 
the relationship of the Spirit to the Son, then within 
the Christoloqical order we can present the 
pneumatological aspect of the Incarnation as the Spirit 
ensuring that the humanity of Jesus is endowed with the 
capacity to receive the self-communication of the 
Father, and within the Trinitarian order, we can say 
that it is the Spirit who bestows on the Son a degree 
of selfhood which is intensified in proportion to the 
union of the Son with the Father. In this way, the 
Spirit ensures the distinction of the Son from the 
Father, at the same time as he unites the Father with 
the Son in a love which overflows in creation and 
redemption. Thus the Spirit can be the agent who 
performs the same function in the Triune'relationality 
of the economy, first of all with regard to the 
humanity of Jesus, and then as the 'searching' love of 
God, drawing the creation into the response of the Son 
to the Father. 
If the Spirit is the one who, within the immanent 
Trinity, ensures the direct proportionality of 
distinction and union between the Son and the Father, 
ýý 1, 
it is precisely this action which enables the 
self-expression in the economy to take place. The 
outreach - of God's action within creation (Rom. 
8.23-27) is thus grounded in the action of the Spirit 
between Father and Son in the divine being, maintaining 
in unity the self-expression of the Father in the 
generation of the Son who is distinct from him. If the 
Spirit is the one who enables the Father to express 
himself in the Son, and who ensures that this 
distinction is maintained in a perfect unity of love, 
then it is the Spirit who is able to exercise an 
analogous, and related, function within the context of 
God's presence to the created order: the Biblical 
events of the Spirit hovering over the waters at the 
beginning of creation (Gen. 1.2), overshadowing the 
Virgin, at the Annunciation (Lk. 1.35), and descending 
upon Jesus at the Baptism M. 1.10, par. ), express 
the role of the Spirit in establishing, the 
self-communication of the Father to that which is 
distinct from him. ' If this is the role of the Spirit 
within the economy, then we are entitled to locate the 
possibility of such a role within the context of the 
Spirit's action between Father and Son in the triune 
relationality. The self-communication of the Father 
within the created order is thus transcendentally 
grounded in the appropriated action of the Spirit who, 
while effecting the distinction of reality 'other than 
the Father', also effects a unity in proportion to that 
distinction. This takes place, first of all, within 
the divine being; the form of the Spirit's action 
within the immanent Trinity is the transcendental 
condition for its openness to economic self-expression, 
in the creation and redemption which are the double 
aspects of God's action ad extra. The action of the 
Spirit, as the one who allows distinction-in-unity to 
exist within the divine being, allows the 
distinction-in-unity of the Father and Son to be 
expressed in the Incarnation, thus ensuring that the 
relationship between Jesus and the Father is nothing 
less than the relationship of Son and Father within the 
triune relationality. 
In support of these proposals, we turn to two Russian 
Orthodox writers, Paul Evdokimov and Serge Boulgakof. 
Evdokimov argues, following Boulgakof, against allowing 
the Trinitarian relations to be conceived in terms of 
the 'production' of the hypostases through 'causal 
dependence': the perspective introduced by the phrase 
'without beginning and without end' means that one 
cannot interpret the Trinitarian relations in these 
terms. They are rather the relations of 'Celui qui se 
revele and ceux qui le reve%lent'. He balances the 
Filioque, designating the role of the Son in the 
spiration of the Spirit -- which he accepts in the 
Greek patristic sense, and not in the Photian sense -- 
with an affirmation of the Spirituqu2, the role of the 
Spirit in the generation of the Son: 
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'Le sens de ces deux formules est dans 
l1affirmation que chaque Personne doit 
etre contemplee simultan4ment dans ses 
relations avec les Deux autres. Ainsi 
le Fils dans sa generation repoit du 
Pere 1'Espirt Saint et donc dans son 
etre il est eternellement inseparable de 
1'Esprit Saint: il est ne ex Patre 
Spiritu(ue., De meme 1'Esprit Saint 
procdde du Pdre et%repose sur le Fils, 
ce qui correspond a per Filium et a ex 
Patre Filioque. on trouve ii-lors que, 
per ou dia, partout ou se pose la 
relation interhypostatique, toujours 
trine. Le Pere engendre le Fils avec la 
participation de 1'Esprit Saint et il 
spire VEsprit avec la participation du 
Fils, et meme son innascibilite comporte 
la participation du Fils et de l'Esprit 
Saint qui en temoignent en provenant de 
lui comme de leur Source unique. mais 
ces relations ne sont point de 
production mais de correlation entre 
Celul qui se revele et ceux qui le 
rev"lent, l1acte trine de l'Amour 
I? reciproque des Trois. LIEsprit nlest 
pas reduit a 11instrumental de l'Amour 
entre le Pere et le Fils, mais il est 
celui qui actualise l'Amour ou% se 
complaisent les Trois. 1 108 
Both Evdokimov and Boulgakof are firm in their 
rejection of causal categories which distort the 
relationship of the monarchy of the Father in his 
relation to the hypostases of Son and Spirit: 'Aucune 
production causale ne peut avoir place dans 
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lleternite. "'--Instead, both writers prefer the terms 
offered by Bolotov, an Orthodox participant in the 
discussions with the old Catholics after Vatican I, who 
uses the term 'condition' to describe the involvement 
of the other two hypostases in the reality of the 
third: 
/ 
I ... le Fils est la condition trinitaire de la spiration du Saint Esprit par le 
Pere, llEsprit Saint est la condition 
trinitaire de llengendrement du Fils par 
le P6re. Llinnascibilite, la generation 
et la procession sont sans confusion ni 
separation un seul acte tri-un de 
R4velation, avec la participation 
simultanee et reciproque des Trois. 1110 
Boulgakof, too, avoids interpreting the Trinitarian 
relations in terms of 'relations of origin', since 
these categories inevitably lead, in his oPinion, to a 
subordinationism: all the correlations of the 
hypostases are mutually Trinitarian: let ce ne sont 
pas les relations de trois (sujets) relies entre eux 
ill 
par un ordre de succession-. -"'-Instead, Boulgakof offers 
as the controlling principle for a discussion of 
-/e 
.4 
i aI t the category of Illauto-revelation de la 
Sainte Trinitel: 
'Cette revelation slaccomplit dans trois 
hypostases correlatives. La corr(ýlation 
est d(gfinie comme trinitaire: le Pere 
se revele par la g4`h4'ration du Fils et 
par la sjýiration du Saint-Esprit; le 
Fils se revele par Sa naissance du Pere 
.I et par la receetion du Saint-Esprit; 
1'Esprit se revele par la procession du 
Pere et par Son repos sur le Fils. La 
naissance et la procession, aux sens 
actif et passif, signifient non 
11origine, mais les formes de 
. 
correvelation. Le principe de 
llauto-rdv6lation tri-hypostatique 
surmonte et supprime toute espece de 
subordinatianisme 9112 
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On the basis of this principle, the 'dyad' of the Son 
and Spirit are not hierarchically related: they are 
the mutually conditioning hypostases which' can be 
presented as jointly involved in their distinction from 
the Father. The, tradition has been uniform in its 
consideration of the Son as the second hypostasis, and 
of the Spirit as the third, and has, in both East and 
West, considered first of all the relation of Son and 
Father as a dyadic relationship which has issued in the 
spiration of the Spirit; whether the Filioque is 
accepted or not, this has been the dominant pattern, 
based primarily on the Johannine presentation of the 
Paraclete's coming to the disciples. Boulgakof and 
Evdokimov permit the introduction of a complementary 
perspective which does not invalidate this other 
Trinitarian pattern: 
'Neanmoins, la correlation ontologique 
des deux hypostases dans 
llauto-reveolation du Pere a travers 
elles, ngetablit pas entre elles de 
relation hierarchique, laquelle est 
immutablement dans Leur rapport au Pere 
(en "soumission"). En effet, cet ordre 
de relation entre le Fils et le 
SaintýýEsprit,, nlest pas stable, il peut 
6tre inverse. En un certain sens, le 
Fils est prius pour le Saint-Esprit, 
mais aussi le Saint-Esprit est prius 
pour le Verbe. Cela depend du point 
dIou' llon pr . ocade: dans la plenitude de 
l1auto-revelation divine .... la 
premiere place appartient a 11hypostase 
accomplissante du Saint-Esprit qui 
0. eprouve les profondeurs Lie Dieu; et la 
deuxieme place appartient au 
Fils .... Elle repose sur le Fils et elle l'unit au Pere. Sans la Trinite 
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economique, cette correlation de la 
Trinite immanente se manifeste. aussi 
d1une facon definie; 1'Esprit Saint, 
initialement, Ilse mouvait au-dessus des 
eaux". Clest lui qui commence 
l'Incarnation en descendant sur la 
Vierge Marie ... Bref, et bien quIen des sens differents, les places de la 
Deuxieme et de la Troisike hypostases 
dans la taxis sont reciproquement 
reversibles. Seule la place de la 
Premi6re, celle du Pere, du Principe, a 
un sens hi4rarchique. 1113 
Evdokimov, too, works from the pattern of the Spirit's 
action within the economy to an expression of the role 
of the Spirit in the generation of the Son: in an 
earlier work, the action of the Spirit in the 
conception of Jesus is interpreted as betokening the 
'maternal' character of the Spirit within the immanent 
Trinity: ILIEsprit Saint traduit ici la presence du 
Pere qui seul engendre et en mAme temps permet de dire 
que le Fils est nepar VEsprit Saint ... (Qui est) 
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11image de la maternite hypostatique. r-His retrieval of 
the Judaeo-Christian theologoumenon of the maternal 
character of the Spirit vis-a-vis the Son is, 
significantly, reworked not in the direction of a 
familial Trinity of Father, Mother and Son, which would 
be. too anthropomorphic to be viably theological, but 
rather it is integrated in an expression of the 
perichoretic involvement of all the divine persons in 
the hypostatic identity of the others. Even the 
monarchy or ingenerateness of the Father, the fons et 
origo totius divinitatis in the phrase of the Council 
3V 
of Toledo (675), is reciprocally involved with the 
perichoretic relationship of Son and Spirit: this is a 
necessary consequence of the eternal character of the 
divine relationality. The Son and the Spirit are the 
'two modalities of the divine self-communication'. in 
Rahner's phrase: 
'Both basic modalities condition one 
another. They derive from the nature of 
the self-communication of the 
unoriginate God who remains 
incomprehensible, whose 
self-communicatioh remains a mystery 
both as possible and actual ... 1115 
The line of inquiry we have presented stands outside 
the customary discussion of the relationship of Son and 
Spirit in the Thomist tradition: Aquinas argues that 
unless the Son and Spirit are related through a 
relationship of origin, then there is no basis for 
distinguishing them. Since the only relations within 
the divine being are those between hypostases on the 
basis of opposition through. origin, he argues that the 
Spirit must be said to proceed from the Father and from 
the Son: 10portet ergo quod, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus 
ad invicem referentur oppositis relationibus; -141-6 This 
seems an unnecessary point of argumentation, made 
against the background of the Greek rejection of the 
Filioque, in which, with the help of the axiom about 
there being only relations of origin in the Triune 
life, the two hypostases of Son and Spirit are related 
3 
in a way which upsets the complementarity between them 
as the two modalities of God's self-presence. 
In addition, as Kasper points out, this account 'has 
difficulty in conceptually distinguishing the relation 
of the Spirit to the Son from the relation of the 
117 
Spirit to the Father-7-One must also ask whether it is 
necessary to consider the Trinitarian life in terms of 
processions or origins: 'The Fathers and the Orthodox 
tell us again and again that the Spirit is received in 
the Son or that he takes from the Son and, in so doing, 
they are providing a foundation for relationships of 
reciprocity, the relationships, in other words, of the 
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perichoresis. 'We should also add that our proposals 
are not intended to supplant the consideration of the 
Spirit from the Father and the Son (or through the 
Son), but to complement them by a consideration of the 
role of the Spirit in the generation of the Son from 
the Father and in establishing the Son in a 
relationship of distinction-in-unity. 
We suggest that the relationship between the immanent 
and economic Trinity might be grounded in the character 
of the Spirit as the hypostasis who, as the open 
horizon and the principle of distinction-in-unity 
within the divine life, makes possible the 
self-expression of the Father in the generation of the 
Son. Because this divine life is eternally directed 
towards God's self-communication in the economy, the 
Spirit is the transcendental condition for the 
expression of the Triune life within the created order, 
in that, since the Spirit affirms the direct 
proportionality of distinctness and unity between 
Father and Son, he is able to establish the same 
proportionality in the Incarnation. The Spirit is the 
one who ensures that the distinction of the Son from 
the Father is not accompanied by a break in the unity 
of love between them. 
By developing the role of the Spirit in enabling the 
triune God to be expressed in the economy, we are 
avoiding the tendency of the axiom formulated by Rahner 
to dissolve the being of God into a process which is 
dependent on temporal events. This was clearly the 
danger in Moltmann and Schoonenberg in particular. If 
the Spirit within the triune relationality presents the 
possibility of a unified differentiation between Father 
and Son, while orientating that relationship towards 
expression in the created order, then the divine 
becoming, while not dependent on creation, q. pevertheless 
has, in the Spirit, the capacity to express that same 
relationship between the Father and the Incarnate Son. 
The Spirit is the ecstatic quality of the divine being, 
in which the love between Father and Son is extended 
outwards to find expression in the love between the 
ýý'O 
Father and the Incarnate Son. Albert the Great, who is 
quoted by both Scheeben and Kasper, characterises the 
activity of the Spirit in these terms: 
'Et ideo'etiam dicit Dionysius, quod est 
exstasim faciens divinus amor, hoc est 
transpositionem; transponit enim 
amantem in amatum et non sinit eum 
manere in seipso. 1 119, 
This description can be applied to the activity of the 
Spirit in his role as the simultane; us condition of the 
generation of the Son,;, and to the further-extension of 
this relationality in the kenotic mode of the economy. 
Malevez, too, speaks of the Spirit as the one who, in 
the distinction of the Son from the Father, effects 
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applicable both to the communion between Father and Son 
and in the economy, and to their communion in the 
triune relationality which issues in the economy. In 
this perspective, the relationship between the immanent 
and ecohomic Trinity ceases to be a 'reflection, 
pattern, in which the events of the economy 'mirror' 
the already existing and self-sufficient immanent life. 
Instead, consideration of the Son and -Spirit as 
distinct hypostases in the divine life is an 
investigation into the mutually necessary conditions 
for the divine self-communication in the economy. The 
economic Trinity ", can be presented as grounded in the 
dynamic character -of the Spirit who is the condition 
for the distinction-in-unity of the Son and Father, and 
who opens and mediates their relationship towards the 
created order. 7 
At the same time, the relationship between the 
pre-existent and Incarnate conditions of the Son's 
existence can be given a pneumatological orientation: 
it is the work of the Spirit to bridge the even greater 
distance between God and creation, and to enable the 
humanity of Jesus to be the actuality of the Son's 
presence within the created order. Like the immanent 
and economic Trinity, the relationship between the 
pre-existent and the Incarnate Son can seem to be a 
'reflection' pattern., But, like the Trinitarian 
pattern, it is possible to provide a pneumatological 
account of the relationship of the 'immanent' Son and 
the Son in the economy. If we take up the correlation 
between the account of the Spirit as the innermost bond 
of unity and love between the Father and the Son who is 
posited in distinction from him, and the account of the 
Spirit as the mode of God's presence, to the created 
order, then,,,. we have an account of the Spirit as both 
innermost within the divine being and outermost within 
the created order: immanent within the relationship of 
Father and Son, and immanent within the created order. 
The love between Father and Son is also the love which 
is extended over and within the creation, bringing that 
creation into a relationship with the Father and 
involving it in the Triune life. The capacity within 
the Trinitarian life to bring that which is distinct 
from the Father, namely the Son, into union with him, 
is precisely the same capacity which establishes the 
created order in a relationship of unity with the 
Father. Because the Spirit exercises this role 
vis-a-vis the created order, it is able to ensure that 
the humanity of Jesus can exist in a perfect union with 
the Father as the humanity of the Son. 
From Barth we derive the idea that the Trinitarian 
relationship is eternally directed towards the 
expression of the divine being as God-for-us in the 
economy. From this perspective, which refutes notions 
of the 'self-sufficiency' of the divine being, since it 
presents God as freely directed towards us in love, we 
may establish a link with the portrayal of the Spirit 
as the hypostasis which, within the divine life, 
establishes the Son in distinction-in-unity with the 
Fathe: iZ, and as the hyposta-sis which is capable of 
expressing this unity in a kenotic form. We might say 
thezT,,., that the Triune God's determination towards 
kenotic expression and involvement can be seen, by 
appropriation, to be the Spirit's capacity to enable 
the hypostasis of the Son to find 'symbolic' 
121 
self-expression in the humanity of Jesusy--and to 
establish for that humanity the 'same bond of 
distinction-in-unity which is characteristic of the 
Father-Son relationship within the divine being. It is 
the Spirit who enables the Son both to relate to the 
Father in a distinction which does not infringe the 
divine unity, and to be even more distinct from the 
Father -- as a subject within the created order -- 
while still being united with the Father. The Spirit 
ensures that in the economy, the Son is united with the 
Father, especially, following von Balthasar, we might 
say that the Spirit ensures the union of the Son with 
the Father even at the furthest determination of the 
created realm, including the realm of sin and death122 
In this sense we might look to the Spirit as the one 
who enables the immanent Son, or the pre-existent Son, 
to enter into the realm of creaturely distance from the 
Father in the Incarnation. The relationship, then of 
the immanent and Incarnate Son is not a reflection 
pattern, in which the incarnate mode is simply a 
reflection of a detached and heavenly mode of 
existence, but the Son within the divine life is 
constituted in the Spirit as the hypostasis which can 
find expression in the created order. In this sense, 
we might say that the Spirit opens or orientates the 
Son towards the Incarnation. 
This pneumatological consideration works from the 
pre-dogmatic theologoumenon of the 19th Ode of Solomon, 
which is based on the association of the 
Spirit-directed Lucan Annunciation scene and the 
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Johannine Logos-directed Prologue. It brings to the 
forefront the role of the Spirit within the economic 
order as a guiding principle for the consideration of 
the immanent order which must be reached by any 
theology. In turn, it can be aligned with the 
consideration of the relationship between the immanent 
and economic Trinity: the Spirit can be seen as the 
hypostasis in whom there is the capacity to effect a 
unity with the Father, both within the triune life and 
in the kenotic mode of the economy. In conjunction 
with this perspective, we can present the Spirit as the 
one through whose characteristic action the Son is 
directed towards the involvement in the created order. 
In this way, the relationship between the immanent Son 
and the Incarnate Son can be considered 
pneumatologically, as grounded in the relationship 
between Son and Spirit, and in this way, there is the 
possibility of establishing a Spirit Christology which 
avoids the customary danger of Adoptionism. At the 
same time, it points in the direction of developing the 
strengths of a Son or Logos Christology in a 
pneumatologica'-1. context: in this way, it can be shown 
that the dynamism established by pre-existence language 
need not result in the predominantly Binitarian pattern 




Our study began with a question: how to find a 
category which would do justice to the dynamism which 
pre-existence language, and its conceptual 
clarifications, have exercised in the inter-related 
fields of Christology and Trinitarian monotheism. We 
judged that it was not helpful to restrict 
consideration of pre-existence to the category of myth, 
whose ever-expanding and diverse use in several 
disciplines renders it increasingly opaque as a 
hermeneutical tool. Nor does a mythological approach 
seem able to account for the redescriptive power of 
pre-existence language in Christology. We proposed 
that metaphor might be a more fruitful interpretative 
category, since this is a form of predication. in which 
there is a 'tension' or 'disjunction' between the 
connotations of the referent and its predicate. In the 
course of construing a metaphor, the reader is led to 
resolve that tension by engaging in a redescription of 
the referent in the light of the connotations offered 
by the predicate. At the same time, metaphorical 
descriptions have the capacity to offer interpretative 
expressions which arise out of the dynamism of the 
metaphor: language is constantly enriched by the store 
of metaphors. Equally, one might say that 
Christological language has been enriched by the 
possibilities offered by pre-existence language, in its 
figurative and conceptual developments. 
5ý7 
This approach has enabled us to cope with the following 
points in the predication of pre-existence: 
1/ The figurative or imaginative aspect of 
the predication: metaphor involves a process of 
'seeing as', a visual dimension in which the referent 
is 'pictured as' the predicate. In this respect it, is 
to be distinguished from simile, in which the 
separation of the two elements is retained while 
aspects of comparison and likeness are disclosed. To 
say that 'Jesus is like Sophia', and to say that 'Jesus 
is Sophia', is to say two different things: in the 
first, there is only a resemblance suggested between 
two realities, but, in the second, there is a more 
complete transfer proposed, in which we are invited to 
see Jesus as Sophia, ' with all the descriptive 
possibilities which this presents. Similarly, to say 
that 'Jesus is like the pre-existent Son of Man in 
Daniel 71j, and to say that 'Jesus is the pre-existent 
Son of Man in Daniel 71, is to engage in two accounts 
of. jesus which, have different potentialities:, in the 
simile, there is no need to transfer 'pre-existent' to 
Jesus, whereas in the second statement, it is precisely 
this transfer which is proposed. 
2/ Related to this first point is the tension 
or clash between Jesus as a temporal existent, and the 
pre- or supra-temporal dimension of the predication of 
3qj 
pre-existence. It is characteristic of metaphor, 
particularly new metaphors, that there is a hiatus 
between what is customarily said of the referent, and 
what is predicated of it in , 
the metaphorical 
predication. There is a jarring quality, or a 
surprising quality which inhibits the movement from the 
referent to the predicate until the interpreter is able 
to see the point and construe it intelligently. This 
is a feature of pre-existence language which is 
exploited most fully in the dramatic and ironic 
structure of the Fourth Gospel: there, the division 
between the Jews who reject Jesus, and the believing 
Johannine community is given expression in their 
contrasting ability to use this predication of Jesus. 
The Jews show their unbelief by being unable to resolve 
the tension between the temporal, existent Jesus and the 
predication of pre-existence: 'You are not yet fifty 
yearsý, and have you seen AbrahamV (8.57; cf. 3.10ff; 
3.31ff; 6.42ff; 6.58ff). 
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The Johannine community, on, 
the other hand, is able to say these things of Jesus, 
and to make the clue to his origin lie in his coming 
f rom above (3 . 13) as God's agent, who alone has seen 
God -and makes him known (1.18). The ability to 
predicate these things of Jesus is the Shibboleth by, 
which those 'inside' are distinguished from those 
'outside': the Jews are blocked at the 'literal' 
level, but the Johannine community construes the, 
predication successfully. The Fourth Gospel dramatises 
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wha. t is, in terms of metaphor, the clash between the 
referent and the predicate, and the subsequent 
resolution of that incompatibility through the creation 
of a new 'sense' or meaning about the identity of 
Jesus. 
3/ The development of an ontological lanquage 
out of the figurative expression of pre-existence. 
Using the Hegelian analysis of Vorstellung and Beqriff, 
we presented 'Jesus is the eternal Son' as the 
conceptual clarification of the pre-existence 
predication. This development can be seen as the 
clarification of the sense to be attributed to the 
figurative expression of pre-existence. The open-ended 
character of metaphor - offering a wide range of 
possible interpretations of how the referent is to be 
seen as the predicate - requires from the interpreter 
that he reach a clarity about which of the 
interpretations are to be accepted and which are to be 
rejected. The move towards a more controlled and 
conceptual discourse arises out of the dynamism of the 
metaphorical expression. The predication of 
pre-existence, as the history of Christological 
development shows, offers a range of possible 
interpretations: for example, there is the Ebionite 
portrayal of the' pre-existent One as an archangel; 
there is the confusion and inconsistency of The 
Shepherd of Hermas, in which the pre-existent One 'is 
"Jý, o 
variously presented as an angel, as the Son and as the 
Holy Spirit who then enters into union with the flesh 
of Jesus; most seductively of all, there-is the Arian 
option which, under the rubric of the immutability and 
indivisibility of the divine being, presents the 
pre-existent One as the first, and pre-eminent, created 
being. The distinction between orthodox and heterodox 
interpretation of Christological correctness and 
adequacy is the choice of which 'sense', out of the 
many possibilities offered by the predication, is to be 
preferred. Hence, in the evaluation of the 
metaphorical character of pre-existence language, we 
cannot avoid considering the conceptual or ontological 
clarifications which must be determined as part of the 
semantic dynamism of the figurative expression. 'The 
symbol gives rise to thought' should be complemented by 
the statement that 'the symbol requires clarification 
by thought': 'clarification' does not imply that the 
breadth and potentiality of figurative expression can 
be exhausted by conceptual formulation, but it does 
indicate the insufficiency of figurative expressions 
which do not issue in the -activity of ontological 
clarification. The appeal of a 'metaphorical theology' 
is illusory if it is taken to be a substitute for, or a 
replacement of, critical and evaluative theology which 
includes, as an essential part of its programme, a 
consideration of ontological issues raised by its 
statements. Sallie MacFaguels recent book, 
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Metaphorical Theology (SCM Press 1983) falls into the 
trap, which seems common in much recent American 
fascination with metaphor and story, of ignoring this 
dimension: narrative and figurative theological 
expressions are not alternatives to ontological 
theology, but they are rather expressive statements 
which offer the possibility of, and at the same time 
require, ontological clarification and controlled 
interpretation. 
4/ By restoring the predicative character of 
pre-existence language, we have proposed that several 
of the methodological difficulties in Christology can 
be avoided. The principal source of confusion 
concerned the suggestion that in the Christological 
field two referents are discussed, the eternal Son or 
Logos and the human person, Jesus. We adopted the 
methodological approach advocated by Pannenberg, in 
insisting that within the Christological area, language 
about pre-existence is to be taken as a predication 
made of Jesus, which stands in a metaphorical 
relationship to the particular temporal existent, 
Jesus. The Ifictivel quality of the predication, 
inviting the interpreter to consider Jesus as, a 
pre-existent One, enables a range of descriptions to be 
deduced concerning his identity as the one who is 
inseparably involved in God's act of self-revelation. 
within the area of Christological discourse, the 
figurative presentation of Jesus as pre-existent, and 
the corresponding conceptual and ontological 
clarification of his identity as 'eternal Son', refer 
only to Jesus as the referent. In addition, we traced 
a pattern of continuity between the metaphorical 
structure of pre-existence language and the 
referent-predicate structure of the Chalcedonian 
definition which we interpreted primarily as linguistic 
regulations for speaking about Jesus: the balance. of 
the two sets of predicates to be made of the -single 
referent corresponds to the balance which exists, at a 
more figurative - level, between the already known 
connotations of Jesus as a temporal existent and those 
which are applied to him through the predicates of 
pre-existence language. The new descriptions which 
emerge concerning his identity as the eternal Son are 
no more destructive of the reality of his humanity than 
are the metaphorical connotations transferred to any 
referent destructive of its characteristics. 
5/ We made a formal distinction between- the 
Christological and the theological use of language of 
eternal Sonship: within Christological speech, it does 
not designate a referent other than Jesus. 'Eternal 
Son, is an identifying expression, derived from the 
clarification of the figurative predication of 
pre-existence, which refers to Jesus in his human 
existence. Within the theological area, however, it is 
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necessary to speak of a referent other than Jesus: we 
are compelled to retain discussion of the Son or Word, 
formally distinct from the incarnate mode of Jesus, 
existence, in order to avoid making the Trinitarian 
relationality dependent on time for its actualisation. 
The divine being cannot 'become' Trinitarian through 
the economy. It does not seem possible to jettison 
language of the immanent Son, distinct from the 
incarnate Son, without thereby making the divine being 
dependent on time for its constitution. our discussion 
of Rahner's axiomatic unity of the immanent and 
economic Trinity showed that it is not possible to 
collapse the immanent Trinity into its economic 
expression; it is necessary to retain language about 
the immanent Trinity to designate precisely the mystery 
of the divine being present in the economy. However, 
we sought to avoid the suggestion that the immanent 
Trinity can be considered 'over against' the economic 
Trinity, as though there was a form of divine life not 
directed towards expression in the economy. In Barth's 
terms, the act by which God is God, is the same as that 
by which God is God-for-us. There can be no suggestion 
of there being a divine life which is not freely 
directed towards its salvific expression in the 
economy., Against this background, Barth's statements 
about the pre-existence of the man Jesus are the 
Christological expression of the principles reached in 
his doctrine of God. Barth's retrieval and 
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rehabilitation of this early Christologoumenon 
exemplifies one of the major principles we have 
presented in the use of pre-existence language: that 
it should be subsumed and integrated within a wider 
context of a controlled conceptual structure, if it is 
to be handled -intelligently. Barth's use of this 
metaphorical predication integrates a wide range- of 
theological concerns, -and focuses attention on the need 
to re-think our understanding of God's being, in the 
light of the eternal orientation of the divine life 
towards the history of the man Jesus. This line of 
inquiry complements the Christological innovations 
introduced by the pre-existence predication, and 
represents the process of thinking through the 
theological implications of speaking of Jesus as 
eternal Son. 
6/ While retaining the use of language about 
the immanent, Trinity, and about the 'immanent Son' who 
is to be distinguishedý from Jesus in theological 
discourse, nevertheless we refused to allow the 
presentation of. the immanent-and economic. Trinity-to be 
a 'reflection' pattern, in which the events of the 
economy 'mirror' thelmmanent life. We proposed that 
this can be avoided by-,, developing the role of the 
Spirit as the one who makes it possible for the triune 
life to open itself towards economic self-expression. 
The Son within the immanent Trinitarian life is 
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'conditioned' by the Spirit as the hypostasis who can 
assume creaturely existence in the kenosis of the 
economy. The implications of this line of inquiry are 
threefold: firstly, the relationship of the immanent 
and economic Trinity can be considered 
pneumatologically, as located in the capacity of the 
Spirit to maintain the Son in distinction-in-unity with 
the Father in the events of the economy. Thus within 
the immanent life, the Spirit is the transcendental 
condition for the salvific expression of the 
Trinitarian relationality in the history of Jesus. 
Secondly, it opens the way towards a pneumatological 
understanding of the relationship between the immanent 
Son and the incarnate Son. Again, the 'reflection, 
pattern can be avoided through considering the 
relationship of Son and Spirit within the divine life 
as mutually conditioning: it is the work of the Spirit 
to enable the Son to become incarnate as the expression 
of the freely chosen determination to be God-for-us, 
which characterises the divine life. Thirdly, this 
line of inquiry acts against the predominantly 
Binitarian treatment of_the relationship between 
_Son 
and Father, which has been the principal pattern 
arising from the dynamic of pre 'existence language. By 
developing the varied pneumatological patterns of the 
New Testament more than has been done in the tradition, 
the Christology which develops from pre-existence 
language can be formulated more pneumatologically. The 
opposition, frequently stated, between 'Son 
Christology' and 'Spirit Christology' may then be 
avoided. The chief difficulty in formulating a Spirit 
Christology in conjunction with a Trinitarian theology 
has been that the patterns have not been consistently 
aligned: as we have indicated, the principal 
Trinitarian pattern has been Father-Son-SPirit, whereas 
a Spirit Christology prefers the pattern of 
Son-Spirit-Father. our proposals, which point to a 
line of inquiry into the pneumatological dimension of 
the relationship between the immanent and economic 
Trinity, and between the immanent and incarnate Son, 
indicate that the dynamic of theological and 
Christological formulation arising out of pre-existence 
language may be extended in this direction. 
7/ our study of the use of the theme of 
pre-existence in the Epistle to the Hebrews showed that 
in the Epistle there is a deliberate integration of the 
motif with the other, and more central, soteriological 
concerns of the Epistle. The author's choice of a 
ken o- tic, rather thanan epiphanic, treatment of the 
humanity of the Son is determined by his need to 
integrate this theme into the principal soteriological 
themes which he deploys. In many ways, this has been a 
confirmation of our concern to consider, within the 
Christological sphere, the affirmation of pre-existence 
as a qualification or metaphorical description of the 
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human person, Jesus. The fact that the Epistle 
maintains 
--such 
a 'high' Christology, while at the same 
time expressing a profoundly appreciative consideration 
of the significance of Christ in his humanity and 
suffering, is an indication that, carefully handled, 
there is no need to fear the purported docetic 
implications of pre-existence language. At the same 
time, we saw that the author relates pre-existence and 
exaltation in a mutually illuminating way: they are 
both figurative expressions of the metaphysical 
permanence which is a key feature of the, philosophical 
argument of the Epistle. The theme of pre-existence is 
integrated into the author's argumentation concerning 
the permanence and efficacy of Christ's salvation, and 
provides, as we have said, a consonant affirmation of 
Christological and soteriological concerns which are 
developed by him in other ways. There is a comparison 
to be made between Barth and the author of the Epistle 
in this respect: both use the theme of pre-existence 
in conjunction with other major themes, and their 
handling of the theme is inseparable from its 
relationship to the wider context in which it is 
-placed. 
8/ Our study of metaphor has introduced 
several brief characterisations of metaphor:, la 
deliberate yoking of unlikes' (Owen Barfield); the 
interpreter of metaphor requires 'the ability to 
'5, 
entertain two different points of view' (Bedell 
Stanford); 'the assimilation to each other of two 
networks of signification by means of an unusual 
attribution' (Paul Ricoeur);, 'metaphor is the 
rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the 
power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality, 
(Paul Ricoeur). All of these illuminate the process by 
which the Christological use of pre-existence language 
develops: the initial tension between the temporal 
referent and the pre- or supra-context in which he is 
envisaged; the figurative imagining of Jesus as a 
pre-existent one; the emergence from this predication 
of a conceptual and ontological clarification of the 
identity of Jesus as the Son or Word who is inseparable 
from the divine being; the corresponding emergence of 
a related language about God who is redescribed as 
differentiated in his divine being. The predica. tion 
of pre-existence gives rise to a wide range of 
Christological and theological revisions, to the extent 
that its central ontological implications the 
divinity of Jesus and the orientation of the divine 
being towards expression in the person of Jesus -- are 
the principal regulative and hermeneutical categories 
for Christian speech about Jesus and God. If we have 
charted the central features of this development which 
arises out of the dynamic of pre-existence language, 
then it might be possible to view more appreciatively 
the role of pre-existence language in providing the 
metaphorical framework for subsequent Christian 
reflection. In this sense, through our choice of 
metaphor as a valuable interpretative tool, we may have 
made some contribution to the understanding, retrieval 
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